ORDER
Shamsuddin Ahmed, J.
1. In this writ application writ petitioners have challenged order of refusal dt. 28th of April, 1978 under the provisions of the Urban Land Ceiling Act refusing to grant exemption under Section 20 of the Act and a declaration Under section 10(3) of the said Act published in the Calcutta Gazettedt. 15th Jan 1980 as well as impugned notice Under section 10(3) issued by the authorities.
2. The writ petitioners’ case in short is that the petitioner No. 1 is a company incorporated under the Companies Act. 1956 and petitioner No. 2 is one of its Directors. The Company is engaged in the business of developing land and constructing building and flats thereon for residential purpose. It purchased about 50 cottahs of land being premises No. 24/7. Raja Santosh Road, Alipore, Calcutta by a registered deed of sale on 11th June 1974. The purchase was for construction of a multistoreyed building thereon as ‘own your own flat’ basis in order to implement a group housing scheme. It prepared a scheme consisting of 41 flats of dwelling units of different types. Immediately. after news of the preparation of the scheme was known people rushed to them to book their respective flats. The company received considerable amount of money from different people. The details of persons who invested money has been disclosed in annexure “A”. M/s Kothari & Co. was the Architect. They prepared the plan of the said building in accordance with the rules & regulations under the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951. The petitioner company on or about 2nd July, I974 submitted an application under Rules 50 and 51 of schedule XVI of the said Act, before the Corporation of Calcutta. On their turn Corporation of Calcutta issued a notice under rule 54 of the said schedule under the said Act and directed the petitioners to comply with the requisitions made. This notice was issued on 23rd Aug. 1974. The notice was issued beyond time, as prescribed by rule 54 but even then the petitioner company in order to expedite the matter replied to the requisition. The said reply is annexure “B” to the writ application. The Consulting Engineer there after met the officers of the corporation and duly produced all the papers in connection with deed of sale and requested the authorities to send copies of the plan to Calcutta I mprovement Trust and the Fire Services for having their no objection certificate. Thereafter Calcutta Corporation under rule 55 of schedule XVI neither rejected not sanctioned the said plan within a period of one month as incumbent upon them under the said rule. The plan accordingly was deemed to have been sanctioned under rule 56 of the said Schedule of the Calcutta Municipal Act enabling the petitioner company to proceed with the construction in terms of the said plan. The petitioners contend that since the plan submitted by them before coming into force of the Urban Land Ceiling Act the land cannot be treated as vacant land exceeding the ceiling limit. It raising the contention the writ petitioners have relied on Sub-section (3) of Section 4 of the said Act. Sub-section (3) lays down that notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1) where in respect of any vacant land any scheme for group housing has been sanctioned by an authority competent in this behalf, immediately before the commencement of this Act then the persons holding such vacant land at such commencement shall be entitled to continue to hold such fandforthepurposeof group housing. Provided that not more than one dwelling unit in the group housing shall be owned by one single person. Provided further that the extent of vacant land which such person shall be entitled to hold shall, in no case, exceed the extent required under the building regulations governing such group housing or the extent calculated by multiplying the number of dwelling units in the group housing and the appropriate ceiling limit referred to in Sub-section (1). In explanation to the said Sub-section and Sub-section (1) group housing means a building constructed or to be constructed with one or more floors each floor consisting of one or more dwelling unit and having common service facility. Common service facility includes facility like stari case, balcony and verandah.
