CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 7253 of 2002 PETITIONER: Manik Lal Mazumdar & Ors. RESPONDENT: Gouranga Chandra Dey & Ors. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 26/02/2004 BENCH: Shivaraj V. Patil JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
SHIVARAJ V. PATIL J.
Few facts, which are considered necessary and
relevant for disposal of this appeal, in short and
substance, are the following:
The respondent No. 1 filed a petition for eviction
under Section 12 of The Tripura Buildings (Lease and
Rent Control) Act, 1975 (for short ‘the Act’) on the
grounds of bona fide requirement and default in payment
of rent. The Rent Control Court held that the claim of
bona fide requirement was not proved. However, it
found that the appellants were defaulters in payment of
rent and directed the appellants to hand over the
possession of the building in question to the
respondent No. 1. The appellants filed R.C.C. Appeal
4/1995 under Section 20 of the Act before the Civil
Judge (Senior Division), West Tripura against the said
order of the Rent Control Court. The learned Civil
Judge, after hearing the parties, dismissed the appeal
holding that the appellants failed to deposit the
arrears of rent as directed by the Rent Control Court
and the appeal filed by them without making deposit of
arrears of rent was not maintainable in view of Section
13(1) of the Act. Thereafter, the appellants filed
revision petition in the court of the District Judge,
Tripura, assailing the order passed by the learned
Civil Judge in appeal. The learned District Judge
allowed the revision petition, set aside the order of
the Civil Judge in appeal and remanded the case to the
appellate court for considering the petition for
adducing additional evidence and for deciding the
appeal afresh. The respondent No. 1, aggrieved by this
order passed in the revision petition, filed a petition
as Civil Rule No. 466 of 1997 under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India before the Gauhati High Court. A
learned single Judge of the High Court, after hearing
the parties, finding some conflict in the decisions of
this Court in Chinnamma vs. Gopalan and others and of
Division Bench of the High Court in Binapani Roy & two
others vs. State of Tripura and two others , felt that
the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court in
Binapani Roy case required reconsideration by a larger
bench to decide the following question: –
“Whether in view of Section 13 of the
Act, 1975, the appellate Court is
prohibited from entertaining an appeal
unless the tenant has paid or pays to
the landlord or deposit with the Rent
Control Court or the appellant
authority, as the case may be, all
arrears of rent admitted by the tenant
to be due in respect of the building up
to the date of payment of deposit and
continue to pay or deposit any rent
which may subsequently become due in
respect of the building until
termination of the proceedings before
the Rent Control Court or the appellate
authority, as the case may be?”
The Division Bench of the High Court, after hearing the
parties, concluded that the judgment of the Division
Bench in Binapani Roy case (aforementioned) did not
require any reconsideration and no reference to a
larger Bench was called for. It also held that no
appeal against the order made under Section 12 of the
Act is competent and maintainable under Section 20 of
the Act unless provision of Section 13(1) of the Act is
complied with; that fulfillment of the requirement of
Section 13(1) is a sine qua non for preferring appeal
under Section 20. Hence, aggrieved by the same, the
appellant-tenants have assailed the impugned judgment
of the Division Bench of the High Court in this appeal.
The learned Senior counsel for the appellants
contended that the High Court was not right and
justified in taking a technical view in the matter; as
in the case of contesting the proceedings before the
Rent Controller, opportunity could be given by the
appellate court for making payment of admitted rent due
or depositing before the appeal is heard; saying that
appeal itself could not be preferred without paying or
depositing admitted arrears of rent may not be correct
in view of Section 13(3) of the Act; if Section 13 is
read as a whole, it will be clear that appeal preferred
without payment or depositing of admitted arrears of
rent, it could not be dismissed. On the other hand,
further proceedings in the appeal could be stopped in
case admitted arrears of rent were not paid or
deposited. He placed reliance on the judgment of this
Court in Chinnamma case (supra).
Per contra, the learned counsel for the
respondents-landlord made submissions supporting the
impugned judgment. It was urged that Section 13(1) in
clear and unambiguous terms states that no appeal can
be preferred against any order of Rent Controller
without paying or depositing of arrears of rent
admitted.
Before proceeding to deal with the respective
contentions urged on behalf of the parties it would be
useful to reproduce the provisions of Sections 12, 13
and 20 of the Act to the extent they are relevant for
the immediate purpose: –
“12. Eviction of tenants (1) Not-
withstanding anything to the contrary
contained in any other law or contract a
tenant shall not be evicted excepted in
accordance with the provisions of this
Act.
