Mukka Narasimha Reddy And Ors. vs Government Of A.P., Rep. By Its … on 15 April, 1997

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Andhra High Court
Mukka Narasimha Reddy And Ors. vs Government Of A.P., Rep. By Its … on 15 April, 1997
Equivalent citations: 1997 (4) ALT 139
Author: L Rath
Bench: L Rath, T Rangarajan

ORDER

Lingaraja Rath, J.

1. The question urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is the non-maintainability of revision before the Government in the matter of bifurcation of Gram Panchayat at the instance of a private person. Vaddimadugu Gram Panchayat was sought to be bifurcated but in view of the unanimous resolution of the Gram Panchayat opposing it, the Collector, Prakasam District decided against it. A revision before the Government was carried by one G. Raghurami Reddy which was allowed. Writ Petition No. 11430 of 1995, filed assailing the revisional order was allowed on 18-12-1995 directing the Government to give notice to the Gram Panchayat before passing order on the revision petition. The Government, after issuing notice to the Gram Panchayat, again confirmed the bifurcation, challenging which the present writ petition has been filed. The revision petitioner having not been made a party, the learned Counsel for the petitioner is permitted to implead him as the 4th respondent.

2. It is urged before us by the learned Counsel that under Rule 10 of the A.P. Gram Panchayat (Declaration of Village) Rules, 1994 and the G.O.Ms.No. 515, Panchayati Raj, Rural Development & Relief (Mandal-I), dated 17-8-1994, it is only the Gram Panchayat which has a right of revision and the Respondent No. 4 could not have preferred the revision. Consequently, the order passed on the revision petition is one which must be set aside.

3. The learned Government Pleader for Gram Panchayats has brought to our notice the provisions of Section 264 of Andhra Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 which vests power in the Government either suo motu or on application from any person interested, to call for and examine the record of a Gram Panchayat, Mandal Parishad or a Zilla Parishad or of its Standing Committees or of any authority, officer or person in respect of any proceeding to satisfy themselves as to regularity of such proceeding or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or orders passed therein and, if in any case, it appears to the Government that any such decision or order should be modified, annulled or reversed or remitted for reconsideration, they may pass orders accordingly. The learned Government Pleader argued that since the Act authorises the revisional powers in the Government to be exercised either suo motu or on the application of any other person, the provision in the Rule 10 of the Rules is superseded by such powers of the Government.

4. Sri V.T.M. Prasad, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners has urged that there are two dicisions of this Court, P. Ramesh v. State of A.P., (D.B.). and D. Venkata Rushi Reddy v. Divisional Panchayat Officer, 1997 (1) An.W.R. 603, 1996 (1) ALD 76 (D.B.). holding revision to be not maintainable at the instance of private persons in view of the provisions of Rule 10 of the Rules. It is also further submitted that the provisions of Section 264 of A.P. Panchayat Raj Act, so far as the records of Gram Panchayat, Mandal Parishad, Zilla Parishad or of its Standing Committees or of any authority, officer or person are concerned, should be interpreted that the later words mean only the authority, officer or person of the Gram Panchayat, Mandal Parishad, Zilla Parishad etc., but not the Collector or the Commissioner of Panchayat Raj. Invoking the principle of Ejusdem Generis, it is the argument that since the Collector does not belong to any of the categories of authority or officer or person of a Gram Panchayat, Mandal Parishad, Zilla Parishad etc., his order is not liable to be varied in revision by the Government.

5. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Maharashtra S.B.S.O. and H Education v. Paritosh, 1984 SC 1543, para 20. to submit that when two provisions of statutes are in conflict, harmonious construction must be given so as to render both the provisions effective and no provision to be considered as superficial. Mr. V.T.M. Prasad places reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in l.A.A.l. v. Grand Slam International, (D.N.). to submit that when of two provisions one is in general nature and the other a specific as is Rule 10 in the present case, the specific provision must take precedence over the general provision.

6. So far as the two decisions of this Court in P. Ramesh v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1 supra) and D. Venkata Rushi Reddy v. Div. Panchayat Officer (2 supra) are concerned, we find that in those cases the provision of Section 264 of A.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 had not been brought to the attention of the Court.

