JUDGMENT
Swatanter Kumar, J.
1. This Regular Second Appeal has been preferred by the appellant against the judgments of the courts below which are based on concurrent findings of fact and law.
2. The short argument raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is that admittedly the appellant was given the benefit of service rendered by him in the Army from 1969 to 1972 vide order dated 2.12.1989 (Ex.P6) passed by the respondents. Then the salary of the plaintiff was fixed in accordance with this order and all other consequential benefits accrued to the plaintiff in terms of the said order. This order was withdrawn by the respondents vide order Ex. P10. Before order Ex. P10 was passed, the learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant was entitled to be heard in accordance with the settled principles of nature justice and doctrine of audi alteram partem. In reply, the learned counsel for the respondents submits that there was no occasion for hearing the appellant because the order, Ex. P10 was only correcting order as having been given to the appellant in furtherance to the order Ex. P.6 which was passed on an erroneous interpretation. According to him, this error was corrected in accordance with the government instructions vide Ex. P.10. He further submits that irrespective of any other grounds the appellant would not be entitled to seek the benefit of service rendered in Army from 1969 to 1972 in the Government Department as he was appointed on adhoc basis. According to the learned counsel in view of the settled law laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in Chambel Singh v. Haryana State, (1995-1)109 P.L.R. 152 (F.B.), the appellant cannot claim any benefit.
3. The basic question that falls for consideration in the present case, therefore, is whether Ex. P. 10 is vitiated for violation of principles of natural justice or not. This aspect of the case has been erroneously ignored by the learned Courts below. To my mind adherence to the principles of natural justice in the facts and circumstances of the case was essential. If the rights of any person are likely to be affected by an administrative order, a quasi-judicial order, the minimum that is required is to afford a hearing to that person. In the present case, by and order of the respondents themselves, a recognizable right had vested in the appellant. This order was duly implemented and given effect to between the parties for a period of two years. Thus, before these benefits or rights could be withdrawn the respondents were required to give a show cause notice to the appellant or at least hear him before passing the order Annexure P.10.
4. It is a well settled and recognised principle of law that the principles of natural justice are fully applicable to the service jurisprudence and all administrative orders which may be passed by the authorities in that regard. Not only this an order of the kind like Annexure P/10 has to be an order which is self-speaking and must indicate some reason and application of mind by the concerned authorities. Reference may be made to the case of Union of India v. E.G. Nambudiri, A.I.R. 1991 Supreme Court 1216.
5. There is no dispute to the fact before me that the appellant had not been afforded opportunity of any kind before the benefits that had accrued to him earlier by virtue of the orders of the respondents themselves were withdrawn by Annexure P/10. The action of the respondents is thus violative of principles of natural justice and would vitiate the impugned order Ex. P.10. In this regard it may be appropriate to refer to the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa v. Dr.(Miss) Binapani Dei and Ors., reported as 1967 S.L.R. 465. This law has only been followed by the Supreme Court of India in subsequent pronouncements, but has further developed in its concept and scope. Even the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar v. Haryana Urban Development Authority etc., reported as 1995(1) Recent Services Judgments 230 held as under :-
“The first argument of Sh. Malik is that the impugned order is liable to be quashed on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice. Shri Malik argues that before passing the impugned order for cancelling the earlier order by which the services of the petitioners were regularised, no action-oriented notice and no opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioners. Shri Malik argued that before the respondents could cancel the order of regularisation of the services of the petitioners it was imperative for the respondents to have given an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners. Learned counsel for the respondents argued that respondents had done nothing more than a mere compliance of the instructions issued by the Government of Haryana and, therefore, it was not necessary for them to give show cause notice to the petitioners. In our opinion, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners merits acceptance. There can be no manner of doubt that orders of regularisation of service passed in favour of the petitioners and conferred a valuable right on the petitioners. With the passing of the orders for regularisation of their services the petitioners became the part of the regular establishment of the organisation. They became entitled to be given all the benefits which are admissible to other regularity appointed persons. Before such right of the petitioners could be taken away, the minimum which was required to be done by the respondents was to have given notice to the petitioners calling upon them to show cause as to why the orders passed in their favour be not recalled. It is trite to say that even administrative orders are required to be passed in consonance with the orders of natural justice. One of the well recognised rules of natural justice is that no person should be condemned unheard. This rule has been applied even in purely administrative state actions as is evident from the judgments of the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Dr.(Miss) Binapani Dei and Ors., AIR 1967 S.C. 1269; A.K. Kraipak and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1970 S.C. 150; and Sayaedur Rehman v. State of Bihar and Ors., AIR 1978 SC 239. An Altogether new dimension has been given to the concept of natural justice in Smt. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and Anr., AIR 1978 S.C. 597. In Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi etc. etc. v. State of U.P. and Ors., A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 537, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that every State action must be fair and reasonable and if it is found to be arbitrary, it will be treated as contrary to Article 14 of the Constitution. In view of this, it must be held that the impugned order dated 27.6.1994 passed by respondent No. 2 cancelling the orders of regularisation of services of the petitioners is liable to be quashed only on the ground that the petitioners were not heard before passing of that order.”
Keeping in view the settled principles of law and admitted fact before this Court that the plaintiff was not granted an opportunity of being heard before passing the order Ex. P10 and the said order is bad and is liable to be set aside.
6. For the reasons aforesaid, this appeal is accepted. The judgments and decrees of the learned courts below are hereby set aside and I pass a decree for declaration in favour of the appellant-plaintiff holding and declaring that the order dated 23.5.1988 Ex. P.10 is liable to be set aside for the reasons stated in the plaint and the plaintiff-appellant would be entitled to all consequential relief flowing therefrom. However, this decree will not in any way deprive the respondents from passing fresh order. However, after hearing the appellant in accordance with law, the contention whether the appellant was entitled to the benefits of service rendered by him from 1969-1972 is left open in view of the rival contention raised by either party before me.