REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.663 OF 2010
Mohan Singh .....Appellant(s)
- Versus -
State of Bihar ....Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
GANGULY, J.
1. This criminal appeal has been preferred from the
judgment of the High Court in Criminal Appeal (DB)
No. 1338 of 2007, dated 3.9.2008, whereby the High
Court upheld the judgment and order of conviction
passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge,
Fast Track Court-IV, Motihari, East Champaran in
Sessions Trial No. 101/16 of 2006/2007. The learned
Sessions Court held the appellant guilty of criminal
1
conspiracy for murder under sections 120B of IPC and
of extortion under section 387 of IPC and sentenced
him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and
was fined for Rs.25,000/- for the offence of
criminal conspiracy for murder under section 120B,
in default of which he was to further undergo simple
imprisonment for 1 year. He was further sentenced
for seven years rigorous imprisonment under section
387 IPC and was fined Rs.5,000/-, in default of
which to undergo simple imprisonment for six months.
2. The facts of the case are that the informant Shri
Vikas Kumar Jha gave a fardbeyan to the effect that
at about 5.00 P.M. on 23.7.2005, he had received a
call on his telephone number 06252-239727, inquiring
about his elder brother Shri Anil Kumar Jha. The
informant stated before the police that his elder
brother, the owner of a medical store, on the said
date had been out of town. He submitted that he had
communicated the same to the caller. Upon such
reply, the caller disclosed himself as Mohan Singh,
2
the appellant herein, and asked the informant to
send him Rs.50,000/-. The informant submitted that
he had similar conversations with the caller three
to four times in the past. However, he then received
another telephone call on 25.7.2005 from a cell
phone number 9835273765. The caller threatened him
that since the demand of money had not been
fulfilled, the informant should be ready to face the
consequences.
3. Upon his elder brother’s return, the informant had
narrated the events to him. However, his elder
brother did not take the threat seriously.
4. On 3.8.2005, at about 9.00 P.M. when the informant
was at a place called Balua Chowk, he had received a
call from his driver Shri Dhanai Yadav on his cell
phone to the effect that informant’s elder brother
and their father, Shri Sureshwar Jha, had been shot
at while they were in their medical store, and that
both of them had been rushed to Sadar Hospital. On
3
reaching Sadar Hospital, the informant saw the dead
body of his elder brother. He was intimated by the
people there that his father had been shifted to
another hospital called Rahman’s Nursing Home. He
was also told that the shots had been fired by one
Laxmi Singh and Niraj Singh. Having heard this, the
informant rushed to Rahman’s Nursing Home, where his
injured father told him that while Niraj Singh
cleared the medical store of all the other people,
Laxmi Singh had fired shots at him and Anil Kumar
Jha with an A.K. 47 rifle, before fleeing from the
scene. After narrating such events, his father
became unconscious.
5. The informant further stated that his family had
actually known the appellant and Laxmi Singh from an
earlier incident in 2004, when on the occasion of
Durga Puja, the two had sent a messenger to Anil
Kumar Jha’s medical store, demanding Rs.50,000/- or
to face death in the alternative. He submitted that
pursuant to this, they had preferred a complaint
4
before the police, and that the matter was sub
judice. He further stated that he had actually met
the appellant once prior to the telephone calls when
the latter had asked for money, as contribution for
celebrations of Sarswati Puja and Durga Puja. The
informant thus stated that his father and brother
had been attacked by Laxmi Singh and Niraj Singh at
the instance of Mohan Singh for not having paid the
extortion money. The informant said so on the
identification of the voice of the telephone caller
as that of the appellant. He, however, did not
follow up the calls made on 23rd and 25th of July,
2005 either with the appellant in person, or with
the authorities of Motihari jail where the appellant
was in fact lodged at the time of the calls. These
statements of the informant were supported by the
informant’s father Sureshwar Jha, and his other
brother Sunil Kumar Jha.
6. On the basis of this fardbeyan, Motihari Town Police
Station Case No.246/2005 was registered on 3.8.2005
5
against the appellant Mohan Singh, Laxmi Singh,
Niraj Singh and others. The investigating officer
submitted that he had known the appellant to have as
many as seven criminal cases for murder, kidnapping
for ransom and loot, pending against him. However,
he submitted that he had received the phone number
attributed to the appellant only from the informant.
Though he submitted that as many as nine calls had
been made between the phone numbers attributed to
the appellant and Laxmi Singh, and that he had
retrieved the records of calls made by the number
attributed to the appellant and that of the
informant, he had not been able to establish as to
who were the registered owners of the SIM cards.