3. Mr. Mitra, learned Counsel in support of his submission has relied on theprovisions of schedule XVI of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951. Under Rule 56 if a plan seeking permission to build is neither sanctioned nor rejected within a specified time limit it will be deemed to have been approved but such approval is in a limited form. The permission which the Municipal Commissioners arc deemed to give is a permission to execute the work in accordance with the plan in so far as the plan complies with the Act and bye laws made thereunder. A deemed sanction is accordingly an authority given to the person seeking permission for construction to construct even without an express sanction but such authority to construct is limited by the provisions of the Calcutta Municipal Act and the bye laws framed thereunder. Mr. Ghosh appearing for the Corporation of Calcutta has relied on a decision reported in AIR 1948 Cal 109 Hon’ble Justice Harris held “that the fact that permission isdeemed to be granted does not mean that the plan must be deemed to be in accordance with the Act and the bye laws made thereunder. The Rule was drafted to prevent delays in the case of applicants who had been careful to comply with the Act and the bye laws. If the plan complied with the Act permission would be deemed to be granted but the rule was never intended to cover plans which were clearly in contravention of the Act or the bye laws. In other words, where this permission is to be implied the person building can build only according to the Rules and bye laws. If it transpires thath is plan is contrary to the Act or contrary to the bye laws implied permission will not save him. Mr. Ghosh has also referred to . A single Bench of this court held that for obtaining the benefit of a deemed sanction the application must be a valid application containing the site plan and other relevant particulars required under the said rules. If for want of such essential relevant particulars the application could not have been considered on merit and sanction given by the Corporation, there cannot be any deemed sanction under Rule 56. Mr. Ghosh drew my attention to annexure ‘B’to the writ application. It appears that City Architect, Corporation of Calcutta wrote to the director of petitioner No. 1 requiring him to furnish information set out in schedules A &B to the said letter and satisfy the Commissioner with regard to the obections mentioned in Schedule ‘C’. This was replied to by M/s. Kothari & Co. on behalf of the writ petitioners on 17th Oct. 1976. It appears from the said letter it was stated that with regard to objection mentioned in schedule ‘A’ they undertook to produce the documents to prove their ownership of boundary wall of the plot. By schedules to the letter of the City Architect no objection certificates from CIT and Fire Service were asked to be obtained. By another reply Architect of the writ petitioners undertook to show the necessary documents from CIT and Fire Services. With regard to objections under Schedule ‘C’ those were replied to and it was intimated that the site plan has been corrected showing access to the main road. Mr. Ghosh contended that it is apparent from the reply relied on by thewrit petitioners annexure B that the requisitions made by the Corporation were not met by the writ petitioners. They undertook to do some thing for removing the omissions but there is nothing to indicate that those undertakings were carried out. In the writ application the writ petitioners have asserted that the Architect M/s. Kothari & Co. met the Corporation Officials and satisfied him which has been denied by the Corporation in their affidavit in opposition. Accordingly it remains only an affidavit versus affidavit. There is no other material to show that in fact the writ petitioners complied with the requisition made by the City Architect. Under these circumstances, the allegations that the Corporation failed either to sanction or to refuse the plan submitted by the writ petitioners will not enable them to treat the plan as deemed sanction under Rule 56.
4. Mr. Ghosh further contended that subsequently the writ petitioners filed another plan in respect of the same premises on 3rd Dec. 1976. On the submission of the said plan a requisition in C’ form was issued. The application for sanction was refused under Rule 51(4) of schedule XVI. It has been contended by Mr. Mitra that without prejudice to their right accrued on them under the deemed sanction will not be affected. In the decision referred to above viz., , it was held that if an applicant waives his right and does not proceed to execute the work and construction in question but approaches the Corporation for consideration of his application on merit a deemed sanction will lose its force and in such circumstances, the Corporation will be quite entitled to consider an application on merit despite the expiry of the period mentioned in Rule 56. In the instant case though the wirt petitioners did not press for consideration of their plan ‘ filed in 1974 for sanction they filed another plan for sanction by the Corporation to build on the same premises. It is, therefore, clear that they have waived their right to build under authority of rule 56 of schedule XVI by filing a plan for fresh sanction on the same premises. They will not, therefore, be entitled to take the benefit of deemed sanction under Rule 56. Mr. Ghosh also relied on a decision reported in (1981) 1 Cal LJ 501, Kalyan Kumar Biswas, v. M/s. Chainrup Sampatram. A Division Bench of this court presided over by our present Chief Justice. Mr. Justice Mookerjee held that rule 56 relaxes the requirement of obtaining prior permission to execute the works mentioned in the application which has not been disposed of within theperiod prescribed by Rule 55 but such an applicant is not entitled to infringe the provisions of the Calcutta Municipal Act including those contained in schedule XVI. A plan which is deemed to have been sanctioned under Rule 56 does not authorise any violation of the Municipal Building Rules. In the instant case, it is apparent that the writ petitioners did not build on the strength of deemed sanction under Rule 56. As it will appear from annexure ‘B’ to the writ application that the said plan suffered from some infirmities which violate the provisions of the said Act and the bye laws in constructing a structure on the land. It cannot be held that the plan said to have been filed by the writ petitioners in 1974 obtained a sanction in terms of Rule 56 of the said Rules.
