JUDGMENT
Jagannadha Raju, J.
1. This civil miscellaneous appeal has come up for admission. A few facts are pertinent for deciding whether this appeal can be entertained. The motor accident which gave rise to the claim for this M.V.O.P. which was rejected by the Tribunal occurred on March 29, 1982. The petition was filed before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Chittoor, on August 18, 1989, indicating as if it is a petition filed under section 110A(3) of the old Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. A persual of the order passed by the District Judge-cum-Chairman of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal indicates that neither the advocates who appeared in the matter nor the judge were aware of the statutory changes that were effected by the passing of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (Act 59 of 1988), which came into force on July 1, 1989. Dealing with the petition as a petition under the old Act, the Chairman, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, came to the conclusion that the delay of 6 years, 10 months and 20 days in filing the original petition cannot be condoned and that there is no jusitifcation for condonation of the exorbitant delay. Accordingly, the peititon was dismissed. Against the order dated August 22, 1990, passed by the Tribunal dismissing the original petition, the present appeal is filed.
2. The crucial question that arises for consideration is whether the appellants-petitioners are entitled to invoke the provisions of section 110A(3) of the old Act after the passing of the new Motor Vehicles Act and whether an original petition can be entertained in violation of section 166(3) of the new Act.
3. While under the old Act, section 110A(3) did not provide any limitation regarding the period of delay that can be condoned by the Tribunal, the new Motor Vehicles Act intorduced section 166(3). Section 166(3) reads as follows :
“(3) No application for such compensation shall be entertained unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident ;
Provided that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the application after the expirty of the said period of six months but not later than twelve months, if it is satisfied that the applicat was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time.”
4. Sub-section (3) clearly contemplates that no application for such compensation shall be entertained unless in is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident. The proviso imposes a total embargo on the Claims Tribunal entertaining the application if such an application is filed after a period of 12 months from the date of the accident. There is a vital statutory change in the law by reason of enactment of section 166(3). The emphasis in the proviso to section 166(3) is on the following words : “The Claims Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of six months but not later than twelve months.” It is also interestign to see that what the applicant has to show under section 166(3), proviso, is that the applicant was prevented from making the application in time. Sri Krishna Murthy, appearing for the appellants-petitioners, contends that, notwithstanding the fact that the new Act came into force on July 1, 1989, his client’s petition should be considered under the pre-existing law and not under the existing law. I am afraim that such an argument cannot be countenanced. It is a wellsettled principle of law that the law which governs an action is the law that is prevailing at the time of instition of the petition. Mr.Krishna Murthy further contends that, under the old Act and under section 110A as it stood then, there are numerous decisions which had laid down that while construing the words “sufficient cause”, a liberal interetation should be given. I have absolutely no quarrel with the principle laid down by those by those decisions. It is significant to remember that, under section 110A(3), there was no limitation on the total period of delay which could by condone by the Tribunal. But, under the new Act, there is a total embargo oon entertaining any claim petition filed after one year from the date of occurrence of the accident. The four decisions relied upon by learned advocate, viz., Vidya Devi v.. Himachal Road Transport Corporation, ; Dujai Bai v. State of U. P. [1986] 2 SCC 231 (All); Niranjan Kaur v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. [1986] 2 SCC 324 ; [1987] 61 Comp Cas 737 and Smt. Bhuvneshwari Devi v. Murari Lal , cannot hold the field after the statutory change has come into existene.
5. Mr. Krishna Murthy raised another agrument saying that, by reason of the accident, the petitioners had a vested right and statutory changes cannot take away a vested right. It should be remambered that the accident gives the legal representatives of the deceased a right to claim compenasation. NO vested right in credited under the enactment. As long as section 110A(3) of the 1939 Act was in force, he could approach the court that he was prevented from approaching the court earlier and that there is justification for the delay in filing the original petition. Now, by reason of the amendment of the law, the Tribunal is precluded from entertaining any application filed after a period of one year from the date of occurrence of the accident.
6. An effort is made to rely upon section 6 of the General Clauses Act. Unfortunately, section 6 of the General Clauses Act which deals with repeal of an earlier enactment is not the proper section. Section 8 of the General Clauses Act is the appropriate section which deals with the construction of reference to repealed enactments. Section 8 clearly indicates that there Acts are repealed and re-enacted with or without modification, how the provision should be construed. Sub-section (1) of section 8 clearly indicates that where the Act of any Central Act or regulation made after the commencement of the Act, repeals and re-enacts with or without modification any provision of a former enactment, then references in any other enactment or in any instrument to the provision so repealed shall, unless a different intention appears, be construed as references to the provision so re-enacted. Sub-section (2) further clarifies the matter by stating that the repealed enactment provisions, which shall not be referred to, can be referred to unless a different intention appears in the re-enacted provisions. In view of the indication given in section 8 of the General Clauses Act also, it is not open to the appellants to rely upon the pre-existing law which was in force prior to July 1, 1989.
7. It is my painful duty to point out that the two advocates who conducted the matter in the Claim Tribunal and the learned judges were totally ignorant of the statutory changes made amd they proceeded on the footing as if the old law applied. Even taking the old law as applicable, the Chairman came to the conclusion that the abnormal delay of 6 years, 10 months and 20 days in filing the original petition cannot be condoned. The position has become much worse after July 1, 1989. After July 1, 1989, as the law stands, no application for claiming compensation can be filed Judged from whateven angle, the original petition filed on August 18, 1989, is fated for dismissal
8. In the result, the appeal is dismissed, as the original petition is not maintainable. The order of the Tribunal dated August 22, 1990, is confirmed, though for different reasons.