JUDGMENT
A.A. Saron, J.
1. The petitioner and respondent No. 2 Gurmeet Singh are the joint owners of shop No. 3-C/3 situated at Anardana Chow (Meat Market) Patiala, which they purchased vide registered sale deed dated 25.11.1993 An-nexure P-1 for a sum of Rs. 1,83,000/-.
2. The grievance of the petitioner is that the respondent No. 1 Municipal Corporation, Patiala, vide order dated 26.3.1998 without any adequate reasons, affording any opportunity or serving any notice on him amended the assessment of house tax and raised the rental value from Rs. 425/- per month to Rs. 5000/- per month. The adjoining shop it is stated has been assessed to the rental value of Rs. 450/- per month and remains the same. This action it is alleged is arbitrary and without any criteria. Therefore, the present petition.
3. Notice was issued to the respondents. Municipal Corporation Respondent No. 1 filed its written statement and denied the allegations of the petitioner. The petitioner filed his replication reiterating his stand in the petition.
4. We have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties and with their assistance gone through the records of the case.
5. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has contended that there has been violation of principles of natural justice inasmuch as no independent notice was issued to the petitioner in terms of Section 103(2) of the Punjab Municipal Corporation Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Besides, the notice issued to respondent No. 2 was, in any case, vague and lacking in material particulars. He also contends that the shop in question measuring about 33 sq. yards was assessed to house tax at rental value of Rs. 425/- per month vide order dated 25.8.1985. Therefore, the rateable value of the building once assessed in accordance with Section 93 of the Act, could not be increased without recording adequate reasons. It is contended that the size and construction of the shop remained the same but for the change of ownership and occupation. Lastly that the shop remained closed from 1993 to 1997 as the petitioner and respondent No. 2 were indecisive as to which trade should the shop be put to use.
6. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1 Municipal Corporation on the other hand contends that as per the case of the petitioner himself, he was a co-owner in the shop alongwith respondent No. 2. The latter was duly associated with the process of assessment and was afforded due and proper opportunity at every stage before finalizing the assessment. With regard to the notice under Section 103(2) of the Act, it is stated that the Corporation issued a notice under the said provisions for the purposes of revising/amending the assessment list of the shop. The proposed annual rent of the shop in question was duly indicated. Besides, the annual tax of Rs. 8100/- was also indicated. Accordingly objections were invited from respondent No. 2, the co-owner of the petitioner, with respect to the proposed value. A copy of the notice dated 23.7.1998 is placed on record as Annexure R-l. The respondent No. 2 filed his objections on 20.3.1998. In these circumstances it is contended that notice to one co-owner is notice to the other and there has been no violation of Section 103(2) of the Act. Besides, it is contended that the petitioner never informed the Municipal Authorities, with regard to the transfer, sale and acquisition of his title to the shop. It is also contended that in the wake of proposed rateable value assessed under Section 93(b) of the Act and on due consideration of the matter, the house tax sub committee, passed the proposed assessment which was confirmed and the order was accordingly passed on 26.7.1998, the copy of which is placed on record as Annexure R-4. The respondent No. 2 was vide letter Annexure R-3 intimated to be present for hearing on 26.3.1998 but he did not appear. With regard to the closure of the shop since 1997, it has been contended that in the course of usual survey, the Municipal Inspector of the Anardana Chowk, Patiala, found respondent No. 2 to be in occupation and in possession of the shop. The same was being used and continues to be used by him for the purposes of selling raw meat. Respondent No. 2 on enquiry, confirmed himself to be the owner having purchased the same.
7. The primary grouse of the petitioner is that he was not afforded full opportunity to represent his case in terms of Section 103(2) of the Act which violated the principles of natural justice. In order to appreciate the contention of the petitioner, the provisions of Sections 103(1)(d) and 103(2) of the Act may be noticed which read as under:-
“103. Amendment of assessment list.- (1) The Commissioner may, at any time, amend the assessment list.-
XX XX XX XX XX (d) by increasing or reducing for adequate reasons the amount of any rateable value and of the assessment, thereupon; or XX XX XX XX XX (2) Before making any amendment under Sub-section (1), the Commissioner shall give to any persons affected by the amendment, notice of not less than one month that he proposes to make the amendment and consider any objections which may be made by such person."
8. The provisions of Section 103(2) provide for issuance of notice and filing of objections before making any amendment of assessment list in terms of Section 103(1) of the Act. In the present case respondent No. 2, who is co-owner of the petitioner, was issued due notice dated 23.2.1998 informing him of the annual value of the unit proposed to be revised under Section 103(1)(d) of the Act. The annual value under Section 93 of the unit is indicated in the notice dated 23.2.1998 appended as Annexure R-1 with the written statement. Respondent No. 2 was asked if he has any objection against the same then he should file petition before the Tax Superintendent, Municipal Corporation, Pa-tiala. The respondent No. 2 filed his objections on 20.3.1998. He was called for personal hearing but he did not appear and thereafter assessment order was passed.
