ORDER
1. In this writ appeal by the petitioner in W.P. No. 7010 of 1992 against the dismissal of the said writ petition, the only question is whether the 2nd respondent, viz., the Collector of Customs & Central Excise, Tiruchi, has jurisdiction to pass the impugned order dated 30.12.1991. Even in the writ petition, only the said question was argued and the learned single Judge has held in his order dated 14.7.1995 that the said collector has the said jurisdiction.
2. The impugned order, inter alia confiscates to the Government of India, under Section 111(d) of the Customs Act, 1962 and under Section 71(1) of the Gold (Control) Act, 1968, 650 gold bars seized earlier at Coimbatore from one Nawaz Khan and levies penalty under Section 112(b) of the abovesaid Customs Act and under Section 74 of the abovesaid Gold (Control) Act, of Rs. 5,00,000/- each, on the abovesaid Nawaz Khan and the appellant Abdul Majeed herein. No doubt, the said order also levied similar penalties on certain other persons also.
3. In order to understand the abovesaid jurisdiction question, the following facts may be stated. According to the respondents, pursuant to smuggling operation, 33 jackets of gold illegally landed at Quilandy (Kerala) and a part of it, viz., 1956 gold biscuits were seized at Irrikkoor, Cannanore (Kerala) on 25.2.1989 and another quantity of 900 gold biscuits were seized at Vengeri, Calicut on 24.2.1989. In relation to the said two seizures made in Kerala, the 1st respondent Collector of Central Excise and Customs, Cochin took action under the abovesaid two enactments against certain persons, including the appellant and apart from confiscating the said seized items, levied penalty of Rs. 20,00,000/- on the appellant and certain other sums on certain others.
4. Now, in respect of the abovesaid 650 gold bars seized at Coimbatore, the contention of learned Counsel for the appellant is that the allegation against him is only that he sold the abovesaid 650 gold bars at Calicut in Kerala to the abovesaid Nawaz Khan and that the said Nawaz Khan only transported it to Coimbatore, where it was seized. The argument of learned Counsel for the appellant before the learned single Judge as well as before us is that when the gold seized at Coimbatore was part of the abovesaid gold landed at Quilandy (Kerala) and when the allegation is that the appellant only sold the same at Calicut, the 2nd respondent, who is the Collector at Trichy, has no jurisdiction to levy penalty thereto by the abovesaid impugned order on the appellant and that if at all only the Collector at Cochin would have such jurisdiction. He also points out that already the said Collector at Cochin (1st respondent) had exercised that jurisdiction and, inter alia, levied penalty on the appellant (as stated above). In this connection, he also relied on Sections 3 and 4 of the Customs Act, 1962 and the relevant notification issued thereunder. According to him, as per the abovesaid notification, the 2nd respondent at Trichy has no jurisdiction to take the abovesaid action against the appellant, against whom, the charge is only that he sold the abovesaid 650 gold bars at Calicut in Kerala only.
5. The learned single Judge, in his order negatived his contention, observing, inter alia as follows:
If the argument of the petitioner is to be accepted, in my opinion it would mean that the 2nd respondent should stop with taking action against the persons who entered his territorial jurisdiction but refrain from taking action against the person, who dealt with smuggled goods outside his jurisdiction. In my opinion, there is no such restriction in the Act.
6. We also have only to uphold the dismissal of the writ petition for the following reasons: Though out of the abovesaid 33 jackets of gold landed at Quilandy, (Kerala), a portion thereof, viz., the above-referred to 1596 gold biscuits and 900 gold biscuits were seized at two places in Kerala, as stated above, and inter alia, penalty was levied on the appellant to the extent of Rs. 20,00,000/- in view of his involvement in relation to the said seizure, another portion of 650 bars of gold, which were sent from Calicut to Coimbatore had been seized at Coimbatore, as stated above and in relation to the latter portion only the 2nd respondent had taken action against certain persons, including the appellant and abovesaid Nawaz Khan, who seems to have purchased the same from the appellant at Calicut and transported it to Coimbatore. Paragraph 124 of the impugned order also specifically states that the abovesaid 650 gold bars, seized at Coimbatore, though may be part of the quantity comprised in the abovesaid 33 jackets of gold landed on the shores of Quilandy, are “distinct and different” form the other two seizures made in Kerala, for which persons involved were penalised by the 1st respondent at Cochin.
