Kiran Bedi & Ors vs Committee Of Inquiry & Anr on 4 January, 1989

           PETITIONER:
KIRAN BEDI & ORS.

	Vs.

RESPONDENT:
COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT04/01/1989

BENCH:
OJHA, N.D. (J)
BENCH:
OJHA, N.D. (J)
VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J)
DUTT, M.M. (J)

CITATION:
 1989 AIR  714		  1989 SCR  (1)	 20
 1989 SCC  (1) 494	  JT 1989 (1)	 21
 1989 SCALE  (1)10


ACT:
    Commissions of Inquiry Act,	 1952/Commissions of Inquiry
(Central)    Rules,   1972:   Sections	 4   and    8-B/Rule
5(5)(a)--Commission	 of	Inquiry--Examination	  of
witnesses--Sequence  of--Issuance of formal notice under  s.
8-B--When arises--Holding persons not entitled to be covered
by  s. 8-B, and compelling them to enter witness box at	 the
inception  while directing similarly placed persons to	whom
notice	 issued	  to  be  examined   at	  the	end--Whether
justified--Whether   discriminatory-Persons  whose   conduct
being inquired into called upon for being cross-examined  at
the inception of the inquiry while persons similarly  placed
directed  to  be enquired at the end--Refuse to	 bind  them-
selves by oath and affirmation believing to be covered by s.
8-B-Whether can avoid consequences--Refusal--When justified.
    Indian  Penal  Code. 1860:	Section	 178--Commission  of
Inquiry---Directing filing of complaint for prosecution	 for
failure to enter witness box--Whether complaint liable to be
quashed for infringement of fundamental right.
    Constitution of India, 1950: Articles 14, 21, 32, 136  &
142-Commission of Inquiry--Holding persons not covered by s.
8-B of Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 and compelling	them
to  enter  witness box. while directing issue of  notice  to
similarly    placed    persons-Whether	  discriminatory--On
refusal--Directing   filing  of	 complaints  under  s.	 178
IPC--Whether infringement of fundamental rights--Writ  Peti-
tion/Special  Leave  Petition filed  challenging  order	 for
filing	 complaints--Summons   by   Magistrate	 not   chal-
lenged--Maintainability	   of--Interference    by    Supreme
Court--Whether called for.



