JUDGMENT
1. The question raised before us in second appeal is whether the plaintiffs’ suit for accounts against the defendant, who was a gomasta, has been properly dismissed under the provisions of article 89, Schedule II, of the Indian Limitation Act so far as the suit concerned the defendant’s agency in the life-time of the plaintiffs’ father.
2. The first Court gave the plaintiffs a full decree; but on appeal to the District Judge, the latter has applied the provisions of article 89 and dismissed the suit to that extent, reckoning the period of three years mentioned in the article as having commenced to run from the date of the death of the plaintiffs’ father, which happened in the year 1308 B. S., that is to say, more than three years before the institution of this suit in the year 1905.
3. It is urged by the learned Vakil for the plaintiffs-appellants that article 120, and not article 89, is applicable.
4. We, however, entertain no manner of doubt that article 89 is the appropriate article, and that limitation began to run from the date of the plaintiffs’ father’s death. Section 201 of the Indian Contract Act expressly says that an agency is terminated by either the principal or the agent dying, and the facts are that, the plaintiffs’ father having died in 1308, that particular agency terminated by that event. There were subsequent transactions but for that period, limitation has not been held to apply. We are fortified in our conclusions by the decision in Sib Chandra Roy Chowdhury v. Chandra Narain Mukerji 1 C.L.J. 232 : 32 C. 719.
5. In the result, the appeal must be dismissed with costs.
