1. The only point urged on behalf of the appellant (the 2nd defendant) was that the respondent’s (the plaintiff’s) right to proceed against the property in question in the hands of the appellant for the debt due under the decree obtained against the deceased father of the appellant had, at the time of the institution of the suit, become barred by limitation. The lower appellate Court held that it had not become barred, and that conclusion is clearly right.
2. No doubt, the decree against the father was for money only. But during the father’s life-time an attachment in execution of the decree was made. The attachment was not of the father’s share alone, but of the whole property; and, as the debt for which the decree was passed is not shown to have been incurred for an illegal or immoral purpose, the respondent was entitled to attach the whole property for the debt. The effect of the attachment was to create as against the appellant a lien or charge in respect of the debt upon the whole property. This lien, the respondent can enforce under Article 132 of the Limitation Act as against the appellant at any time within 12 years from the date of the father’s death, since the decree amount must, in so far as the appellant is concerned, be deemed to have become due on the date the father died. The present suit was instituted within 12 years from that date. The contention for the appellant fails, and the second appeal is dismissed with costs.