JUDGMENT
Ratnam, J.
1. The plaintiff in O.S. No. 3880 of 1977, XI Assistant City Civil Court, Madras, is the appellant in this second appeal. In that suit, the appellant prayed for the relief of declaration declaring that the sale deed purporting to have been executed by him in favour of the 1st respondent herein on 3-11-1976 and registered as document No. 2400 of 1978, is invalid and not binding upon the appellant and for an injunction restraining the 3rd defendant in the suit (not a party to the second appeal) from bringing the property to sale in enforcement of a mortgage executed by the appellant in her favour. The circumstances under which the appellant was obliged to institute the suit praying for the reliefs set out earlier, are as follows:
2. The suit property bearing door No. 29, Kachaleeswarar Agraharam, Street, Madras-1, belonged to the 1st respondent herein, (hereinafter referred to as the respondent). On 24-9-1970 the appellant purchased if for Rs. 25,000 on payment of a sum of Rs. 10,000 only and the appellant agreed to pay later the balance of the unpaid purchase money of Rs. 15,000. After the purchase, the appellant had to carry out extensive repairs, for which purpose, he mortgaged the property to one Deivanai Ammal (2nd defendant in the suit) for Rs. 12,000 and also borrowed a further sum of Rs. 3,000 from her on a promissory note. In addition the appellant also borrowed from K. Sivakamasundari (3rd defendant in the suit) another sum of Rs. 11,000 by executing a second mortgage. Unable to pay off the debts, the appellant decided to dispose of the property. According to the case of the appellant, the respondent introduced Smt. Indira Natarajan who not only agreed to purchase the property for Rs. 67,000 but also paid an advance of Rs. 5,000. However, the transaction did not go through. The respondent was assuring the appellant to help to get out of his difficulties and the appellant reposed confidence in the respondent, who was also a relation of his. The respondent introduced two persons to the appellant as rich agriculturists from Coimbatore, who were prepared to advance Rs. 60,000 and they also offered to lend money to the appellant; but requested that the matter should be kept secret. They promised to lend Rs. 50,000 and wanted a mortgage to be executed. The case of the appellant is that on 3-11-1976, while he was in the Vinayagar Temple in Kachaleeswar Agraharam, the respondent approached and informed him that his efforts had borne fruit and produced a document for his signature by representing that it was a necessary prelude for obtaining a loan. The document had been written in English and the contents thereof were read over by the respondent as evidencing a mortgage of the property. The appellant is stated to have believed the representations of the respondent and signed the papers under the impression that it was only a mortgage transaction. The further case of the appellant was that one of the persons introduced to him by the respondent, met him on 4-11-1976 and took him to the Sub Registrar’s Office where he was offered a cool drink, after consuming which, the appellant felt giddy and while the document was being registered, he was seated at a distance and the Sub Registrar asked him something, to which he merely nodded his head and also signed whatever was placed before him. Later, according to the appellant, he was taken to T. Nagar and left near a hotel and that only on 6-11-1976, on receipt of a notice from the respondent calling upon him to deliver vacant possession of the property to him by 15-1-1977 by virtue of the registered sale deed stated to have been executed by the appellant in favour of the respondent, the appellant became aware of the fraud played upon him by the respondent. The appellant pleaded that he had no intention whatever to sell the property to the respondent, but that owing to fraud, deception and misrepresentation practiced by the respondent, a sale deed had actually been taken and therefore, the document is not valid or binding on him the appellant also sent a notice to the competant authority under the Urban Land Ceiling Act, Madras, but that was of no avail. Thus claiming that the document of sale executed by the appellant in favour of the respondent on 4-11-1976 had no legal effect as sale deed, the appellant instituted the suit against the respondent and the subsequent mortgagees, for the reliefs set out earlier.
3. In the written statement filed by the respondent, he contended that the appellant was unable to pay the balance of the sale consideration and the interest thereon and therefore the appellant reconveyed the property to him for Rs. 40,000 and that the respondent undertook to discharge the mortgages. The respondent further pleaded that there was no fraud or misrepresentation and that the appellant was a consenting party to the execution of the sale deed and also appeared before the concerned authority and accepted its execution and only thereafter the document was registered on 4-11-1976, subject to the formal approval of the Assistant Commissioner under the Urban Land Ceiling Act, which was however, later considered to be unnecessary. Thereupon, the Sub-Registar endorsed the certificate of registration on the sale deed, dated 4-11-1976 on 30-6-1978, after the filing of the suit, and therefore, no exception could be taken to the validity of the sale deed in his favour.
