ORDER
Y.K. Sabharwal. J.
1. This judgment will dispose of LPA Nos. 164 of 1998 and LPA 222 of 1998.
2. The appellants are employees of Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking (Now Delhi Vidut Board). There were allegations of defalcation of property worth huge amount against the appellants in respect of the incident alleged to have been taken place in the year 1982. The appellants, S.C. Yadav, was placed under suspension in terms of the order of suspension dated 10th February, 1983. The appellant, K.K. Bhardwaj, was suspended in terms of the suspension order dated 8th January, 1987. Criminal cases have been lodged against them. Challan in the Special Court was filed by the CBI in the case of K.K. Bhardwaj on 29th May, 1986. He is accused in two cases. The appellant, S.C. Yadav, is accused in one case which is of 1984. In the year 1989, charges were framed by Special Court in the case against K.K. Bahardwaj and on 5th January, 1988 in the case against S.C. Yadav.
3. Since the appellants had continued to remain under suspension, they challenged the suspension orders by preferring the writ petitions (C.W. 5025/97 & 5034/97) out of which these appeals have arisen. Both the writ petitions were disposed by the learned Single Judge on 17th March, 1988 by separate judgments. The prayer of the appellants for quashing the suspension orders was not accepted inter alia observing that for quashing the suspension order, the appellants could move for appropriate reliefs after disposal of the criminal case.
4. The short point involved in the present appeals is whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the appellants should be asked to wait till disposal of criminal cases and should they remain under suspension after lapse of more than fifteen years in one case and about twelve years in the other.
5. From the averments made in the writ petitions and a copy of the proceedings of the criminal court, it seems that till date not a single witness has been examined. This is the position after nearly a decade of framing of charges. There were other accused as well. We are told that during this intervening period two of the accused died and one was discharged at the stage of framing of charge. It could not be disputed on behalf of the CBI that no witness in the criminal trial has been examined. We are constrained to observe that the attitude of the CBI has been absolutely callous. This is even evident from the manner the CBI has assisted this Court. One of the points urged by the appellants was regarding undue delay in the trial of the criminal cases. The CBI did not file any counter affidavit to the writ petition. On 29th October, 1998 after observing that learned counsel for the CBI is unable to assist the Court, as neither any officer from the CBI had come to the Court to assist the counsel nor the file had been sent to the counsel, we directed the CBI to file counter affidavit to the writ petition and place the same on record within three weeks. The concerned officer from the CBI was directed to remain present in Court today along with the file, Neither the counter affidavit has been filed nor the file has been produced before us. Mr. Dutt states that the concerned Investigating Officer is at Chennai in connection with the investigation of some case. This is no way of assisting the court when the matter comes up after two months, particularly when the thrust of the grievances of the appellants is undue delay in the trial of the criminal case; nonexamination of even a single witness and the continuance of their suspension for twelve to fifteen years. In short there has been no assistance whatsoever from the CBI.
6. Mr. Nath, however, submits that the charges against the appellants are of serious nature and relates to defalcation of property worth huge amounts and, therefore, it is not a fit case for quashing the orders of suspension. The seriousness of the allegations and charges against the appellants on itself cannot be a justification for keeping the officers under suspension for such unduly long period of twelve and fifteen years without any explanation much less reasonable explanation for the delay. The decision in the case of U.P. Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad and Another Vs. Narendra Kumar Malik and Another, 1993 Supp (3) SCC 483 , relied upon by Mr. Nath, has no applicability to the facts of the present case. In the said case the order of suspension of 1991 was quashed by the High Court and thereafter on the consideration of the preliminary inquiry report and finding out prima facie case, a fresh order of suspension along with a chargesheet was served on the employee on 26th March, 1992 which had been stayed by the High Court on the ground that it was not competent for the employer to pass order of suspension second time in the same manner. It was this order of the High Court which was reversed by the Supreme Court.
7. As is evident from the facts noticed hereinbefore, the present case is altogether different. We are conscious of the fact that ordinarily it is for the employer to decide the matter relating to the suspension of an officer and the courts are slow in interfering with such matters, but again it all depends on the facts and circumstances of each case which are required to be examined to determine whether continuation of suspension would be arbitrary or not. Reference may be made to the decision of Supreme Court in the case of State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. B.C. Thakur, 1994, 27 Administrative Tribunals Cases 567 where the Supreme Court upheld quashing the suspension order where the employee had been under suspension for two years on the date of Tribunal’s order and another year had elapsed on the ground that no substantial progress in the disciplinary proceedings had been made.
8. Considering the fact that the appellants have been under suspension for so many years and no progress has been made in the criminal cases, we are of the view that the appellants’ prayer does not deserve to be rejected and they cannot be asked to await till the disposal of the criminal case. The continuance of their suspension, to our mind, is clearly arbitrary and unjustified. It is nobody’s case that the appellants were responsible for delay in disposal of the criminal cases. We have noticed these facts only for the purpose of deciding the validity of continuance of the appellants’ suspension. This order will have no effect, one way or the other, on the criminal cases pending against the appellants. We may not that it was submitted by learned counsel for the appellants that this Court may only consider in these appeals the matter relating to the validity of their suspension.
9. For the aforesaid reasons we set aside the orders of suspension dated 8th January, 1987 in the case of K.K. Bhardwaj and 10th February, 1983 in the case of S.C. Yadav. The matter pertaining to the period from the date of suspension till date of reinstatement would be considered by the appropriate authorities in accordance with the relevant rules.
10. The appeals are allowed in the above terms leaving parties to bear their own costs.