HIGH COURT OF CHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WRIT PETITION No 5875 of 2000
Manoj Rathi & Others
...Petitioners
VERSUS
State of Madhya Pradesh & Others
...Respondents
! Shri Bhaskar Payasi Advocate for the petitioners
^ Shri P K Bhaduri Panel Lawyer for the State/respondent No 1&3 Shri Ajay Singh Advocate on behalf of Shri B P Sharma Advoc
CORAM: Hon'ble Shri Satish K Agnihotri J
Dated: 08/12/2010
: Judgement
PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 226/227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
ORDER (ORAL)
(Passed on 08th day of December, 2010)
1. By this petition, the petitioners seek quashing of the
notification issued under section 4(1), 6(1) and 17(1) and
the award dated 08.12.1999 (Annexure P/10), of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act,
1894′).
2. The indisputable facts, in nutshell, as projected by
the petitioners are that the petitioners are the owner of
the disputed land situated at village Mandir Hasaud, Tahsil
Arang, District Raipur. Admittedly, a notification under
section 4(1) of the Act, 1894 was issued on 19.02.1999 in
the official gazette. Thereafter, a notification under
section 17(1) of the Act, 1894 was published in the local
news papers namely Nav Bharat and Dainik Bhaskar on 7 and
8th May, 1999 respectively. The respondent No. 2, on
25.05.1999 submitted an application for invoking provisions
of section 17(1) of the Act, 1894. The Commissioner, vide
order dated 10.06.1997 granted approval for invoking the
provisions of section 17(1) of the Act, 1894. The Sub
Divisional Officer, on 1.7.1999 directed for publication of
notification under section 4(1) and 17(1) of the Act, 1894.
Accordingly, notification under section 4(1) and 17(1) of
the Act, 1894 was published on 7.8.1999 in the gazette.
Prior to that, declaration under section 6 of the Act, 1894
was published in the gazette on 30.07.1999. Thereafter the
proceedings of the land acquisition was completed and the
award was passed on 08.12.1999 (Annexure P/10). The
Tahsildar, Raipur, was directed by the Sub Divisional
Officer-cum-Land Acquisition Officer on 14.02.2000 to take
over the possession of the land in dispute which was handed
over to the respondent No. 2 on 17.02.2000.
3. According to learned counsel for the petitioners, the
entire land acquisition proceedings were initiated in
violation of the Act, 1894. The entire proceedings have been
initiated behind the back of the petitioners and the
principles of natural justice was not followed. Shri Payasi
further submits that according to the notification issued by
the Government under section 11 of the Act, 1894, the
competent authority to pass the award is the Collector. But
in the case on hand, the award has been passed by the Sub
Divisional Officer on 08.12.1999 (Annexure P/10). Thus, the
same is not sustainable. Thus, the entire land acquisition
proceedings as well as the impugned award may be quashed.
4. Be that as it may, the law on the issue asto whether a
writ petition is maintainable after passing of the land
acquisition award, is well settled. The petitioners slept
over their right for a long period, even after passing of
the award. The award was passed on 08.12.1999 and the
petitioners had filed this petition on 05.10.2000. A
notification under section 4(1) of the Act, 1894 was issued
on 19.02.1999 and no objection was taken by the petitioners.
A notification under section 6 of the Act, 1894 was
published in the official gazette on 30.07.1999. The
petitioners did nothing during the acquisition proceedings
and even after passing the award.
5. It is well settled principle of law that a writ
petition questioning of the award is not maintainable as
after taking over the possession of the land the same vests
absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances.
Even under section 48 of the Act, 1894, the State Authority
also cannot withdraw from acquisition after possession has
been taken over.
6. In the matter of Municipal Corporation of Greater
Bombay v. Industrial Development Investment Co. Pvt. Ltd. &
Others1, the Supreme Court held as under:
“29. It is thus well settled law
that when there is inordinate delay
in filing the writ petition and
when all steps taken in the
acquisition proceedings have become
final, the Court should be loath to
quash the notifications. The High
Court has, no doubt discretionary
powers under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India to quash the
notification under Section 4(1) and
declaration under Section 6. But it
should be exercised taking all
relevant factors into pragmatic
consideration. When the award was
passed and possession was taken,
the Court should not have exercised
its power to quash the award which
is a material factor to be taken
into consideration before
exercising the power under Article
226. The fact that no third party
rights were created is hardly a
ground for interference. The
Division Bench of the High Court
was not right in interfering with
the discretion exercised by the
learned Single Judge dismissing the
writ petition on the ground of
laches.”
