JUDGMENT
1. Dewan Dilbagh Rai respondent is the landlord while Mehnga Singh petitioner is his tenant in a shop situate Saddar Bazar, Gurdaspur. On March 31, 1967, the landlord filed an application under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restrict Act, III of 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), on the ground that the tenant had failed to pay rent from August 1, 1966, to February 28, 1967, and had sublet the shop to respondents 2 to 5, without his consent. The tenant and other respondents to the petitioner resisted the said petition on the ground that the arrears of rent for the period of seven months claimed by the landlord in his petition for ejectment had already been deposited in the Court under Section 31 of the Punjab Relief of Indebtedness Act and that no rent was due to the landlord at the time the application for ejectment was made. The allegation of subletting was also denied and it was contended that respondents 2 and 3 and brothers of the tenant, Mehnga Singh, and they have been working with him since the shop was taken on lease by respondent 1. With regard to respondents 4 and 5 it was pleaded that they were the employees of respondents 1 to 3 and were not doing any independent business in the shop in dispute. It was also alleged that the plea of subletting was barred by respondent judicata. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned Rent Controller framed the following issues.:-
1. Whether the respondents are liable to be ejected on the grounds alleged in the petition?
2. Whether the plea of subletting is barred by respondent judcata?
3. Relief.
The learned Rent Controller came to the conclusion that the tenant had deposited the sum of Rs. 96.25 on November 4, 1966, and Rs. 240.60 on March 15, 1967, for payment to the landlord and in this manner it was proved that the rent claimed by the landlord in his application for ejectment had been paid by the tenant and, therefore, the ground on non-payment of arrears of rent was not available to the landlord for the ejectment of the tenant. The ground of subletting was also found against the landlord and as a result of his findings, the application for ejectment was dismissed on February 15, 1968.
2. The landlord filed an appeal which was allowed by the learned Appellate Authority, Gurdaspur, on April 17, 1969, on the ground that the deposit of rent in the Court under Section 31 of the Punjab Relief of Indebtedness Act did not amount to either tender or payment of arrears of rent to the landlord and, therefore, the tenant was liable to ejectment on the ground of non-payment of rent. For coming to this conclusion, the learned Appellate Authority relief on the judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Vidya Prachar Trust v. Basant Ram, 1969-71 Pun LR 526 = (AIR 1969 SC 1273) which was till then not reported. Their Lordships reversed te judgment of a Division Bench of this Court on the point. Feeling aggrieved from that order, Mehnga Singh and his two brothers filed the present revision petition in this Court under Section 15 (5) of the Act which came up for hearing before my learned brother Mahajan, J., on September 25, 1970. It was argued before the learned Judge that the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court relied upon by the learned Appellate Authority did not apply to the facts of this case because the tenant had deposited the rent due from him not under Section 31 of the Punjab Relief of Indebtedness Act but in the Court of the Rent Controller who is the appropriate authority trying the applications for ejectment under Section 13 of the Act. Considering that this was an important point of law of frequent occurrence, the learned Judge referred the case to a larger Bench and that his how this petition has come up before us for decision.
3. The facts stated above are not in dispute and the learned counsel for the petitioners has filed copies of the receipts in proof of the two deposits made by Mehnga Singh tenant in the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge exercising the powers of Rent Controller, Gurdaspur, on November 4, 1966, and March 15, 1967. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that there is no provision in the Act enabling the tenant to deposit the rent in the Court of a Rent Controller instead of paying it to the landlord or even if the landlord refused to accept the same. ON these facts, the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Shri Vidya Prachar Trust case, 71 Pun LR 526 = (AIR 1969 SC 1273) (supra) aptly apply to the facts of this case and cannot be distinguished on any ground. Their Lordships observed:-
“The Act does not lay down any other procedure under which money can be deposited with any Government Authority. Such provisions are to be found in other Rent Control Acts but are missing in this Act. Eviction, there are missing in this Act. Eviction, therefore, takes place on the ground of non-payment or tender of rent due within item fixed by the tenancy and 15 days thereafter. There is only one saving for the tenant and that is when he tenders the full rent in Court before the Rent Controller together with interest and costs. In the present case, the tenant did tender rent but only for a portion of the period and he relied on his deposit under the Relief of Indebtedness Act as due discharge of his liability for the earlier period. It may be stated that the deposit before the Senior Sub Judge was made not only of arrears of rent but prospectively for some further period for which the rent was then not due. The question is whether such payment is a valid payment or tender to the landlord.”
Their Lordships then considered the provisions of Section 31 of the Punjab Relief of Indebtedness Act and held:-
“The Act is not intended to operate between landlords and tenants; nor is the Court of the Senior Sub Judge created into a clearing house for rent. Although the general words ‘any person’ who owes money may appear to cover the case of a tenant, we have to look at the Act as a whole and see what kind of a person is intended thereby. The phrase must be read to cover cases of debtors must be read to cover cases of debtors and creditors between whom there is an agreement for payment of interest because the deposit is intended to stop interest from running. No interest is agreed to be paid by tenants, at any rate, nor ordinarily, and, therefore, the section cannot be said to cover a case between a landlord and a tenant. There is no provision in the Urban Rent Restriction Act for making a deposit deposit except one, and that is on the first day of the hearing of the case. IT could not have been intended that all tenants who may be disinclined to pay rent to their landlords should be enabled to deposit it in the Court of a Senior Sub Judge making the Senior Sub Judge a kind of a Rent Controller for all landlords. The provisions for stoppage of interest is a pointer that the interest in the first instance must have been due. In our judgment Section 31 has been misunderstood in the High Court. A second pointer is that amount may be deposited in part which cannot possibly be a valid tender in case of rent. It may be pointed out that the decision of the Division Bench runs counter to two other decisions of single Judges of the same High Court who have taken the same view which we are taking here. The decisions are noticed by the Division Bench has taken a very extended view of the deposit under the Relief of Indebtedness Act.”
In view of these observations of their Lordships it cannot be held that the two deposits made by Mehnga Singh petitioner amounted to payment or tender of rent due to the landlord-respondent.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioners, however, submitted that the Court should discard technicalities of law and act upon equitable principles, keeping in view the spirit of the law. On that basis, the argument proceeded that the amount deposited in the Court of the Senior Sub Judge by the tenant was available to the landlord on the first date of hearing of the application for ejectment because the information of the deposits was given out by him to the landlord on that day and he could have withdrawn the amount from the said Court particularly because his application for ejectment of the tenant was pending in that very Court. WE are, however, of the opinion that there is no substance in this argument as the payment or tender of the amount due has to be made to the landlord in cash by the tenant to avoid his ejectment on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent, together with interest and costs, on the first date of hearing of the application for ejectment and the tenant cannot force the landlord to withdraw the amount which had been deposited by the tenant with some Government Authority. Since the amount had not been paid to the landlord by that date, he was entitled to interest on the entire amount of arrears which was never tendered by the tenant to the landlord and, therefore, it cannot be said that the provisions of Section 13 (2) (i) of the Act were complied with. It is also to be noted that while depositing the amount in the Court of the Senior Sub Judge, the tenant did not notify the address of the landlord and, therefore, no notice was ever issued to him by the Court informing him that any amount to his credit had been deposited which he could withdraw. The deposit was made as if a case ‘Mehnga Singh versus R. S. Dilbagh Rai Dewan’ was pending in that Court which was not the case when the deposits were made.
5. For the reasons given above, we, find no merit in this revision petition which is dismissed but without any order as to costs.
6. Revision dismissed.