HEADNOTE:
    A  Committee consisting of two Judges of the High  Court
was  constituted  by Delhi Administration  to  enquire	into
certain incidents in January 1988, involving the lawyers and
the police sequel to an alleged incident of a lawyer,  being
apprehended by the students of a College, and banded over to
the police on the accusation of committing an offence within
the  campus of the said College and his	 subsequently  being
brought	 in handcuffs by the police for production before  a
Magistrate,
21
who ultimately discharged him with direction to the  Commis-
sioner	of Police to take action against the  guilty  police
officials.
    In	its interim report, the Committee observed  that  it
had 10 examine the conduct of various police officers,	and,
in particular, among others, the petitioners and recommended
the transfer of the petitioners from their posts.
    In	pursuance of a notice issued by the Committee  under
Rule 5(2)(a) of the Rules, statements of cases on behalf  of
the  High  Court  Bar Association and  the  Commissioner  of
Police	together with the supporting affidavits	 were  filed
before	the Committee. The Police were required to be  ready
for  examination from May 16, 1988 onwards but	the  counter
affidavit and the list of witnesses had not been filed	till
17th  May,  1988, on which date the Commissioner  of  Police
submitted  two	applications  praying  for  postponement  of
hearing	 and for calling upon the Bar Association  to  start
their  evidence first and to call upon the  Commissioner  of
Police	to adduce the evidence thereafter.  Rejecting  these
applications,  the  Committee passed an	 order	saying	that
since the Police had failed to file their counter  affidavit
or  list of witnesses, the petitioners should be present  in
Court on May 19, 1988 for crossexamination.
    On	the petitioners' refusing to enter  the	 witness-box
for taking oath for cross-examination, the Committee decided
to  file complaints against the petitioners for	 an  offence
under  s. 178 of the Indian Penal Code and in  pursuance  of
which  complaints were filed against the petitioners in	 the
Chief Metropolitan Magistrate's Court under sub-s. (4) of s.
5  of the Commissions of Enquiry Act, 1952 read with s.	 346
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
    The petitioners challenged these orders in this Court by
way  of	 writ petitions and Special  Leave  Petitions.	This
Court passed an order on June 2, 1988 directing the  Commit-
tee  to reconsider the whole question relating to the  order
in which the witnesses had to be examined in the case.
    In	pursuance  of  the aforesaid  order,  the  Committee
passed an order on 29th June, 1988 holding that the  concept
of burden of proof was not quite relevant in the proceedings
before	a  Commission, under the Act, which had	 been  given
free hand to lay down its own procedure subject, of  course,
to  the provisions of the Act and the rules made  thereunder
and that it would be difficult for the committee to lay down
22
the  manner  in	 which the witnesses were  to  be  examined,
foregoing its right to examine any witness at any stage,  if
his  statement appeared to be relevant, that merely  because
there were allegations against a particular person he  would
not  be	 said to be covered under s. 8-B, which	 required  a
positive order from the Committee, and that when the Commit-
tee mentioned that it was to examine the conduct of  various
Police	Officers and others, it did not have in view s.	 8-B
of  the Act. The Committee specifically held that the  three
other  persons to whom notices had been issued under s.	 8-B
would be examined at the end of the inquiry.
    On August 18, 1988 this Court quashed the orders of	 the
Committee  directing  the filing of the complaints  and	 the
criminal  proceedings  against the  petitioners	 before	 the
Metropolitan Magistrate and held (a) that the Delhi Adminis-
tration	 had to examine first all its witnesses as  required
by  Rule  5(5)(a) of the Rules framed under  the  Act;	even
those  witnesses who may have filed affidavits	already	 may
first be examined in-chief before they were  cross-examined,
since it was stated that when the affidavits were filed	 the
deponents  did not know what the other parties who had	also
filed  affidavits had stated in their affidavits; the  ques-
tion  whether a party had the right of cross-examination  or
not shall be decided by the Committee in accordance with  s.
8-C of the Act; the direction to the Delhi Administration to
examine its witnesses first did not apply to those witnesses
who fell under s. 8-B of the Act, who had to be examined  at
the  end of the inquiry, as opined by the Committee  itself;
(b) that the petitioners were persons, who fell under s. 8-B
of  the	 Act and had to be dealt with accordingly,  and	 (c)
that  if the three persons to whom notices under s. 8-B	 had
been  issued  were  to be examined, even  according  to	 the
Committee, at the end of the inquiry there was no  justifia-
ble reason to deny the same treatment to the petitioners who
were in the same position as those three persons; the action
of the Committee in asking them to be cross-examined at	 the
beginning  of  the inquiry was,	 therefore,  discriminatory;
mere non-issue of notices to them under s. 8-B ought not  to
make  any difference if they otherwise satisfied the  condi-
tions  mentioned in s. 8-B; the issue of such a	 notice	 was
not  contemplated under s. 8-B of the Act; it was enough  if
at  any	 stage	the Commission considered  it  necessary  to
inquire into the conduct of any person and such person would
thereafter  be	governed by s. 8-B of the Act.	Reasons	 for
this order were to be given later.
Giving reasons for the above order the Court,
HELD: 1. Recourse to procedure under s. 8-B of the Commis-
23
sions of Enquiry Act, 1972 is not confined to any particular
stage  and if not earlier, at any rate, as soon as the	Com-
mittee made the unequivocal declaration of its intention, in
its  interim report to examine the conduct of the two  peti-
tioners it should have issued notice under s. 8-B to the two
petitioners, if it was of the view, for which view there  is
no justification, that issue of a formal notice under s. 8-B
was  the  sine-qua-non for attracting that Section.  At	 all
events,	 the  Committee could not deny the  petitioners	 the
statutory  protection  of s. 8-B by merely  refraining	from
issuing	 a  formal notice even though on  its  own  declared
intention, the section was clearly attracted. [42C-E]
    State  of Jammu and Kashmir v. Bakshi  Ghulam  Mohammad,
[1966]	Suppl.	S.C.R. page 401 and State  of  Karnataka  v.
Union of India & Another, [1978] 2 S.C.R. page 1, relied on.
    2.1 The use of the word 'or' between clauses (a) and (b)
of  s.	8-B of the Act makes it clear that s. 8-B  would  be
attracted if requirement of either clause (a) or clause	 (b)
is fulfilled. Clause (a) of s. 8-B applies when the  conduct
of  any	 person is to be enquired into	whereas	 clause	 (b)
applies to a case where reputation of a person is likely  to
be prejudicially affected. [42B]
    2.2 The fact that no formal notice had been issued under
s. 8-B would constitute no justification for not treating  a
person to be covered by that section if otherwise the ingre-
dients of the said section were made out. Having once stated
in its interim report in unequivocal terms, that the conduct
of these two petitioners among others was to be examined, it
was  not open to the Committee to still take the stand	that
s.  8-B was not attracted in so far as they were  concerned.
[42B-C]
    2.3	 Keeping in view the nature of the allegations	made
in  the	 statements of case and	 the  supporting  affidavits
filed  on behalf of the various Bar  Associations  including
the  Delhi High Court Bar Association, requirement  of	even
clause	(b)  of s. 8-B was fulfilled inasmuch  as  if  those
allegations  were proved they were likely  to  prejudicially
affect the reputation of the two petitioners. In view of the
specific  term	of reference which  contemplated  taking  of
"stringent  action" against all those responsible, even	 the
career	of the petitioners as police officers was likely  to
be affected in case an adverse finding was recorded  against
them  and the principle that the report of a  Commission  of
Enquiry has no force proprio vigore does not, on a pragmatic
approach to the consequences, seem to constitute  sufficient
safeguard so far as the petitioners are concerned. [43C-E]
24
    The	 reason for the importance attached with  regard  to
the matter of safeguarding the reputation of a person  being
prejudicially affected in cl. (b) ors. 8-B of the Act is not
far to seek. [43E-F]
    Blackstone's  Commentary of the laws of  England  Vol-I,
IVth Edition, Corpus Juris Secundum Vol. 77 at page 268	 and
D.F.  Marion  v.  Davis, 55 American Law  Reports  page	 171
referred to.
    3.1	 Section 8-B inter alia contemplates an	 opportunity
being  given to the person governed by the said	 section  to
produce	 evidence in his defence whereas s. 8-C	 inter	alia
gives  him  the	 right to cross examine	 the  witnesses	 who
depose against him. [45D]
    Not	 only that calling upon a person governed by s.	 8-B
to produce evidence in his defence at the very inception  of
the inquiry is a contradiction in terms inasmuch as in	this
situation such a person would really be required to disprove
statements prejudicial to him of such witnesses who are	 yet
to be examined, it would also reduce the right of crossexam-
ination	 by such person to a mere formality for the  obvious
reason	that by the time the witnesses who are to be  crass-
examined  are  produced, the defence of	 such  person  which
would normally constitute the basis for the line and  object
of cross-examination would already be known to such witness-
es and they are likely to refashion their statements accord-
ingly. [45E-F]
    3.2 Perhaps in a case where there is no other witness to
give information about the alleged incident about which	 the
inquiry	 is  being held and the only person or	persons	 who
could give such information is or are the person or  persons
who  are likely to be adversely affected by the inquiry,  it
may  be necessary to depart from the above view as a  matter
of  necessity.	But  this is not one such  case.  There	 are
admittedly any number of other persons who can give evidence
about what happened on the relevant dates. [45G]
    Since the two petitioners clearly fell within the  cate-
gory  of persons contemplated by s. 8-B of the Act and	were
consequently  entitled	to the same treatment  as  has	been
accorded by the Committee to the persons to whom notice	 has
been issued by it under the said section, the Committee	 was
not  justified in calling upon the two petitioners to  stand
in the witness box for cross-examination at the very initial
stage of the enquiry. [54B-D]
3.3  The apprehension that in case a person governed  by  s.
8-B
25
was to be examined at the end and at that stage such  person
even  at  the risk of not producing his	 defence,  for	some
reason,	 chooses not to appear as a witness,  the  Committee
would  be deprived of knowing the facts in the knowledge  of
such  person  and such a course would obviously	 hamper	 the
enquiry is more imaginary than real inasmuch as the power of
the  Commission to call upon any person to appear as a	wit-
ness under s. 4 of the Act, which in terms is very wide	 and
is not circumscribed by fetters of stage, would be available
to  the	 Commission and it would be entitled  to  call	such
person as a witness even at that stage. [46A-C]
    4.1 In view of the provisions contained in ss. 4 to 6 of
the Act, and the rules framed thereunder a person could not,
on  the	 belief	 that he was covered by s.  8-B,  avoid	 the
consequence of ss. 178 and 179, by claiming absolute immuni-
ty  from binding himself by an oath or affirmation  for	 an-
swering questions put to them. [51H; 52A]
    Mc Grain v. Daugherty, 71 L. ed. 580; Uphaus v. Wyman, 3
L.ed.  2d  1090; Sinclair v. United States,  73	 L.ed.	692;
Kastigar  v.  United States, 32 L. Ed. 2d 212 and  Brown  v.
Walker40 L.ed. 819, referred to.
    However, a valid justification put forth by the  witness
was  sufficient ground to make him immune from	prosecution.
[52F]
    Watkins  v.	 United States, 1 L.ed. 2d 1273;  Flaxer  v.
United	States,	 3  L.ed. 2d 183 and  Murphy  v.  Waterfront
Commission of New York, 12 L.ed. 2d 678 referred to.
    In	the instant case, the petitioners are not  asserting
that  they could not be required at all to appear as a	wit-
ness before the Committee and make statement on oath. It was
submitted  on their behalf that they did not either wish  to
delay  the proceedings or to show disrespect to the  Commit-
tee, but only wanted to protect their own interest by making
the submission which they made before the Committee, as	 per
legal  advice given to them, namely that they being  covered
by  s. 8-B of the Act their defence would be put to  serious
jeopardy  and  will be prejudicially affected if  they	were
required  to appear in the witness box for  crossexamination
at the very inception of the inquiry even before  statements
of witnesses proving the accusations against the petitioners
had been recorded which they were entitled to defend.  [52B-
E]
    4.2 On the view of the Committee that persons covered by
8-B were to be examined at the end of the enquiry, the	fact
that  an  affidavit of the petitioner was  on  record  could
hardly justify the petitioner being
26
called upon to enter the witness box at the very  inception.
[55C]
    Smt. Indira Gandhi and another v. Mr. J.C. Shah  Commis-
sion of Inquiry, ILR 1980(1) Delhi 552 referred to.
    4.3	 Had  the  Committee not been  labouring  under	 the
misapprehension that the petitioners were not covered by  s.
8-B,  because no notices under that section had been  issued
to them, notwithstanding the fact that their conduct was  to
be  examined on its own declared, intention, it would  obvi-
ously  not  have required the petitioners to take  oath	 for
being  cross-examined at the stage at which it did  so.	 The
subsequent  orders of the Committee directing complaints  to
be  filed against the petitioners for an offence  punishable
under s. 178 IPC and the act of filing such complaints	were
the consequences of the said misapprehension. [55F-G]
    Since the petitioners were covered by s. 8-B, the action
of the Committee in compelling the petitioners to enter	 the
witness box for being cross-examined, when even according to
it  persons similarly situated were to do so at the  end  of
the inquiry, was in itself discriminatory. There was, there-
fore, valid justification for the refusal by the petitioners
to  take oath for cross-examination at the stage  when	they
were required to do so. [55H; 56A-B]
    Therefore, the Committee should not have, in the instant
case,  directed the filing of a complaint against either  of
the petitioners for an offence punishable under s. 178	IPC.
[56C]
    5. Since the action of the Committee in holding that the
petitioners  were not covered by s. 8-B of the Act and	com-
pelling them to enter the witness box on the dates in  ques-
tion  was discriminatory and the orders directing  complaint
being  filed against the petitioners were illegal, it  is  a
case  involving	 infringement of Articles 14 and 21  of	 the
Constitution.  In such a situation, the power of this  Court
to pass an appropriate order in exercise of its jurisdiction
under  Articles	 32 and 142 of the  Constitution  cannot  be
seriously doubted, particularly having regard to the special
facts and circumstances of this case. [56D-El
    The orders directing filing of complaints being invalid,
the  consequential  complaints and the	proceedings  thereon
including  the	orders	of the	Magistrate  issuing  summons
cannot survive. [56E-F]
6. If the petitioners are compelled to face prosecution.  in
spite of
27
the finding that the orders directing complaint to be  filed
against them were illegal, it would cause prejudice to them.
Therefore, this Court can interfere in the matter. [56G]
    7.	Apart from the directions contained in this  Court's
order  dated 18th August, 1988, it is not expedient  to	 lay
down  any particular rigid procedure to be followed  by	 the
Committee with regard to sequence in which witnesses were to
be examined by it. [41G-H]



JUDGMENT:

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 626 of
1988 etc. etc.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)
G. Ramaswamy, Additional Solicitor General, S. Murlidha-
ran, A.D.N. Rao, A. Subba Rao and Krishnan Kumar for the
Petitioners.

Kuldip Singh, Additional Solicitor General, K.K. Venugo-
pal, Kapil Sibbal, Lal Chand, C.S. Vaidyanathan, H.S. Phool-
ka, N.S. Das, Rajiv Khosla, P. Tripathi, Kailash Vasdev,
Miss A. Subhashini, Harish Salve and Ravinder Sethi, for the
Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
OJHA, J. In the writ petition and the special leave
petitions filed by Smt. Kiran Bedi, the orders dated 17th,
20th and 23rd May 1988 passed by the Committee of Inquiry
consisting of Mr. Justice N.N. Goswami and Mr. Justice D.P.
Wadhwa of the High Court of Delhi (hereinafter referred to
as the Committee) are sought to be quashed whereas in the
writ petition and the S.L.P. filed by Jinder Singh, the
order dated 26th May, 1988 passed by the said Committee is
sought to be quashed.

