1. The only question which had to be decided in this suit was that of estoppel. It is not denied that the plaintiff did represent to the parents of the second defendant in 1876 that she had the authority of her husband to adopt; that acting upon the belief that such representation was true, they gave the second defendant in adoption; and that the plaintiff then brought up the second defendant as her adopted son, and, as such, married him to the girl of her choice, and as her adopted son he, for years, performed funeral ceremony of her husband. Having so acted, she cannot now be heard to deny that the adoption was valid. We have been referred to the dicisions in Chitko v. Janki 11 Bom., H.C.R., 199 and Ravji Vinayakrav Jaggannath Shankarsett v. Lakshmibai I.L.R., 11 Bom., 381, in both of which it was held that the conduct of the person who actively participated in the adoption estopped him from disputing the validity of the adoption. It seems to us that this is just such a case as Section 115 of the Evidence Act was framed to meet, and we are unable to assent to the argument of the appellant’s pleader that estoppel only refers to cases of contract.
2. This second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.