7. The learned Sessions Court in the course of trial
took note of the fact that identities of the
registered owners of the said SIM cards had not been
established by the police, but it did not give much
emphasis on this on the grounds that the informant’s
family had known the appellant and Laxmi Singh long
6
enough and had known about their common intention to
extort money. On these findings the learned Sessions
Court found the appellant guilty.
8. On appeal the learned Division Bench upheld the
conviction inter alia on the grounds that the
informant himself and his family had known the
appellant and Laxmi Singh from before.
9. Even though the High Court in the impugned judgment
held that identification by voice and gait is risky,
but in a case where the witness identifying the
voice had previous acquaintance with the caller, the
accused in this case, such identification can be
relied upon. The High Court also held that direct
evidence in a conspiracy is difficult to be
obtained. The case of conspiracy has to be inferred
from the conduct of the parties. The High Court
relied upon the evidence of the informant, PW.4 and
on Exts. 9 and 10 where the conversation between
PW.4 and the appellant was recorded. The High Court
7
also relied upon the evidence of PW.1 Dhanai Yadav,
who was sitting inside the medical store of the
deceased Anil Kumar Jha at the time of the incident.
PW.1 was a witness to the incident of Laxmi Singh
firing shots at the deceased and his father
Sureshwar Jha. The High Court also relied upon the
evidence of PW.2 Surehswar Jha, the injured witness.
The High Court found that the evidence of PW.2 and 4
is unblemished and their evidence cannot be
discarded. The High Court also relied upon the
evidence of PW.4 as having identified the voice of
the appellant.
10. On appreciation of the aforesaid evidence, the High
Court came to the conclusion that Mohan Singh was
performing one part of the act, and Laxmi Singh
performed another part, both performing their parts
of the same act. Thus the case of conspiracy was
made out.
8
11. Assailing such finding of the Sessions Court which
has been affirmed by the High Court, the learned
Counsel appearing for the appellant argued that the
appellant cannot be convicted under section 120-B
and given the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for
life in view of the charges framed against the
appellant.
12. In order to appreciate this argument, the charges
framed against the appellant are set out below:
“FIRST – That you, on or about the
day of at about or during the period
between 23.7.05 & 3.8.05 agreed with Laxmi
Narain Singh, Niraj Singh & Pankaj Singh
to commit the murder of Anil Jha, in the
event of his not fulfilling your demand,
as extortion of a sum of Rs.50,000/- and
besides the above said agreement you did
telephone from Motihari Jail to Vikash Jha
in pursuance of the said agreement
extending threat of dire consequences if
the demand was not met and then on 3.8.05
the offence of murder punishable with
death was committed by your companions
Laxmi Narain Singh and Niraj Singh and you
thereby committed the offence of criminal
conspiracy to commit murder of Anil Jha
and seriously injured Sureshwar Jha and
thereby committed an offence punishable
under Section 120-B of the Indian Penal
Code, and within my cognizance.
9
SECONDLY – That you, during the period
between 23.7.05 & 3.8.05 at Hospital gate
Motihari P.S., Motihari Town Dist. East
Champaran, Put Vikash Jha in fear of death
and grievous hurt to him and his family
members in order to commit extortion on
telephone and thereby committed an offence
punishable under Section 387 of the Indian
Penal Code, and within my cognizance and I
hereby direct that you be tried by me on
the said the charge.
Charges were read over and explained
in Hindi to the accused and the accused
pleaded not guilty as charged. Let him be
tried.”
13. Admittedly, no complaint of any prejudice by the
appellant was raised either before the trial Court
or in the High Court or in the course of examination
under Section 313 Cr.P.C.
14. These points have been raised before this Court for
the first time. In a case where points relating to
errors in framing of charge or even misjoinder of
charge are raised before this Court for the first
time, such grievances are not normally considered by
this Court. Reference in this connection may be
10
made to the decision of a three-Judge Bench of this
Court in the case of Mangal Singh and others v.
State of Madhya Bharat reported in AIR 1957 SC 199.
Justice Imam delivering a unanimous opinion of the
Court held in paragraph 5 at page 201 of the report
as follows:-
“It was, however, urged that there had
been misjoinder of charges. This point does
not seem to have been urged in the High
Court because there is no reference to it in
the judgment of that Court and does not seem
to have been taken in the Petition for
special leave. The appellants cannot,
therefore, be permitted to raise this
question at this stage.”
