JUDGMENT
R.S. Mongia, J.
1. M/s. Kay Iron Works Pvt. Ltd. (Petitioner), instituted eviction application against the respondent Molar Mal under Section 13 of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 from rented land on the ground that the same was required for personal necessity of the petitioner. It was averred that the landlord was not occupying any other rented land for the purpose of business in the urban area of Yamuna Nagar, nor he has vacated any such rented land without sufficient cause after the commencement of Rent Act.
2. The tenant contested the Eviction Application inter-alia on the ground that the demised premises were not residential building. The same could not be got vacated on the ground of personal necessity. The demised premises consisted of a room with a varandah and courtyard with two tin sheds and a passage situated appurtenant thereto. The demised premises according to the tenant were covered under the definition of ‘building’ as given in the act and the same was not rented land. The allegation of personal necessity was denied. It was further averred in the amended written statement that during the pendency of the ejectment application, the landlord had got possession of area about 18 x 45 from Atma Ram Jassa Ram; 16 x 40 from Sakuja Trunk Houses; and 10 x 40 from Sh. Kehar Singh and under these circumstances, the need of the landlord had been sufficiently met and there was no need to get the premises in dispute vacated for personal necessity.
3. On the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed by the learned Rent Controller :-
1) Whether the applicant company is a private limited company and whether Ram Avtar is competent to file the present application for ejectment? OPA.
2) Whether the property in dispute is a rented land and is if so its effect? OPA.
3) If issue No. 2 is proved in the affirmative whether the applicant company, requires the premises in dispute for its bonafide use and occupation? OPA.
4) Whether the suit land is a non-residential building and as such the ground of ejectment for personal use is not available to the applicant ? OPR
5) Relief.
4-A) Whether the personal necessity of the applicant satisfied during the pendency of the present petition? OPR.
4. Vide order dated June 04, 1988, the learned Rent Controller decided Issue No. 1 in favour of the petitioner and on Issue No. 2 and 4, which were dealt together, findings were recorded, after discussing the entire oral and documentary evidence, that the premises in dispute was rented vacant land and not non-residential building. On issue No. 3 finding was recorded in favour of the petitioner for bonafide use and occupation. On issue No. 4-A it was held that the need of the applicant by getting the other property vacated had not been satisfied and the petitioner was entitled to get the respondent ejected from the demised premises.
5. Aggrieved by the order of ejectment by the learned Rent Controller, the respondent-tenant filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority. Vide judgment of the Appellate Authority dated February 14, 1992, the impugned order of the learned Rent Controller was set aside and the case was sent back to the learned Rent Controller to re-decide Issue Nos. 3 and 4-A in the light of the observations made by the Appellate Authority. Against the judgment of the Appellate Authority the present petitioner (landlord) filed a revision petition in this Court, which vide order dated July 23, 1992, was allowed and the impugned order of the Appellate Authority was set aside with a direction to the Appellate Authority to rehear the appeal. Con- troversy again arose-whether the appeal was to be heard afresh on all the issues or only on Issue Nos.3 and 4-A. The Appellate Authority decided vide order dated April 27, 1993 that the appeal would be heard on all the issues. The landlord again brought the matter before this Court in a revision petition and vide order dated September 14, 1993, this court allowed the revision petition and set aside the impugned order of the Appellate Authority dated April 27, 1993 and a direction was given to the Appellate Authority to rehear the appeal only on issues Nos.3 and 4-A. It was further observed that in case it was found that further enquiry was necessary, the. Appellate Court may call for report or may make enquiry itself. Vide impugned order of the Appellate Authority, it has been observed that in the earlier judgment of the Appellate Authority, dated February 14, 1992, the findings of the learned Rent Controller on issue Nos.1, 2 and 4 had been affirmed by the Appellate Authority and findings on issues Nos.3 and 4A were only being gone into by the Appellate Authority. The learned Appellate Authority reversed the findings of the learned Rent Controller on issue Nos.3 and 4-A. Resultantly, the appeal of the tenant was accepted vide the impugned judgment of the Appellate Authority dated January 12, 1994. Hence, the present revision petition by the landlord.