7. Further Section 112(b) of the Customs Act, under which the abovesaid penalty is levied on the appellant, is very wide in its terms. It says as follows:
Any person, who acquires possession of or is in any way concerned in carrying, removing, depositing, harbouring, keeping concealing, selling or purchasing, or in any other manner dealing with any goods which he knows or has reason to believe are liable to confiscation under Section 111, shall be liableto penalty.
In view of the abovesaid expression “any person, who is in any way concerned” the appellant
can easily be said to come under that expression.
8. This is more so in the light of the following relevant passage appearing in paragraph 6 of the show cause notice dated 25.8.1989, issued before passing the impugned order, by the 2nd respondent against the appellant as well as the abovesaid Nawaz Khan and others, which, inter alia, speaks of the nature of the involvement of the appellant in selling and transporting the said 650 gold bars from Calicut to Coimbatore. The said paragraph 6 only deals with the abovesaid Nawaz Khan’s statement given before the Superintendent of Central Excise, Headquarters Preventive Unit, Coimbatore. The relevant portions of the said paragraph 6 runs as follows:
Nawaz Khanstated that he was owning his house atTrichur District, Kerala that he was
residing at.Coimbatorethat he came into contact with one Majid of Calicut (appellant)that he used to visit Majid’s house near civil station at Kallai (Kerala)and his house at Beach where
Majid usually stays, that Majid introduced him Atta Bhai.Sattarand Asu (Son of Majid), that
he knew that these people are engaged in the smuggling of gold biscuits from foreign countries to India, that he used to purchase from Majid smuggled gold biscuits and had sold it at Coimbatore and neighbouring places, the he used to get Rs. 200 to 300 as commission per gold biscuit, that on 24.2.1989he received a call from Dubaifrom Basheer, son of Majid’s maternal aunt, that Basheer told him that he should go to Calicut and help Majid there, that he phoned to..Coimbatore and asked his employeeto go to Calicut and contact Majidthaton the same day he received a call from Majid that Majid was in trouble and he wanted his help and asked him to go over to Calicutthat Majid informed him that the 7 jackets (containing 700 gold biscuits) would be given to him after the Friday afternoonthat Majid travelled with him in the Maruti Car.
The above passage and other contents of the show cause notice certainly would show that the appellant would come within the term “any person, who is in any way concerned in carryingsellingor in any other manner dealing with” the abovesaid gold bars.
9. In this connection, we may also point out, as held by the Supreme Court in Ambalal, v. Union of India AIR 1961 SC 264, that the imposition of penalty under the Customs Act is a guan-criminal proceeding, to which the general principles of criminal jurisprudence applies. Further, the Supreme Court has also held in Satwant Singh v. State of Punjab in the light of Section 179, Cr. PC, that in the case of misrepresentation by the accused, in relation to the offence of cheating at Simla and the consequence at Lahore, the offence of cheating by the accused could have been tried either at Lahore or at Simla and that consequently a person could also have been tried for the abetment of that offence either at Lahore or at Simla. Likewise, the Supreme Court has also held in Banwarlal v. Union of India that a Courttrying an accused for an offence of conspiracy is competent to try him for all offences committed in pursuance of that conspiracy, irrespective of the fact that any or all the other offence were not committed within its territorial jurisdiction. On the same analogy, following the abovesaid principles of criminal jurisprudence, in the light of the abovesaid features, it can be certainly concluded that the 2nd respondent has got, jurisdiction to pass the impugned order, levying the abovesaid penalty on the appellant.
10. The net result is, the writ appeal is not admitted, but dismissed. C.M.A. No. 11389 of 1995, for stay, is consequently dismissed.
Srinivasan, J. and Abdul Hadi, J.
Learned Counsel for the appellant prays for grant of leave to file appeal to the Supreme Court. We have decided the case on the basis of well-settled principles of law and on the facts and circumstances of this case. In our opinion, there is no substantial question of law and it is not a fit case to be considered by the Supreme Court. Hence, we reject the prayer for leave.