9. The petitioner in the circumstances would be deemed to have due notice of the assessment proceedings as admittedly his co-owner was duly served with a notice dated 23.2.1998 under Section 103(1)(d) of the Act. He also filed objections against the same. It is well settled proposition of law that notice to one co-owner is notice to all. A Full Bench of this Court in Biro v. Suraj Bhang, A.I.R. 1983 Punjab and Haryana page 347 in a case under the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation & Prevention of Fragmentation) Act 1948, held that in proceedings under Sections 21 and 42 of the said Act all co-sharers need not be impleaded and hearing to one or some of the co-sharers, will tantamount to a hearing of all co-sharers in the eyes of law, in the absence of fraud or collusion. The dictum of the Full Bench in Biru’s case (supra) was followed in Blrda Ram v. Smt. Attri, (1994-1)106 P.L.R. 392, wherein also it was held that if adequate hearing is given to one or some of the co-owners, it will tantamount to a hearing of all the body of co-sharers. Similar is the position in a case under the Punjab Town Improvement Act. wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case titled Teja Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1995 Supreme Court 1547, held that where the land was under acquisition belonging to co-owners or occupiers, service of notice on one must be taken as service on all the co-owners. Therefore, we are of the view that service of notice on the co-owner Gurmeet Singh respondent No. 2 is service of the petitioner also.
10. As regards the notice being vague and lacking in material particulars is concerned, the learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Food Corporation of India v. State of Punjab and Ors., J.T. 2000 (Suppl.3) S.C. 376, to contend that the vague and unspecific notice would not provide reasonable opportunity to the notice to file objections meeting the reasons/grounds on which the amendment of assessment list is proposed to be made. There is no dispute to this proposition of law. However, in the present case, as already noticed above, the respondent-Municipal Corporation, has placed on record the notice dated 23.2.1998. The said notice is under Section 103(1)(d) of the Act. It gives the description of the shop, the covered area and the capital value of the unit proposed to be revised. The annual value under Section 93 of the Act in respect of the unit is indicated as follows:-
“Proposed
U/s 93(c)
Details
of the property 1 Shop (10′ x 30′)
(Self
occupied) @5000/- p.m. Proposed u/s 93(b)
Plot
area
Covered
area
Proposed
value of property
Name of
the tenant
Rent per
month
Annual
Rent Rate 60,000/-
Depreciation
10% 6.000/-
Total 54.000/- Annual Tax 8,100/- 11. In this manner the annual tax has been proposed to be assessed at Rs. 8100/-.
Thereafter the notice gives an opportunity to file objections. !t is provided that in case the notice has any objections, he can file them before the Tax Superintendent of the respondent Corporation on his own or through counsel within 30 days of the receipt of the notice. The respondent No. 2 Gurmeet Singh filed his reply to the same on 20.3.1998. In the circumstances of the case, the notice dated 23.2.1998 is not in any manner vague or unclear. In Food Corporation of India v. Slate of Punjab and Ors. (supra), the assessment in question related to a godown of the Food Corporation of India within the local limits of the municipality. Notice was issued under Section 67 of the Punjab Municipal Act 1911, intimating that the Committee intends to amend/revise the assessment in respect of the Food Corporation and if it has any objection, it may file the same along with documentary proof in support, within a month. The notice which was issued in the said case was held to be vague. It had neither stated reasons for, or the ground on which the amendment was proposed to be made, nor did it indicate any material on the basis of which the revision, as stated in the notice, was proposed to be made. It was staled in the said notice of that case as follows:-
“Whereas your above-mentioned property has wrongly been left out from the assessment list, whereas it should have been in the same. Whereas the assessment of this property of yours was assessed less due to inadvertent mistake/fraud or intention, which needs amendment thereby.”
12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in these circumstances held that the Municipal Committee was not sure on which ground it was proposed to proceed for amending the assessment list. In the present case, as already noticed above, the area of the shop is given, the proposed value of the property is given, the annual rental value, depreciation and the annual tax has been indicated. The assessment proposed in terms of Section 93(b) of the Act has also been mentioned. Therefore, the ratio of the judgment in Food Corporation of India v. State of Punjab and Ors. (supra) is not applicable.