15. However, instead of refusing to consider the said
grievance on the ground of not having been raised at
an earlier stage of the proceeding, we propose to
examine the same on its merits.
16. The purpose of framing a charge is to give
intimation to the accused of clear, unambiguous and
precise notice of the nature of accusation that the
accused is called upon to meet in the course of a
11
trial. (See decision of a four-Judge Bench of this
Court in V.C. Shukla v. State Through C.B.I.,
reported in 1980 Supplementary SCC 92 at page 150
and paragraph 110 of the report). Justice Desai
delivering a concurring opinion, opined as above.
17. But the question is how to interpret the words in a
charge? In this connection, we may refer to the
provision of Section 214 of the Code. Section 214 of
the Code is set out below:
“214. Words in charge taken in sense of
law under which offence is punishable. In
every charge words used in describing an
offence shall be deemed to have been used
in the sense attached to them respectively
by the law under which such offence is
punishable.”
18.The other relevant provisions relating to charge may
be noticed as under:
“211. Contents of charge.- (1) Every
charge under this Code shall state the
offence with which the accused is charged.
(2) If the law which creates the offence
gives it any specific name, the offence
12
may be described in the charge by that
name only.
(3) If the law which creates the offence
does not give it any specific name, so
much of the definition of the offence must
be stated as to give the accused notice of
the matter with which he is charged.
(4) The law and section of the law against
which the offence is said to have been
committed shall be mentioned in the
charge.
(5) The fact that the charge is made is
equivalent to a statement that every legal
condition required by law to constitute
the offence charged was fulfilled in the
particular case.
(6) The charge shall be written in the
language of the Court.
(7) If the accused, having been previously
convicted of any offence, is liable, by
reason of such previous conviction, to
enhanced punishment, or to punishment of a
different kind, for a subsequent offence,
and it is intended to prove such previous
conviction for the purpose of affecting
the punishment which the Court may think
fit to award for the subsequent offence,
the fact date and place of the previous
conviction shall be stated in the charge;
and if such statement has been omitted,
the Court may add it at any time before
sentence is passed.
215. Effect of errors. No error in stating
either the offence or the particulars
required to be stated in the charge, and
no omission to state the offence or those
particulars, shall be regarded at any
stage of the case as material, unless the
13
accused was in fact misled by such error
or omission, and it has occasioned a
failure of justice.
464. Effect of omission to frame, or
absence of, or error in, charge. (1) No
finding sentence or order by a Court of
competent jurisdiction shall be deemed
invalid merely on the ground that no
charge was framed or on the ground of any
error, omission or irregularity in the
charge including any misjoinder of
charges, unless, in the opinion of the
Court of appeal, confirmation or revision,
a failure of justice has in fact been
occasioned thereby.
(2) If the Court of appeal, confirmation
or revision is of opinion that a failure
of justice has in fact been occasioned, it
may-
(a) in the case of an omission to
frame a charge, order that a
charge be framed and that the
trial be recommenced from the
point immediately after the
framing of the charge;
(b) in the case of an error, omission
or irregularity in the charge,
direct a new trial to be had upon
a charge framed in whatever
manner it thinks fit:
Provided that if the Court is of
opinion that the facts of the case are
such that no valid charge could be
preferred against the accused in respect
of the facts proved, it shall quash the
conviction.”
14
19. While examining the aforesaid provisions, we may
keep in mind the principles laid down by Justice
Vivian Bose in Willie (William) Slaney v. State of
Madhya Pradesh reported in (1955) 2 SCR 1140. At
page 1165 of the report, the learned judge
observed:-
“We see no reason for straining at the
meaning of these plain and emphatic
provisions unless ritual and form are to
be regarded as of the essence in criminal
trials. We are unable to find any magic or
charm in the ritual of a charge. It is the
substance of these provisions that count
and not their outward form. To hold
otherwise is only to provide avenues of
escape for the guilty and afford no
protection to the innocent.”
20. The aforesaid observation of Justice Vivian Bose in
William Slaney (supra) has been expressly approved
subsequently by this Court in V.C. Shukla (supra).
21. Reference in this connection may be made to the
decision of this Court in the case of Tulsi Ram and
others v. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in AIR
15
1963 SC 666. In that case in paragraph 12 this
Court was considering these aspects of the matter
and made it clear that a complaint about the charge
was never raised at any earlier stage and the
learned Judges came to the conclusion that the
charge was fully understood by the appellants in
that case and they never complained at the
appropriate stage that they were confused or
bewildered by the charge. The said thing is true
here. Therefore, the Court refused to accept any
grievance relating to error in the framing of the
charge.