5. I have quoted Section 4(3) of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, The proviso to the said sub-section provided that not more than one dwelling unit in the group housing shall be owned by one single person. According to the case of the writ petitioners 42 dwelling units are sought to be constructed on the land in question. They have shown that only 20 of, them were sought to be purchased by the respondent Nos. 6 to 23. Annexure ‘A’ shows that intending purchasers were 21 in number. Since the writ petitioners wanted to build 41 flats 21 flats still remained to be purchased on the date of vesting under the Urban Land Ceiling Act. Obviously those 20 flats remained the property of the writ petitioners, which is in contravention of the proviso to the said sub-section. Mr. Gupta Id. Advocate General has submitted that the list of intending purchasers will show that purchasers at serial Nos. 4,6,8.9,10, 11 & 12 are from the same place being 61, Chowringhee Road. Calcutta which is also the address of the writ petitioners. Writ petitioner No. 2 is Mr. K. S. Bhutani. (Kartar Sadhu Singh Bhutani). Intending purchasers at serial No. 4 is Miss. Anita Bhutani. at serial No. 8 Mr. K. S. Bhutani, at serial No. 10 Mrs. Rule K. Bhutani. Mr. Gupta submitted that those persons hail from the same place and also bear the identical title name with petitioner No. 2. The writ petitioner has not explained that they a re not related to him or that they do not come within the definition of persons Under section. 2(1) of the said Act. Even after Mr. Gupta made his submissions the writ petitioners did not take any steps for clearing the position. Mr. Gupta submitted that the writ petitioners are trying to defeat the provisions of law by not disclosing those relevant facts. Mr. Gupta also drew my attention to the intending purchasers at serial No. 9 of annexure ‘A’. It is K. B. & Co., its address is at No. 60/1, Chowringhee Road, Intending purchaser at serial No. 1] is Kartar Co. at serial No. 12 is K. B. Instrument & Equipment Corporation at the same address. This will indicate according to Mr. Gupta that the names of those companies have strong resemblence with the name of writ petitioner No. 2 Kartar Sadhu Singh Bhutani.The address is also identical. The writ petitioners did not take any steps to clarify the position. Section 4(5) of the Urban Land Ceiling Act contemplates that where any firm or any body of individual holds vacant land or holds any other land on which there is a building with dwelling unit therein or holds vacant land and such other land then the right or interest of any person in the vacant land or such other land for both as the case may be on the basis of their share in such form or association or body shall also be taken into account in calculating the extent of vacant land held by such persons. Since the interest of the writ petitioners as well as the members of his family as contemplated by Section 2(i) of the said Act has not been cleared, it is not possible for a court of equity to grant them relief prayed for. Considering this position asdetailed earlier by me i t is not possible for me to accept the contention raised by Mr. Mitra. The writ petitioners are not entitled to the benefit of Section 4(3) of the Urban Land Ceiling Act.
6. Mr. Gupta Id. Advocate General has also urged that the writ petitioners have stated that the plan prepared for group housing scheme also included provision for shops. Group housing as defined in the explanation to Section 4(3) of the Urban Land Ceiling Act is that the group housing means a building constructed or to be constructed with one or more floors consisting of one or more dwelling units and having common service facility. In reply, in this connection writ petitioners replied in their affidavit that provisions for shops was a common service facility. Clause (ii) of the said explanation made it clear that common service facility includes facility like staircase, balcony and verandah. Common service generally means the service relating to power supply, water-supply, access, drainage etc. along with these facilities like staircase, balcony and verandah has been included. A shop cannot be treated as a common service facility. To be a common service facility the ownership of such facilities has to be a common ownership of the owners of the group housing scheme. Nowhere it has been staled that the shops which were planned by the writ petitioners in the aforesaid group housing scheme were to be the common property of all the owners. Accordingly, accepting the contention of Mr. Gupta 1 hold that the house proposed to be contructed by the writ petitionerson the land in dispute is not a group housing within the meaning of ULCR Act and is not entitled to an exemption Under section. 4(3) of the said Act.
7. 1 have already indicated that deemed sanction under Rule 56 of the Calcutta Municipal Act is not a sanction contemplated by Section 4(3) of the ULCR Act. On this count as well writ petitioners cannot claim the benefits of Section 4(3) of the said Act.
