ORDER
V.S. Aggarwal, J.
1. The present revision petition has been filed by Mukhtiar Singh (hereinafter described as ‘the petitioner’) directed against the order of eviction passed by the learned Rent Controller, Moga which was upheld by the learned Appellate Authority, Faridkot.
2. The sole controversy agitated in the revision petition was as to whether the respondent-landlord bona fide requires the property or not. Therefore, this Court deems it unnecessary to refer to other facts in controversy that arose between the parties during the course of trial.
3. The respondent filed the petition for eviction against the petitioner alleging that the suit property had been let out to the petitioner from 1-5-1982. The respondent had retired from the Indian Revenue Service and had built the house in dispute in 1961. He bona fide required the property for himself and members of his family. After retirement he lived with his wife up to 30-4-1982 in the suit premises. Thereafter he started
practice as consultant/adviser in Customs and Central Excise matters and had shifted to Ludhiana. He claimed that now he has grown old and is not in a position to work as a consultant/adviser and intends to reside in the suit property. He had strained relations with his son Harinder Singh and, therefore, he intends to shift to Moga his native place where his friends and relations are residing.
4. The petition for eviction had been contested. It was denied that the respondent bona fide required the property for himself and members of his family. As per the petitioner the respondent is residing at Ludhiana in his own house and is working as consultant/adviser in Customs and Central Excise at Ludhiana. He resides in House No. 233-H, Bhai Randhir Singh Nagar, Ludhiana. He has no intention to shift to Moga. The version stated to be set up by the respondent was false and concocted. It was denied that the respondent has any sentimental value or that he has strained relations with his son. His son was stated to be living separately. Plea was further raised that there are better medical facilities at Ludhiana and his contention in old days to shift to Moga is not correct.
5. The learned Rent Controller had framed the issues and recorded the findings that the respondent bona fide required the property for himself and members of his family. Accordingly, the order of eviction was passed. An appeal was preferred which was dismissed by the Appellate Authority. In the revision petition the order of the Appellate Authority was set aside on 29-9-1997 holding that when application for additional evidence had been filed, the Appellate Authority should have decided the same. Certain letters purported to have been written by the respondent have been placed on the record. The petitioner’s counsel has no objection if those letters are read in evidence. It was held that as regards the intention to move to the said house or change of mind of the respondent is concerned, the respondent should be given an opportunity to explain with a corresponding right to the petitioner to cross-examine the witness.
6. Before the Appellate Authority in terms of the directions given by this Court, the respondent appeared and was cross-examined. The learned Appellate Authority went through the controversy and held that so far
as the sale of the shop at Moga is concerned, it has no reflection on the bona fide requirement of the respondent because with the status of the respondent he was not expected to live in the shop which was a single room. It was further held that the respondent had sold a house which was a joint house along with his brothers and on that occasion also no inferences can be drawn. The contention ot the petitioner that respondent intended to sell the house was rejected. It was held that the close relatives of the respondent live near the property in question at Moga and, therefore, if the respondent intends to shift to Moga, the requirement must be held to be bona fide. The plea of the petitioner that respondent is residing abroad even was rejected. It was held that he had come to India and stayed in India for long intervals. As a result of the dismissal of the appeal, the present revision petition has been filed.
7. Learned counsel for the respondent on the contrary had urged that there are concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the learned Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority and, therefore, this Court will not interfere in the said findings. The said contention in principle is correct. The Supreme Court in the case of Gurbachan Singh (Dead) through LRs. v. Saliabi alias Bibijan, 1995 (suppl) (4) SCC 438 considered this question and held :–
“It is not disputed that the upstairs portion of the building, although leased to the tenant for residential purpose has been used by him as a godown. It is also not in dispute that the landlord is carrying on a business in scraps and that she bona fide requires the whole building for residence as well as business. Bona fide requirement is a question of fact. So is comparative hardship. These questions have to be decided on the basis of evidence on record. Appreciation of evidence is not the task of High Court in exercise of its revisional power. On the facts of this case, the High Court, in our view, was wrong in re-appreciating the evidence and reversing the conclusions concurrently reached by the courts below.”
Similarly in the case of Prativa Devi (Smt) v. T. V. Krishnan, (1996) 5 SCC 353 the Supreme Court held that it is not for the High Court to re-appraise the evidence. In fact it goes without saying that concurrent findings of fact need not be disturbed unless
they are erroneous or absurd. With this backdrop one can conveniently revert back to the facts of the present case.
8. As referred to above, the sole controversy agitated has been that respondent intends to shift to the property in question at Moga and in his old days wants to live at that place where his friends and relatives are residing.