In order to appreciate the respective submissions made
by learned counsel for the parties, it would be useful to
give in brief the circumstances leading to the appointment
of the Committee and also to quote the terms of reference.
What ultimately assumed the shape of confrontation between
lawyers and police sparked off from an alleged unfortunate
incident on 15th January, 1988 of a lawyer being apprehended
by the students of St. Stephens College, University of Delhi
and being handed over to the police on the accusation of
committing an offence within the campus of the said College.
According to the statement of case filed before the Commit-
tee on behalf of the Delhi
28
High Court Bar Association, the said lawyer was brought by
the police in handcuffs for production before a Metropolitan
Magistrate on 16th January, 1988. The lawyers present pro-
tested against the handcuffing but their protest was ignored
by the police officials. The Metropolitan Magistrate ulti-
mately discharged the lawyer on the same date and also
directed the Commissioner of Police to take action against
the guilty police officials. In support of their demand for
action against the police officials, the lawyers went on
strike from 18th January 1988. In the said statement of case
it was further stated that on 20th January, 1988, Smt. Kiran
Bedi, Deputy Commissioner of Police, North District, Delhi,
made a statement in a Press conference justifying the action
of police and criticising the order of the Magistrate in
discharging a “thief” and that in order to express their
deep concern and anguish a group of lawyers went to meet
Smt. Bedi on 21st January, 1988 in her office which at that
time was situated in the Tis Hazari Court Complex itself.
Smt. Bedi, however, refused to come out and meet the lawyers
whereupon they preferred to wait upon her till such time as
she agreed to meet them. They assert that while they had
waited for 15-20 minutes the police took recourse to lathi
charge on the lawyers at the orders of Smt. Bedi. In the
said statement of case it has further been asserted that
while the indefinite strike and the agitation of the lawyers
demanding a judicial inquiry into the incident of lathi
charge and suspension of Smt. Kiran Bedi was continuing, a
mob which eventually swelled to about 3000 persons came to
Tis Hazari Court Complex on 17th February 1988 raising
slogans in support of Smt. Bedi and against the striking
lawyers. The mob used brickbats and stones causing injury to
some lawyers and damage to property. According to them this
mob attack was engineered by Smt. Kiran Bedi. A statement of
case was also filed by Ved Prakash Marwah, the then Commis-
sioner of Police, attaching thereto affidavits of 25 police
officers including an affidavit of Smt. Kiran Bedi. There is
a denial on their part of the assertions and insinuations
made against them by the Delhi Bar Association referred to
above. With regard to the incident on 21st January 1988 the
case of Smt. Kiran Bedi as is apparent from her affidavit
filed along with the aforesaid statement of case is that she
along with some other officers reached her Tis Hazari Office
at about 11.15 A.M. and while a meeting was in progress in
connection with the arrangements for the Republic Day some
time around 22.00 noon, slogans were heard “being raised
outside by an apparently large crowd approaching in our
direction. Before we realised what was happening. all of
sudden a group of lawyers stormed into my office pushing
aside the female constable on duty at my door. They rushed
towards me making violent gestures and uttering obsceneties
at me. They made physical gesture
29
and threats to the effect ……. The Police Officers who
were sitting around my table jumped to their feet. They held
back one of hysterical persons who had actually advanced in
my direction and formed a ring around the lawyers and man-
aged to move them out of my office while bolting me inside
along with my female constable and a female visitor who had
come to see me for her own work”. We have thought it proper
not to quote the actual words of threat stated in the said
affidavit. According to Smt. Kiran Bedi the situation there-
after outside her office was handled by the other officers
present while she remained inside the office.
We are not concerned with the correctness or otherwise
of either of the two versions stated above and as already
pointed out we have referred to them only to indicate the
background in which the Committee was constituted. Having
referred in brief to the circumstances which led to the
appointment of the Committee we now quote the order of
reference:

“F.No. 10/9/88-NP-II
DELHI ADMINISTRATION: DELHI
(HOME POLICE-II DELHI)
Dated the 23rd Feb. 1988.

ORDER
Whereas the Administrator of the Union Territory.
of Delhi is of the opinion that a judicial inquiry is neces-
sary into matters of public importance mentioned below; Now
therefore, the Administrator is pleased to constitute a
Committee, in consultation with the Chief Justice of Delhi
High Court consisting of Mr. Justice N.N. Goswami and Mr.
Justice D.P. Wadhwa Hon’ble Judges of the High Court to
inquire into and record their findings on the following:

(i) The incident of the 15th January,
1988 in St. Stephen’s College, University of
Delhi regarding apprehension of a lawyer by
the police.

(ii) The incident and reported lathi-
charge on the 21st January, 1988 outside the
office of the DCP/North, Delhi.

30

(iii) Circumstances leading to presence
of a mob in Tis Hazari premises on 17th Febru-
ary, 1988 and the resultant violence.

(iv) Any other incidental development
connected with the above.

The Committee is requested to ascertain the
facts leading to the aforesaid incidents with
a view to identifying those responsible for
the incidents so that stringent action could
be taken against all those responsible.
The Committee may, if it deems appro-
priate, submit an interim report within seven
days of its first sitting suggesting action if
any, against police officials or any other
involved persons pending submission of the
final report within a period of 3 months.”

Subsequently in pursuance of a direction issued by this
Court the aforesaid notification was modified by the Admin-
istrator vide Notification dated 15th March, 1988 by direct-
ing that the provisions of Sections 4, 5, 5-A, 6, 8, 8-A,
8-B. 8-C, 9, 10 and 10-A of the Commissions of Inquiry Act,
1952 and the rules made under Section 12 thereof shall apply
to the said Committee.

The Committee submitted an interim report on 9th April,
1988 and during the course of proceedings before it thereaf-
ter passed the aforesaid orders which are the subject matter
of these writ petitions and special leave petitions.
After having heard learned counsel for the parties at
length we passed an order on 18th August, 1988 which we
consider it appropriate to reproduce here with a view to
avoiding the repetition of the reasons already given therein
in support of the said order:

“It is unfortunate that this case has arisen between lawyers
and police who are both guardians of law and who constitute
two important segments of society on whom the stability of
the country depends. It is hoped that cordiality between the
two sections will be restored soon.

In order to avoid any further delay in the proceed-
ings before the Committee consisting of Goswamy and Wadhwa,
JJ,
31
constituted by Order dated 23rd February, 1988 to enquire
into certain incidents which took place on the 15th January,
1988. 2 1st January, 1988 and 17th February, 1988, we pass
the following order now but we shall give detailed reasons
in support of this order in due course.

The order is as under:

1. This order is passed on the basis of the material
available on record, the various steps already taken before
the Committee and other peculiar features to the case.

2. The Delhi Administration has to examine first all its
witnesses as required by Rule 5(5)(a) of the Commissions of
Inquiry (Central) Rules, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as
the Rules) framed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952
(hereinafter referred to as the Act). Even those witnesses
who may have filed affidavits already may first be
examined-in-chief before they are cross-examined, since it
is stated that when the affidavits were filed the deponents
did not know what the other parties who have also filed
affidavits had stated in their affidavits. The question
whether a party has the right of crossexamination or not
shall be decided by the Committee in accordance with Section
8-C of the Act. In the facts and circumstances of the case
to which reference will be made hereafter this direction
issued to the Delhi Administration to examine its witnesses
first as provided by rule 5(5)(a) of the Rules referred to
above does not apply to those witnesses falling under sec-
tion 8-B of the Act, who have to be examined at the end of
the inquiry as opined by the Committee itself.

3. We have gone through the several affidavits and other
material placed before the Committee and also the Interim
Report dated April 9, 1988 passed by the Committee. In para
13 of the Interim Report the Committee has observed thus:

During the course of the inquiry, we have to examine the
conduct of various police officers and others and particu-
larly, as the record shows, of the DCP (North), Addl. DCP
(North), SHO, PS Samepur (Badli) and SI Incharge Police
Post, Tis Hazari and SI. Samepur (Badli).

In para 14 of the Interim Report it is observed.

32

Lawyers have seriously urged that this Committee should
send a report recommending suspension of the DCP (North) Ms
Kiran Bedi.

Ultimately the Committee recommended the transfer of the
petitioners in these cases, namely, Ms Kiran Bedi, DCP
(North) and Jinder Singh SI, Incharge Police Post, Tis
Hazari.

Section 8-B of the Act reads:

“8-B. If, at any stage of the inquiry, the Commission,

(a) considers it necessary to inquire
into the conduct of any person; or

(b) is of opinion that the reputation of
any person is likely to be prejudicially
affected by the inquiry,
the Commission shall give to that person a
reasonable opportunity of being heard in the
inquiry and to produce evidence in his de-

fence:

Provided that nothing in this section
shall apply where the credit of a witness is
being impeached.”

In its Interim Report the Committee has unequivocally
observed that it had to examine the conduct of various
police officers, and in particular among others Ms Kiran
Bedi, DCP (North) and Jinder Singh, SI, Incharge Police
Post, Tis Hazari.

Having given our anxious consideration to all the as-
pects of the case we hold that the petitioners Ms Kiran Bedi
and Jinder Singh are persons who fall under Section 8-B of
the Act and have to be dealt with accordingly.

4. According to the Committee’s own opinion formed in
the light of the facts and circumstances of the case, all
these persons to whom notices under Section 8-B of the Act
are issued have to be examined at the end of the inquiry.
This is obvious from the order of the Committee passed on
June 29, 1988 after it was asked by this Court by its order
dated June 2, 1988 to reconsider the whole question relating
to the order in which the witnesses had to be examined in
the case. In its order dated June 29, 1988 the Committee has
observed thus:

33

“Without going into the controversy if Rule
5(5) is an independent rule or is governed by
Sections 8-B and 8-C of the Act, we would
direct that in the circumstances of the case
three persons namely, the Additional Commis-
sioner of Police (Special Branch), DCP (Traf-
fic) and Mr. Gopal Das Kalra, SI to whom
notices under Section 8-B of the Act have been
issued be examined at the end of the inquiry.”

