ORDER
Vishnu Sahai, J.
1. Through this petition preferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner detenu Manzoor @ Mansoor @ Manoj Ahmed Sayad Ahmed impugns the detention order dated 12th April 1999 passed by the 1st respondent Mr. R.H. Mendonca, The Commissioner of Police, Greater Bombay, detaining him under sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug Offenders and Dangerous Persons Act, 1981 (No. IV of 1981), (Amendment-1996), hereinafter referred to as “MPDA Act”. A true copy of the detention order is filed as Exhibit “A” to the petition.
2. The prejudicial activities of the petitioner detenu warranting the issuance of the impugned detention order are contained in the grounds of detention which are also dated 12th April, 1999, a true copy of which is filed as Exhibit “C” to the petition. A perusal of para 5 of the grounds of detention would show that the petitioner detenu has been detained as a dangerous person.
3. The detention order and grounds of detention were served on the petitioner detenu on 13th April 1999.
4. In short it has been alleged in the grounds of detention that the petitioner was a weapon wielding desperado whose activities had created a reign of terror in the minds of public in the localities of Manipada, Kalina village, Mohamadi Estate, Motilal Nehru Nagar, Santacaruz (East) and the areas adjoining thereto, within the jurisdiction of Vakola Police Station. It has been alleged in the grounds of detention that the petitioner is a member of Abu Salem gang. A perusal of the grounds of detention would show that the impugned detention order is founded on one C.R. viz. C.R. No. 94/99 under section 387 r.w. 34 I.P.C. read with section 3(25) of the Arms Act arising out of a complaint lodged on 25-2-1999 by one Sabarjitsingh at Vakola Police Station and two in camera statements of witnesses A and B. In short Sabarjitsingh in his complaint stated that the petitioner phoned him on 2-2-1999 and told him to contact at Dubai on Phone No. 00971506965183. Thereafter he frequently phoned Sabarjitsingh and demanded Rs. 25 lacs as extortion money. Sabarjitsingh informed police and installed a Caller I.D. machine from which he was able to know the phone number and the place from where the petitioner was phoning him.
On 25-2-1999 at about 6 p.m. Sabarjitsingh received a phone call from the petitioner and immediately communicated the information to the Senior Inspector of Vakola Police Station who reached the spot from where the phone call was made. The Senior Inspector of Vakola Police Station introduced himself to the petitioner who tried to run away but was apprehended. On his personal search the following articles were recovered:
1) One country made Katta,
2) One live Cartridge,
3) One Mobile Phone of Siemens company, and
4) Maruti Car No. MFC-7667 and documents of the car.
Thereafter C.R. No. 94/99 was registered against the petitioner at Vakola Police Station.
5. The in camera statements are of two witnesses, viz. witnesses A and B, and are set out as grounds 4(b)(i) and 4(b)(ii).
Ground 4(b)(i) refers to the incamera statement of witness A. In short he stated that one day in the last week of January 99 at about 11 a.m. when the witness was present in his shop the petitioner along with his two associates arrived there and demanded Rs. 2000/-. When he showed his inability to pay the amount the petitioner threw one chocolate bottle and threatened him saying that he would see as to how he would run his shop. Seeing the incident passersby dispersed quickly and nearby shopkeepers closed their shops. Out of fear the witness handed over Rs. 500/- to the petitioner who caught hold of his collar and told him that in the evening a woman would come and he should give her a month’s ration and in case he went to the police then he would be dealt with.
Ground 4(b)(ii) refers to the incamera statement of witness B. In short he stated that in the first week of February 1999 at about 4.30 p.m. when he was present in his shop he received the petitioner’s call which was to the effect that two of his men would visit him and they should be given Rs. 1 lac. When he expressed his inability, the petitioner threatened him that he should remember that his name was Manzoor and disconnected the line. At about 5 p.m. the same day the petitioner and his two associates arrived in his wine shop and asked him whether he had brought the money to which he replied that he had no money. Thereafter the petitioner gave fist blows to him and told him that in case he did business in his area he should give him the entire money. The petitioner threw one beer bottle on the show case. Seeing the incident passersby dispersed quickly and nearby shopkeepers closed their shops.
6. We have heard Mr. Prakash Naik for petitioner and Mr. S.G. Deshmukh, APP., for respondents.
Although in the petition Mr. Prakash Naik has pleaded as many as nine grounds, as grounds 6(i) to 6(ix), but he has pressed before us only two grounds.
The first ground pressed by Mr. Naik is ground 6(xiii). The burden of song in the said ground is that the petitioner cannot read, write and understand English and Marathi language and consequently it was imperative to supply him Hindi translation of English documents and this was not done. It has been averred that the Hindi translation of documents at pages 171 to 175 of the compilation has not been furnished to the petitioner. It has been averred that since the same has not been furnished, the petitioner was deprived of his right of making an effective representation under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India.