Provided that nothing contained in
this section shall apply to a tenant
whose landlord is the State Government
or the Central Government or any other
public authority notified under this
Act.
Provided further that where the
tenant denies the title of the landlord
or claims right of permanent-tenancy the
Rent Control Court shall decide whether
the denial or claim is bonafide and if
it records a finding to that effect, the
landlord shall be entitled to sue for
eviction of the tenant in a civil court
and such court may pass a decree for
eviction on any of the grounds mentioned
in this section, notwithstanding that
such court finds that such denial does
not involve forfeiture of the lease or
that the claim is unfounded.
(2)(a) A landlord who seeks to evict
his tenant shall apply to the Rent
Control Court for a direction in that
behalf.
(b) If the Rent Control Court, after
giving the tenant a reasonable
opportunity of showing cause against the
application, is satisfied that the
tenant has not paid or tendered the rent
due by him in respect of the building
within fifteen days after the expiry of
the time fixed in the agreement or
tenancy with his landlord or in the
absence of any such agreement by the
last day of the month next following
that for which the rent is payable and
such default has continued for three
months within a period of twelve months,
it shall make an order directing the
tenant to put the landlord in possession
of the building, and if it is not
satisfied it shall make an order
rejecting the application thereof by
him.
Provided that an application under
this sub-section shall be made only if
the landlord has sent a registered
notice to the tenant intimating the
default and the tenant has failed to pay
or tender the rent together with
interest at six per cent per annum and
postal charges incurred in sending the
notice within fifteen days of the
receipt of the notice or of the receipt
of the notice or of the refusal thereof.
(c) The order of the Rent Control
Court directing the tenant to put the
landlord in possession of the building
shall not be executed before the expiry
of one month from the date of such order
or such further period as the Rent
Control Court may in its discretion
allow; and if the tenant deposits the
arrears of rent with interest and cost
of proceedings within the said period of
one month or such further period, as may
be, it shall vacate that order.”
xxx xxx xxx xxx
“13. Payment or deposit of rent during
the pendency of proceedings for
eviction. No tenant against whom an
application for eviction has been made
by a landlord under section 12 shall be
entitled to contest the application
before the Rent Control Court under that
section, or to prefer an appeal under
section 20 against any order made by the
Rent Control Court on the application,
unless he has paid or pays to the
landlord, or deposit with the Rent
Control Court or the appellate
authority, as the case may be, all
arrears of rent admitted by the tenant
to be due in respect of the building
upto the date of payment of deposit, and
continues to pay or to deposit any rent
which may subsequently become due in
respect of the building, until the
termination of the proceedings before
the Rent Control Court or the appellate
authority as the case may be.
(2) The deposit under sub-section
(1) shall be made within such time as
the Rent Control Court may fix and in
such manner as may be prescribed and
shall be accompanied by the fee
prescribed for the service of notice
referred to in sub-section (4):
Provided that the time fixed by the
Rent Control Court for the deposit of
the arrears of rent shall not be less
than forty-five days from the date of
the order and the time fixed for the
deposit of rent which subsequently
accrues due shall not be less than two
weeks from the date on which the rent
become due.
(3) If any tenant fails to pay or to
deposit the rent as aforesaid, the Rent
Control Court or the appellate
authority, as the case may be, shall
unless the tenant shows sufficient cause
to the contrary, stop all further
proceedings and make an order directing
the tenant to put the landlord in
possession of the building.
(4) When any deposit is made under
sub-section (1), the Rent Control Court
or the appellate authority, as the case
may be, shall cause notice of the
deposit to be served on the landlord in
the prescribed manner and the amount
deposited may, subject to such
conditions as may be prescribed, be
withdrawn by the landlord on application
made by him to the Rent Control Court or
the appellate authority in that behalf.
xxx xxx xxx xxx
“20. Appeal. (1) (a) The State
Government may, by general or special
order notified in the Official Gazette,
confer on such officers and authorities
not below the rank of a subordinate
judge the powers of appellate
authorities for the purposes of this Act
in such classes of cases as may be
specified in the order.
(b) Any person aggrieved by an order
passed by the Rent Control Court may,
within thirty days from the date of such
order, prefer an appeal in writing to
the appellate authority having
jurisdiction.
Note: – In computing the thirty days
in this clause, the time taken to obtain
a certified copy of the order appealed
against shall be excluded.
(2) On such appeal being preferred,
the appellate authority may order stay
of further proceedings in the matter
pending decision on the appeal.