If three persons referred to above to whom notices under
Section 8-B have been issued are to be examined even accord-
ing to the Committee at the end of the inquiry there is no
justifiable reason to deny the same treatment to the peti-
tioners Ms Kiran Bedi and Jinder Singh who are in the same
position as those three persons. The action of the Committee
in asking them to be cross-examined at the beginning of the
inquiry appears to us to be discriminatory. Mere non-issue
of notices to them under Section 8-B ought not to make any
difference if they otherwise satisfy the conditions men-
tioned in Section 8-B. The issue of such a notice is not
contemplated under Section 8-B of the Act. It is enough if
at any stage the Commission considers it necessary to in-
quire into the conduct of any person. Such person would
thereafter be governed by Section 8-B of the Act. The Com-
mittee should have considered whether the petitioners were
entitled to be treated as persons governed by Section 8-B of
the Act before asking them to get into the witness box for
being cross-examined. If the Committee had found that the
petitioners were covered under Section 8-B, then perhaps
they would not have been asked to get into the witness box
for being cross-examined till the end of the inquiry. The
Committee would have then asked them to give evidence along
with others who were similarly placed at the end of the
inquiry.

On behalf of both the petitioners it is submitted that
they did not either wish to delay the proceedings or to show
disrespect to the Committee but only wanted to protect their
own interest by making the submission which they made before
the Committee as per legal advice given to them.
This is not a case where the circumstances in which the
several incidents that had taken place were not known to
anybody else. The affidavits and other material before the
Committee show that there were a large number of persons who
were eye-witnesses to the incidents and who could give
evidence before the Committee.

Taking into consideration all the aspects of the case we
feel that
34
the Committee should not have in the circumstances of the
case directed the filing of a complaint against either of
the petitioners for an offence punishable under Section 178
IPC.

In view of the foregoing we feel that the orders of the
Committee directing the filing of the complaints and the
criminal proceedings initiated against the petitioners
before the Metropolitan Magistrate pursuant to the com-
plaints filed on behalf of the Committee should be quashed
and we accordingly quash the said orders of the Committee
and also the criminal proceedings.

A judgment containing the reasons for this order will fol-
low.

Before concluding this order we record the statement
made by Shri Kuldip Singh, learned Additional Solicitor
General appearing for the Delhi Administration that the
Delhi Administration and its police officers will fully
cooperate with the Committee so that the Committee may
complete its work as early as possible. We also record the
statement made by Shri G. Ramaswamy, learned Additional
Solicitor General that he and his clients, the petitioners
in this case hold the Committee in great respect and that
they never intended to show any kind of discourtesy to the
Committee. He also expresses apology for using one or two
strong words against the Committee in the course of the
arguments in this Court.

We now proceed to give our detailed reasons in support
of the aforesaid order:

We find it necessary to refer to some of the regulations
framed by the Committee to regulate its procedure. We also
find it necessary to indicate the nature of the orders which
have been challenged in these writ petitions and special
leave petitions. It also seems appropriate at this very
place to refer to the order of this Court passed in these
proceedings on 2nd June 1988 and the order of the Committee
passed on 29th June, 1988 in pursuance of the order of this
Court dated 2nd June 1988. As is apparent from a copy of the
regulations filed in these proceedings, the Committee framed
“Regulations of procedure under Section 8 of the Commissions
of Enquiry Act, 1952 to be followed by the Committee of
Inquiry”. Regulations 8, 11, 14, 18, and 21 which in our
opinion appear to be relevant for purposes of these cases
are reproduced as hereunder:

“8. To avoid its proceedings being unduly prolonged and
35
protracted, the Committee may divide and group
together the various persons, Associations and
departments before it in such manner as it
thinks just and proper for the purposes of
producing oral evidence, cross-examination of
witnesses examined before it, and for address-
ing arguments.

Provided, however, any person who is
likely to be prejudicially affected as provid-
ed in Sec. 8-B of the Act shall be entitled to
appear personally or through an authorised
agent, and to produce evidence in his or her
defence.

11. The witness whose evidence is recorded by
the Committee orally on oath will be allowed
to be cross-examined by the concerned parties
in accordance with the provisions of the Act.

14. The affidavit or statement of case filed
by any deponent can be treated as his examina-
tion-in-chief.

18. Technical rules of the Evidence Act, as
such, shall not govern the recording and
admissibility of evidence before the Commit-
tee. However, the principles of natural jus-
tice and fair play shall be followed.

21. The Committee reserves the right to alter,
modify, delete or add to any of these regula-
tions of procedure at any time during the
inquiry, as and when it considers necessary.”
In pursuance of a notice issued by the Committee under
Rule 5(2)(a) of the Rules, statements of case inter alia on
behalf of Delhi High Court Bar Association and the Commis-
sioner of Police which were accompanied by affidavits in
support of the facts set out in the respective statements of
case were filed before the Committee. On 8th April, 1988,
the parties and their counsel stated that they would need
two weeks’ time to file counter affidavit and list of wit-
nesses to be examined by them. The time prayed for was
granted. The proceedings on that date were adjourned to 22nd
April, 1988. On that date an application was made on behalf
of the Commissioner of Police and other police officers for
extension of time to file counter affidavit which was ex-
tended till 13th May, 1988. The following order, how-

36

ever, was simultaneously passed on that date. “Mr. Vijay
Shankar Das has been told to keep. his witnesses ready for
being examined from 16th May, 1988. The Committee proposes
to hold the sitting from day-today w.e.f. 16th May, 1988.
For further proceedings and recording of evidence to come up
on 16th May, 1988.” Here it may be pointed out that Mr.
Vijay Shankar Das was the counsel appearing for the Delhi
Police and the effect of the order aforesaid was that the
Delhi Police was required to keep its witnesses ready for
being examined from 16th May, 1988. On 16th May time till
5.00 P.M. to all concerned to file their counter affidavits
along with the list of witnesses was granted and further
proceedings were adjourned for the next day. On 17th May,
1988, two applications were made on behalf of the Commis-
sioner of Police; one for postponement of heating and the
other for calling upon the Bar Association to start their
evidence and to call upon the Commissioner of Police to
adduce his evidence thereafter. The counter affidavit and
the list of witnesses on behalf of the Commissioner of
Police had not been filed even till 17th May, 1988. The
Committee dismissed both the applications referred to above
and passed an order saying that since the Commissioner of
Police has failed to file the counter affidavit or the list
of witnesses, Mr. Jinder Singh, S.I., and Mrs. Kiran Bedi,
the then D.C.P. (North) be present in Court on 19.5.88 at
10.30 A.M. for being cross-examined. On 19th May, 1988,
counsel for Delhi Police was directed to produce Mr. Jinder
Singh, S.I., in the witness box for being cross-examined. On
being informed by counsel for Delhi Police that Mr. Jinder
Singh was not available, bailable warrant was ordered by the
Committee to be issued for production of Mr. Jinder Singh at
10.30 A.M. on 23rd May, 1988. Thereafter Smt. Kiran Bedi who
was present in Court was directed to come in the witness box
for cross-examination. The relevant portion of the order
passed thereafter on 19th May, 1988 reads as hereunder:

“Mrs. Bedi has been asked to take oath, but
she has refused to do so. At this stage, we
called upon Mr. G. Ramaswamy, Counsel appear-
ing for Delhi Police as also Mr. Vijay Shanker
Dass, Counsel appearing for Mrs. Kiran Bedi to
justify the action of the witness in not
taking the .oath. We call upon the counsel to
address because according to us prima facie
offence is made out under Section 178 I.P.C.
Mr. Ramaswamy relies on the judgment
of this Court in Smt. Indira Gandhi and Anr.
v. Mr. J.C. Shah, Commission of Inquiry, ILR
1980(1) Delhi 5522. We have been
37
taken through certain passages of judgment and
we find that the facts of case are entirely
different inasmuch as no affidavit had been
filed by Smt. Indira Gandhi in that case and
she had been summoned merely under Section 8-B
of the Commission of Enquiry Act.
In the present case, an affidavit of
Mrs. Kiran Bedi is on record. She had to be
given further opportunity to make any further
statement and her affidavit already filed has
to be justified by cross-examination.
Let notice issue to Mrs. Kiran Bedi
to show cause why she should not be prosecuted
under section 178 I.P.C. Since she is present,
she is accepting this notice. The notice is
returnable for tomorrow, the 20th May, 1988.
Ordinarily directions have to be issued to her
to be present in court, but Mr. Shankar Dass
undertakes that she will be present in Court
tomorrow and as such no further directions are
necessary.”

On 20th May, 1988 as the order sheet of that date indi-

cates counter affidavit along with list of witnesses was
filed on behalf of the Commissioner of Police and both were
taken on record. With regard to the notice issued to Smt.
Kiran Bedi on 19th May, 1988, the following order was
passed:

“By our order dated 19.5.88, we had issued a
notice to Mrs. Bedi to show cause as to why
she should not be prosecuted under Section 178
of the I.P.C. for refusing to take oath in the
witness box. Notice was made returnable for
today.

Mr. Shankar Dass who appears for Mrs.
Kiran Bedi has refused to show any cause on
the ground that notice was too short.
We have heard the arguments of Mr.
K.K. Venugopal on behalf of the Bar Associa-
tion.

For orders to come up on 23rd May,
1988. Mrs. Kiran Bedi who is present today is
directed to be present in the Court on 23.5.88
at 10.30 A.M.”