7. We have examined ground 6(xiii) and para 16 of the affidavit of the 1st respondent wherein the said ground has been replied to. We have also examined the compilation furnished to the petitioner which has been annexed along with this petition. On examining the compilation we find that pages 171 and 172 are the bail application of the petitioner in English in C.R. No. 94/99 referred to in grounds of detention and pages 173, 174 and 175 are the copy of the order passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, in English, rejecting the said bail application.
8. It is well-settled that a bail application and a bail order would only be vital documents if the detenu was on bail at the time of passing of the detention order. In this connection it would be useful to advert to para 12(6) of the decision of the Supreme Court Abdul Sathar Ibmhim Manik v. Union of India and others.
“(6) In a case where detenu is released on bail and is at liberty at the time of passing the order of detention, then the detaining authority has to necessarily rely upon them as that would be a vital ground for ordering detention. In such a case the bail application and the order granting bail should necessarily be placed before the authority and the copies should also be supplied to the detenu.”
9. Since in the instant case the petitioner detenu was not on bail at the time of the passing of the impugned detention order, in our view, neither the bail application nor the bail order were vital documents and since they were not vital documents, the detaining authority was not enjoined in law to furnish their Hindi translation to the detenu.
10. It is well settled that the detenu’s right to make an effective representation under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India would only be impaired if copies of vital documents are not supplied to the detenu. As we have said the bail application and the bail order in the instant case were not vital documents. Consequently we reject the first submission.
11. The second ground pressed by Mr. Prakash Naik is that pleaded as ground 6(iii), which in substance is that even if the grounds of detention are accepted to be true on their face value, they disclose a breach of law and order and not public order.
We have examined the said submission and do not find any merit in it.
Way back as the year 1970, in para 3 of the oft-quoted case of Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, , Hidayatullah C.J., drew the distinction between the concepts of law and order and public order. To our understanding the ratio laid down by His Lordship is that where the impact of an act disturbs the even tempo of lives of individuals, the said act would constitute breach of law and order but if the even tempo of life of a segment of a society or society as a whole is affected by it, it would amount to violation of public order. If the said norm is borne in mind and the grounds of detention examined in its perspective there cannot be even an iota of doubt that in the instant case there is breach of public order.
12. Earlier we have referred to C.R. No. 94/99 of Vakola Police Station and the incamera statements of witnesses “A” and “B”. We have seen that a perusal of the two incamera statements viz. of witnesses A and B shows that the impact of the act was not confined to witnesses A and B but affected a segment of community. To repeat, witness A stated that one day in the last week of January 99 at about 11 a.m. the petitioner along with his two associates came to his shop and demanded Rs. 2000/-. When he showed his inability to pay the amount the petitioner threw one chocolate bottle and threatened him saying that he would see as to how he would do his business, and on “Seeing the incident passersby dispersed quickly and nearby shop; keepers closed their shops”.
The statement of witness “B” shows that one day in the first week of February 1999 at about 4.30 p.m. when he was present in his shop he received the petitioner’s call to the effect that two of his men would visit him and they should be given Rs. 1 lac. When he showed his inability the petitioner threatened him that he should remember that his name was Manzoor and disconnected the telephone line. At about 5 p.m. the same day the petitioner and his two associates arrived in his wine shop and asked him whether he had brought the money to which he replied that he had no money. Then the petitioner inflicted fist blows on him saying that in case he wanted to do business in his area he should give him the entire money. He also stated that the petitioner threw one beer bottle on the show case. “Seeing the incident passersbv dispersed quickly and nearby shopkeepers closed their shops.”
A perusal of the said statements would show that the impact of the act of the petitioner was not confined to witnesses “A” and “B” alone, but as a result thereof the nearby shop keepers closed their shops and the persons who saw the act ran away. In our view the acts of the petitioner referred to by witnesses A and B amount to a clear violation of public order and not law and order simpliciter.
13. In our view, the petitioner has breached the public order as defined in section 2 of the MPDA Act. A perusal of the section 2(a) (iv) would show that acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order in the case of a dangerous person (the petitioner detenu has been detained as a dangerous person), would mean when he is engaged, or is making preparation for engaging, in any of his activities as a dangerous person which affect adversely, or are likely to affect adversely, the maintenance of public order.
A perusal of the explanation to section 2(a) would show that in case of a dangerous person public order would be deemed to have been affected if any of the activities of a dangerous person directly or indirectly cause or are calculated to cause any harm, danger or alarm or a feeling of insecurity amongst the general public or any section thereof.
13-A.A perusal of the in-camera statements, which we have extracted in detail, shows that directly as a consequence of the activities of the petitioner, alarm and feeling of insecurity was created in the section of general public referred to in the said statements.
14. No other point was pressed before us by Mr. Prashant Naik.
15. In the result this petition is dismissed and the rule is discharged
16. Petition dismissed.
