JUDGMENT
Ramanujulu Naidu, J.
1. This writ petition is filed for issue of a writ of Habeas Corpus, quashing the order dated 16-9-1989, passed by the Collector and District Magistrate, Warangal, the first respondent-herein, directing detention of petitioner’s husband in the Central Prison, Warangal in exercise of the powers vested in him under sub-section (2)(a) of S. 3 read with S. 3(1) of the Prevention of Blackmarketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), and setting the petitioner at liberty.
2. On information received by the first respondent that Sri Kundaram Damodar, husband of the petitioner, hereinafter referred to as ‘the detenu’, had indulged in acts prejudicial to the maintenance of supply of the commodity, i.e., Kerosene, essential to the community by indulging in diversion of Kerosene meant for distribution to the Public in order to use the diverted Kerosene for adulterating High Speed Diesel, and in turn, sell the adulterated diesel to consumers and thereby contravened clause-3 of Kerosene (Restriction on use) Order, 1966, punishable under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, the said Damodar was directed to be detained by the first respondent. Pursuant to the order of detention, the detenu was actually taken into custody on 17-9-1989 and lodged in the Central Prison, Warangal.
3. Sri B. Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner strenuously contended that the impugned order of detention was in violation of Art. 22(5) of the Constitution of India read with Section 8 of the Act, in that certain documents relied upon and referred to in the grounds of detention communicated to the detenu, were not at all supplied to him, thereby denying him an opportunity to make an effective representation to the authorities envisaged under the Act, against the order of detention. It is complained on behalf of the detenu that trip sheet No. 67, invoice No. 9025, the stock book, and bill books seized from one Krishna Prakash, very much relied upon by the first respondent in paragraphs Nos. 4, 3, 9 and 12 respectively of the grounds of detention, were not supplied to the detenu along with the grounds of detention.
4. The learned Advocate-General, appearing for the respondents, fairly concedes that the above complaint is well-founded, though he would like to have it, that the documents not supplied to the detenu are irrelevant.
5. It is now well-settled that the barest minimum safeguards enacted in Article 22 of the Constitution of India, which must be observed before an executive authority can be permitted to preventively detain a person, thereby drowning his right of personal liberty in the name of public good are twofold : (1) The detaining authority must, as soon as may be, that is, as soon as practicable after the detention, communicate to the detenu the grounds on which the order of detention has been made; and (2) The detaining authority must afford the detenu the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention. One of the basis requirements of clause (5) of Art. 22 is that the authority making the order of detention must, as soon as may be, communicate to the detenu the grounds on which the order of detention has been made, ordinarily not later than five days an in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be record in writing, not later than fifteen days from the date of detention as required under Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act, or not later than ten days as required under Section 8 of the Act. If the grounds of detention under the Act are not furnished to the detenu within five or ten days, as the case may be, the continued detention of the detenu would be rendered illegal both on the ground of violation of clause (5) of Art. 22 as also on the ground of breach of requirement of Section 8 of the Act. What is meant by the grounds of detention is that, the grounds of detention in their entirety must be furnished to the detenu. If there are any documents, statements or other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention, they must also be communicated to the detenu, because being incorporated in the grounds of detention, those form part of the grounds, and the grounds of detention furnished to the detenu cannot be said to be complete without the same. It would not, therefore, be sufficient to communicate to the detenu a bare recital of the grounds of detention, but copies of the documents, statements and other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention must also be furnished to the detenu within the prescribed time, subject of course to Clause (6) of Article 22, in order to comply with clause (5) of Art. 22, read with S. 8 of the Act. One of the primary objects of communicating the grounds of detention to the detenu is to enable the detenu, at the earliest opportunity, to make a representation against his detention and it is difficult for the detenu to make an effective representation unless he is furnished with copies of the documents, statements and other materials relied upon in the grounds of detention. “Grounds” in Art. 22(5) do not mean mere factual inferences. The “grounds” must be self-sufficient and self-explanatory. Therefore, copies of documents to which reference is made in the “grounds” must be