ORDER
D.P. Sarkar, J.
1. This is an application under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure directed against the Judgment and Order passed on 11-10-1996 by the learned Additional DistricI Judge, Purulia in Misc. Appeal No. 19/1996.
2. The present petitioner with the intention to start a hotel business at Purulia took a loan of Rs. 15 lakhs from the West Bengal Financial Corporation against the securities both personal and immovable on 12-2-1988. On that date of formal agreement was also executed and an equitable mortgage in respect of landand building was also executed by the petitioner, besides his personal guarantee. On 30-9-1991 he gota further term loan of Rs. 2.72 lakhs against subsidy respectively with interest @ 19% under terms
and conditions and manner of payment of interest and etc. On 6-12-1991 the petitioner applied for additional term loan of Rs. 10 lakhs. But the petitioner defaulted in payment of interest and the Default Review Committee of the Corporation directed that the petitioner should first clear the arrear interest amounting to Rs. 15,000/-approximately by 25-3-1992. The view of the Review Committee was communicated to the petitioner and on 21-9-1992 by a letter. The West Bengal Financial Corporation requested the petitioner to start a restaurant and open a few rooms of the hotel after which the proposal for additional term loan would be considered. On 17-3-1993 the petitioner requested the W.B .F.C. for issuing a loan at least of Rs. 5 lakhs otherwise it was impossible for him to start the restaurant. Then on 24-5-1993 notice under Section 30 of the W.B .F.C. Act was served upon the petitioner. On 9-6-1993 the W.B.F.C. raised objection to the petitioner for utilising the hotel premises as a place of residence. Finally, on 10-11-1993 the W.B.F.C. issued the ultimatum to open the restaurant and a few rooms of the hotel within three months from the date of issuance of that letter in default to face legal action. On 16-8-1994 further notice under Section 30 of the W.B.F.C. Act was served. The petitioner moved the wrong forum against that before the State Consumer Disputes’ Rcdrcssal Commission, West Bengal. On 18-6-1990 notice under Section 29(1) read with Section 30 of the W.B.F.C Act was issued to the petitioner. The said Commission dismissed the petition of the petitioner and the petitioner on 2-7-1996 filed the suit and moved an application for injunction. But on 26-7-1996 the petitioner was informed the W.B. F.C. that the possession of the unit was taken over. The injunction application was dismissed by the learned trial Court and there was an appeal before the learned District Judge. But the learned District Judge also affirmed the order of the learned trial Court in Misc. Appeal No. 19/1996. On 8-11-1996 an unit was sold and sale was confirmed and possession was delivered to the purchaser and thereafter on 7-11-1996 the possession of the portion which was under the occupation of the petitioner was also taken over.
3. The petitioner on being aggrieved by the order of rejection of his injuction prayer by both the Courts below has preferred the present revis-ional application, inter alia, on the grounds :
(i) If notice under Section 30 is issued remedy is under Section 31 or 32 of the Act of 1951 and no steps can be taken under Section 29 of the Act of 1951;
(ii) The notice under Section 29 has been issued by the Branch Manager who had no power to issue the notice;
(iii) The discrepancy in the figure mentioned in the notice makes that the notice invalid;
(iv) It was also contended that in the facts and circumstances, the principle of Promissory Estoppel will apply.
4. The O.P. i.e. the West Bengal Financial Corporation has contested the matter and submitted that the arguments advanced by the learned Advocate for the petitioner are not correct and the action, taken by the W.B.F.C. is absolutely justified under the law and as such the impugned order passed by the Courts below arc justified and not liable to be set aside and the Revisional Application should be dismissed.
5. Let us take up the first point for consideration. It was contended by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that the combined notice under Section 29 read with Section 30 of the West Bengal Financial Corporation Act is bad in law. Because, Section 30 of the Act appears to be independent of the provision of Section 29 of the Act. Section 30 contains that notwithstanding anything in any agreement to the contrary, the Corporation by a notice can ask any industrial concern to discharge forthwith in full all liabilities. Thus, it is clear that Section 30 of the Act is in addition to and not in derogation of the provision of Section 29 of the Act.
6. The provision contained in Section 31 of the Act supports this view, because, it is emphatically mentioned that the follow up action in Court under Section 31 following the notice under Section 30 of the Act, may proceed without prejudice to the provision of Section 29 of this Act and Section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act. This view has further been supported by the Supreme Court in its decision , Orissa Slate Financial Corporation v. Hotel Yogendra. That decision has laid down that the Corporation is at liberty to take action against the respondent as required under Section 29 of the Act, irrespective of the orders passed by any
Court. Similarly, in Andhra Pradcsh State Financial Corporation v. Gar Re-rolling Mills and Andhra Pradesh Stale Financial Corporation v. Kola Subba Reddy reported in AIR 1995 SC 2151, the Supreme Court has laid down that where the Corporation has obtained a decree in pursuance to the provision of Section 30 read with Section 31 of the Act, it has got the option to have recourse to remedy available under Section 29 without executing the order under Section 31. That apart, I do not find any bar in the Act itself that the notice under Sections 29 and 30 cannot be clubbed together. Therefore, the first contention raised by the learned Advocate for the petitioner cannot be accepted.
7. The second contention raised by the ld. Advocate for the petitioner is that under Section 9 of the W.B.F.C. Act the direction and management of the affairs and business of the Corporation shall vest in the Board ot’Directors and as such it is submitted by the ld. Advocate that action contemplated under Sections 24 or 30 should be taken according to the decision of the Board. In the instant case, the Branch Manager issued notice. But under Section 43-A the Board may delegate its power to the Managing Director or to any other officer of the Financial Corporation.