7. Before going to the question of principle of Generalis Specialibus non derogant or the principle of Ejusdem Generis, the scope of the Section 264 of the Act may be considered. The Section in so far as is relevant, is in the following words:

“Section 264: Power of Review and Revision by Government:-

(1) The Government may, either suo motu or on application from any person interested, call for and examine any record of a Gram Panchayat, Mandal Parishad or a Zilla Parishad or of its Standing Committees or of any authority, Officer or person, in respect of any proceeding to satisfy themselves as to regularity of such proceeding or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or orders passed therein and, if in any case, it appears to the Government that any such decision or order should be modified, annulled or reversed or remitted for reconsideration, they may pass orders accordingly:

Provided that the Government shall not pass any order prejudicial to any party unless such party has had an opportunity of making a representation.

(2) The Government may stay the execution of any such decision or order pending exercise of their powers under Sub-section (1) in respect thereof.

(3) The Government may suo motu at any time or on an application received from any person interested within ninety days of the passing of an order under Sub-section (1), review any such order if it was passed by them under any mistake whether of fact or of law, or in ignorance of any material fact. The provisions contained in the proviso to Sub-section (1) and in Sub-section (2) shall apply in respect of any proceeding under this Sub-section as they apply to a proceeding under Sub-section(1).

Without resorting to any interpretation of any sort the provision yields to the prima facie meaning on the face of it of omnibus powers vested in the Government in all matters relating to Gram Panchayat, Mandal Parishad, Zilla Parishad or of its Standing Committees or of any authority, officer or person. The use of different words relating to the different authorities does not show restrictive approach being made that it is only the records of the Gram Panchayat, Mandal Parishad, Zilla Parishad or of its Standing Committees or of any authority, officer or person thereof as liable to be called for scrutiny. The intention is to base a general revisional power in the Government in respect of orders passed by or in relation to Gram Panchayat, Mandal Parishad, Zilla Parishad or of its Standing Committees. When any person or authority or officer passes orders in connection with the affairs of Gram Panchat, Mandal Parishad, Zilla Parishad or of its Standing Committees, his orders are equally liable to revisional jurisdiction as also when orders are passed by the Gram Panchayat, Mandal Parishad, Zilla Parishad or of its Standing Committees are concerned. The underlying intention is of the Government to be satisfied about the correctness, legality, propriety of the decision or order passed. The principle of Ejusdem Generis does not apply to say that the words “authority or officer or person” must be of either the Gram Panchayat, Mandal Parishad or of the Standing Committees as each of the word Gram Panchayat, Mandal Parishad, Zilla Parishad or of its Standing Committees, authority, officer or person is controlled by the words “record of” which means that record of any authority or person could be called for. There is no limitation therein that the latter category i.e., authority or officer or person has necessarily to belong only to the Gram Panchayat, Mandal Parishad or Zilla Parishad.

8. The principle of harmonious construction of Generalis specialibus non derogant is applicable mostly to two statutes or two legislations of the same source. When two competing provisions are not from the same source but emanate from different legislative authorities of which one is a subordinate authority, the principle has little application and though an attempt for harmonious construction may be made, yet in the event they are found irreconcilable the legislation of the subordinate authority must yield to that of the superior legislation. In the present case, however, we feel both the provisions to be possible to be read together. Section 264 of the A.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 vests the right in any person interested to prefer the revision. Rule 10 of A.P. Gram Panchayats (Declaration of Villages) Rules, 1994, on the other hand, gives specific right to the Gram Panchayat to make a revision petition. It might be said that since there could have been some doubt as to whether the Gram Panchayat had the authority Under Section 264 of the A.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 to prefer the revision, as it might not be regarded as person interested, the subordinate legislation made it clear that such a right is also available to the Gram Panchayat. But it does not mean that such a right created under Rule 10 excluded the right of other persons interested which is statutorily conferred by the Section 264. Thus, both the provisions are legally sound. The two earlier decisions of this Court having had not the benefit of considering Section 264 of the Act, hold good in the facts of their own cases. In that view of the matter, we do not find any merit in the writ petition.

9. Mr. V.T.M. Prasad, learned Counsel for the petitioners also further urges the impugned order not to have contained any reasons as it was only a repetition of the earlier orders passed by the Government. A reference to the order shows the Government to have taken the view that its earlier order was in order and required no modification as the population of Vaddimadugu was 2697 and that of Regumanupalli was 1586. Such reason being there, we do not find any merit in this contention also.

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