supplied to the detenu as part of the “grounds”. The failure to communicate the factual material as a part of the “grounds” would amount to non-communication of grounds on which the order of detention has been made and thus would infringe Art. 22(5) of the Constitution. Since all the constitutional protection that a detenu can claim is the little that is afforded by the procedural safe-guards prescribed by Art. 22(5) read with Art. 19, the Courts have a duty to rigidly insist that preventive detention procedures be fair and be strictly observed. Therefore, the grounds communicated to the detenu must reveal the whole of the factual material considered by the detaining authority and not merely the inferences of fact arrived at by the detaining authority. Consequently, an opportunity to make a representation against the order of detention necessarily implies that the detenu is informed of all that has been taken into account against him in arriving at a decision to detain him. It means that the detenu is to be informed not merely of the inferences of fact, but of all the factual materials which have led to the inferences of fact. If the detenu is not to be so informed, the opportunity so solemnly guaranteed by the Constitution becomes reduced to an exercise in futility. If a procedure under Art. 22(5) of the Constitution has to be reasonable, fair and just, then the words “effective representation” appearing in Art. 22(5) must be construed so as to provide a real and meaningful opportunity to the detenu to explain his case to the detaining authority in his representation. If the words “effective representation” are interpreted in an artificial or fanciful manner, then it would defeat the very object not only of Art. 22(5) but also of Art. 21 of the Constitution. The fact that the detenu is aware of the contents of the documents not supplied to him, is hardly an answer to the constitutional mandate. There are no exceptions or qualifications provided to the rule enacted in Art. 22(5) of the Constitution and if the requirement of the rule is not satisfied, the continued detention of the detenu would be illegal and void. (Vide Icchu Devi v. Union of India, , Shalini Soni v. Union of India, ; Kamala v. State of Maharashtra, ; Mehrunissa v. State of Maharashtra, (1); and Ashok Kumar v. Union of India, 1988 SCC (Cri) 193).
6. It must, therefore, be held that there being a clear breach of the provisions of Art. 22(5) of the Constitution of India and S. 8 of the Act, the continued detention of the detenu is bad.
7. It is next contended by Sri Kumar, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner that there was inordinate delay in disposing of the representation made by the detenu to the Government, thereby rendering the order of detention void. Reliance is placed upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Mohinuddin v. District Magistrate, Beed, ; R. D. Borade v. V. K. Saraf, ; Harish Pahwa v. State of U.P., as also the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in M. Obula Reddy v. Govt. of A.P. (1987 Cri LJ 34).
8. It is not denied that on 30-9-1989, the detenu submitted his representation to the Government of Andhra Pradesh through the Central Prison, Warangal and that it was received by the Government on 4-10-1989 first and second October, 1989 being holidays. It is claimed by the Government that the representation of the detenu was forwarded by the Government to the first respondent for his remarks and that the same was received by him only on 11-10-1989. There was, thus, a delay of six (6) days in receipt of the representation of the detenu by the first respondent. How the representation was despatched to the first respondent, and why there was delay of six days in receipt of the representation by the first respondent, is not satisfactorily explained. It is also not denied that the remarks offered by the first respondent were received by the Government on 14-10-1989. The same were marked to the Secretary to Government of Andhra Pradesh, General Administration Department, Hyderabad, for his perusal on 16-10-1989. Where was the need for his perusal and approval ? Be that as it may, the representation of the detenu along with the remarks of the first respondent was placed before the Chief Secretary to the Government of Andhra Pradesh on 17-10-89, and he in turn, called for the views of the Law Department of the Government. Whatever might be the justification for calling the views of the Law Department, it is unfortunate that the Law Department offered its remarks only on 24-10-1989, one week after receipt of the representation from the Chief Secretary to Government. The entire file was later sent to the Chief Minister on 25-10-1989, and the representation of the detenu was ultimately rejected by the Chief Minister on 31-10-1989. There was again a delay of six days in the Peshi of the Chief Minister, which is also not satisfactorily explained. On this ground also, the continued detention of the detenu is bad.
9. We, therefore, quash the impugned order of detention dated 16-9-1989, passed by the first respondent, as confirmed by respondents 2 and 3, and issue a writ of Habeas Corpus, directing respondents 1 and 2 to set the detenu at liberty forthwith. The writ petition is accordingly allowed.
10. Petition allowed.