13. The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the amendment of the assessment list has been increased without recording adequate reasons in respect of the amount of rateable value and the assessment thereupon. In this regard, it may be noticed that the respondent No. 2, who is the co-owner of the petitioner filed his objections to the notice dated 23.2.1998 on 20.3.1998. Thereafter he was called for personal hearing on 26.3.1998 at 3 p.m. in the office of the Tax Superintendent, Municipal Committee, Patiala. However, he did not appear and the House Tax Sub Committee passed the order dated 26.3.1998 accepting the proposed assessment made by the office of respondent No. 1 Corporation at Rs. 8100/- annually. It has already been held that the notice dated 23.2.1998 issued to respondent No. 2 was not vague or unclear. Even in the objections dated 20.3.1998 filed by respondent No. 2, tt has not been alleged that the notice was in any manner vague. The notice itself proposed the mode of assessment of the amount of rateable value and the assessment thereof. The proposal in the notice dated 23.2.1998 has also been indicated to be under Section 93(b) of the Act which reads as under:-
“93. Determination of rateable value of lands and buildings assessable to taxes -Subject to the rules, if any, made by the State Government in this behalf, the rateable value of any land or building assessable to taxes specified in Section 91 shall be -xx xx xx xx xx
(b) in the case of any building the gross annual rent at which such building, together with its appurtenances and any furniture that may be let for use for enjoyment therewith, may reasonably be expected to let, subject to the following deductions:-
(i) such deduction not exceeding 20 per cent of the gross annual rent as the Commissioner in each particular case may consider a reasonable allowance on account of the furniture let therewith.
(ii) a deduction of 10 per cent for the cost of repairs and for all other expenses necessary to maintain the building in a state to command such gross annual rent. The deduction under this sub-clause shall be calculated on the balance of the gross annual rent after the deduction (if any) under Sub-clause (i);
(iii) where land is let with a building, such deduction, not exceeding 20 percent, of the gross annual rent, a the Commissioner in each particular case may consider reasonable on account of the actual expenditure, if any, annually incurred by the owner on the upkeep of the land in a state to command such annual rent.
Explanation I.- For the purposes of this clause it is immaterial whether the house or building, and the furniture and the land let for use or enjoyment therewith, are let by the same contract or by different contracts, and if by different contracts whether such contracts are made simultaneously or at different times.”
Explanation II.- The term “gross annual rent” shall not include any tax payable by the owner in respect of which the owner and tenant have agreed that it shall be paid by the tenant.”
14. The above provisions provide for the determination of the rateable value of buildings assessable to taxes on the basis of gross annual rent at which such building, together with appurtenances and any furniture that may be let for use for enjoyment therewith, may reasonably be expected to let. The same is subject to the deductions indicated therein. The notice dated 23.2,1998 proposes to amend the assessment list by increasing the amount of rateable value and thereupon in accordance with the provisions of Section 93(1) of the Act. However, it is on account of the failure of the respondent No. 2, who is the co-owner of the petitioner to be present before the Sub-Committee for personal hearing on 26.3.1998, in response to the notice Annexure R-3, that the House Tax Sub Committee confirmed the assessment proposed by the office. Therefore, it cannot be said that the amount for rateable value and the assessment thereupon is without adequate reasons as enjoined by Section 193(1)(d) of the Act. The petitioner in his affidavit dated 19.12.2000 filed on record by way of C.M. No. 3078I of 2000 deposes that he applied for the order dated 26.3.1998 which has not been supplied. However, the same is on record as Annexure P-4 with the reply filed by the respondent Corporation. Besides, respondent No. 2 Gurmeet Singh filed an appeal against the said order dated 26.3.1998 before the State Government. The same was dismissed by the Principal Secretary, Local Government, Punjab on 14.9.1999, for want of dispositing the tax due as provided under Section 146 of the Act. The order dated 14.9.1999 dismissing the appeal has been appended with the written statement as Annexure R-5. The petitioner does not assail the order dated 14.9.1999 regarding pre deposit of the tax for hearing the appeal. There is no prayer of the petitioner for quashing the order dated 14.9.1999 even though he is aware of the same as he makes averments in this regard in para 12 of the petition. From this the inference that can be drawn is that the petitioner wants to pursue the case by assailing the initial order dated 26.3.1998 only, so as to avoid the pre deposit of tax. The petitioner however, placed reliance on a Division Bench of this Court in Am Grindways Bank Limited, Amritsar v. Municipal Corporation, Amritsar and Ors., (1999-1)112 P.L.R. 254, to contend that the Government while discharging its quasi judicial function under Section 146 of the Act was duty bound to record reasons for not accepting the request to hear and decide the appeal without insisting on prior deposit of the tax. Further that in any case the Government should have given opportunity to deposit the tax if it felt that the appeal does not deserve to be entertained without prior deposit of the tax. In the said ANZ Grindlays Bank case, the challenge was to the order passed by the Principal Secretary to the Government, which was assailed on the ground that it