HIGH COURT OF CHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WRIT PETITION S No 4730 of 2009
Manoj Joshi
...Petitioners
Versus
State of Chhattisgarh & Others
...Respondents
! Shri Manish Sharma Advocate for the petitioner
^ Shri Y S Thakur Deputy Advocate General for the State Shri B D Guru Advocate for the respondent No 4
CORAM: Honble Shri Satish K Agnihotri J
Dated: 05/01/2010
: Judgement
ORAL ORDER
Passed on 05th day of January 2010
Writ Petition Under Article 226227 Of The Constitution Of India
With the consent of learned counsel appearing for
the parties, the matter is heard finally.
1. By this petition, the petitioner seeks a writ to quash
the order dated 11.08.2009 (Annexure P/1) whereby the
petitioner, posted on deputation at Naya Raipur Development
Authority (for short `NRDA’), Raipur as Revenue Inspector,
has been repatriated to his parent department i.e. Revenue
Department.
2. The indisputable facts, in brief, are that the parent
department of the petitioner as Revenue Inspector is the
Revenue Department of the State Government of Chhattisgarh.
The petitioner was sent on deputation vide order dated
27.08.2001 to Capital Area Development Authority (for short
`CADA’) and posted at Raipur, which was later on renamed as
NRDA.
3. Shri Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner submits that the impugned order has been passed
arbitrarily, unreasonably and with an ulterior motive. Shri
Sharma further submits that the borrowing department has not
take any permission from the parent department to repatriate
the services of the petitioner to the parent department. It
is further contended that since there is scarcity of staff
in the NRDA, therefore, there is no need to repatriate the
petitioner back to his parent department.
4. Shri Thakur, learned Deputy Advocate General appearing
for the State/respondents 1 to 3 and Shri B.D.Guru, learned
counsel appearing for the respondent No. 4 submit that the
deputationist can be repatriated back to his parent
department at the instance of either the borrowing
department or the parent department. The deputationist has
no vested right to continue even after expiry of minimum
prescribed period of deputation.
5. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties,
perused the pleadings and the documents appended thereto.
Admittedly, in the present case, it is evident that the
petitioner was sent on deputation by order dated 27.08.2001
(though a copy of the order whereby the petitioner was sent
on deputation to NRDA has not been filed with the petition)
and by order dated 11.08.2009 (Annexure P/1), the petitioner
was repatriated back to the parent department after
completion of minimum period of two years. The petitioner
was on deputation for about eight years.
6. The law on deputation is very clear. The Supreme Court
in State of Punjab and others vs. Inder Singh and others1
while considering the deputation and repatriation to the
parent cadre/department on expiry of period of deputation
observed as under :-
“18. The concept of “deputation” is
well understood in service law and has
a recognized meaning. “Deputation” has
a different connotation in service law
and the dictionary meaning of the word
“deputation” is of no help. In simple
words “deputation” means service
outside the cadre or outside the parent
department. Deputation is deputing or
transferring an employee to a post
outside his cadre, that is to say, to
another department on a temporary
basis. After the expiry period of
deputation the employee has to come
back to his parent department to occupy
the same position unless in the
meanwhile he has earned promotion in
his parent department as per the
Recruitment Rules. Whether the transfer
is outside the normal field of
deployment or not is decided by the
authority who controls the service or
post from which the employee is
transferred. There can be no deputation
without the consent of the person so
deputed and he would, therefore, know
his rights and privileges in the
deputation post. The law on deputation
and repatriation is quite settled as we
have also seen in various judgments
which we have referred to above…..”
7. The Supreme Court in Umapati Choudhary v. State of
Bihar and another2 has defined `deputation’ in the following
terms:-
“Deputation can be aptly described as
an assignment of an employee (commonly
referred to as the deputationist) of
one department or cadre or even an
organization (commonly referred to as
the parent department or lending
authority) to another department or
cadre or organization (commonly
referred to as the borrowing
authority). The necessity for sending
on deputation arises in public interest
to meet the exigencies of public
service. The concept of deputation is
consensual and involves a voluntary
decision of the employer to lend the
services of his employee and a
corresponding acceptance of such
service by the borrowing employer. It
also involves the consent of the
employee to go on deputation or not.”
8. Further, in Kunal Nanda vs. Union of India and
another3, the Supreme Court observed as under:
“6..The basic principle underlying
deputation itself is that the person
concerned can always and at any time be
repatriated to his parent department to
serve any substantive position therein
at the instance of either of the
departments and there is no vested
right in such a person to continue for
long on deputation or get absorbed in
the department to which he had gone on
deputation..”
9. The Supreme Court in Prasar Bharti & Ors. vs. Amarjeet
Singh & Ors4. observed that;
“13. There exists a distinction
between `transfer’ and `deputation’.
`Deputation’ connotes service outside
the cadre or outside the parent
department in which an employee is
serving. `Transfer’, however, is
limited to equivalent post in the same
cadre and in the same department.
Whereas deputation would be a temporary
phenomenon, transfer being antithesis
must exhibit the opposite indications.”
10. The question of law, as stated hereinabove, came into
consideration in the matter of Radhe Lal Nag v. Government
of Chhattisgarh and others [WP(S) No. 3997/2007] decided on
27.3.2008, wherein this Court, after having examined the
circular dated 02.12.1988 dealing with the period of
deputation, held as under:
“6. As per the circular dated 2.12.1988
(Annexure p/3) in normal cases the
minimum period of deputation is two
years, which can be extended for a
period of four years. The relevant
clause of the circular dated 2.12.1988
(Annexure P/3) reads as under:
“2- izfrfu;qfDr dk p;u iSuy ds vk/kkj
ij gksus ds mijkur p;u fd;s x;s O;fDr
dks lsok,a de ls de nks o”kZ ds fy, yh
tkuh pkfg,A ;g vof/k nksuksa foHkkxksa
dh lgefr ls dqy feykdj pkj o”kZ rd
c<kbZ tk ldsxh o mls fdlh Hkh gkyr esa
izfrfu;qfDr ij pkj o"kZ dh vof/k ds
mijkUr cxSj eq[;ea=h th ds] dkfeZd
foHkkx ds ekQZr vuqeksnu izkIr fd;s
fcuk ugha j[kk tk;sA ,sls leLr
izfrfu;qfDr le; c<kus ds izdj.k dh
vof/k lekIr gksus ds rhu ekg iwoZ
dkfeZd foHkkx dks iz'kkldh; vuqeksnu ds
mijkUr lqLi"V la{ksfidk o `kkldh; lsod
dh v|ru xksiuh; oS;fDrd uLrh ds lkFk
Hksts tkosaA"
11. Applying the well settled principles of law on
deputation to the facts of the case, continuation of the
employees on deputation or repatriation on completion of
deputation period does not depend on their consent. After
completion of minimum period of deputation, the
petitioner/employee may be repatriated back to the parent
department.
12. In view of foregoing and for the reasons mentioned
hereinabove, no interference is warranted with the order
dated 11.08.2009 (Annexure-P/1). Accordingly, the writ
petition is dismissed at the motion stage itself. Interim
relief granted earlier is vacated.
JUDGE
