JUDGMENT
V.K. Singhal, J.
1. All these writ petitions are disposed of by this common judgment. The learned Counsel for the respondents have raised a preliminary objection that the writ petitions are not maintainable as filed by the societies or association of persons and that the petitions suffer from laches and delay.
2. In the case of writ petition No. 1013 of 1996 the plot holders of villages Budhsingh Pura, Manohar Pura, Tilawala Badh, Jagatpur, Tilawala etc. have prayed that the notification dated 15.10.1991 issued under Section 4 and declaration dated 16.2.1993 issued under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and also the award dated 7.8.1995, be quashed and the respondents be directed not to interfere with the peaceful possession of the plot holders.
3. In the case of writ petition No. 416 of 1996 the petitioner is stated to be an organisation of the plot holders of 45 schemes chalked out by many cooperative societies in the area of villages Budhsingh Pura, Manohar Pura, Tilawala Badh. Tilawala, Jagatpura, Khokhawala, Surajpura Ghati and Sawai Getore. Same prayer, as has been made in writ petition No. 1013/96, has been made in this petition also.
4. In the case of writ petition No. 2 of 1997 the petitioners have challenged the notification issued under Section 4 dated 15.10.1991, declaration issued under Section 6 dated 16.2.1993, the award dated 7.8.1995 and have also claimed suitable compensation for the houses and other constructions they have made over their lands.
5. The land in question is situated near Sanganer town and in the notification issued under Section 4 it was mentioned that the land was required for extension of the Aerodrum. The notification under Section 4 was published in Dainik Nav Jyoti on 10.12.1991 and in Rajasthan Patrika on 12.12.1991 and was published in the official gazette on 19.12.1991. The third mode of public notice has also been complied with on 7.2.1992. The declaration issued under Section 6 was published in the official gazette on 16.2.1993. Public notice was issued on 27.8.1993 and the declaration was published in Samachar Jagat and Rajasthan Patrika on 22.9.1993. The first award was passed on 6.4.1995 and was in respect of 13 bigha 12 biswa land. Subsequently another award dated 7.8.1995 was passed. Various representations were made by the samities to various authorities and when no action was taken it is stated that these writ petitions have been filed in 1996.
6. The submission of the learned Counsel for respondents is that under Article 226 of the Constitution only the person who has a personal interest, could file the writ petition. The samities have no interest and even if the samities are authorised by the members to file the writ petitions, the same is not maintainable because the facts of each and every individual are different and they cannot collectively invoke the extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court. Section 3(b) defines the expression “person interested” and it reads as follows:
the expression “person interested” includes all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of land under this Act; and a person shall be deemed to be interested in land if he is interested in an easement affecting the land;
It is stated that possession of the land has been taken and handed over to the Airport Authority. The plot holders who are represented by the samities, were allotted the plots by the societies under the agreement of sale and since the societies are not entitled for claiming any interest on the basis of judgments of this Court, the members also cannot be the aggrieved person in this regard.
7. On behalf of the petitioners reliance has been placed on the decision given in the case of Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India and Ors., , wherein it was observed that if the aggrieved person suffers from poverty, disability, socially or economically disadvantaged position, writ petition by another person on his behalf is maintainable. It may be observed that the case in hand is neither a public interest litigation nor the members of the societies are suffering from poverty, disability or are socially or economically at disadvantaged position. It was also observed by the Apex Court in this very case that the Court would not, in exercise of its discretion, intervene at the instance of a meddlesome inter-lopper or busy body and would ordinarily insist that only a person whose fundamental right is violated should be allowed to activist the Court.
8. Decision given in the case of Fertilizer Corporation Kamagar Union Sindri and Ors. v. Union of India AIR 1981 SC 344, is also relied upon by the petitioners, wherein it was observed that when a citizen belongs to an organisation which has special interest, in the subject matter, if he has some concern deeper than that of a busybody, a writ petition by such a citizen would be permissible under Article 226 of the Constitution.