did not contain reasons as the Appellate Authority had formed an opinion that the appeal was not maintainable without prior deposit of the amount of house tax. If that was so, then an opportunity should have been given to the assessee therein to remove the defect in the filing of appeal by depositing the amount of arrears. The assessee therein had in fact deposited the arrears of the house tax and, therefore, assailed the dismissal of appeal on the ground of maintainability. It was in these circumstances that it was held that while deciding appeal filed by the assessee under Section 146 of the Act, the government was discharging quasi-judicial functions and, therefore, it was duty bound to record cogent reasons for not accepting the request of the petitioner to decide the appeal without insisting on prior deposit of the tax. It was further observed that in any case, the government should have given opportunity to the petitioner to deposit tax if it felt that the appeal does not deserve to be entertained without prior deposit of the arrears of tax. In the present case, as already noticed above, the appellate order dated 14.9.1999 regarding pre deposit of tax is not under challenge. Even otherwise the said order dated 14.9.1999 shows that respondent No. 2 despite being given last opportunity to deposit the house tax, he did not do so. He was not present before the Principal Secretary on the date fixed and the request of his counsel was found to be not genuine. The appeal filed by Gurmeet Singh respondent No. 2 was accordingly dismissed. In fact the pre-deposit of house tax is essential for the hearing of the appeal in terms of Section 147 of the Act, which reads as under:-
“147 Conditions of right to appeal.- No appeal shall be entertained under Section 146, unless-
(a) xx xx xx xx xx (b) the amount, if any, in dispute in the appeal has been deposited by the appellant in the office of the Corporation."
15. In these circumstances and in the absence of the challenge to the appellate order dated 14.9.1999 passed by the Principal Secretary, Local Government, Punjab, no fault can be found with the assessment of rateable value for house tax. It cannot be said that there has been failure to record cogent reasons to hear and decide the appeal without insisting on prior deposit of the tax or that an opportunity was not give to deposit the tax if it was felt that the appeal does not deserve to be entertained without prior deposit of house tax.
16. Insofar as the annual assessment of the house tax is concerned, it may be noticed that the same is the domain of the authorities under the Act. The rateable value of land and buildings assessable to taxes is determined in accordance with the provisions of Section 93 of the Act. The amendment of assessment list has been done by invoking the provisions of Section 103(1)(d) of the Act. This Court does not act as a Court of appeal against the assessment of rateable value of building done by the House Assessment Sub Committed. It is well settled that the jurisdiction of this Court in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution is supervisory and not appellate. This Court while exercising its jurisdiction does not sit in appeal over the findings of the Assessing Authorities under the Act. The limited ground on which the order of the assessing authority in such circumstances that can be assailed is that there has been illegality or irrationality. In the circumstances of the case, the petitioner has not indicated any illegality or violation of any statutory provisions of law which would warrant interference of this Court. Neither is it his case that the order passed by the Authorities was beyond their power. There is no irregularity in the order as it has been passed after following the procedure and decision taken is not shown to be based on irrelevant consideration of the rateable value of house tax. There is no procedural impropriety in the decision making process. It is not a case where there has been a breach of principles of natural justice or fair and reasonable opportunity has not been afforded in the case. As already noticed above, the co-owner of the petitioner was duly served and he also filed his objections. Therefore, in the circumstances of the case, it is not for this Court to go into the matter with regard to the actual amendment of assessment list. That is the function for the authorities under the Act.
17. The last contention of the petitioner is that the shop remained closed from 1993 to 1997 as the petitioner and respondent No. 2 were indecisive as to for what trade the shop’s to be used. This position has already been explained in the written statement. It has been contended that in the course of usual survey, the Municipal Inspector found respondent No. 2 to be in occupation and in possession of the shop in question He is using the shop as Meat Shop and continues to use the same for the purposes of raw meat. Respondent No. 2, on enquiry, was found to be the owner having purchased the shop, it is even not disputed that the respondent No. 2 is a co-owner of the petitioner. Even otherwise, we are of the view that whether the shop was actually closed or not for the period from 1993 to 1997 is disputed question of fact which this Court cannot go on in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.
18. For the fore-going reasons, we do not find any merit in the writ petition and the
same is dismissed. However, any observations made herein shall not preclude the petitioner or respondent No. 2 for seeking restoration of the appeal filed by respondent No. 2
against the order dated 26.3.1998 before the Principal Secretary, Local Government after
making pre deposit of the house tax assessed. In case such a request is made after pre
deposit of tax assessed, the same shall be considered by the Principal Secretary on its
own merit uninfluenced by any observations made herein. However, there shall be no
order as to costs.