22. Subsequently, in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh
v. Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao and another reported
in AIR 1963 SC 1850, this Court also had to consider
a similar grievance. Both in the case of Tulsi Ram
(supra) as also in the case of Cheemalapati (supra)
the charges were of conspiracy. The same is also a
charge in the instant case. Repelling the said
grievance, the learned Judges held that the object
16
in saying what has been set out in the first charge
was only to give notice to the accused as to the
ambit of the conspiracy to which they will have to
answer and nothing more. This Court held that even
assuming for a moment that the charge is cumbersome
but in the absence of any objection at the proper
time and in the absence of any material from which
the Court can infer prejudice, such grievances are
precluded by reason of provision of Section 225 of
the Cr.P.C. Under the present Code it is Section
215 which has been quoted above.
23. Reference in this connection may also be made in the
decision of this Court in Rawalpenta Venkalu and
another v. The State of Hyderabad reported in AIR
1956 SC 171 at para 10 page 174 of the report. The
learned Judges came to the conclusion that although
Section 34 is not added to Section 302, the accused
had clear notice that they were being charged with
the offence of committing murder in pursuance of
their common intention. Therefore, the omission to
17
mention Section 34 in the charge has only an
academic significance and has not in any way misled
the accused. In the instant case the omission of
charge of Section 302 has not in any way misled the
accused inasmuch as it is made very clear that in
the charge that he agreed with the others to commit
the murder of Anil Jha. Following the aforesaid
ratio there is no doubt that in the instant case
from the evidence led by the prosecution the charge
of murder has been brought home against the
appellant.
24. In K. Prema S. Rao and another v. Yadla Srinivasa
Rao and others reported in (2003) 1 SCC 217 this
Court held that though the charge specifically under
Section 306 IPC was not framed but all the
ingredients constituting the offence were mentioned
in the statement of charges and in paragraph 22 at
page 226 of the report, a three-Judge Bench of this
Court held that mere omission or defect in framing
of charge does not disable the criminal court from
18
convicting the accused for the offence which is
found to have been proved on the evidence on record.
The learned Judges held that provisions of Section
221 Cr.P.C. takes care of such a situation and
safeguards the powers of the criminal court to
convict an accused for an offence with which he is
not charged although on facts found in evidence he
could have been charged with such offence. The
learned Judges have also referred to Section 215 of
the Cr.P.C., set out above, in support of their
contention.
25. Even in the case of Dalbir Singh v. State of U.P.,
reported in (2004) 5 SCC 334, a three-Judge Bench of
this Court held that in view of Section 464 Cr.P.C.
it is possible for the appellate or revisional court
to convict the accused for an offence for which no
charge was framed unless the court is of the opinion
that the failure of justice will occasion in the
process. The learned Judges further explained that
in order to judge whether there is a failure of
19
justice the Court has to examine whether the accused
was aware of the basic ingredients of the offence
for which he is being convicted and whether the main
facts sought to be established against him were
explained to him clearly and whether he got a fair
chance to defend himself. If we follow these tests,
we have no hesitation that in the instant case the
accused had clear notice of what was alleged against
him and he had adequate opportunity of defending
himself against what was alleged against him.
26. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Paras Nath Singh
reported in (2009) 6 SCC 372 this Court, setting out
Section 464 of Cr.P.C., further held that whether
there is failure of justice or not has to be proved
by the accused. In the instant case no such
argument was ever made before the Trial Court or
even in the High Court and we are satisfied from the
materials on record that no failure of justice has
been occasioned in any way nor has the appellant
suffered any prejudice.
20
27. In Annareddy Sambasiva Reddy and others v. State of
Andhra Pradesh reported in (2009) 12 SCC 546 this
court again had occasion to deal with the same
question and referred to Section 464 of Cr.P.C. In
paragraph 55 at page 567 of the report, this Court
came to the conclusion that if the ingredients of
the section charged with are obvious and implicit,
conviction under such head can be sustained
irrespective of the fact whether the said section
has been mentioned or not in the charge. The basic
question is one of prejudice.
28. In view of such consistent opinion of this Court, we
are of the view that no prejudice has been caused to
the appellant for non-mentioning of Section 302
I.P.C. in the charge since all the ingredients of
the offence were disclosed. The appellant had full
notice and had ample opportunity to defend himself
against the same and at no earlier stage of the
proceedings, the appellant had raised any grievance.