9. Relying on the decision given in the case of The R.S.E.B. Accountant’s Associations Rajasthan Jaipur v. The Rajasthan State Electricity Board and Anr. 1995(3) WLC1, it was stated that since the petitioner societies are registered and the members are identifiable, the writ petitions are maintainable.
10. Reliance has also been placed on the decision given in the case of Lecturers Forum v. State of Rajasthan, 1993(l) WLC 654, where also it was observed that when the grievance raised by different petitioners is identical there is every justification for them to approach to this Court by filing a joint writ petition instead of filing separate writ petition by individual member and when the grievance raised by a large number of persons is common and based on the same facts, filing of separate writ petitions should be avoided.
11. The decision in the case of Scheduled Caste and Weaker Section Welfare Association and Anr. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. , is also relied upon, where also it was observed that if action of the government affects a class of persons and if that group of persons is represented by the association, they have a right to be beard in the matter. Where a member of the public acting bona fide moves the Court for enforcement of a fundamental right on behalf of a person or class of persons who on account of poverty or disability or socially or economically disadvantaged position cannot approach the Court for relief, such member of the public may move the Court even by just writing a letter.
12. The decision given in the case of Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh (Railway) v. Union of India and Ors., , is also relied upon where also it was observed that a large body of persons with a common grievance can approach the Apex Court under Article 32 of the Constitution.
13. The observations in the case of Godde Venkateswara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. , are also relied upon where it was held that ordinarily the petitioner who seeks to file an application under Article 226 should be one who has a personal or individual right in the subject matter of the petition. The personal right need not be in respect of a proprietary interest: it can also relate to an interest of a trustee. In exceptional cases, a person who has been prejudicially affected by an act or omission of an authority, can file a petition even though he has no proprietary or even fiduciary interest in the subject matter.
14. The decision given in the case of Olga Tellis and Ors. v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and Ors., 1995 Suppl (2) SCR 51, is also relied upon. The Peoples Union for Civil Liberties, Committee for the Protection of Democratic Rights and two journalists submitted the petition under Article 32 of the Constitution which was entertained for enforcement of fundamental rights.
15. The decision given in the case of S.P. Gupta and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. , is also relied upon where the locus standi of the lawyers to raise issues like fixation of strength of Judges in each High Court, appointment and reappointments of additional Judges, short term appointments, transfer etc. was examined and following observations were made:
The traditional rule in regard to locus standi is that judicial redress is available only to a person who has suffered a legal injury by reason of violation of his legal right or legally protected interest by the impugned action of the State or a public authority or any other person or who is likely to suffer a legal injury by reason of threatened violation of his legal right or legally protected interest by any such action. The basis of entitlement to judicial redress is personal injury to property, body, mind or reputation arising from violation, actual or threatened, of the legal right or legally protected interest of the person seeking such redress. This is a rule of vintage and it arose during an era when private law dominated the legal scene and the public law had not been born. Under this rule, the Court concerned only with the question whether the applicant was an aggrieved person. According to this rule, it is only a person who has suffered a specific legal injury by reason of actual or threatened violation of his legal right or legally protected interest who can bring an action for judicial redress. This Rule in regard to locus standi postulates a right duty pattern.
But, narrow and rigid though this rule may be, there are a few exceptions to it which have been evolved by the Courts over the years. They are: (a) A rate payer of a local authority is accorded standing to challenge an illegal action of the local authority; (b) if a person is entitled to participate in the proceedings relating to the decision making process culminating in the impugned decision, he would have locus standi to maintain an action challenging the impugned decision (c) the statute itself may expressly recognise the locus standi of an applicant, even though no legal right protected interest of the applicant has been violated resulting in legal injury to him; and (d) the applicant for judicial redress must have suffered a legal wrong or injury in order to entitle him to maintain an action for such redress.
Where a person who has suffered a legal wrong or a legal injury or whose legal right or legally protected interest is violated, is unable to approach the Court on account of some disability or it is not practicable for him to move the court for some other sufficient reasons, such as his socially or economically disadvantaged position, some other person can invoke assistance of the court for the purpose of providing judicial redress to the person wronged or injured, so that the legal wrong or injury caused to such person does not go unredressed and justice is done to him.