38

On 23rd May, 1988, the Committee held that refusal of
Smt. Kiran Bedi in not testifying on oath before the Commit-
tee was wholly unjustified and proceeded to file a complaint
for an offence under section 178 of the Indian Penal Code.
As regards Mr. Jinder Singh, it seems that he could not be
required to appear in the witness box on 23rd, 24th or 25th
May, 1988. On 26th May, 1988 the following order was passed:
“Mr. Jinder Singh was directed to come into the witness box.
When asked by us to bind himself on oath or affirmation to
state the truth, the witness refused to do so. Earlier we
had authorised the court master to administer him the oath.
But, as we have already said, the witness refused to take
the oath. The witness states that he is willing to make a
statement without oath and would be prepared to answer all
the questions in cross-examination. When asked if he is
aware of the fact that his action in not taking the oath is
punishable under Section 178 of the Indian Penal Code, he
says he has nothing further to state. On consideration the
Committee is of the opinion that since this witness has
already filed an affidavit which is a statement on oath, it
is not possible to record any further statement or crossex-
amine without oath. Mr. Jinder Singh, however, states that
he is not prepared to take the oath because he is in the
nature of an accused and he cannot be asked to start the
evidence and would be prepared to come in the witness box
after the evidence of other party is recorded.

Mr. Jinder Singh at present S.I. at
Police Post, Railway Station, Subzi Mandi,
Delhi, who was S.I. in charge Tis Hazari
Courts, Delhi during January and February,
1988, was summoned as a witness and was asked
to step into the witness box. His statement
was to be recorded on oath for the purpose of
cross-examination. He, however, refused to
bind himself by an oath or affirmation to
state the truth when required so to bind
himself by the Committee. The Committee con-
siders that Mr. Jinder Singh who was at the
relevant time S.I. in charge at Tis Hazari
Courts, Delhi, where the incidents took place
is a very material witness and his case is
identical to the case of Ms. Kiran Bedi. For
the reasons recorded in our order dated 23rd
May, 1988 regarding Ms. Kiran Bedi, we proceed
to file a complaint for an offence under
section 178 of the Indian Penal Code.”

39

In pursuance of the orders dated 23rd May and 26th May,
1988 complaints were filed by the Committee in the Court of
the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, for an offence
under section 178 of the Indian Penal Code and as is appar-
ent from a copy of one of the complaints produced before us
these complaints have been filed under sub-section 4 of
section 5 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 read with
section 346 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. As
already indicated, it is the aforesaid orders dated 17th,
20th, 23rd and 26th May, 1988 which have been challenged in
these writ petitions and special leave petitions. These writ
petitions and special leave petitions first came up for
consideration’ before K.N. Singh, J. who was functioning as
the Vacation Judge. After hearing the parties he passed an
order on 2nd June, 1988. The relevant portion of the order
which was passed by this Court on 2nd June, 1988 in these
proceedings, reads as hereunder:

“Learned counsel for the parties agree that
the respondent Committee should be directed to
re-examine the order and sequence in which
parties witnesses as well as the witnesses
summoned by the Committee should be examined
with reference to the incidents mentioned in
the Notification dated 23rd February, 1988.
The Committee is accordingly directed to
consider afresh the order in which the parties
witnesses as well as witnesses summoned by the
Committee on its own are to be examined with
reference to the incidents mentioned in the
Notification appointing the Committee after
hearing counsel for the parties. The Committee
is further directed to consider the question
as to the stage when main witnesses on behalf
of the respective parties should be examined.
The Committee will pass a reasoned order after
hearing the parties. Parties agree that these
questions should be considered by the Commit-
tee on 20th June, 1988 or any subsequent date
subject to its convenience.”

In pursuance of the aforesaid order, the Committee after
hearing learned counsel for the parties passed an order on
29th June, 1988. It inter alia took the view that the con-
cept of burden of proof did not appear to be quite relevant
in the proceedings before a Commission under the Act which
had been given free hand to lay down its own procedure
subject, of course, to the provisions of the Act and the
rules made thereunder. It also held that it would be diffi-
cult for the committee to lay down the manner in which the
witnesses are to be
40
examined foregoing its right to examine any witness at any
stage if his statement appeared to be relevant.
One of the submissions made by learned counsel for the
Commissioner of Police was that since serious accusations
have been made by the lawyers against Smt. Kiran Bedi and
the police with regard to the incidents dated 21st January
and 17th February, 1988, the lawyers should be first called
upon to lead evidence to substantiate their allegations and
the police personnel may be required to lead evidence only
in rebuttal. This submission, however, did not find favour
with the Committee. It took the view that the whole stress
of learned counsel seemed to be on burden of proof and was
based on certain misconceptions. Likewise, the argument that
Smt. Kiran Bedi and Jinder Singh also fell within the pur-
view of Section 8-B of the Act did not find favour with the
Committee. In this connection, it was pointed out that
except for the three officers namely, the Addl. Commissioner
of Police (Special Branch), New Delhi, D.C.P. (Traffic) and
Mr. Gopal Das Kalra, S.I., Police Station, Samepur (Badli),
to no other officer notice under section 8-B of the Act had
been issued and that merely because there were allegations
against a particular person he could not be said to be
covered under Section 8-B which required a positive order
from the Committee. It was also pointed out that a person
has to be put on guard by the Committee if it considers it
necessary to inquire into his conduct or the Committee is of
the opinion that the reputation of that person is likely to
be prejudicially affected by the inquiry. When its attention
was invited to the interim report where the Committee had
mentioned that conduct of various police officers particu-
larly of the D.C.P. (North), Addl. D.C.P. (North) S.H.O.,
P.S. Samepur (Badli) and S.I. Incharge Police Post, Tis
Hazari and S.I., Samaypur (Badli), was to be examined and it
was submitted that consequently they were covered under
section 8-B, the Committee took the view that the submission
was misplaced inasmuch as when the Committee mentioned that
it was to examine the conduct of various police officers and
others, it did not have in view section 8-B of the Act.
According to the Committee the plea that Section 8-B was
attracted appeared to be an afterthought.
With regard to the three persons mentioned above to whom
notices under section 8-B of the Act had been issued, the
Committee specifically held that those persons would be
examined at the end of the inquiry. The Committee emphasised
on the circumstance that in the inquiry before it there was
no “Lis” as is commonly understood while trying a criminal
or civil case and that principle of burden of proof had no
relevance.

41

These cases were then posted before this Bench for
hearing. On the respective submissions made by learned
counsel for the parties, the following points, in our opin-
ion, arise for consideration:

(i) whether the procedure adopted by the
Committee with regard to the sequence in which
witnesses were to be examined was legal?

(ii) Whether Smt. Kiran Bedi and Jinder
Singh, the two petitioners, fell within the
category of persons contemplated by Section
8-B of the Act and were consequently entitled
to the same treatment as was accorded by the
Committee to the persons to whom notice had
been issued by it under the said Section?

(iii) whether the Committee was justified
in calling upon the two petitioners to stand
in the witness box for crossexamination almost
at the very initial stage of the inquiry?

(iv) whether the orders of the Committee
directing prosecution of the two petitioners
under Section 178 IPC are legal?

(v) whether an appeal is maintainable
against filing of complaint, the same being an
administrative Act?

(vi) whether a challenge to the filing of
the complaint is infructuous inasmuch as the
order issuing summons to the petitioners
passed by the Magistrate upon the complaints
filed against them had not been challenged?

(vii) whether it is a fit case for inter-
ference by this Court at this stage with the
filing of complaint, it being open to the
petitioners to prove themselves to be innocent
before the magistrate?

With regard to point No. (i), we are of the opinion
that apart from the directions contained in paragraph 4 of
our order dated 18th August, 1988 regarding the stage at
which persons failing under Section 8B of the Act were to be
examined and also what has been observed in paragraph 2 of
the said order, we do not find it expedient to lay down any
particular rigid procedure to be followed by the Committee
with regard to sequence in which witnesses were to be exam-
ined by it.

42

Consequently, we find it unnecessary to consider in any
further detail, the submissions made by counsel for the
parties on this point. In so far as point No. (ii) is con-
cerned, it would be seen that the use of the word ‘or’
between clauses (a) and (b) of Section 8B of the Act makes
it clear that Section 8B would be attracted if requirement
of either clause (a) or clause (b) is fulfilled. Clause (a)
of Section 8B applies when the conduct of any person is to
be enquired into whereas Clause (b) applies to a case where
reputation of a person is likely to be prejudicially affect-
ed. As regards the enquiry about the conduct of Smt. Kiran
Bedi and Jinder Singh, even the Committee in its interim
report specifically stated that the conduct of these two
petitioners among others was to be examined. Having once so
stated in unequivocal terms, it was not open to the Commit-
tee to still take the stand that Section 8B was not attract-
ed in so far as they were concerned. Recourse to procedure
under Section 8-B is not confined to any particular stage
and if not earlier, at any rate, as soon as the Committee
made the aforesaid unequivocal declaration of its intention
in its interim report, it should have issued notice under
section 8-B to the two petitioners, if it was of the view as
it seems to be, for which view there is apparently no justi-
fication, that issue of a formal notice under section 8-B
was the sine-qua-non for attracting that Section. At all
events, the Committee could not deny the petitioners the
statutory protection of Section 8-B by merely refraining
from issuing a formal notice even though on its own declared
intention the section was clearly attracted.
In State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad,
[1966] Suppl. S.C.R. page 401, while dealing with Section 10
of the Jammu and Kashmir Commission of Enquiry Act, 1962,
which seems to be an amalgam of Section 8-B and 8-C of the
Commissions of Enquiry Act, 1952 and repelling the argument
that section 10 applied only when the conduct of a person
came to be enquired into incidentally and not when the
Commission had been set up to enquire directly into the
conduct of a person, it was held:

“If a Commission is set up to inquire directly
into the conduct of a person, the Commission
must find it necessary to inquire into that
conduct and such a person would, therefore, be
one covered by s. 10. It would be strange
indeed if the Act provided for fights of a
person whose conduct incidentally came to be
enquired into but did not do so in the case of
persons whose conduct has directly to be in
quired into under the order setting up the
Commission. It would
43
be equally strange if the Act contemplated the
conduct of a person being inquired into inci-
dentally and not directly. What can be done
indirectly should obviously have been consid-
ered capable of being done directly.”