(3) The appellate authority shall
call for the record of the case from the
Rent Control Court and after giving the
parties an opportunity of being heard,
and if necessary, after making such
further inquiry as it thinks fit either
directly or through the Rent Control
Court, shall decide the appeal.
Explanation: – The appellate
authority may, while confirming the
order of eviction passed by the Rent
Control Court grant an extension of time
to the tenant for putting the landlord
in possession of the building.
(4) The appellate authority shall
have all the powers of the Rent Control
Court including the fixing of arrears of
rent.
(5) The decision of the appellate
authority, and subject to such decision,
an order of the Rent Control Court shall
be final and shall not be liable to be
called in question in any court of law,
except as provided in section 22.”
(emphasis supplied)
The short question that arises for consideration
in this appeal is whether an appeal can be preferred
under Section 20 of the Act aggrieved by the order made
under Section 12 of the Act without making the payment
or depositing all arrears of rent admitted as required
under Section 13(1) of the Act. A landlord can seek a
direction to evict his tenant under Section 12 of the
Act and the Rent Control Court on being satisfied that
the tenant has not paid or tendered the rent due in
respect of the building shall make an order directing
the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the
building and if it is not satisfied it shall make an
order rejecting the application. The order of the Rent
Control Court directing the tenant to put the landlord
in possession shall not be executed before the expiry
of one month from the date of such order or till such
further period as the Rent Control Court may in its
discretion allow; and if the tenant deposits the
arrears of rent with interest and cost of the
proceedings within the said period, it shall vacate
that order.
Section 13 makes provision for payment or deposit
of rent during the pendency of the proceedings for
eviction. In this Section it is clearly stated that no
tenant against whom an application for eviction has
been made by a landlord under Section 12 shall be
entitled to contest the application before the Rent
Control Court under that Section, or to prefer an
appeal under Section 20 against any order made by the
Rent Control Court on the application, unless he has
paid or pays the landlord or deposit with the Rent
Control Court or the appellate authority, as the case
may be, all arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to
be due in respect of the building up to the date of
payment or deposit, and continues to pay or deposit any
rent, which may subsequently become due before the Rent
Control Court or the appellate authority, as the case
may be. Under sub-Section (1) of Section 13 two
situations are contemplated one is contesting the
application before the Rent Control Court and the other
is preferring an appeal under Section 20 of the Act.
An embargo is placed on the tenant expressly either to
contest the application under Section 12 before the
Rent Control Court or to prefer an appeal under Section
20 of the Act without payment or deposit of arrears of
rent. The second part of the same sub-Section requires
the tenant to continue to pay or deposit any subsequent
rent before the Rent Control Court or the appellate
authority, as the case may be. From this sub-Section
it is clear that a tenant cannot prefer an appeal under
Section 20 (1) unless the tenant has paid or pays to
the landlord or deposits the arrears of rent admitted
by the tenant to be due in respect of the building and
(2) after preferring an appeal he is required to
continue to pay or deposit subsequent rent before the
appellate authority to prosecute the appeal.
From the plain language and clear terms of Section
13(1) of the Act it follows that payment or deposit of
all arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due in
respect of the building up to the date of the payment
or deposit is a mandatory requirement for preferring an
appeal under Section 20 of the Act. The said sub-
section declares that no tenant shall be entitled to
contest or to prefer an appeal unless he has paid or
pays to the landlord or deposits with the Rent Control
Court or the appellate authority, as the case may be.
The use of the words “no” and “unless” in sub-
Section (1) of Section 13 in the context makes the
position clear that the payment or deposit of all
arrears of rent is a pre-requisite essential condition
for preferring an appeal.
The contentions of the learned counsel for the
appellants that sub-Section (3) of Section 13 provides
opportunity to the tenant to show sufficient cause in
regard to failure to pay or deposit the rent both
before the Rent Control Court and the appellate
authority and by combined reading of Section 13(1) and
13(3) it may be construed that there is no bar for
preferring an appeal without depositing or paying the
arrears of rent; the appeal could be preferred but the
further proceedings could be stopped in the appeal in
case the tenant fails to pay or deposits arrears of
rent without any sufficient cause and the appeal being
in continuation of the original proceedings, the same
powers could be exercised by the appellate authority in
granting time to a tenant to pay or deposit arrears of
rent even after preferring an appeal, cannot be
accepted. In the same Section the Legislature
consciously contemplated different situations and
different stages in regard to contesting the
application under Section 12 of the Act and preferring
an appeal under Section 20 and continuing the
proceedings in the appeal after preferring an appeal.