8. In their writ application, the writ petitioners have made out a case that they have filed a statement Under section. 611) of the ULCR Act as a measure of abundant caution and also made an application Under section. 20(1) of the said Act for exemption of the excess land, if any or at all. This was done without prejudice to their rights and contentions. The writ petitioners further stated that over this, various correspondence was exchanged between the petitioner company and the authorities under the said Act. Petitioners referred to the investments made by the said 21 persons who have invested their money for implementation of the said scheme. The petitioners also prayed for permission to transfer 10 cottahs of land in favour of the Corpn. of Calcutta for the purpose of road alignment. They agreed to such a transfer without any consideration for building a road. They produced some papers in connection with the implementation of the said scheme. They also produced documents to indicate that the proposed building would be utilised for group housing. It was alleged that the petitioners were not given reasonable opportunity to produce all the materials in connection with the said application nor was given any opportunity of being heard in respect of the said application for exemption under the said Ceiling Act. The application for exemption dated 28-4-1978 was rejected. The rejection was without any reasonable ground. It is alleged that the application was not considered at all and the materials produced was not taken into consideration. Annexure ‘E’ is a copy of the order. On the same date another order was issued stating that there is no objection to transfer by way of free gift land measuring 10 cottahs in favour of the Corpn. of Calcutta. On these facts the writ petitioners contended that the order of refusal to grant exemplion was arbitrary, mala fide, illegal and was done mechanically without any application of mind. It was so done for collateral purpose and on extraneous consideration and in complete violation of guidelines provided for exercise of powers Under section. 20(1) of the said Act. Being aggrieved by such rejection the writ petitioners filed an application for review and reconsideration of the purported order. On 25th Sept. 1979 the petitioner company was informed that there was no ground for reconsideration of the decision already taken in the matter. Writ petitioners alleged that they were not provided any opportunity to furnish the materials in support of their application for reconsideration. Thereafter on 2nd Nov. 1979 a representation was made before the Hon’ble Minister-in-Charge, Land Utilization and Land Reforms Department, Govt. of West Bengal urging that in premises No. 24/7, Raja Santosh Road, there is no vacant land which is liable to be vested. During the pendency of the representation before the Hon’ble Minister in Charge the Urban Land Ceiling authorities illegally and in purported exercise of power Under section. 10(3) of the said Act vested the excess land of the said premises measuring about 2929 sq. meters by a declaration dt. 14-1-1980 and the same was published in the Calcutta Gazette dt. 15-1-1980. The writ petitioners stated that they came to know of its notification only from the impugned notice dt. 4-3-1980. The said notification was issued in spite of the fact that the representation made by the petitioner was pending. They were informed by a letter dt. 22-2-1980 that in view of provisions of the Section 4(3) the ground taken by the Company in their application dt. 22nd Nov. 1979 is untenable. Thereafter on 22nd Mar. 1980 the writ petitioners were served with a notice dt. 4th March 1980 issued Under section. 10(5) of the said Act. They were directed todeliver possession within 30 days. The said notice was left in a letter box in the office of the petitioner company only on 22nd Mar. The petitioners contend that pursuant to this notice possession was not taken by the respondents. On this ground the writ petitioners have prayed for setting aside the order of vesting and other orders issued in connection with the same. Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 in their affidavit-in-opposition have stated that the writ petitioners filed a statement Under section. 6(1) of the said Act. They also filed an application Under section. 20. The Govt. of West Bengal by order dt. 28-4-1978 rejected the prayer for exemption. On 30-4-1979 a draft statement was prepared Under section. 8 of the said Act provisionally determining the excess vacant land to the extent of 2929.09 s.m. It was served on the petitioner company inviting objection. Hearing of the objection filed by the writ petitioners was made on 9-8-1979 and after its due consideration Under section. 8(4) the same was rejected on merit. Thereafter a final statement was prepared Under section. 9. The petitioner company received the copy of the said final statement on 23.10.79. Thereafter notification Under section. 10(1) was published in the Calcutta Gazette Extraordinary dt. 7-11-1979 inviting claims from the persons interested. No claim was preferred by anybody. Thereafter an order was passed Under section. 10(3) declaring the said excess land as vested to the State and was to be acquired by the State Govt. with effect from 16-1-1980. The notification Under section. 10(3) was published in the Gazette on 15-1-1980. Thereafter Under section. 19(5)of the said Actan order was made directing the writ petitioners to make over possession of the land within 30 days from the date of receipt of the notice. Petitioner No. 2 refused to accept the same. Further attempts were made to serve the notice but those measures also failed. On 10th March 1980 writ petitioner No. 2refused to receive the said notice. The order was then served by hanging on the main door of the petitioner company. The time limit of 30 days expired on 8th April 1980 and order was passed on 9-4-1980 by the competent authority for taking over possession of the said land with effect from the said date. A copy of the order was put up on the conspicuous place on the said land and possession was handed over to the Housing Board. In reply to this affidavit of respondent Nos. 1 to 4 the writ petitioners have denied that any attempt was made to serve notice Under section. 10(5) on the writ petitioner No. 2. Their case with regard to the service of notice has also been indicated earlier.