In State of Karnataka v. Union of India & Another,
[1978], 2 S.C.R., page 1, with reference to Section 8-B of
the Act, it was held at page 108 of the report that it was
undeniable that the person whose conduct was being enquired
into was exposed to the fierce light of publicity.
Keeping in view the nature of the allegations made in
the statements of case and the supporting affidavits filed
on behalf of the various Bar Associations including the
Delhi High Court Bar Association requirement of even Clause

(b) of Section 8-B was filfilled inasmuch as if those alle-
gations were proved they were likely to prejudicially affect
the reputation of the two petitioners. Indeed, in view of
the term of reference which contemplated taking of “strin-
gent action” against all those responsible, even the career
of the petitioners as Police officers was likely to be
affected in case an adverse finding was recorded against
them. In view of the aforesaid specific term of reference,
the principle that the report of a Commission of Enquiry has
no force proprio vigore does not on a pragmatic approach to
the consequences seem to constitute sufficient safeguard so
far as the petitioners are concerned.

The reason for the importance attached with regard to
the matter of safeguarding the reputation of a person being
prejudicially affected in Clause (b) of Section 8-B of the
Act is not far to seek.

The following words of caution uttered by the Lord to
Arjun in Bhagwad Gita with regard to dishonour or loss of
reputation may usefully be quoted:

“Akirtinchapi Bhutani Kathaishyanti
te-a-vyayam, Sambhavitasya Chakirtir mara-
nadatirichyate.” (234) (Men will recount thy
perpetual dishonour, and to one highly es-
teemed, dishonour exceedeth death. )
In Blackstone’s commentary of the laws of England, Vol-
I, IVth Edition, it has been stated at page 101 that the
right of personal security consists in a person’s legal and
uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body,
his health and his reputation.

44

In Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 77 at page 268 is to be
found the statement of law in the following terms:

“It is stated in the definition Person, 70
C.J.S.p. 688 note 66 that legally the term
“person” includes not only the physical body
and members, but also every bodily sense and
personal attribute, among which is the reputa-
tion a man has acquired. Blackstone in his
Commentaries classifies and distinguishes
those fights which are annexed to the person,
jura personarum, and acquired fights in exter-
nal objects, jura rerum; and in the former he
includes personal security, which consists in
a person’s legal and uninterrupted enjoyment
of his life, his limbs, his body, his health,
and his reputation. And he makes the corre-
sponding classification of remedies. The idea
expressed is that a man’s reputation is a part
of himself, as his body and limbs are, and
reputation is a sort of fight to enjoy the
goods opinion of others, and it is capable of
growth and real existence, as an arm or leg.
Reputation is, therefore, a personal fight,
and the right to reputation is put among those
absolute personal fights equal in dignity and
importance to security from violence. Accord-
ing to Chancellor Kent, “as a part of the
rights of personal security, the preservation
of every person’s good name from the vile arts
of detraction is justly included. The laws of
the ancients, no less than those of modern
nations, made private reputation one of the
objects of their protection.

The fight to the enjoyment of a good
reputation is a valuable privilege, of ancient
origin, and necessary to human society, as
stated in Libel and Slander S. 4, and this
fight is within the constitutional guaranty of
personal security as stated in Constitutional
La S. 205, and a person may not be deprived of
this fight through falsehood and violence
without liability for the injury as stated in
Libel and Slander S. 4.

Detraction from a man’s reputation is
an injury to his personality, and thus an
injury to reputation is a personal injury,
that is, an injury to an absolute personal
right.”

In D.F. Marion v. Davis, 55 American Law Reports, page
171, it was held:

45

“The right to the enjoyment of a private
reputation, unassailed by malicious slander is
of ancient origin, and is necessary to human
society. A good reputation is an element of
personal security, and is protected by the
Constitution equally with the right to the
enjoyment of life, liberty, and property.”

In view of the foregoing discussion and the reasons
already stated in our order dated 18th August 1988, we are
of the view that the two petitioners namely, Smt. Kiran Bedi
and Jinder Singh clearly fell within the category of persons
contemplated by section 8-B of the Act and were consequently
entitled to the same treatment as has been accorded by the
Committee to the persons to whom notice has been issued by
it under the said section. As a consequence, we are further
of the opinion that our answer to point No. (iii) has to be
that the Committee was not justified in calling upon the two
petitioners to stand in the witness box for cross-examina-
tion at the very initial stage of the enquiry. In this
connection, it has to be borne in mind that Section 8-B
inter alia contemplates an opportunity being given to the
person governed by the said section to produce evidence in
his defence whereas Section 8-C inter alia gives him the
right to cross-examine the witnesses who depose against him.
Not only that calling upon a person governed by Section 8-B
to produce evidence in his defence at the very inception of
the inquiry is a contradiction in terms inasmuch as in this
situation such a person would really be required to disprove
statements prejudicial to him of such witnesses who are yet
to be examined, it would also reduce the right of cross-
examination by such person to a mere formality for the
obvious reason that by the time the witnesses who are to be
cross-examined are produced, the defence of such person
which would normally constitute the basis for the line and
object of crossexamination would already be known to such
witnesses and they are likely to refashion their statements
accordingly.

Perhaps in a case where there is no other witness to
give information about the alleged incident about which the
inquiry is being held and the only person or persons who
would give such information is or are the person or persons
who are likely to be adversely affected by the inquiry, it
may be necessary to depart from the above view as a matter
of necessity. But this is not one such case. There are
admittedly any number of other persons who can give evidence
about what happened on the relevant dates.
Learned counsel for the various Bar Associations who shall
46
hereinafter be referred to as learned counsel for the re-
spondent expressed an apprehension that in case a person
governed by Section 8-B was to be examined at the end and at
that stage such person even at the risk of not producing his
defence, for some reason, chooses not to appear as a wit-
ness, the Committee would be deprived of knowing the facts
in the knowledge of such person and such a course would
obviously hamper the enquiry. To us this apprehension seems
to be more imaginary than real inasmuch as the power of the
Commission to call upon any person to appear as a witness
under Section 4 of the Act which in terms is very wide and
is not circumscribed by fetters of stage, will be available
to the Commission and the Commission would be entitled to
call such person as a witness even at that stage.
Before parting with these points we may point out that
learned counsel for the respondent cited several authorities
in support of the principle that the report of a Commission
of Inquiry which was only a fact finding body did not have
force proprio vigore and was only recommendatory in nature.
Since the principle is well-settled we have not considered
it necessary to deal with those authorities. Likewise some
cases were cited with regard to claim of privilege by a
witness. Since the petitioners are not claiming any privi-
lege but are only claiming to be treated in a reasonable way
as persons governed by Section 8-B of the Act and to be
meted out the same treatment which has been given to persons
falling in that category, those cases also are not necessary
to be dealt with.

Now we come to the fourth point namely whether the
orders of the Committee directing prosecution of the peti-
tioners under Section 178 I.P.C are legal. In order to
appreciate the respective submissions of the learned counsel
for the parties on this point it will be useful to reproduce
here Sections 178 and 179 I.P.C They read:

“178. Refusing oath or affirmation when duly
required by public servant to make it.–Whoev-
er refuses to bind himself by an oath or
affirmation to state the truth, when required
so to bind himself by a public servant legally
competent to require that he shall so bind
himself, shall be punished with simple impris-
onment for a term which may extend to six
months, or with fine which may extend to one
thousand rupees, or with both.

179. Refusing to answer public serv-
ant authorised to question. Whoever, being
legally bound to state the truth
47
on any subject to any public servant, refuses
to answer any question demanded of him touch-
ing that subject by such public servant in the
exercise of the legal powers of such public
servant, shall be punished with simple impris-
onment for a term which may extend to six
months, or with fine which may extend to one
thousand rupees, or with both.”