4. On a consideration of the oral as well as the documentry evidence, the XI Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras, found that the sale deed was not signed by the appellant knowing it to be a sale deed, that deception had been practised upon the appellant and the sale deed executed by the appellant cannot therefore be given effect to. On those conclusions the trial court granted .a decree in favour of the appellant. Aggrieved by this, the respondent herein preferred A.S. No. 38 of 1979, before the V Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Madras. The lower appellate Court, adverting to the case of the appellant in the notice sent prior to the suit and the averments in the plaint, found that the appellant had not come forward with a true case, that the sale deed had been voluntarily executed by the appellant in favour of the respondent as a sale and that its subsequent registration renders it effective as a validly registered sale deed on and from 3-11-1976, the date of its execution, and therefore, the appellant is not entitled to the reliefs prayed for in the suit. On those conclusion, the appeal was allowed and the suit instituted by the appellant was dismissed. It is the correctness of this that is challenged in this second appeal.
5. During the pendency of the second appeal, the respondent (1st respondent in the second appeal) sold the property in favour of one Kursheed Bee and by order in C.M.P. No. 9448 of 1982, dated 1-9-1983, the purchaser has been brought on record as the 2nd respondent in this second appeal.
6. Thus, the principal question that arises for consideration in this second appeal is whether the document of sale executed by the appellant in favour of the respondent was brought about on a representation made by the respondent to the effect that the transaction in question was intended only to be a mortgage deed. It is seen from para 8 of the plaint that the case of the appellant was that on 3-11-1976 when he was sitting in Vinayagar temple in Kachaleeswarar Agraharam, the respondent produced a document to be signed by him, saying that the execution of that document was necessary for getting the loan and that the appellant, believing the representation of the respondent, signed the papers, thinking that it was only a mortgage deed. Whether, on the materials made available before Court, the appellant had made out such a case, has now to He considered. Thus on a careful consideration of the case of the appellant and the evidence as well as the conduct of the appellant, the lower appellate Court was right in concluding that the sale deed had not-been proved to have been taken by the respondent by exercise of fraud or misrepresentation on the appellant by the respondent. The conclusion is therefore irresistible that the sale deed was voluntarily executed by the appellant as a sale deed in favour of the respondent.
7. Reference was made to the provisions of the Indian Registration Act and the Rules framed thereunder by the learned Counsel for the appellant to contend that there is no provision for the document being kept in the custody of the registering authority pending registration. It may be that there is not specific provision in that regard. However, the provisions of the Act and the Rules indicate that the time limit must be strictly adhered to only with reference to the presentation of a document executed for registration and there is no time limit, as such, for other matters. It is desirable that registration of documents should be done as expeditiously as possible and in all cases as soon as the documents are presented for registration, subject to the fulfilment of other requirements; but there is no prohibition in the Act, as such, enabling the concerned Registering Authority, to keep pending documents for registration. There is no time limit within which the registration as such should be done and the process of registration completed by the issue of the certificate under Section 6(2) of the Act. There is therefore, no substance in the criticism of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the document had been kept pending for an unduly long time between 4-11-1976 and 30-6-1978 and therefore, its delayed registration would deprive it of its efficacy as a registered instrument. There is no dispute in this case that the document had been presented for registration within four months from the date of its execution as provided under Section 25 of the Registration Act, and on its registration, it will operate from the date of its execution by virtue of Section 47 of the Registration act. Further, in this case, it is seen that though originally it was thought that permission of the concerned authority under the Urban Ceiling Act was necessary, and the registration of the document was kept pending, it was later realised that no such permission was necessary and thereupon, the document was registered on 30-6-1978. It is further seen from para 12 of the judgment of lower appellate court that it was common ground that the permission from the Authority under the Urban Land Ceiling Act was not necessary and till that was ascertained, the document could not be registered and that was the reason for the delay in the registration of the document. Consequently, there is no substance in the objection that by reason of the delay in the registration process, the document would be rendered ineffective.
8. Yet another objection raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant was that there was a statutory embargo upon the registration of documents, in that a clearance from the competent Authority under the Urban land Ceiling Act, had to be obtained, and without that, no registration could have been done. There was no question of any statutory embargo preventing the registration as such, except that there has been some kind of a misapprehension in the minds of the concerned officers and the public regarding the need to get a clearance from the Authority concerned under the Urban Land Ceiling Act prior to the registration, and that had, in the circumstances of this case, been responsible for the delayed registration of the sale deed. That however, would not in any manner affect either the validity of the registration or the title to the suit property in the respondent herein. Consequently no case is made out to interfere with the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court. The second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs of the 2nd respondent.