9. Mr. Mitra has referred to certain decisions regarding consideration and disposal of application Under section. 20 of the ULCR Act. In a decision , a Division Bench of the said High Court held that the factors which are required to be taken into account by the Govt. are (1) the lack of availability of land (2) the purpose for which such land was used at the time the application was made or (3) the purpose for which such land is proposed to be used in future and (4) such other relevant factors as make the Govt. decide that it is necessary or expethent and that too in the public interest to grant exemption. A citizen can explain his difficulty more effectively if a personal hearing is granted. It is because of this far-reaching effect of the Govt.’s decision on his prospect that the hearing is requi red to be read as the implicit requirement on the provisions of Section 20 of the said Act. Mr. Mitra also placed his reliance of . This court also held that the claimant has to be heard before the refusal of his claim for exemption so that he may show that there will be undue hardship on him in case the exemption is not granted. Mr. Mitra then referred to an Andhra Pradesh High Court decision re ported in ,. (Katya Co-operative Building Society Ltd. v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh). In the said decision a Division Bench of the Court held that having regard to the objects of the Act the Central Govt. had specifically instructed the State Govt. to exempt vacant land held by persons in excess of ceiling limit Under section. 20 of the Act to enable the landlords to transfer such vacant land to Housing Co-operative Societies or Group Housing Co-operative Societies for the purpose of constructing dwelling units subject to certain conditions. On this background the order of the State Govt. that all requests for exemption from the land owners shall be rejected, was bad in law. Mr. Mitra submitted relying on those decisions that the rejection of application Under section. 20(2) was bad in law. It was rejected arbitrarily, without giving any opportunity to the writ petitioners of being heard. Mr. Gupta, Id. Adv. General submitted that the case of a group housing was not made out in the application for exemption. It is indicated in the writ petition itself that petitioners were informed by the authorities on their subsequent representation that their case is flot covered by Section 4(3) of the ULCR Act. The writ petitioners have, admitted that there was correspondence between them and the authorities concerned over their exemption application. The highest case that has been made out by the writ petitione rs is that they prayed for exemption on the ground that the land cannot vest because of Section 4(3) of the ULCR Act. This cannot be treated as a ground for exemption. If the contentions of the writ petitioners are correct then the land does not vest at all, and as a result there is no question of making any exemption. Section 20 contemplates that where any person solds vacant land in execes of ceiling limit and the State Govt. is satisfied on its own motion or otherwise that having regard to certain factors mentioned in the said section it is necessary or expethent in public interest so to do, the Govt. may by order exempt subject to such conditions as may be imposed by the State Govt. Clause (b) of Section 20 also authorises the Govt. to exempt any land in excess of the ceiling limit from vesting on the ground that it would cause undue hardship to such persons. Clause la) of Section 20 provides that the State Govt. may by order exempt vacant land in excess of ceiling limit from vesting in consideration of factors mentioned in the said section. It does not specifically say of granting any hearing to the person applying for exemption. In respect of clause (b) of the said section it is provided that no order under the said clause shall be made unless the reasons for doing so are recorded in writing. In this case while rejecting the application the State Govt. in its order noted that the grounds shown in the said application were not acceptable to them. From the writ petition it appears that the writ petitioners claimed exemption on the plea that the land would be utilised for group housing. 1 have indicated in the earlier part of this judgment that this contentions of the writ petitioners are not at all tenable. The other ground that remains is that the ground of hardship. Writ petitioners indicated in this case that 21 persons expressed their willingness to own a flat in the proposed group housing and made some advances to the writ petitioners. While dealing with the application Under section. 