Sub-Section (1) of Section 13 speaks of payment or
deposit of arrears of rent before preferring an appeal
and Sub-Section (3) of the same Section speaks of
stopping all further proceedings by the appellate
authority.
Under Section 13(1) a tenant is not entitled to
contest the application unless he has paid or pays to
the landlord or deposits with the Rent Control Court
the arrears of rent. He cannot prefer an appeal
without payment or deposit of arrears of rent admitted.
Section 13(3) deals with stopping all further
proceedings unless the tenant shows sufficient cause
for his failure to pay or deposit the rent. Stopping
of further proceedings would arise only if the
proceedings are pending. Unless an appeal is preferred
after complying the payment of arrears of rent or
deposit of the admitted arrears of rent due, the
question of either pendency of the appeal or stopping
of further proceedings in such appeal does not arise.
There are two separate aspects in regard to an appeal
one is compliance to be made before preferring an
appeal and the other is the tenant has to continue to
pay or deposit the rent, which may subsequently become
due. Sub-section (3) of Section 13 will come into
operation on the tenant failing to pay or deposit
subsequent arrears of rent arising during the pendency
of the appeal, so as to stop further proceedings in the
appeal. But, it cannot relieve the statutory compulsion
or the mandatory requirement of Section 13(1), viz.,
paying or depositing the arrears of admitted rent
before preferring an appeal. Under Section 20(2) only
after an appeal is preferred under Section 20 after
complying with Section 13(1), the appellate authority
may stay further proceedings. Under Sub-section (4) of
Section 20, no doubt, the appellate authority shall
have all the powers of the Rent Control Court including
the fixing of arrears of rent. This sub-section cannot
be read in isolation. It has to be read along with
Sub-sections (1) and (3) of Section 13 and Sub-sections
(1) and (2) of Section 20. Under Section 20(4) the
appellate authority may have the power of fixing of
arrears of rent but that is only in relation to arrears
of rent that may become subsequently due during the
pendency of the appeal.
Payment or deposit of arrears of admitted rent
before preferring an appeal under Section 20 is a
statutory requirement as expressly stated in compulsive
language under Section 13(1) of the Act and no
discretion is left to the appellate authority to say
that an appeal could be preferred without satisfying
pre-condition of deposit or payment of admitted arrears
of rent. Under Section 20(1)(b) any person aggrieved
by an order passed by the Rent Control Court may within
30 days prefer an appeal. Under Section 20(2) on such
appeal being preferred, the appellate authority may
order stay of further proceedings. The appeal could be
preferred only on payment or deposit of arrears of
admitted rent. It also follows that no effective order
of stay of further proceedings can be passed by the
appellate authority unless an appeal is preferred after
such payment or deposit of admitted arrears of rent.
This is also a factor to indicate that payment or
deposit of arrears of admitted rent is essential before
preferring an appeal. It is to command a tenant to pay
or deposit arrears of admitted rent to protect the
interest of the landlord as in other matters certain
provisions are made to protect the interest of the
tenant. Remedy of appeal is a creation of statute and
it is open to the legislature to provide for an appeal
subject to certain conditions. Insistence of payment
or depositing of arrears of rent admitted as stated in
Section 13(1) of the Act cannot be diluted or defeated
merely on the ground of hardship to a tenant more so
when tenant already had one opportunity before the Rent
Control Court in regard to making payment or depositing
arrears of rent. Perhaps it was considered unreasonable
or unnecessary to provide again opportunity before
Appellate Authority to a tenant that too to pay or
deposit admitted arrears of rent. A Bench of three
learned Judges of this Court in Nasiruddin & Ors. vs.
Sita Ram Agarwal while dealing with the question of
deposit of arrears of rent and default in depositing
the rent within the given time, in para 35 has
expressed thus:-
“In a case where the
statutory provision is plain
and unambiguous, the court
shall not interpret the same
in a different manner, only
because of harsh consequences
arising therefrom.”
Sub-section (4) of Section 20 also does not help the
appellants to say that the appellate authority shall
have all powers of Rent Control Court and in that view
an appeal could be preferred without payment or deposit
of arrears of admitted rent. If it is so read or
understood, it will dilute or defeat the clear, express
and mandatory requirement of Section 13(1). As already
noticed above, in view of the specific provision made
in Section 13(1) as regards payment or deposit of
arrears of admitted rent before preferring an appeal,
the argument based on sub-Section (4) cannot be
accepted. Under sub-section (4), the Appellate
Authority may exercise powers of the Rent Controller as
regards arrears of rent that may become due after
preferring an appeal and during the pendency of it.