21
Apart from that, on overall consideration of the
facts and circumstances of this case we do not find
that the appellant suffered any prejudice nor has
there been any failure of justice.
29. In the instant case, in the charge it has been
clearly mentioned that the accused-appellant has
committed the murder of Anil Jha. By mentioning that
the accused has committed the murder of Anil Jha all
the ingredients of the charge have been mentioned
and the requirement of Section 211, sub-section (2)
has been complied with. Therefore, we do not find
any substance in the aforesaid grievance of the
appellant.
30. Now the only other point on which argument has been
made on behalf of the appellant is that in the
instant case appellant was in jail at the time of
the commission of the offence. It has been
submitted that his involvement in the whole episode
has been argued for only on the evidence of PW.4 who
22
is said to have identified his voice on the basis of
some telephone calls.
31. These are essentially questions of fact and after a
concurrent finding by two courts normally this Court
in an appeal against such finding is slow and
circumspect to upset such finding unless this Court
finds the finding to be perverse.
32. However, on the legal issue one thing is clear that
identification by voice has to be considered by this
Court carefully and on this aspect some guidelines
have been laid down by this Court in the case of
Kirpal Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh reported
in AIR 1965 SC 712. In dealing with the question of
voice identification, construing the provisions of
Section 9 of the Indian Evidence Act, this Court
held:
“…It is true that the evidence about
identification of a person by the timbre of
his voice depending upon subtle variations
23
in the overtones when the person recognising
is not familiar with the person recognised
may be some-what risky in a criminal trial.
But the appellant was intimately known to
Rakkha Singh and for more than a fortnight
before the date of the offence he had met
the appellant on several occasions in
connection with the dispute about the
sugarcane crop….”
(para 4, page 714 of the report)
33. Relying on such identification by voice this Court
held in Kripal Singh (supra) that it cannot come to
the conclusion that the identification of the
assailant by Rakkha Singh was so improbable that
this Court would be justified in disagreeing with
the opinion of the Court which saw the witness and
formed its opinion as to its credibility and also of
the High Court which considered the evidence against
the appellant and accepted the testimony (see para
4, page 714 of the report). The same principles
will apply here. PW.4 in his evidence clearly
stated that the appellant gave him a phone call
asking for money on 23.7.2005 and again on 25.7.2005
when the appellant threatened him of dire
consequences for not paying the money. PW.4 also
stated in his evidence that he got an ID caller
installed in his phone and he informed the police of
24
the phone number of the caller which is of the
appellant. PW.4 also stated in his evidence that he
had direct talks with the appellant at hospital
chawk prior to the incident when he used to demand
money from him and other shopkeepers at the time of
Durga Puja and Saraswati Puja. PW.4 specifically
stated that he can identify the voice of Mohan
Singh. The first I.O. of the case (PW.6) in his
evidence also stated that during investigation
mobile No.9835273765 of Mohan Singh was found and
mobile No.9431428630 of Laxmi Singh was also found.
P.W. 8, the other I.O. of the case stated that on
23.7.2005, four calls were made between the mobile
phones of Laxmi Singh and Mohan Singh. Then six more
calls were made by Laxmi Singh to Mohan Singh on
3.08.2005, i.e. on the day of the incident itself.
The printout details of these phone calls were
produced before the Court. So both the Trial Court
and High Court considered the evidence of PW.6 and
PW.8 who were the investigating officers in this
case, apart from the evidence of PW.4, other
witnesses and the materials on record before coming
25
to the conclusion. The fact that the name of
registered allottees the SIM cards of these mobile
phones could not be traced is not relevant in this
connection. This Court finds that from para 19
onwards of the judgment by the High Court these
aspects have received due consideration.
34. The learned counsel for the appellant relied on some
judgments in support of his contention that in the
facts of this case voice identification cannot be
accepted. The learned counsel relied on a judgment
of this Court in the case of Nilesh Dinkar Paradkar
v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2011) 4 SCC
143. In that case the voice in the telephone was
tapped and then the voice was recorded in a cassette
and the cassette was then played to identify the
voice. Therefore, there is a substantial factual
difference with the facts in the case of Nilesh
(supra) and the facts of the present case. Apart
from that in Nilesh (supra), the High Court
acquitted A1 to A4 and this Court finds that the
26
evidence against Nilesh was identical. Therefore,
this Court held that the conclusion of the High
court in acquitting Accused 1, 2, 3 and 4 has
virtually “destroyed the entire substratum of the
prosecution case” (see para 28 of the report).
Since that decision was passed on tape recorded
version of the voice, the principles decided in that
case, even though are unexceptionable, cannot be
applied to the present case.
35. The other case on which reliance was placed by the
learned counsel for the appellant was in the case of
Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu v. Palanisamy alias
Selvan reported in (2008) 14 SCC 495. In that case
this Court held that identification from voice is
possible but in that case no evidence was adduced to
show that witnesses were closely acquainted with the
accused to identify him from his voice and that too
from very short replies. Therefore, this case
factually stands on a different footing. In the
instant case the evidence of PW.4 that he knows the
27
voice of the appellant was not challenged nor was it
challenged that the mobile no. 9835273765 is not
that of the appellant. Nor has the evidence of PW.8
been challenged that on 3.8.2005 eight calls were
recorded between the mobiles of the appellant and
his conspirator Laxmi Singh.
36. The next decision on which reliance was placed by
the learned counsel for the appellant was rendered
in the case of Saju v. State of Kerala reported in
(2001) 1 SCC 378. In Saju (supra) this Court
explained the principles of Section 10 of the
Evidence Act, as follows:-
“Evidene Act, 1872 – Sec.10 – Condition
for applicability of
Act or action of one of the accused cannot
be used as evidence against the other.
However, an exception has been carved out under
Section 10 of the Evidence Act in the case of
conspiracy. To attract the applicability of
Section 10 of the Evidence Act, the court must
have reasonable ground to believe that two or
more persons had conspired together for
committing an offence. It is only then that
the evidence of action or statement made by one
of the accused could be used as evidence
against the other.”
28
37. If we apply the aforesaid principles to the facts of
the present case it is clear that there is enough
evidence to furnish reasonable ground to believe
that both the appellant and Laxmi Singh had
conspired together for committing the offence.
Therefore, the principles of this case do not help
the appellant.
38. Learned counsel for the appellant also relied upon
the decision of this Court in the case of Yogesh
alias Sachin Jagdish Joshi v. State of Maharashtra
reported in (2008) 10 SCC 394. In paragraph 25 at
page 402 of the report this Court laid down the
following principles:-
“Thus, it is manifest that the meeting of
minds of two or more persons for doing an
illegal act or an act by illegal means is
sine qua non of the criminal conspiracy but
it may not be possible to prove the
agreement between them by direct proof.
Nevertheless, existence of the conspiracy
and its objective can be inferred from the
surrounding circumstances and the conduct of
the accused. But the incriminating
circumstances must form a chain of events
from which a conclusion about the guilt of
29
the accused could be drawn. It is well
settled that an offence of conspiracy is a
substantive offence and renders the mere
agreement to commit an offence punishable,
even if an offence does not take place
pursuant to the illegal agreement.”
39. In view of the aforesaid principles, this Court
finds that no assistance can be drawn from the
aforesaid decision to the case of the appellant in
this case.
40. Reliance was also placed on the decision of this
Court in the case of S. Arul Raja v. State of Tamil
Nadu reported in (2010) 8 SCC 233. In that case
this Court held that mere circumstantial evidence to
prove the involvement of the accused is not
sufficient to meet the requirements of criminal
conspiracy and meeting of minds to form a criminal
conspiracy has to be proved by placing substantive
evidence. In the instant case, as discussed above,
substantive evidence was placed to prove the meeting
of minds between the appellant and Laxmi Singh about
the murder of the victim. In evidence which has
30
been noted hereinabove in the earlier part of the
judgment it clearly shows that there is substantial
piece of evidence to prove criminal conspiracy.
41. Reliance was also placed by the learned counsel for
the appellant on the decision of this Court in the
case of Mohd. Khalid v. State of West Bengal
reported in (2002) 7 SCC 334. In that case, this
court held that offence of conspiracy can be proved
by either direct or circumstantial evidence. In
paragraph 24 at page 354 of the report the following
observations have been made:-
“Conspiracies are not hatched in the open,
by their nature, they are secretly planned,
they can be proved even by circumstantial
evidence, the lack of direct evidence relating
to conspiracy has no consequence.”
42. For the reasons discussed above, this Court does not
find that there is any reason to interfere with the
concurrent finding in the instant case. This Court,
therefore, does not find any reason to take a view
different from the one taken by the High Court.
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43. The appeal is dismissed and the conviction of the
appellant under Section 120B of IPC for life
imprisonment is affirmed.
…………………..J.
(ASOK KUMAR GANGULY)
…………………..J.
New Delhi (DEEPAK VERMA)
August 26, 2011
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