8. Chapter III of the Act contains the power and the duties of the Board and this chapter covers Sections 29, 30, 3 1 and 32 etc. Therefore, the powers contemplated under those sections are the powers and the duties of the Board. And the Board is to exercise such power and discharge such functions. Of course, the Board as I have already pointed out under Section 43-A of the Act can delegate its power to the Managing Director or to any other officer. In the instant case, it is admitted that the letter containing the sanction of the loan amount was also signed by the Branch Manager and there is no dispute that the notice under Section 29 read with Section 30 of the Act was also signed by the Branch Manager.
9. The ld. Advocate for the petitioner with reference to some decisions of the Court of England and also the definition of Officer as contained in the Indian Company Act has emphatically submitted that a Branch Manager cannot be an Officer contemplated by Section 43-A of the Act. The O.P. has produced a copy of the resolution dated 3rd September, 1982. It shows thai the Branch Manager is also delegated with the power of executing documents, other
deeds, important letters etc. of course, it docs not specifically mention that the Branch Manager is delegated with the power under Section 29 or 30 read with Section 31 of the Act. But hardly there is any doubt that the Branch Manager has the delegated power to do certain acts which ought to have been done by the Board. That apart, when the petitioneraccepted the loan on the basis of the letter signed by the Branch Manager, he is, in my considered opinion, estopped from challenging the authority of the Branch Manager. Subsequently, when the Branch Manager under his signature issued notice for realisation of lhat loan amount. The petitioner should not be allowed to approbate and reprobate according to his convenience. Moreover, Section 114(e) of the Indian Evidence Act creates a presumption regarding judicial and the official acts, lhat judicial and official acts done, have been done according to the procedure as established by law. From lhat point of view also the presumption should follow that the Branch Manager acted with the delegated authority to issue notice under Sections 29 and 30 read with Section 31 of the Act.
10. In Section 23 of the Act, the word ‘Officer’ has been used, but the Acl itself docs not contain any definition of the word ‘Officer’. Although the word ‘Officer’ is defined in other Acts such as Section 2(d) of Co-operative Societies Act, 1912, Section 2(12) of the Insurance Acl, 1938, Section 3 of the Army Act, 1980 and Section 2(30) of the Companies Act to name only a few yet those are inclusive definitions given for the purpose of those Acts.Thus, the sense and meaning assigned to the term in this Act would not be helpful in considering the word ‘Officer’ in the said Financial Corporation Act. According to the Chambers 20lh Dictionary, the word ‘Officer’ means a functionary or a holder of some offices. The office may be of high dignity or of humble nature, but it is essential that the person holding such office should have been delegated with certain functions. Bul it should not be held synonymous to the word ’employee’. In short, all officers of the Corporation would be its employees but all its employees are not its officers. Therefore, the contenlion that the Branch Manager had no proper authority to issue notice under Section 29 or 30 cannot also be accepted.
11. Again, the ld. Advocate for the petitioner
has challenged the notice Under Section 29 of the Act on the ground that there is discrepancy in the figure mentioned in the notice which renders the notice invalid. But the explanation has been given by the O.P. that the first figure contains the principal amount of loan and the second figure depicts the total amount including interest. Therefore, there is no discrepancy. The purpose of a notice is to give prior intimation about the action to be taken against the persons on whom the notice is served. Therefore, minor discrepancies or clerical errors if appears in the body of the notice, but the purport and the intent of the notice is not blurred or made unintelligible, the notice should not be termed as bad. On ihis count too, the submission of the ld. Advocate for the petitioner cannot be accepted.
12. The ld. Advocate for the petitioner as the last weapon has raised the plea of promissory estoppel. Promissory estoppel arises when a person promises something to another person and the qther person on the basis of such promise does some act, the first person making the promises is estopped from going back on his promise. In the instant case, we do not find that there was any such promise made by the O.P. which has prompted the petitioner to act in certain manner. Undoubtedly, there was a commercial agreement for the purpose of advancing loan by the O.P. to the petitioner and there was no promise that the loan amount need not be repaid at any time or in future. Therefore, the question of promissory estoppel cannot be entertained here in the facts and circumstances of this case. That apart, such a plea has not even taken in the revisional application.
13. The main grievance of the petitioner is that the O.P. under Section 29 of the Act has already taken possession of the entire suit property and has already transferred the suit property to a stranger who is in possession. It is also admitted that the present petitioner has got no sort of possession over the suit property. He has been thrown out of possession, In the instant case, the acts of dispossession has been done in accordance with the provisions of Section 29 of the W.B.F.C. Act and it is also an admitted fact that the property has been transferred to a stranger — 3rd parly. In the above circumstances, there remains nothing to be restrained by an order of injunction, I think, in the order of restraining the O.P. from dispossessing the petitioner or assigning the property to any other person would be meaningless. Because, admittedly, both the acts have been performed long back and any order of injunction at this stage in such terms as prayed for would turn infructuous and futile and ultimately ineffective. A Court of Law is not supposed to pass an ineffective order.
14. In the above facts and circumstances, the revisional application filed by the petitioner challenging the order of injunction passed by the ld. Trial Court and affirmed by the First Appellate Court fails and the revisional matter is accordingly disposed of.