But this sub-section cannot render mandatory
requirement under sub-section (1) of Section 13
ineffective or otiose. It is well settled principle of
interpretation that every part of the provision has to
be given meaning and effect in the context of a
statute. When there is express provision made in
Section 13(1) in emphatic terms using negative words
indicating mandatory requirements of payment or deposit
of arrears of admitted rent before preferring an appeal
under Section 20, neither sub-section (3) of Section 13
nor sub-Section (4) of Section 20 are of any avail to
the appellants. This view is supported by a decision
of Bench of three learned Judges of this Court in
Nasiruddin & Ors (supra), which after considering
several decisions dealing with the provisions of Rent
Control Acts of different States, expressed that where
statutory provision is plain and unambiguous, the court
shall not interpret the same in a different manner only
because of harsh consequences arising therefrom; the
Rent Control Act is a welfare legislation not entirely
beneficial enactment for the tenant but also for the
benefit of the landlord; scope of legislation or its
intention cannot be enlarged when the language of the
provision is plain and unambiguous. In para 37 of the
said judgment, it is stated thus:
“37. The court’s jurisdiction to
interpret a statute can be invoked when
the same is ambiguous. It is well known
that in a given case the court can iron
out the fabric but it cannot change the
texture of the fabric. It cannot
enlarge the scope of legislation or
intention when the language of the
provision is plain and unambiguous. It
cannot add or subtract words to a
statute or read something into it which
is not there. It cannot rewrite or
recast legislation. It is also
necessary to determine that there exists
a presumption that the legislature has
not used any superfluous words. It is
well settled that the real intention of
the legislation must be gathered from
the language used. It may be true that
use of expression “shall or may” is
not decisive for arriving at a finding
as to whether the statute is directory
or mandatory. But the intention of the
legislature must be found out from the
scheme of the Act. It is also equally
well settled that when negative words
are used, the courts will presume that
the intention of the legislature was
that the provisions are mandatory in
character.”
(emphasis supplied)
In the same decision, it is also held that where
the statute does not provide either for extension of
time or condone the default in depositing the rent
within the stipulated period, the court does not have
the power to do so.
In E.Palanisamy vs. Palanisamy (Dead) by Lrs. &
Ors. , this Court has taken the view that benefits
conferred by statutory provisions can be enjoyed only
if such provisions are strictly complied with and
procedure prescribed is followed step by step. Para 5
of the said judgment reads: –
“5. Mr. Sampath, the learned counsel
for the appellant argued that since the
appellant tenant had deposited the
arrear of rent in court, it should be
taken as compliance with Section 8 of
the Act. This would mean there is no
default on the part of tenant in payment
of rent and therefore, no eviction order
could have been passed against the
appellant on that ground. According to
the learned counsel, the court should
not take a technical view of the matter
and should appreciate that it was on
account of refusal of the landlords to
accept the rent sent by way of money
orders that the tenant was driven to
move the court for permission to deposit
the arrears of rent. Since there is a
substantial compliance with Section 8
inasmuch as the arrears of rent stand
deposited in court, a strict or
technical view ought not to have been
taken by the High Court. We are unable
to accept this contention advanced on
behalf of the appellant by the learned
counsel. The rent legislation is
normally intended for the benefit of the
tenants. At the same time, it is well
settled that the benefits conferred on
the tenants through the relevant
statutes can be enjoyed only on the
basis of strict compliance with the
statutory provisions. Equitable
consideration has no place in such
matters. The statute contains express
provisions. It prescribes various steps
which a tenant is required to take. In
Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to
be followed by the tenant is given step
by step. An earlier step is a pre-
condition for the next step. The tenant
has to observe the procedure as
prescribed in the statute. A strict
compliance with the procedure is
necessary. The tenant cannot straight
away jump to the last step i.e. to
deposit rent in court. The last step
can come only after the earlier steps
have been taken by the tenant. We are
fortified in this view by the decisions
of this Court in Kuldeep Singh vs.
Ganpat Lal [(1996) 1 SCC 243] and M.
Bhaskar vs. J.Venkatarama Naidu [(1996)
6 SCC 228].”
This Court in Union of India & Ors. vs. Filip
Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama opined that the
paramount object in statutory interpretation is to
discover what the legislature intended. Such intention
is primarily to be ascertained from the text of an
enactment in question and if the strict grammatical
interpretation gives rise to absurdity or
inconsistency, the court could discard such
interpretation and adopt an interpretation, which will
give effect to the purpose of legislation. In the case
on hand, no such anomaly, absurdity or inconsistency
would arise even if plain and grammatical
interpretation is given to Section 13(1) of the Act
insisting to pay or deposit all the arrears of rent
admitted before preferring an appeal under Section 20
of the Act.