16. In order to examine the contentions whether the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution could be filed in respect of a land acquisition proceedings, the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act are relevant. Before referring to those provisions it would not be relevant to consider that the writ petition could be filed for enforcement of the fundamental rights which are conferred by Part III and for, any other purposes. The present petition is not for enforcement of any fundamental right but is for any other purposes. It has been held by the Apex Court that the acquisition proceedings cannot be challenged before the Civil Court and the only remedy, therefore, remains is the filing of the writ petition under Article 226. Now question arises as to who may file it. This matter has to be examined in the light of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The Act has used three expressions, namely “person interested”, “occupier” and “other person”. Section 3(b) defines “person interested” who is having interest in the compensation in an easement affecting the land. Section 4, by which the preliminary notification is issued, refers to the consent of the “occupier” and that a notice is required to be given for entering into any building or house etc. Section 5A gives the power to the “person interested” for filing the objections. Section 9(2) provides that a notice is required to be given and all ‘persons interested are to appear personally or by agent before the Collector. Section 10 refers to the power to require and enforce the making of statements as to names and interests. Section 11 provides to enquire into the objections of the ‘person interested’ and passing of an award, and under Section 12 the Collector is required to give immediate notice of his award to the ‘persons interested’ if they are not present personalty or by their representative when the award is made. Section 17 gives special powers in cases of urgency and for taking the possession the compensation is required to be offered to the ‘person interested. Under Section ’18 any person interested’ who has not accepted the award, may make a written application to the Collector for reference to the Court. The jurisdiction of the Court is given to the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. Under Section 19(2) the statement along with the reference is to be delivered by the ‘parties interested’. Section 21 provides that the scope of enquiry in every acquisition proceeding shall be restricted to the interests of the persons affected by the objection. Section 23 also refers to the ‘Persons interested’ in its various clauses of Sub-section (1) in respect of the matters to be considered in determining the compensation. Section 24 provides the matters which are not to be taken into consideration in determining compensation and refers to disinclination of the person interested to part with the land acquired, and under Section 28A the persons who are aggrieved by the award of the Collector have been considered to be ‘persons interested’ for re-determination of the amount of compensation. Section 29 provides apportionment of the compensation between several persons interested and payment of compensation is to be made to the ‘persons interested’ entitled thereto under Section 31. Section 33 refers the word “parties interested” for investment of the money deposited in other cases and under Section 35 notice is required to be given to the ‘persons interested’ for the temporary occupation and use of any waste or arable land needed for public purpose.
17. There are various other provisions which I need not refer. Admittedly in the present case the societies are not the “persons interested” and, therefore, it cannot be said that the writ petition can be filed by them watching the interest of their members. The Land Acquisition Officer has considered the rights of members of the societies and found that the societies does not have any locus standi as the agricultural lands were not purchased by them by a registered sale deed. The constructions, if any, also not been made on the basis of permission given by the appropriate authority.
18. The samities were neither party before the Land Acquisition Officer nor it is a case of invoking the fundamental rights of any citizen. It has also not been proved that the members of the societies are suffering from poverty, disability or “are socially or economically disadvantaged and, therefore, could not approach this Court individually. The faces of different members of the societies are altogether different; some are only plot holders, others have constructed their house on such plots and even for the purpose of compensation the consideration is different in individual cases. In a land acquisition matter, writ petition can be filed only by the “person interested” and he can only be said to be the aggrieved person. The association cannot have any right to file a writ petition keeping in view the provisions of Section 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Act.
19. The decision given in the case of Sunder Lal v. Paramsukhdas , relied upon on behalf of the petitioners is also of no assistance to them as it is mentioned in the said Judgment that a person who has no interest in the land can never claim compensation qua compensation, for what he claims is an interest in the compensation, to be awarded, that is not to say that a person claiming an interest in the compensation may not claim that the compensation awarded for the acquired land is low, if it affects his interests. The societies are having no interest in respect of the compensation.
