JUDGMENT
1. In this case the appellant is aggrieved by an order of the Subordinate Judge of Saran disallowing his objection to the execution of a decree. That objection was made on the ground that the decree was now extinct under the Law of Limitation, no step-in aid of execution having been taken in accordance with law within three years prior to the present application. It is conceded that an application was made to execute the decree in 1916. But it is urged that this application was not in accordance with law by reason of the fact that the judgment-debtor was then a minor, and the application was made as against the minor represented by his’ mother without any application to the Court for an order appointing the mother as guardian ad litem. We are of opinion that the application must be held to have been a step-in-aid of execution taken in accordance with law, for it was open to the decree-holder either to include in his application for execution an application for a formal order appointing a guardian or to make that application as a separate application. The first step-in-aid of execution was obviously to pursue the property of the minor, stating that be was a minor and naming the person who would be his natural guardian. The appointment of the guardian by the Court would not be the first step but the second step-in-aid of execution. Therefore, clearly the application itself was a first step made in execution of the decree and was in accordance with law. Even if it were not so, I should be loath to hold otherwise than was held in Gopal Chunder Manna v. Gosain Das Kalay 25 C. 594 (F.B.) : 2 C.W.N. 556 : 13 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 392 by the Full Bench, Kalka Dube v. Bisheshar Patak 32 A.162 : A.W.N. (1901) 31 and Hari v. Narayan 12 B. 427 : 6 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 770. A decree does not become time-barred by reason of a trivial defect in the form in which the former application was made. I would dismiss this appeal with costs.