ORDER
D.P. Sood, J.
1. Shri Khan Mohammad, petitioner, has approached this Court by way of this petition under Section 397 read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (herein-‘ after shortly referred to as “the Code”), for quashing order dated 6-11-1993 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, District Mandi.
2. The dispute is in between the father-in-law and the son-in-law. Latter is the complainant who has initiated criminal proceedings against the former, his father-in-law. The daughter of the petitioner was married to the complainant in the year 1990. However, pursuant to a writing on 31 -1-1992, allegedly, divorce had been effected in between the parties. After the divorce, the petitioner along with his parents was handed over articles and the money belonging to his former wife (daughter of the petitioner) as per amicable settlement arrived at. It is alleged that on October 31, 1993 at about 2.00 p.m., the complainant accompanied by S/Sh. Sunder Singh and Hari Singh, while proceeding to Sunder Nagar, met the petitioner at Dadaur. He inquired the petitioner as to why he had not handed over the articles to his daughter, who had proceeded against him in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nahan. On this inquiry, the accused is stated to have used abusive language, labelling him to be a “Beiman” and “Badmash”. The complainant controlled himself, otherwise there would have been breach of peace. However, when he asked the accused not to call him names, he used the above said abusive language and further added that he (complainant) had stolen the articles and money of his daughter. It is alleged that thereby his reputation was lowered in the eyes of the genera! public and defamed because of the false allegations levelled against him. Further allegation is that when the complainant asked him not to charge him with such false allegations, the petitioner threatened him with dire consequences.
3. The Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, recorded the preliminary evidence, consisting of the complainant and one another witness. Vide the impugned order, he directed the issuance of summons to the petitioner for the commission of the offences punishable under Sections 417, 500, 504, 506 and 406 of the Indian Penal Code. The impugned order reads:
“6-11-1993 : Sh. H. K. Sharma, ld. Counsel for the complainant.
Heard. There are reasonable grounds to proceed against the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 500, 417, 504, 506 and 406 IPC. Let accused be summoned for 7-12-1993.
Sd/-
CJM, Mandi.”
Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the petitioner has moved this Court by way of the instant petition. It would be pertinent to state that complain-ant and his witness Sunder Singh have reiterated the contents of the complaint in their testimonies before the Court below. This is the essence of the complaint and also the preliminary evidence adduced by the complainant.
4. Mr. Kuldip Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner-accused, has vehemently contended that the trial Court has not applied its judicial mind to the facts and circumstances emerging from the complaint as also to the preliminary evidence. According to him, learned Court below did not even look into the matter minutely so as to hold that there exists sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, which is apparent from the impugned order. Thus, the impugned order being cryptic in its nature in not disclosing the existence of prima facie case sufficient for proceeding against the accused-petitioner, is liable to be set aside. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that an application for grant of maintenance under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights) Act, 1986 (Act No. 25 of 1986) has been filed in the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate at Nahan by the daughter of the petitioner against the respondent for the grant of the maintenance of “Iddat” period and return of the dowry articles pursuant to divorce effected through writing dated 31-1-1992 and, therefore, unless those proceedings are finally terminated by the concerned Court, issue of summons for the commission of the offences aforesaid, is unwarranted. Reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on catena of cases, namely, : Smt. Manju Gupta v. Lt. Col. M.S. Paintal, AIR 1982 SC 1181 : (1982 Cri LJ 1393), State of H.P. v. Naval Thakur, ILR (1989) Him Pra 518, Delhi Cloth and General Mills Company Ltd. v. State of H.P., ILR (1980) Him Pra 500: (1980 Cri LJ Noc 163), Gopi Nath & Sons v. State of H.P., ILR (1980) Him Pra 678 : (1981 Cri LJ 175), Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. State of West Bengal, (1973) 3 SCC 753 : AIR 1972 SC 2639, and State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604 : (1992 Cri LJ 527). The principle laid down in the above said cases is that the object of examination of the complainant and his witnesses under Section 200 of the Code is to ascertain whether there is a prima facie case against the person, accused of the offence in the complaint, and to prevent the issue of process on a complaint which is either false or vexatious or intended only to harass such a person. Such examination is provided, therefore, to find out whether there is or not sufficient grounds for proceeding. If in the opinion of the Magistrate concerned, there is no sufficient cause for proceeding, he may, for reasons to be recorded briefly, dismiss the complaint, if on the contrary, the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence, is of the opinion that there is sufficent cause for proceeding. He should issue process against the accused in accordance with Section 204 of the Code. It may be that the evidence which is required to be adduced by the complainant at that stage, may not be sufficient for recording a finding of conviction, but that fact would not absolve the complainant who wants the Magistrate to issue a process against the accused person from leading some credible evidence, as may prima facie show the commission of the offence. The words “sufficient grounds” used in Section 203 and Section 209 of the Code have been construed to mean the satisfaction that a prima facie case is made out against the person accused by the evidence of witnesses entitled to a reasonable degree of credit and not sufficient ground for the purpose of conviction.
5. This is in view of this settled principle laid down by the Apex Court as also our own High Court in the cases referred to above, that I have to determine whether the impugned order is a routine and innocuous order which has been passed by the learned Court below without applying its judicial mind to the allegations made in the complaint and the preliminary evidence adduced by the complainant. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, from whatsoever angle the complaint and the evidence may be viewed, it does not show the existence of a prima-facie case for the commission of the offences alleged against him. Rather, the allegations made in the complaint as also supported by the evidence, as per him, are so absured and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person will ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. In addition, as per his further submissions, the criminal proceeding initiated by the complainant is manifestly attended with mala fide and or the proceeding has been maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on him and with a view to mentally, physically and economically harass him. He submits that his case fails within the parametres of guidelines at Sr. Nos. 1,5 and 7, which have been laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Ch. Bhajan Lal (supra).
6. Admittedly, proceedings under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 for the grant of maintenance for the “Iddat” period and for return of dowry articles pursuant to the divorce effected through a writing have been filed by the former wife of the complainant (daughter of accused) against him (complainant) in separate proceedings than the one under consideration. The instant is a private complaint filed by the son-in-law of the petitioner-accused. Here, his complaint is that he had returned the dowry articles to his wife through the petitioner (her father) but they have not been returned and secondly, on inquiry with respect to this fact led to the use of abusive language etc. on the date of occurrence which was witnessed by his witnesses.
7. The existence of a prima facie case depends upon the facts and circumstances alleged in each case. No doubt, the statute has laid down a legal duty upon the Magistrate to scan through the allegations and the evidence in order to see the existence of prima facie case on the basis of sufficient grounds before issuance of summons and this duty is more when he issues the summons under Section 204 Cr. P.C. However, the material emerging from the complaint and the evidence adduced has not to be scanned with a view to consider whether a finding of conviction can or cannot be based. It is only to see whether sufficient grounds are in existence to proceed against the accused or not. Section 204 of the Code does not envisage the recording of reasons muchless brief reasons as is required under Section 203 of the Code. The application of judicial mind to the facts and circumstances of the case is the key note which is to be kept in view before summons are ordered to be issued against the accused.
8. In the instant case, the words used by the trial Court in the impugned order are: “that there are reasonable grounds to proceed against the accused…………..”To my mind, the order couched in these words indicate that the Magistrate has applied his mind. Ordinarily, “sufficient grounds to proceed” would include quantitative as also qualitative reasonable grounds, whereas reasonable grounds would though indicate more than one ground and ultimately would mean the same thing. However, even if these words be considered not to amount to “sufficient grounds to proceed” as envisaged under Section 204 of the Code, this Court is not precluded from going into the allegations and the preliminary evidence adduced by the complainant in the trial Court nor judge whether summons have rightly or wrongly been issued. I have carefully scanned through the allegations and also the preliminary evidence. To my mind, there exists a prima facie case on the basis of sufficient grounds emerging therefrom for proceeding against the accused in the circumstances, referred to above. So far as the pendency of the other proceedings are concerned, that does not appear to have any relevancy at this stage with the facts and circumstances alleged by the complainant. May that be, he had returned the dowry articles and those have not reached the hands of the daughter of the accused. The pendency of the other proceedings might be a defence for the accused which has to be considered by the appropriate forum, namely, Chief Judicial Magistrate on merits. Accordingly, the petition, being meritless, is dismissed. Parties are directed to appear before the trial Court on 30th of April, 1994. The Registry shall remit the lower Court’s record forthwith. The interim order staying the proceedings in the criminal case pending before the lower Court is vacated. Petition stands disposed of in terms of above.