Yet again in Bhavnagar University vs. Palitana
Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. & Ors. , a bench of three leaned
Judges of this Court in para 25 has observed that
“scope of the legislation on the intention of the
legislature cannot be enlarged when the language of the
provision is plain and unambiguous. In other words,
statutory enactment must ordinarily be construed
according to its plain meaning and no words shall be
added, altered or modified unless it is plainly
necessary to do so to prevent a provision from being
unintelligible, absurd, unreasonable, unworkable or
totally irreconcilable with the rest of the statute.”
Judged by what is stated above, it cannot be said
that the provisions of Sections 13 and 20 of the Act
are irreconcilable, unintelligible or absurd so as not
to give effect to plain language of Section 13(1)
requiring a tenant to pay or deposit arrears of
admitted rent before preferring an appeal under Section
20 of the Act.
The decision of this Court in the case of
Chinnamma (supra) does not advance the case of the
appellants for the reasons more than one. That was a
case wherein the question, which has arisen in this
appeal neither arose nor decided. No doubt, the
provisions 11 and 12 of Kerala Building (Lease and Rent
Control) Act, 1965 and Sections 12 and 13 of the Act
are similar but the question decided in that case is
altogether different, as is evident from paragraph 4 of
the said judgment, which reads: –
“4. We heard counsel. The short
question that arises for our
consideration is what is the amount that
should be deposited by the tenant under
Section 11(2)(c) of the Act to set aside
the order passed under Section 11(2)(b)
of the Act. Should the deposit be only
of that amount which was specified as
payable in the order of eviction passed
under Section 11(2)(b) of the Act or
will it take within its fold even the
arrears of rent that accrued due
subsequent to the said order of eviction
and up to the date of deposit? The Rent
Controller passed the order of eviction
on 22-2-1980. He held that in case the
tenant deposits a sum of Rs. 540 which
is the arrears of rent due as on 1-2-
1980 along with the advocate’s fee Rs.
25 and interest at the rate of 6% per
annum on arrears of Rs. 540, the tenant
will be entitled to get the order of
eviction vacated under Section 11(2)(c)
of the Act. The learned District Judge
has found that the amount of Rs. 750
will cover the amount quantified
specifically by the Rent Controller in
the order dated 22-2-1980. The deposit
made along with the application filed
under Section 11(2)(c) of the Act –
complied with the order dated 22-2-1980.
Really, no other point arose for
consideration on the facts of this case,
at that stage. But the learned Single
Judge of the High Court held that
deposit to be made by the tenant should
also include the arrears of rent that
accrued due subsequent to the order of
eviction dated 22-2-1980 and should
include the dues till the date of
deposit, i.e., 6-4-1982. The question is
whether the view so expressed by the
learned Single Judge is in accord with
Section 11(2)(c) and the Scheme of the
Act?”
In paragraph 7 of the same judgment, this Court
has expressed that a mere look at Sections 11 and 12 of
the Kerala Act would show that they operate in
different situations. Under Section 11(2)(b) the court
passes a final order of eviction directing the tenant
to put the landlord in possession of the building, if
there is a default as provided therein. The execution
of such final order is statutorily suspended for a
period of one month. Within that time or such further
time, as the court may allow, the tenant is given an
opportunity to pay or deposit the arrears of rent with
interest and cost and, if payment or deposit is made,
the court shall vacate the order. Whereas the
provisions of Section 12 are applicable during the
pendency of the proceedings for eviction. In the same
paragraph it is made clear that for the applicability
of Section 12 the proceedings for eviction should be
pending.
Hence the said judgment, having regard to the
facts of that case and the question that was decided,
does not support the contention urged on behalf of the
appellants in this appeal. Even the judgment of the
Division Bench of Gauhati High Court in Binapani Roy
case, aforementioned, in a way supports the case of the
respondents.
The Division Bench of the High Court was right in
holding that there was no conflict in the judgments in
cases of Chinnamma and Binapani Roy.
In view of the discussion made and reasons stated,
the question set out above is answered in the negative
meaning thereby payment or deposit of all arrears of
rent admitted is mandatory before preferring an appeal
by a tenant under Section 20 of the Act. Hence, the
appeal is dismissed finding no merit in it, with no
order as to costs.