The Committee had in the instant case directed a com-

plaint to be filed against each of the petitioners for an
offence punishable under Section 178 I.P.C. and subsequently
filed complaints accordingly. The charge against the peti-
tioners, therefore, was of refusal to bind themselves by an
oath or affirmation to state the truth on being called upon
to do so. Section 179 I.P.C. in the context becomes relevant
in so far as it deals with the consequences of refusal by
the person concerned to answer questions demanded of him
touching that subject with regard to which such person had
bound himself to state the truth under Section 178. The
context in which the two petitioners were required to bind
themselves by an oath or affirmation to state the truth was
to face cross-examination. The petitioners were obviously
placed on the horns of a dilemma. If they refused to bind
themselves by an oath or affirmation to state the truth they
became liable to be punished with simple imprisonment for a
term which may extend to six months or with fine which may
extend to one thousand rupees or with both. If on the other
hand they had to bound themselves and thereafter refused to
answer any question as contemplated by Section 179 they
would have again become vulnerable to identical punishment.
The problem in the aforesaid background presents two
propositions: (1) whether on the belief that they were
persons covered by Section 8-B of the Act the petitioners
could avoid the consequences of Sections 178 and 179 I.P.C
by claiming absolute immunity from binding themselves by an
oath or affirmation for answering questions put to them and
(2) whether they could avoid those consequences if they had
valid justification for refusing to take oath or affirmation
without claiming an absolute immunity from binding them-
selves by an oath or affirmation. The answer to the first
proposition, in our opinion, has to be in the negative
whereas of the second in the affirmative. Our reasons for
this conclusion are these:

In McGrain v. Daugherty, 71 L.ed. 580 one of the ques-
tions which arose for consideration was whether the
Senate–or the House of Representatives, both being on the
same plane in this regard–has
48
power, through its own process, to compel a private individ-
ual to appear before it or one of its committees and give
testimony needed to enable it efficiently to exercise a
legislative function belonging to it under the Constitution.
It was held that the power of inquiry–with process to
enforce it–is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function and that the provisions in this behalf
are not of doubtful meaning, but “are intended to be effec-
tively exercised, and therefore to carry with them such
auxiliary powers as are necessary and appropriate to that
end. While the power to exact information in aid of the
legislative function was not involved in those cases, the
rule of interpretation applied there is applicable here. A
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in
the absence of information respecting the conditions which
the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where
the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite
information–which not infrequently is true–recourse must
be had to others who do possess it. Experience has taught
that mere requests for such information often are unavail-
ing, and also that information which is volunteered is not
always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion are
essential to obtain what is needed. All this was true before
and when the Constitution was framed and adopted. In that
period the power of inquiry–with enforcing process–was
regarded and employed as a necessary and appropriate at-
tribute of the power to legislate–indeed, was treated as
inhering in it. Thus there is ample warrant for thinking, as
we do, that the constitutional provisions which commit the
legislative function to the two houses are intended to
include this attribute to the end that the function may be
effectively exercised.”

On these findings, with regard to refusal by the witness
to appear and testify before the Committee and being at-
tached as a consequence thereof, it was held:

“We conclude that the investigation was or-
dered for a legitimate object; that the wit-
ness wrongfully refused to appear and testify
before the Committee and was lawfully at-
tached; that the Senate is entitled to have
him give testimony pertinent to the inquiry,
either at its bar or before the committee; and
that the district court erred in discharging
him from custody under the attachment.”

In Uphaus v. Wyman (3 L.ed 2d 1090) a witness at an
investigation by the Attorney General of the State of New
Hampshire, conducted pursuant to a resolution of the State
legislature authorizing the
49
Attorney General to determine whether there were subversives
within the state, refused to obey a subpoena calling for the
production of a list of persons who were guests at a camp
operated within New Hampshire by a voluntary corporation of
which the witness was executive director. On petition of the
Attorney General, the Merrimack Country Court called the
witness before it and the witness again refused to produce
the information, asserting, first, that, by the Smith Act
(18 USC s. 2385), Congress had so completely occupied the
field of subversive activities that the states were without
power to investigate in that area, and, second, that the due
process clause precluded enforcement of the subpoena. The
court rejected the witness’ argument, and, upon his contin-
ued refusal to produce the list, adjudged him in contempt
and committed him to jail until he should comply. The Su-
preme Court of New Hampshire affirmed, and even after remand
by the United States Supreme Court it reaffirmed its former
decision. On appeal, while affirming the decision of the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire the United States Supreme
Court held that since the Attorney General sought to learn
if subversive persons were in the State because of the
legislative determination that such persons, statutorily
defined with a view toward the Communist Party, posed a
serious threat to the security of the State, the investiga-
tion was undertaken in the interest of self-preservation and
this governmental interest outweighed individual rights in
an associational privacy which, however, real in other
circumstances were here tenuous at best. It was further held
that “the governmental interest in self-preservation is
sufficiently compelling to subordinate the interest in
associational privacy of persons who, at least to the extent
of the guest registration statute, made public at the incep-
tion the association they now wish to keep private. In the
light of such a record we conclude that the State’s interest
has not been “pressed, in this instance, to a point where it
has come into fatal collision with the overriding” constitu-
tionally protected rights of appellant and those he may
represent.”

In Sinclair v. United States, (73 L.ed. 692 it was held:

“Neither Senate Joint Resolution 54 nor the
action taken under it operated to divest the
Senate or the committee of power further to
investigate the actual administration of the
land laws. It may be conceded that Congress is
without authority to compel disclosures for
the purpose of aiding the prosecution of
pending suits; but the authority of that body,
directly or through its committees, to require
pertinent disclosures in aid of its own con-
stitutional power, is
50
not abridged because the information sought to
be elicited may also be of use in such suits.”

In Kastigar v. United States, (32 LEd 2d 2 12) the
United States District Court for the Central District of
California’ ordered the petitioners to appear before a grand
jury and to answer its questions under a grant of immunity.
The immunity was based upon a provision of the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970 stating that neither the compelled
testimony nor any information directly or indirectly derived
from such testimony could be used against the witness.
Notwithstanding the grant of immunity, the petitioners
refused to answer the grand jury’s questions and were found
in contempt. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed (440 F2d 954), rejecting the peti-
tioners’ contention that it violated their constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination to compel them to
testify without granting them transactional immunity from
prosecution for any offence to which the compelled testimony
might relate.

On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court affirmed.
It held that the power of government to compel persons to
testify in court or before grand juries and other governmen-
tal agencies was firmly established but was not absolute,
being subject to a number of exemptions, the most important
of which was the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. With reference to Federal Statute (18 USCS s.
6002) it was held:

“That a federal statute permitting the govern-
ment to compel a witness to give testimony,
but granting the witness immunity from the use
in any criminal case of the compelled testimo-
ny or any evidence derived therefrom, does not
violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination.”

In Brown v. Walker, (40 L.ed. 819) the question involved
was with regard to an alleged incompatibility between that
clause of the 5th Amendment to the Constitution, which
declares that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself” and the act of Con-
gress of February 11, 1983 (27 Stat. at L. 443), which
enacts that” no person shall be excused from attending and
testifying or from producing books, papers, tariffs, con-
tracts, agreements and documents before the Interstate
Commerce Commission, or in obedience to the subpoena of the
Commission, …… on the ground or for the reason that
the testimony or evidence, documentary
51
or otherwise, required of him, may tend to criminate him or
subject him to a penalty or forfeiture. But no person shall
be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for
or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concern-
ing which he may testify, or produce evidence, documentary
or otherwise, before said Commission, or in obedience to its
subpoena, or either of them, or in any such case or proceed-
ing.” It was held:

“it is entirely true that the statute does not
purport, nor is it possible for any statute,
to shield the witness from the personal dis-
grace or opprobrium attaching to the exposure
of his crime; but, as we have already ob-
served, the authorities are numerous and very
nearly uniform to the effect that, if the
proposed testimony is material to the issue on
trial, the fact that the testimony may tend to
degrade the witness in public estimation does
not exempt him from the duty of disclosure. A
person who commits a criminal act is found to
contemplate the consequences of exposure to
his good name and reputation, and ought not to
call upon the courts to protect that which he
has himself esteemed to be of such little
value. The safety and welfare of an entire
community should not be put into the scale
against the reputation of a self-confessed
criminal, who ought not, either in justice or
in good morals, to refuse to disclose that
which may be of great public utility, in order
that his neighbors may think well of him. The
design of the constitutional privilege is not
to aid the witness in vindicating his charac-
ter, but to protect him against being com-
pelled to furnish evidence to convict him of a
criminal charge. If he secure legal immunity
from prosecution, the possible impairment of
his good name is a penalty which it is reason-
able he should be compelled to pay for the
common good. If it be once conceded that the
fact that his testimony may tend to bring the
witness into disrepute, though not to incrimi-
nate. him, does not entitle him to the privi-
lege of silence, it necessarily follows that
if it also tends to incriminate, but at the
same time operates as a pardon for the of-
fence, the fact that the disgrace remains no
more entitles him to immunity in this case
than in the other.”

It is in this view of the matter and in view of the
provisions contained in Sections 4 to 6 of the Act and the
rules framed thereunder that we are of the opinion that the
petitioners on the belief that they
52
were persons covered by Section 8B could not avoid the
consequences of Sections 178 and 179 by claiming absolute
immunity from binding themselves by an oath or affirmation
for answering questions put to them.

Indeed in the instant case the petitioners are not
asserting that they could not be required at all to appear
as a witness before the Committee and make statement on
oath. As is apparent from our order dated 18th August, 1988
on behalf of both the petitioners it was submitted that they
did not either wish to delay the proceedings or to show
disrespect to the Committee but only wanted to protect their
own interest by making the submission which they made before
the Committee as per legal advice given to them. According
to learned counsel for the petitioners the legal advice
given to the petitioners was that since they were persons
covered by Section 8B of the Act they were entitled to
produce evidence in defence and could as such be called upon
to enter the witness box at the end of the inquiry and could
not be required to enter the witness box for cross-examina-
tion almost as the first two witnesses before the Committee.
According to him the stand taken by the petitioners was that
they being covered by Section 8B of the Act their defence
would be put to serious jeopardy and will be prejudicially
affected if they were required to appear in the witness box
for cross-examination at the very inception of the inquiry
even before statements of witnesses proving the accusations
against the petitioners had been recorded which they were
entitled to defend. That this was really the case of the
petitioners will be apparent from our discussion a little
later. In this background we pass on to the second proposi-
tion referred to above namely whether the petitioners could
avoid the consequences contemplated by Sections 178 and 179
I.P.C by putting forth valid justification for refusing to
bind themselves by oath or affirmation even without claiming
an absolute immunity from binding themselves by an oath or
affirmation.