9. What would be the bona fide requirement? Indeed it goes with facts and circumstances of each case. There cannot be a straight-jacket formula. The Supreme Court in the case of Mattulal v. Radhe Lal, 1974 Rent CR 441 (AIR 1974 SC 1596) held that the Court should apply the objective test and not a subjective test and merely because the landlord asserts that he wants the accommodation, would not be enough to establish the bona fide. The burden is on him to establish the fact. The law has always been that the landlord is the best judge of his requirement. For his own sake the tenant cannot insist that the landlord should put himself to his inconvenience. But mere desire on the part of the landlord is not enough. There should be an element of need as opposed to mere desire or wish. The Supreme Court in the case of Gulabbai v. Nalin Narsi Vohra (1991) 2 Rent CR 453 considered this controversy and held that bona fide requirement must have an element of need as opposed to mere desire or wish. Similarly in the case of M/s. Rahabhar Productions Pvt Ltd. v. Rajendra K. Tandon (1998) 1 Rent CR 482 : (AIR 1998 SC 1639) while construing the same question, the Supreme Court held that bona fide need should be genuine, honest and conceived in good faith. It was held :–
“The phrase “bona fide need” or “bona fide requirement” occurs not only in the Dehli Rent Control Act but in the Rent Control legislation of other States also. What is the meaning of this phrase has been considered innumerable times by various High Courts as also by this Court and requires no citations to explain its legal implications. Even then reference may be made to the decision of this Court in Ram Das v. Ishwar Chander (1988) 2 SCC 131 : AIR 1988 SC 1422 : (1988) 1 Rent CR 625, in which it was indicated that “bona fide need” should be genuine, honest and conceived in good faith. It was also indicated that landlord’s desire for possession, however honest it might otherwise be, has, inevitably, a subjective element in it. The “desire” to become “requirement” must have the objective element of a “need” which can be decided only by taking all relevant circumstances into consideration so that the protection afforded to a tenant is not rendered illusory or whittled down. These observations were made in respect of the provisions contained in E. P. Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949.”
10. Similarly, this Court in the case of Salim Ahmed v. Surjit Kumar Sahai (1998) 120 Pun LR 182 held that it is not that landlord at any time and every time can seek eviction. It is not his whimsical or fanciful desire. There has to be an element of need before it can be stated that the requirement is bona fide.
11. Therefore, one necessarily has to revert back to the facts of the present case. The admitted facts are that after retirement from Indian Revenue Service, the respondent for almost a decade lived in the house in question. In 1982 he shifted to Ludhiana where he practised as a Consultant. It is also an admitted fact that respondent had been writing to the petitioner for purchasing the house and the letters to that effect have been proved and admitted on the record. But the contention of the respondent has been that thereafter has changed his mind and intends to shift to the property in his old days to live with his friends and relatives.
12. Not only the letters show that the
respondent had been dealing with the peti
tioner regarding the purchase of the prop
erty but certain further facts came to light
during the cross-examination of the respond
ent in appeal. It transpired that he has
become a citizen of Canada. He admitted
that he is hardly in a position to see and is
hard of hearing.
13. On behalf of the respondent it was urged that the respondent has been visiting India and staying in India for long periods which shows that he intends to reside in his own house. It is correct that the respondent had come to India and stayed for one year in 1987-1988, again for one year in 1989 to 1990 and thereafter has been staying for 5 to 6 months at a stretch on 4 to 5 occasions.
14. While the objection raised referred to above has to be applied, the totality of the circumstances has to be seen. As mentioned above, the respondent has been negotiating
with the petitioner regarding the sale of the house. Suddenly he changed his mind and intends to settle at Moga and not to sell the house. Thereafter he has become a citizen of Canada. He can hardly see and is hard of hearing. These factors clearly show that when a person has become a citizen of other country, he would prefer to live there. The plea in the peculiar facts of the present case that he intends to reside in the house is patently incorrect. The findings to the contrary by the Appellate Authority are erroneous and are not based on proper reading of the evidence. Therefore, this Court tn exercise of the revisional jurisdiction keeping in view the impropriety of the order, must Interfere.
15. Strong reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in the case of Tripta Soni v. S. P. Jain, (1987) 2 Rent CR 181. In the cited case the landlady living in England wants to settle in India and occupy his own house for education of her children. There was nothing on the record to show that she wanted enhancement of the rent. It was held that requirement must be taken to be bona fide. The facts of the case clearly show that in that case there was a clear indication that the landlady wants to shift to India for education of her children. Here in the present case the landlord has taken the citizenship of Canada because most of his relatives are living in Canada.
16. Reference was also made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Meenal Eknath Kshirsagar (Mrs) v. Traders and Agencies (1996) 5 SCC 344 : (AIR 1997 SC 59). Herein also the landlord wanted the property for his own bona fide requirement. It was found that the husband of the landlady had another premises. The said property was available temporarily. The requirement was held to be bona fide. The facts of the case clearly show that they are not part materia with the peculiar facts of the case in hand.
17. Attention of the Court in that event was drawn to the other decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Prativa Devi (Smt) v. T. V. Krishnan (1996(5) SCC 353) (supra). Herein the landlord was 70 years old. The High Court held that the requirement is not bona fide. The Supreme Court held that it is not for the High Court to. dictate to the landlord as to how and in what manner he should live. But the cases where bona fide
requirement is not established have to be examined in different premise. In the present case as noted above, the totality of circumstances clearly show that the respondent did not bona fide require the property. Mere assertion of the landlord that he requires the properly is not decisive. The Court has to determine the truth and the claim if it is bona fide or not. It has also to see if it is reasonable. Once it is so examined and as noted above it is found that the landlord does not bona fide require the property, the impugned orders cannot be sustained.
18. For these reasons, the revision petition is allowed and the impugned orders of the learned Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority are set aside. Instead the eviction petition is dismissed.