4(3) on the facts of this case I have dealt with some aspects of this matter. Those are also relevant for consideration of this ground for exemption. It will appear from annexure ‘A’ to the writ application that 21 persons made advances noted against each name. It will appear that those persons who reside at 60/1, Chowringhee Road have made the most of the advances. Person at serial No. 9 of the said annexure K.B. & Co. of the same address made an advance of 1,05,000 and odds. Similarly others who are residing in the same address had advanced considerable amount. Others have made advances of token sums of 5000/- or above excepting a few cases. These figures raise a doubt if the amounts advanced to the writ petitioners was a genuine case. It will also appear that the persons residing at 60/1, Chowringhee Road, has made their payments by F. D. Rule Those persons are respondents in this application and have appeared. They did not produce any scrap of paper to indicate any agreement between them and the writ petitioners. They made the payments as is alleged for owning a flat in the said premises after its construction. Since no construction could be made paying back the money to the persons who have made the deposits will not cause such hardship to the writ petitioners which may warrant exemption of such a big plot of land under the provisions of Urban Land Ceiling Act. In the facts of this case and the endeavour of the writ petitioners to get the land exempted by various means it does not appear to me that by getting a hearing that could have improved upon their case. The best case that can be made out by the writ petitioners has been spelt out in this writ application. I am unable to accept the view of Mr. Mitra that by not hearing the writ petitioners miscarriage of justice has occasioned in this case. Since whole case is open before this Court and the court can consider the merit of it, only for some technical irreg ularity, I do not consider proper to send back the matter for further consideration.
10. Mr. Mitra has urged that while the writ petitioners representations were under consideration of the higher authorities the order of vesting was passed. Writ petitioners representations for consideration or review of the order of rejection of exemption is not provided by the law. Writ petitioners have made it to satisfy the authorities so that they can direct alteration of the same. Section 34 of the Act provides that the State Govt. may on its own motion after examining the records and in an order against which no appeal has been preferred, pass such order with respect thereto as may think fit. The representation made by the writ petitioners can be considered only under this section. In a decision , the Court held that the expression reasonable opportunity of being heard does not necessarily include oral or personal hearing: The question of allowing or giving personal hearing in absence of any statutory provisions arises only when the person affected asked for it. It also held that it is well settled that absence of reasons does not always vitiate the order and every case is to be adjudged in the light of its own facts and circumstances. His representations were ultimately rejected by the authorities. Only because a representation was pending order to Section 19(33) cannot be said to be illegal in any manner. The writ petitioners filed a statement Under section. 6 of the Act. a draft statement as required by Section 8 was prepared. It is not denied that it was not served on the writ petitioners. After service the writ petitioners were entitled to raise objection. Under sub-section (4) of Section 8 the competent authority was to consider objections received within the period specified. There is no complaint that this was not done. Final statment was prepared Under section. 9 and was also served on the writ petitioners. A notification Under section. 10(1) was also published. Section 10(3) notification has also been made. In a notification Under section. 10(2) any person interested in the land is entitled to raise a claim. Persons who entered into alleged agreemen I for a flat on the disputed land did not raise any claim before the authorities concerned. There after a notification Under section. 10(3) was made and the lands in question have vested absolutely in the State Govt. free from all encumbrances. In view of what has been stated above, 1 am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Mitra that the exemption application was rejected causing miscarriage of justice to the writ petitioners.
11. Mr. Mitra furthercontended that the possession of the land in question was not in fact taken over by the authorities concerned. According to him the date on which he received the notice Under section. 10(5) (sic) fordelivery of possession. The State Govt. cannot take possession of the land as alleged by them unless 30 days from that date have expired. On the facts of this case if the writ petitioners’ statement that they received the notice only on 28th March the State Govt. will not be entitled to recover possession unless 30 days have expired from that date. On the other hand State respondents have claimed that notice was served on 10th of March. Excepting affidavits I do not find any other material on record. No case of any animus against the writ petitioners has been alleged in this case. Therefore, why the official machinery did not act in accordance with (the rule) could not be explained. Moreover, long time has passed away since the date of receipt of notice Under section. 10(5) is admitted by the writ petitioners. Because of the interim order passed in this case, there has been no change in respect of the lands in dispute. In this background the question whether the possession was taken within 30 days is essentially a techinical question which has no bearing on the merits of the whole case. Since all the aspects of the case are under consideration on this Court only a technical violation not causing any injustice to anybody cannot be treated as a ground for interference by this Court. As a result this Rule fails and is discharged.
12. On the prayer of the Id. Advocate for the writ petitioners, the exercise of this order is stayed for three weeks.