JUDGMENT
G.N. Ray, J.
1. In this appeal, the conviction of the appellants by the Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana by order dated November 29,1983 in Criminal Appeal No. 585-DB of 1983 is under challenge. The appellants along with one Sukhwinder Singh were tried on a charge under Section 148, Section 302 read with Section 149, I.P.C. before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Gurdaspur in Sessions Case No. 14/83 arising out. of F.I. R. No. 359/82 of Police Station Gobindpur. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, after considering the evidence adduced in the case, convicted the accused Karnail Singh and Mohain Singh under Section 302, I.P.C. and sentenced them to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-each. The learned Additional Sessions Judge also convicted three other accused Avtar Singh, Bawa Singh and Sukhwinder Singh alias Chhinda under Section 302/149, I.P.C. and sentenced them to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- each. All the five accused were also convicted under Section 148, I.P.C. and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year on the said count. It was indicated by the learned Additional Sessions Judge that in the case of default of payment of fine the defaulting convict would suffer further rigorous imprisonment for six months. The accused, thereafter, preferred the said Crl. Appeal No. 585-DB of 1983 in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and by the impugned judgment dated 29-11-1983, the High Court gave the benefit of doubt to the accused Sukhwinder Singh alias Chhinda and acquitted him and in view of such acquittal of Sukhwinder Singh, the High Court also acquitted all the accused under Section 148, I.P.C. and set aside the conviction and sentence passed against the other accused under Section 148, I.P.C. It appears that the High Court has given the benefit of doubt to Sukhwinder Singh alias Chhinda in view of the fact that Sukhwinder Singh was son-in-law of Karnail Singh and brother-in-law of other accused and he was resident of a different village. That apart, it appears that in the F.I. R. the name of the father of Sukhwinder Singh was wrongly mentioned. So far as the other accused are concerned, the High Court inter alia came to the finding that the other four accused who are appellants before us had participated in committing the said crime which ultimately caused the death of one Bawa Singh, But the High Court has held that such murder was not committed with any pre-planning because altercation started at the spot. The said four accused inflicted the injuries on the deceased which ultimately caused the death. As the commission of crime had taken place out of such altercation, without any motive for murdering the High Court was of the view that it was not a fit case for conviction under Section 302, or under Section 302/149, I.P.C. Accordingly, the High Court modified the conviction of the accused and convicted them under Section 304, Part I and sentenced to each of the said four accused to suffer seven years rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 7500/-, in default of payment of such fine, further rigorous imprisonment for two and a half years. The High Court has also indicated that the entire amount of fine, when recovered, will be paid to the next of kin of deceased Bawa Singh as compensation.
2. Mr. Kohli, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellants has submitted that in the instant case, there was hardly any strong motive for committing the said murder. According to the prosecution case, the dispute arose when the accused were cleaning the path way. He has submitted that at the time of the murder, Karnail Singh was aged about 70 years old and his sons were all adults and hardly there was any occasion for old man to go for cleaning the path way. Mr. Kohli has further submitted that in the instant case, there was an attempt to implicate Sukhwinder Singh, the son-in-law who was resident of a different village but the High Court felt that Sukhwinder Singh should be acquitted. Mr. Kohli has further submitted that there has been some scuffle between the deceased and the accused persons but the factum of such scuffle was deliberately suppressed by the prosecution and in the course of such scuffle injuries have been caused to the deceased which ultimately resulted in the death of the deceased. In the aforesaid circumstances, the conviction under Section 304, Part I is not warranted. Each of the accused may be convicted for his individual act if the case about his participation in causing injuries on the deceased attributable to each of the accused is fully established. He has submitted that in the facts of the case Section 34, I.P.C. cannot be pressed into action and no conviction under Section 304, Part I read with Section 34, I.P.C. can be passed. Mr. Kohli has submitted that so far as Avtar Singh is concerned, there is hardly any evidence on the basis of which it can be reasonably held that he caused injuries by Kassi because the injury, as noted by the doctor in holding post mortem examination, was likely to be caused by a lathi or by any other blunt substance. He has also submitted that so far as Karnail Singh is concerned, the learned Additional Sessions Judge has come to the finding that two-three blows were caused by Karnail Singh but since it was not at all likely that Karnail Singh was present at the relevant time his conviction under Section 304, Part I read with Section 304, I.P.C. is also not warranted. He has, therefore, submitted that both Karnail Singh and Avtar Singh should be acquitted by giving benefit of doubt. So far as the other accused are concerned, they should also not be convicted under Section 304, Part I and if the Court comes to the finding that they had participated in causing some injuries to the deceased for which they may be convicted under Section 324, I.P.C, since they have already suffered 2 1/2 years, the sentence should be reduced to the period already undergone by them.
3. We are however, unable to accept the submissions made by Mr. Kohli. In the instant case, number of injuries have been caused on the deceased which caused his death and convincing evidence has been led by the prosecution about the participation of the appellants in causing such injuries on the deceased. On the face of the convincing and positive evidence adduced in the case, it cannot be reasonably held that in all probabilities, Karnail Singh was not present because he was aged at that point of time. As a matter of fact, the evidence has been led that he inflicted sua blow on the deceased. The medical evidence sup ports prosecution case about such injuries caused by sua. So far as Avtar Singh is concerned, the learned Sessions Judge has given a very cogent reason as to why the case of Avtar Singh causing injuries on the back of the deceased should be accepted. We do not find any reason to take a contrary view in the matter. In the facts of the case, the conviction of the appellants under Section 304, Part I is well reasoned and need not be interfered with in this appeal. We, therefore, dismiss this appeal. If the appellants have been released on bail, they should be taken into custody to serve out the sentence passed by the High Court against them.
In Criminal Appeal No. 309 of 1985
4. This appeal has been preferred by the com plainant against the acquittal of Sukhwinder Singh and also acquittal of other accused from the charge under Section 302, read with Section 149, I.P.C. Such order of acquittal has been passed by the High Court by giving Sukhwinder Singh benefit of doubt as he was a resident of a different village and his father’s name was also not properly mentioned in the F.I. R. Although the factum of residence of Sukhwinder Singh in a different village by itself may not be a good ground for acquittal but since there was also some error in describing the accused by giving she name of his father correctly, his participation has been held to be doubtful. If on consideration of the facts the benefit of doubt has been given by the High Court by indicating good reasons, we do not think that interference against such order of the High Court is called for. Therefore, the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed.
