JUDGMENT
Madan B. Lokur, J.
1. The Appellants are aggrieved by an order dated
29th March, 1997 whereby their first appeal was dismissed
by the learned Additional Rent Control Tribunal.
2. The Respondent had filed a petition for eviction
of the Appellants on the ground that Appellant No.1 had
sub-let the suit premises to Appellant No.2. It was
contended that in view of this, the Appellants were liable
to be evicted under the provisions of Clause (b) of the
proviso to Section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act,
1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
3. Both the Courts below found that a case of
sub-letting had been made out against the Appellants and,
therefore, an eviction decree was passed against the
Appellants.
4. The suit premises were taken on rent by Appellant
No.1 (since deceased) sometime in December, 1978.
According to the Respondent, in January 1979 Appellant No.1
informed him that he was the sole proprietor of Sigma
Electronics. He requested that the rent receipts be issued
in the name of Sigma Electronics.
5. Sometime towards the end of 1982 the Respondent
saw some other persons conducting business in the suit
premises and came to know that Appellant No.1 had nothing
to do with Sigma Electronics, which was allegedly his
sub-tenant. Accordingly, he filed an eviction petition
against the Appellants.
6. It was the contention of the Appellants that Sigma
Electronics was the tenant in the suit premises and in the
alternative, both the Appellants were tenants. It was
alleged that Sigma Electronics was owned by the wife of
Appellant No.1 and that Appellant No.1 was working in Sigma
Electronics as its Manager.
7. Both the Courts below disbelieved the Appellants.
It was held that Appellant No.1 was in fact carrying on his
business at some other place in the name and style of M/s
Spectrum Electronics.
8. Learned counsel for the parties made their
submissions on 8th November, 2000 when judgment was
reserved.
9. Learned counsel for the Appellants contended that
for almost 3 years Appellant No.1 issued cheques drawn from
the account of Sigma Electronics and the Respondent issued
rent receipts in favor of Sigma Electronics. It was
contended that now the Respondent cannot turn around and
say that Sigma Electronics is not his tenant.
10. It does appear that the Respondent was extremely
naive in believing Appellant No.1 that he was the sole
proprietor of Sigma Electronics and, therefore, on the
request of Appellant No.1 issued rent receipts in favor of
Sigma Electronics. Later on, however, he came to know that
someone else was carrying on business in the suit premises
and that Appellant No.1 had nothing to do with Sigma
Electronics. He, therefore, stopped issuing rent receipts
in favor of Sigma Electronics and began issuing rent
receipts in favor of Appellant No.1. It appears from the
record that Appellant No.1 did not object to the rent
receipts being drawn out in his favor from 1983 onwards.
This being so, Appellant No.1 acknowledged the fact that he
alone was the tenant of the suit premises. Indeed,
Appellant No.1 cannot get out of the fact that only he was
the tenant in the suit premises because he had entered into
a written agreement with the Respondent on 17th December,
1978 to this effect.
11. Consequently, I am of the view that in the facts
of this case, merely because for some time, rent receipts
were made out in the name of Sigma Electronics on the
request of Appellant No.1, it does not mean that Sigma
Electronics was the tenant.
12. Learned counsel for the Appellants submitted that
the Respondent had admitted in his statement that Appellant
No.1 used to sit in the suit premises. This fact by itself
does not establish that Appellant No.1 had any control over
the suit premises. There is nothing on the record to
indicate the constitution of Sigma Electronics. No
document was produced by Appellant No.1 or his wife to show
how they were concerned with Sigma Electronics. In fact,
the wife of Appellant No.1 who was said to be the owner of
Sigma Electronics did not even enter the witness box.
Appellant No.1 who claimed to be working as a Manager in
Sigma Electronics did not produce any document in support
of his contention.
13. Even if Appellant No.1 was a Manager in Sigma
Electronics, it really means nothing – it does not show
that he exercised control over the suit premises. Control
over the suit premises was in the hands of Sigma
Electronics, his alleged employer.
14. It was then contended that after all Sigma
Electronics was owned by the wife of Appellant No.1 and,
therefore, there can be no case of subletting by him to his
wife. Reliance in this regard was placed on Smt.
Krishnawanti Vs. Hans Raj, 1979 ALL India Rent Control
Journal 164. In that case, the facts were the reverse,
namely that the tenant therein was the wife and her husband
was carrying on the business of a chemist in the shop with
occasional help from his wife. The Supreme Court was of
the view that the factual commonsense inference in such a
case would be that the wife had not sublet the suit
premises to her husband.
15. Unfortunately, however, there is nothing on record
in this case to suggest that the business in the suit
premises was being carried out by the wife of Appellant
No.1. It was the case of the Appellants that business was
being carried on in the suit premises by Sigma Electronics.
The constitution of the Sigma Electronics was not
disclosed. The wife of Appellant No.1 did not enter the
witness box to say that she was the sole proprietor of
Sigma Electronics and that she was carrying on business
with the help of Appellant No.1 as Manager of Sigma
Electronics. Necessary evidence in this case is lacking.
Therefore, Smt.Krishnawanti does not apply to the facts of
this case.
16. Learned counsel for the Appellants contended that
since the Courts below have ignored important evidence on
record, this Court can always set aside a concurrent
finding of fact. Reliance in this regard was placed on
Smt. Sonawati and Ors. Vs. Sri Ram and Anr., .
17. With respect, it is not correct to say that the
Courts below have ignored any material evidence on record.
Two important facts that learned counsel for the Appellants
relied upon and which, according to him, were ignored are
that the Respondent issued rent receipts to the Appellants
in the name of Sigma Electronics and that payments were
made to the Respondent by cheques drawn in the name of
Sigma Electronics. Both these aspects have been considered
by the learned Additional Rent Controller as well as by the
learned Additional Rent Control Tribunal.
18. It was also contended that the statement of the
Respondent that he used to see Appellant No.1 sitting in
the suit premises was not given due importance. It is not
for this Court to weigh the evidence. The assessment of
the evidence has already been done by the Courts below and
they have come to the conclusion that the mere presence of
Appellant No.1 in the suit premises establishes, at best,
his claim that he was the Manager of Sigma Electronics.
The mere presence of Appellant No.1 in the suit premises
does not establish that Sigma Electronics was not the
sub-tenant of Appellant No.1 or that Appellant No.1 had not
parted with possession of the suit premises in favor of
Sigma Electronics.
19. In view of the above, I am of the opinion that
both the Courts below have rightly held that Appellant No.1
had sublet the suit premises to Sigma Electronics and had
parted with possession of the suit premises in favor of
Sigma Electronics. The ingredients of provisions of Clause
(b) of the proviso to Section 14(1) of the Act have been
fully met.
20. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. No costs.