7. In the matter of State of Rajasthan & Others v.
D.R.Laxmi & Others2, it was held as under:
“9…When the award was passed and
possession was taken, the Court
should not have exercised its power
to quash the award which is a
material factor to be taken into
consideration before exercising the
power under Article 226. The fact
that no third party rights were
created in the case, is hardly a
ground for interference.”
8. In the matter of Municipal Council, Ahmednagar &
another v. Shah Hyder Beig & Others3, it was held as under:
“17. In any event, after the award
is passed no writ petition can be
filed challenging the acquisition
notice or against any proceedings
thereunder. This has been the
consistent view taken by this Court
and in one of the recent cases (C.
Padma v. Dy. Secy. to the Govt. of
T.N.)..”
9. In State of Karnataka & Another v. Sangappa Dayappa
Biradar & Others4, the Supreme Court held as under:
“12. A right of a landholder to
obtain an order of reference would
arise only when he has not accepted
the award. Once such award is
accepted, no legal right in him
survives for claiming a reference
to the civil court. An agreement
between the parties as regards the
value of the lands acquired by the
State is binding on the parties. So
long as such agreement and
consequently the consent awards are
not set aside in an appropriate
proceeding by a court of law having
jurisdiction in relation thereto,
the same remain binding. It is one
thing to say that agreements are
void or voidable in terms of the
provisions of the Indian Contract
Act having been obtained by fraud,
collusion, etc., or are against
public policy but it is another
thing to say that without
questioning the validity thereof,
the respondents could have
maintained their writ petitions. We
have noticed hereinbefore that even
in the writ petitions, the prayers
made by the respondents were for
quashing the order dated 23-8-1999
passed by the Special Land
Acquisition Officer and for
issuance of a direction upon him to
refer the matter to the civil
court. The High Court while
exercising its jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution,
thus, could not have substituted
the award passed by the Land
Acquisition Officer by reason of
the impugned judgment. Furthermore,
the question as regards the
validity of the agreements had not
been raised before the High Court.
As indicated hereinbefore, the
Division Bench of the High Court
had also rejected the contention
raised on behalf of the respondents
herein to the effect that the
agreements did not conform to the
requirements of Article 299 of the
Constitution or had not been drawn
up in the prescribed pro forma.”
10. In Swaika Properties Pvt. Ltd. & another v. State of
Rajasthan & Others5, the Supreme Court held that a writ
petition having been filed after taking over the possession
and the award having become final, the same deserves to be
dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.”
11. Recently, the Supreme Court, in Sulochana Chandrakant
Galande v. Pune Municipal Transport & Others6, it was
observed as under:
“16. Thus, “free from encumbrances”
means vesting of land in the State
without any charge or burden in it.
Thus, the State has absolute title/
ownership over it.
17. In Satendra Prasad Jain v.
State of U.P., this Court held that
once land vests in the State free
from all encumbrances, it cannot be
divested. The same view has been
reiterated in Awadh Bihari Yadav v.
State of Bihar, U.P. Jal Nigam v.
Kalra Properties (P) Ltd., Pratap,
Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil v.
State of Maharashtra, Allahabad
Development Authority v.
Nasiruzzaman, State of Kerala v. M.
Bhaskaran Pillai, M. Ramalinga
Thevar v. State of T.N., Printers
(Mysore) Ltd. v. M.A. Rasheed,
Bangalore Development Authority v.
R. Hanumaiah and Govt. of A.P. v.
Syed Akbar.
22. In view of the above, the law
can be summarised that once the
land is acquired, it vests in the
State free from all encumbrances.
It is not the concern of the
landowner how his land is used and
whether the land is being used for
the purpose for which it was
acquired or for any other purpose.
He becomes persona non grata once
the land vests in the State. He has
a right to get compensation only
for the same. The person interested
cannot claim the right of
restoration of land on any ground,
whatsoever.”
12. No exceptional or extraordinary grounds exist or raised
to invoke extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India, to take a departure from the well
settled principles of law.
13. The petition is accordingly dismissed. No order asto
costs.
Judge
