JUDGMENT
G.C. Jain, J.
(1) On June 1,1962 Dr. Beli Ram (Since deceased) Jet out the premises in dispute, i.e. 167 Golf Link, Mew Delhi to Smt. Abinash Kaur (Since deceased) on a monthly rent of Rs. 14007-. On January 22, 1963, he filed a petition for recovery-of the possession of the said premises on the allegations that the tenant had not paid arrears of rent since September 1, 1962. Later on, by way of amendment the eviction was also claimed under clause ( J) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (for short ‘the act’). This petition was admittedly dismissed and there is no challenge to that order in this appeal.
(2) In the written statement the tenant, however, had prayed for fixation of the standard rent. He also moved a separate application dated March 25, 1963, for fixation of the standard rent as well as the interim rent. It was averred that the costs of the construction of the premises was not more than Rs. 50.000.00 in 1956-57 and the price of the land was not more than Rs. 20.000.00 and consequently the standard rent under section 6(l)(A)(2)(b) of the Act would work out to Rs. 481.00 per month.
(3) The landlord in his replication averred that the premises in dispute had been assessed at Rs. 1,80.000.00 by the Wealth Tax Officer. The plot of land on which the premises had been constructed was owned by the Government. It bad been given to him by the president of India on lease under an agreement dated February 18, 1953 at the rental of Rs. 302.50 per annum and consequently the market price of the plot underneath the building was incapable of determination.
(4) Learned Addl. Controller on appraisal of the evidence assessed the cost of construction at Rs. 60.000.00 . He, however, held that there was no evidence on record to fix the market price of the land comprised in the premises and therefore the standard rent could not be fixed. He also held that there was no sufficient material on record to fix the standard rent under section 9(4) of the Act and consequently dismissed the petition of the tenant for fixation of the standard rent.
(5) Feeling aggrieved the appellant/tenant filed an appeal before the Tribunal. The appeal was also dismissed on November 2, 1983. Hence this second appeal.
(6) The ‘standard rent’ has been defined in section 6 of the Act. The premises in dispute were let out in 1962 i.e. after 2nd day of June, 1944. Admittedly the rent of these premises had not been fixed under the ‘Delhi and Ajmer-Marwara Rent Control Act, 1947 or the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. Therefore, the standard rent of these premises under section 6(1)(A)(2)(b) means the rent calculated on the basis of seven and one-half per cent per annum of the aggregate amount of the reasonable cost of construction and the market price of the land comprised in the premises on the date of commencement of the construction. In case the rent so calculated exceeds Rs. 1.000.00 the standard rent would be 8¬ per cent instead of 7″ per cent.
(7) Both the courts below assessed the costs of construction at Rs. 60.000.00 . There is no challenge to this finding. The courts below, however, held that there was no evidence on the record on the basis of which market price of the land, comprised in the premises, on the date of the commencement of the construction, could be assessed.
(8) Mr. G.C. Mittal, learned counsel for the appellant contended that the tenant in para 18(a) of the written statement had pleaded that the price of the land could not be more than Rs. 20.000.00 . This fact was not specifically denied in the application and, therefore, the landlord would be deemed to have admitted this averment as correct.
(9) In para 18(a) of the written statement the tenant had pleaded that the price of the land was not more than Rs. 20,000.00 . The landlord in the opening part of para 18(a) of the replication stated “contents of para 18 (a) of the written statement are repudiated being false to the knowledge of the respondent”. This in itself amounts to specific denial. In any case, he further averred that the land comprised in the building was owned by the Government of India. It had been leased to the landlord on a rent of Rs. 302.50 per annum and its market price could not be determined. Again in para 12(a) of the eviction petition the landlord had pleaded that the costs of construction was Rs. 1,75,000.00 In the replication he reaffirmed this this plea and it was also stated that the value of the premises in dispute had been assessed at Rs. 1,80,000.00 by the Wealth Tax Officer of the Central Board of Revenues In the presence of these pleas the contention of the learned counsel for the tenant, that his averments regarding the cost of land had not been specifically denied, cannot be accepted. The learned Tribunal rightly rejected this plea.
(10) It was then contended that the land comprised was a lease hold land. It was inalienable and therefore it had no market value. Reliance was placed on Prem Kumar Bhatia v. Shiv Dutt Sharma, 1970 (II) Rcr 365.
(11) In Prem Kumar Bhatia’s case (supra) the dispute was regarding the fixation of the standard rent. The grievance of the appellant was that the courts below should have taken into account not only the cost of construction of the premises but also the market price of the land comprised in the premises on the date of the commencement of the construction. A single judge of this court held : “IT has now transpired that the land was leased by the Government to displaced person Kimat Rai, the predecessor in title of the appellant, at a very nominal rent. The land is thus, a lease hold property. It had, therefore, no market price as it was not for sale and was not sold by the Government to the predecessor in title of the appellant.
(12) According to this decision the land which was in alienable had no market price. However, in the present case, it cannot be said that the land was not alienable. The appellant has filed on record copy of the agreement of lease between the President of India and the landlord. It provides, inter alia, that upon the production by the intended lessee certified certifying that the said building had been completed on the land subject matter of the agreement and on fulfillment of other condition the President will grant or cause to be granted to the said intended lessee a lease in perpetuity. Clause Ix of the lease agreement only prohibited the intended lessee from transferring the property without the consent of the Chief Commissioner in writing. In other words, the property could be transferred with the consent in writing of the Chief Commissioner. Thus it cannot be said that the land was in alienable. The land, of course, was subject to the restricted covenants against alienation. Such land, however, had the market value. It was so held by a Division Bench of this Court in M/s. Raghunandan Saran Ashok Saran Joint Hindu Firm v. M/s Peerey Lal and Sons (P) Ltd. 1972 (4) Rcr 750. The relevant observations at page 761 read : “THE lands subject to restricted covenants against alienation, also command a market value and the purchaser may be willing to parchase such and hoping to obtain sanction of the Lesser for the transfer or may like to run the risk of action by the Lesser, if any.
(13) It was then argued that the market price of this land could be the premium paid i.e. Rs. 11.500.00 plus twelve years rent i.e. Rs. 630.00 . This amount was less than Rs. 20,000.00 .
(14) This contention also cannot be accepted in view of the Division Bench decision in Raghunandan Saran’s case (supra). The relevant observations read: “THE market value is understood to mean the price that a willing purchaser would pay to a willing seller for a property including a lease-hold land having regard to its existing advantages. See Raghubans Narain v. Government of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1967 Sc 465). This can be found in a hypothetical sale in the common market. It is, therefore, difficult to accept the contention that in the case of lease-hold rights, the amount of premium paid is the only market value. The market price of the land is being determined not for an apportionment between the owner of the land and the Lesser of the land between the landlord who owns the leasehold rights and owns the property and his tenant to whom he has let it out.”
(15) As found by the courts below there was no evidence to prove the market price of the land in 1956 and 1957 when the construction commenced. Therefore the courts were justified in dismissing the claim for fixation of standard rent.
(16) Before concluding it may be pointed out that the appellant/tenant filed an application before the Tribunal for permission to lead additional evidence. This request was negatived. The appellant assailed this finding of the Tribunal in the grounds of appeal but at the time of arguments Mr. Mittal, learned counsel for the appellant, stated at the bar that the appellant was not interested in leading additional evidence.
(17) For all these reasons I find no merit in the appeal and dismiss the same. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs.