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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH AT NAGPUR.
WRIT PETITION NO. 2593 OF 2000
1. Kisanrao Khobragade Education Society,
Armori, Through its President Shri Bhagyawan
s/o Kisanrao Khobragade, Adult,
r/o Armori, Distt. Gadchiroli.
2. Principal,
Yeshwantrao Chavan College,
Lakhandur, Distt. Bhandara. :: PETITIONERS
-: Versus :-
1. Bhojraj s/o Kevalram Motghare,
aged about 38 yrs., r/o Talodhi (Kh.),
Post Gangalwadi, Tq. Bramhapuri,
Distt. Chandrapur.
2. University & College Tribunal,
Nagpur University, Nagpur.
3. Nagpur University,
through its Registrar,
Tagore Marg, Civil Lines,
Nagpur. :: RESPONDENTS
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Shri S. A. Radke, Advocate for the petitioners.
Shri A. S. Kilor, Advocate for respondent No. 1.
None for respondents No. 2 & 3.
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CORAM: F. M. REIS, J.
DATE : 2nd May, 2009
ORAL JUDGMENT
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1. Heard the learned Counsel for the petitioners and respondent No. 1.
The petition has been filed to challenge order dated 4/5/2000 passed by
respondent No. 2 whereby Misc. Civil Application No. 16 of 2000 filed by
respondent No. 1 for condonation of delay was allowed. It is the case of
the petitioners that on or about 3/3/2000 respondent No. 1 filed appeal
under Section 59 of the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994 challenging
his termination w.e.f. July, 1998 and prayed for relief of reinstatement
with all back wages. As the appeal was not filed within the period of 30
days, respondent No. 1 moved an application for condonation of delay
for preferring the said appeal. In the said application the grounds which
were sought to be invoked by respondent No. 1 as a justification to file
appeal beyond the period of limitation was that, he was pursuing another
remedy in as much as he had filed representation before respondent No.3
to get his grievances decided. According to respondent No.1, he was
bona-fidely pursuing his remedy before respondent No. 3. Respondent
No. 1 further stated in the application that despite of direction on the part
of respondent No. 3 to get him reinstated, the petitioners failed to comply
with such direction which forced him to file the said appeal before
respondent No. 2.
2. Despite all objections on the part of the petitioners to the said
application for condonation of delay, respondent No. 2 vide impugned
oder dated 4/5/2000 condoned the delay to prefer the appeal filed by the
respondent No. 1. Being aggrieved by the said order dated 4/5/2000, the
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present petition has been filed by the petitioner.
3. During the course of hearing, the learned Counsel for the petitioners
sought to impugn the said order passed by respondent No. 2 contending
that there was no justification shown by respondent No. 1 which could
condone the delay to prefer the appeal. Respondent No. 1 had not shown
any cause to condone the delay and consequently there was no
justification according to the petitioners in respondent No. 2 passing the
impugned order. On the other hand, the learned Counsel appearing for
respondent No. 1 urged before me that there was ample justification on
the part of respondent No. 1 in preferring the appeal beyond the period
of limitation as he was pursuing the remedy bona-fidely before
respondent No. 3 and had reasonable expectation that he would get
required results before respondent No. 3. Having not been able to get the
relief as sought for, in view of the attitude by the petitioners in failing to
accept the directions by respondent No. 3 to reinstate respondent No. 1,
the appeal had to be preferred by respondent No. 1 before respondent
No. 2. The learned Counsel relied upon the judgment of this Court
reported in 2008 (2) Mh. L. J. -494 – Sandeep Hiralal Netke vs. State of
Maharashtra & others. The learned Counsel further submits that there is
no dispute that respondent No. 1 was bona-fidely pursuing remedy
before respondent No. 3. However, considering the attitude on the part
of the petitioner in failure to accept direction of respondent No.3, the
appeal had to be filed by respondent No. 1.
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4. In the judgment of this Court, cited supra, at para 11, this Court has
held as under:
“It is significant to note that the petitioner had made
representation to the Deputy Director of Education and
Vocational training, who had issued directions from time to
time and had even threatened the Management of stoppage of
salary grants and had also directed the Management not to
admit the students unless the directions were complied with.
In the aid circumstances, the petitioner can be said to be
entitled to a legitimate expectation that he would ultimately
get relief from the said Authority. It is not as if the petitioner
was making only representations after representations. The
representations were met with the order being passed by the
Deputy Director of Education and Vocational training. In the
said circumstances, the delay between the year 2000 and
31-3-2003, when the Writ Petition filed by the petitioner was
rejected, can be justified. In my view, the petitioner has shown
sufficient cause for condoning the said delay as it is well settled
that it is to the extent of the delay but the cause shown. In the
instant case, it cannot be said that the petitioner was negligent
or that he was mala-fidely pursuing some other remedy….”
The facts in the present case and the facts before this Court in the
said judgment appears to be identical. There is no reason shown by
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the petitioner which could disclose that respondent No. 1 was mala-fidely
pursuing some other remedy or then there was any negligence on his
part in pursuing such remedy. On the contrary, the facts disclosed, as
rightly held by respondent No. 2 that respondent No. 1 was pursuing the
remedy before the Authority in a bonafide and diligent manner.
5. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that there was any infirmity
in respondent No. 2 condoning the delay in filing appeal by respondent
No.1. However, the said application for condonation of delay ought to
have been disposed of by awarding some costs to the petitioner, which
was not done by respondent No. 2 whilst passing the impugned order.
Consequently, there is no illegality so as to interfere in the impugned
order dated 04/5/2000 in M. C. A. No. 16 of 2000. But, however,
respondent No. 1 is directed to pay costs of Rs. 1,000/- (rupees one
thousand only), within two weeks, to the petitioner for getting the delay
condoned.
6. In the circumstances, the writ petition is disposed of accordingly.
Rule discharged.
JUDGE
WWL
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