In Watkins v. United States, 1 L.ed. 2d 1273 a union
officer, appearing as a witness before a subcommittee of the
House Committee on Un-American Activities, refused to answer
questions as to past Communist Party membership of certain
persons, objecting to the questions on the ground of lack of
pertinency to the subject under inquiry by the subcommittee.
In a prosecution in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, he was convicted of violating the
statute providing for criminal punishment of witnesses
before congressional committees who refuse to answer any
question pertinent to the question under inquiry, and the
conviction was affirmed by the
53
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court
reversed the conviction. Warren, Chief Justice, speaking for
the five members of the Court, ruled that to support a
conviction under a statute a congressional investigating
committee must, upon objection of a witness on the grounds
of pertinency, state for the record the subject under in-
quiry at that time and the manner in which the propounded
questions are pertinent thereto. Consequently refusal to
answer a question on the ground that it was not pertinent,
was found to be a valid justification.

In Flaxer v. United States, 3 L.ed. 2d 183 relying on
the decision in Watkins (Supra) that the courts must accord
to the defendants every right which is guaranteed to defend-
ants in all other criminal cases it was held that one of
these guarantees is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the
refusal of the witness was deliberate and intentional. This
decision is. therefore~ an authority for the proposition
that if the refusal of the witness was not deliberate and
intentional but was for a valid cause such refusal could not
be made the basis for prosecuting the witness.
In Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York, 12 L.ed.
2d 678 notwithstanding the grant of immunity under the laws
of New Jersey and New York, petitioners, as witnesses before
the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, refused to
answer questions on the ground that the answers might tend
to incriminate them under federal law, to which the grant of
immunity did not purport to extend. Petitioners were there-
upon held in civil and criminal contempt of court. The New
Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the civil contempt judgments,
holding that a state may constitutionally compel a witness
to give testimony which might be used in a federal prosecu-
tion against him. On certiorari, the United States Supreme
Court vacated the judgment of contempt and remanded the
cause to the New Jersey Supreme Court. It was held:

“… We hold the constitutional rule to be
that a state witness may not be compelled to
give testimony which may be incriminating
under federal law unless the compelled testi-
mony and its fruits cannot be used in any
manner by federal officials in connection with
a criminal prosecution against him. We con-
clude, moreover, that in order to implement
this constitutional rule and accommodate the
interests of the State and Federal Governments
in
54
investigating and prosecuting crime, the
Federal Government must be prohibited from
making any such use of compelled testimony and
its fruits. This exclusionary rule, while
permitting the States to secure information
necessary for effective law enforcement,
leaves the witness and the Federal Government
in substantially the same position as if the
witness had claimed his privilege in the ab
sence of a state grant of immunity. It follows
that petitioners here may now be compelled to
answer the questions propounded to them. At
the time they refused to answer, however,
petitioners had a reasonable fear, based on
this Court’s decision in Feldman v. United
States, supra, that the federal authorities
might use the answers against them in connec-
tion with a federal prosecution. We have now
overruled Feldman and held that the Federal
Government may make no such use of the an-
swers. Fairness dictates that petitioners
should now be afforded an opportunity, in
light of this development, to answer the
questions. Accordingly, the judgment of the
New Jersey courts ordering petitioners to
answer the questions may remain undisturbed.
But the judgment of contempt is vacated and
the cause remanded to the New Jersey Supreme
Court for proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion.”

In this case also it is, therefore, clear that a valid
justification put forth by the witness was considered to
constitute sufficient ground to make him immune from prose-
cution.

We have already pointed out in our order dated 18th
August, 1988 that if the Committee had found that the peti-
tioners were covered by Section 8B of the Act it would most
probably itself not have required them to get into the
witness box for being cross-examined till the end of the
inquiry. We have reached this conclusion from the circum-
stances that it is the Committee’s own view as expressed in
its order dated 29th June, 1988 that persons covered by
Section 8B have to be examined at the end of the inquiry.
That the case of the petitioners in not taking oath for
being cross-examined at the very initial stage was based on
Section 8B seems to be apparent. The plea taken in the
application made on behalf of the Commissioner of Police on
17th May, 1988 for first calling upon the Bar Association to
start their evidence and to call upon the Commissioner of
Police to adduce his evidence thereafter was the first
indication in this behalf. This plea was, at all events,
relevant qua those police officers whose conduct was
55
to be examined. Secondly, when on 19th May, 1988 the learned
counsel for Smt. Kiran Bedi was required to justify her
stand of not taking oath, Section 8B was specifically plead-
ed and reliance was placed on the decision in the case of
Smt. Indira Gandhi and another v. Mr. J.C. Shah Commission
of Inquiry, ILR 1980 1 Delhi 552 as is borne out by the
order of the Committee of that date. The justification so
pleaded was repelled by the Committee on two grounds, namely
that Smt. Indira Gandhi in that inquiry had not filed any
affidavit and that she had been summoned under Section 8B.
On the view of the Committee expressed in its order dated
29th June, 1988, which will, in the absence of any material
to the contrary, be deemed to be its view even on 19th May,
1988, that persons covered by Section 8B were to be examined
at the end of the inquiry, the fact that an affidavit of
Smt. Kiran Bedi was on record could hardly justify her being
called upon to enter the witness box at the very inception.
As regards the second ground we have already held that the
fact that no formal notice had been issued under Section 8B
would constitute no justification for not treating a person
to be covered by that section, if otherwise the ingredients
of the said section were made out.

As regards Jinder Singh the order of the Committee dated
26th May, 1988 quoted earlier indicates that Jinder Singh
had clearly stated that he is not prepared to take the oath
because he is in the nature of an accused and he cannot be
asked to start the evidence and would be prepared to come in
the witness box after the evidence of other party is record-
ed. Jinder Singh did not state that he was an accused before
the Committee. In saying that he was “in the nature of” an
accused be obviously meant that since his conduct was to be
examined as contemplated by Section 8B he was entitled to
appear as a witness in his defence after the witnesses on
behalf of the Bar Association which was accusing him had
been examined. Had the Committee not been labouring under
the misapprehension that the petitioners were not covered by
Section 8B, because no notices under that section had been
issued to them, notwithstanding the fact that their conduct
was to be examined on its own declared intention, it would
obviously not have required the petitioners to take oath for
being cross-examined at the stage at which it did so. The
subsequent orders of the Committee directing complaints to
be filed against the petitioners for an offence punishable
under Section 178 I.P.C. and the act of filing such com-
plaints apparently were the consequences of the aforesaid
misapprehension. We have already held that the petitioners
were covered by Section 8B of the Act. The action of the
Committee in compelling the petitioners to enter the witness
box on the dates in question for being
56
cross-examined, when even according to it as is apparent
from its order dated 29th June, 1988, persons similarly
situated were to do so at the end of the inquiry, was in
itself discriminatory. There was, therefore, valid justifi-
cation for the refusal by the petitioners to take oath for
cross-examination at the stage when they were required to do
so. The Committee could have on its own reconsidered the
question whether the prosecutions should be pressed further
when the case was referred back to it by the learned Vaca-
tion Judge of this Court by his order dated 2nd June, 1988.
For these reasons and the reasons already given in our order
dated 18th August, 1988 we are of the opinion that the
Committee should not have in the instant case directed the
filing of a complaint against either of the petitioners for
an offence punishable under Section 178 I.P.C. We decide
point (iv) accordingly.

As regards points (v), (vi) and (vii) suffice it to
point out that the petitioners have apart from filing spe-
cial leave petitions also filed writ petitions challenging
the very same orders and since we have held that the action
of the Committee in holding that the petitioners were not
covered by Section 8B of the Act and compelling them to
enter the witness box on the dates in question was discrimi-
natory and the orders directing complaint being filed
against the petitioners were illegal, it is apparently a
case involving infringement of Articles 14 and 21 of the
Constitution. In such a situation the power of this Court to
pass an appropriate order in exercise of its jurisdiction
under Articles 32 and 142 of the Constitution cannot be
seriously doubted particularly having regard to the special
facts and circumstances of this case. On the orders direct-
ing filing of complaints being held to be invalid the conse-
quential complaints and the proceedings thereon including
the orders of the Magistrate issuing summons cannot survive
and it is in this view of the matter that by our order dated
18th August, 1988 we have quashed them. As regards the
submission that it was not a fit case for interference
either under Article 32 or Article 136 of the Constitution
inasmuch as it was still open to the petitioners to prove
their innocence before the Magistrate, suffice it to say
that in the instant case if the petitioners are compelled to
face prosecution in spite of the finding that the orders
directing complaint to be filed against them were illegal it
would obviously cause prejudice to them.. Points (v), (vi)
and (vii) are decided accordingly.

These, apart from those stated in our order dated 18th
August, 1988 are our reasons for the said order.
N.P.V.

57