20. The decision given in the case of Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd. v. The State of West Bengal and Ors., 1962 Suppl. (3) SCR 1, is also relied upon on behalf of the petitioners, where the appellant’s lawful rights under the agreement has been abridged, if not wholly destroyed, by the impugned Act. It was held that he has locus standi to apply under Article 226 of the Constitution. There is no agreement for transfer of the land from the Khatedars. It is stated that the khatedars have taken the benefits by way of compensation.
21. In the decision given in the case of the General Government Servants Cooperative Housing Society Ltd., Agra v. Wahab Uddin and Ors., , where purchase was made in auction sale by the government under Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act by depositing entire sale consideration would be person interested though the possession was not given till acquisition due to litigation, it was held that such person has locus standi to maintain writ petition.
22. In Himalaya Tiles & Marble (P.) Ltd, v. Francis Victor Coutinho , the acquisition was made for the company who was bound to make the payment of compensation under the agreement, was considered “interested person.”
23. In Hindu Kanya Maha Vidyalaya, Jind and Anr. v. Municipal Committee, Jind and Ors. , where the appellant was liable to pay more under clause of agreement in the event of compensation being enhanced, it was considered that such person is not “person interested”.
24. The various judgments which have been relied upon on behalf of the petitioners, does not pertain to the matter of Land Acquisition Act. The preliminary objection raised by the learned Counsel for the respondents regarding maintainability of the writ petitions, is accepted and writ petitions No. 416/96 and 1013/96 are dismissed on that ground.
25. The next preliminary objection is on the ground of delay and laches. The learned Counsel for petitioners have stated that the award is void ab initio as they did not had notice of passing the second award and, therefore, the limitation will not come in their way. Reliance is placed on the decision given in the case of Jaipur Development Authority v. Radhey Shyam and Ors. , where it was observed that the land which has been given under Section 11 is a nullity and Its invalidity can be raised even in the execution proceedings. Reliance was also placed on the decision given in the case of Kiran Singh and Ors. v. Chaman Pasivan and Ors. , where it was found that if a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties.
26. The law requires that the notification under Section 4 or the declaration under Section 6 must be challenged immediately and in respect of the challenge of notification under Section 4 if the action is not taken immediately the result would be that declaration under Section 6 is issued. Persons interested have abandoned their right and have allowed the respondents to continue the proceedings of publishing the declaration under Section 6. Similarly for the purpose of challenge of notification under Section 6 if the award is passed and it is challenged thereafter, it will be a delayed matter and it will be considered that the persons interested are not aggrieved with the declaration and, therefore, the award is passed. The award may be challenged by way of making a reference to the Civil Court under Section 18 and it can also be challenged before this Court only on the ground that it is without jurisdiction or beyond the limitation prescribed under Section 11A. Even this challenge to the award has to be within reasonable time. In the present matter the second award was passed on 7.8.1995 and the writ petitions were filed after three months. Even the period of three months has been considered fatal by this Court if steps are not taken to challenge the same by way of writ.
27. I need not consider the objection with regard to the delay and laches in the cases of the societies in which the writ petitions are dismissed as not maintainable. It is only with regard to the writ petition No. 2 of 1997 where the petitioners have only claimed their right for compensation of the houses constructed on the land acquired, which cannot be considered here. The proper remedy in this regard lies under Section 18. The validity of the notification under Section 4 and the declaration under Section 6, has not been challenged in time and the petition suffers from laches and delay and the award has been challenged mainly on the ground of not paying the compensation of the houses constructed for which the remedy lies under Section 18.
28. On behalf of the respondents it has been pointed out that once the possession has been taken, the entire process of acquisition comes to an end. Reliance has been placed on the decision given in the case of Balmokand Khatri Educational & Industrial Trust, Amritsar v. State of Punjab and Ors. .
29. As regards the application moved by the intervenors which was allowed by this Court, no relief could be given to them since writ petitions No. 416/1996 and 1013/96 have been dismissed.
30. In the result, the writ petitions having no force are hereby dismissed.