6. It was observed by the Appellate Authority that the landlord in his eviction application nowhere specifically pleaded as to for what purpose it needed the demised premises. It was only vaguely mentioned that the rented land was required for purpose of its business. No particular purpose was mentioned in the eviction application. It was further observed that though in the resolution dated December 28, 1978 passed by the petitioner-Company by which Sh. Ram Avtar, Manager was Authorised to sign and verify the application for ejectment it was mentioned that the company is facing great difficulty in storing the raw-material and other material like, sand soil etc. and the rented land in possession of the tenant-Moler Ram is the only place where these items could be stored. However, no such pleadings have been made in the application. In the replication dated October 01, 1986, filed to the amended written statement it was pleaded by the landlord that the landlord required the land in question for extension of their foundry and for storage of foundry material; like sand, soil, firewoods, fire-bricks, etc. According to the Appellate Authority a new case had been set up in the replication and for all intents and purposes there was no constituency in the stand of the landlord so as to conclude a genuine need. It was further observed by the Appellate Authority that as per the evidence led by the landlord the petitioner-Company was doing the manufacturing business and running a factory while the tenant was running the business of timber on the rented land. Manufacturing purpose cannot be taken as business purpose rather purpose for which the landlord required the premises is different from the purpose for which the tenant is using the premises in question. Reliance was placed by the Appellate Authority on a judgment of this Court in Mahant Bachan Das v. Amarjit Singh, 1977 R.L.R. 634, which according to the learned Appellate Authority, laid down that the rented land could be got vacated if the landlord required it for the same purpose for which it was given i.e. for carrying on same business. It was further observed that it is nowhere the case of the landlord that it needs the demised premises for the same business or business purpose. The purpose of the landlord is manufacturing one or at most it is for storing the raw-material or other materials like sand, soil etc. Even if the landlord required to use the rented land as a storage or a godown then also the purpose is different. It was further held that since some other piece of land had been got vacated by the landlord during the pendency of the eviction application before the learned Rent Controller, which are also located just in the vicinity of the demised premises and can well he used by the landlord, the need of the landlord does not remain any more for getting the demised premises vacated. On the above basis the findings of issue No. 3 and 4-A were reversed.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that in the ejectment application, it was clearly indicated that the disputed rented land was required by the petitioner for the personal use and occupation for the business and it was not occupying in the urban area of Yamunanagar any rented land for purpose of business nor had vacated any such rented land without sufficient cause after the commencement of the Rent Act. It was further stated that the premises already in possession of the applicant are not sufficient for their requirements. In the replication filed to the written statement the details were given regarding the business that was to be carried out in the demised premises for extension of their foundary and for storage of factory material i.e. sand, earth, fire wood, fire bricks etc. According to the learned counsel, the Appellate Authority was not correct that different case had been set up in the original application and the replication. The rented land can be got vacated if the landlord requires it for purpose of business which was clearly indicated in the application. The details as to what business is to be carried out need not necessarily be given in the application as that is not the requirement of law. However, the details of the business to be carried out were given in the replication which has to be treated as part of the pleadings. There is no contradiction between the case set up in the application for ejectment and the replication. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, as per plan the demised premises is just adjacent to the factory premises of the petitioner and the rented land is required by the petitioner for extension of business and for storing the raw material like sand, earth, firewood, fire bricks, etc. Further according to the learned counsel the Appellate Authority has gone wrong to observe that the rented land can be vacated only for the same purpose for which it was let out. It can certainly not mean that the rented land can only be vacated to carry out the same business as is being carried out by the tenant. It can only mean that the rented land cannot be used by the landlord for any other purpose than the business for which it was let out but it does not mean the same business. The rented land after getting vacated cannot be used by the landlord for residential purpose. In support of his contention, learned counsel cited Attar Singh v. Inder Kumar, A.I.R. 1967 Supreme Court 773. It was further argued that one property which was got vacated during the pendency was one in which buildings were there and had been let out to another person so that could not be used for purpose of business. Apart from that, the other properties are not sufficient to meet the need of the petitioner. Moreover, that are not adjacent to the factory.
8. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent-tenant argued that the findings of the Appellate Authority on issues Nos. 3 and 4-A were well based. The petitioner having got other land vacated could not get the demised premises vacated from the respondent. Moreover, he had not pleaded the purpose for which the demised premises were required.
9. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that the revision petition is liable to succeed. In the petition, details of what business is to be carried out were not to be mentioned. It was sufficient to plead that the rented land was required for business purposes. As to what business is to be carried out is a matter of details. In this case, even these details were given in the replication which are part of the pleadings. There is no contradiction between the pleadings in the application and the replication. The learned Appellate Authority was not correct in observing that a new case had been set up in the replication. The further finding that the premises could only be got vacated for the same purpose for which it was let out can only mean that the purpose for which it was let out was business. The same can be got vacated for purpose of business. Same purpose does not mean the same business. The authority cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is a complete answer to this proposition. Even the authority relied upon by the learned Appellate Authority Mahant Bachan Das v. Amarjit Singh, 1977 R.L.R. 634, relies upon the same authority of the apex Court as cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The learned Appellate Authority has not properly interpreted the import of the judgment in Mahant Bachan Dass case (supra).
10. So far as the question of getting some other premises vacated is concerned, the landlord clearly stated that the premises which were got vacated during the pendency of the petition from some other tenant were not sufficient and on one of the premises which was got vacated, there were buildings which had been let out to a tent store. The landlord is the best judge of his need. The demised premises is just adjacent to the factory owned by the petitioner on which they wish to extend the business and store raw-material. The tenant cannot dictate terms to the landlord. The sufficiency or insufficiency of the premises already in occupation of a landlord is a question which can be judged from the view point of the landlord. The tenant cannot create a clog on the extension of landlord’s business. According to me, the finding on issues no. 3 and 4-A by the Appellate Authority are not well based. The Rent Controller had rightly come to the conclusion of these points.
10. For the foregoing reasons, I allow this revision petition, set aside the judgment of the Appellate Authority and restore that of the Rent Controller. The respondent-tenant is ordered to be ejected from the demised premises. Since, he had been carrying on the business of the demised premises for sufficiently long time, he is given three months time to vacate the same.
