JUDGMENT
K.B.N. Singh, J.
1. This appeal by the defendant arises out of a suit for his eviction from a shop, which is part of a house bearing Municipal Holding No. 2. Ward No. VII, of the Daltonganj Municipality.
2. The plaintiff’s case in short is that Syed Ajmal Hussain, father of the first three plaintiffs and the husband of the fourth, died on the 20th October, 1964, leaving behind the plaintiffs as sole heirs of his properties, including the one in dispute. Ajmal Hussain, by a registered deed dated the 21st February. 1957. had inducted the defendant as a monthly tenant of a shop room in the aforesaid holding for a period of ten years on a monthly rental of Rs. 55/-, payable on expiry of every month. It was also agreed that the defendant would spend a sum of Rs. 2,400/- over the reconstruction of the suit premises and would deduct a sum of Rs. 20/- per month from the rental, towards the aforesaid cost of re-construction. It was also provided in the lease deed that the work of reconstruction was to be completed within a period of six months and the tenancy in question was to commence from the date of the completion of reconstruction. In the lease was incorporated a clause giving option for renewal of the lease on same terms after the expiry of the specified period. The case of the plaintiffs was that the reconstruction was completed by the end of May, 1957, and the tenancy, according to the terms of the lease, commenc-ced with effect from the 1st day of June. 1957, and the period of lease expired on the 31st May, 1967, and the defendant did not get the lease renewed.
The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendant failed to pay the rent from the month of February, 1967 onwards, and he was liable to be evicted on the ground of non-payment of the rent for more than two months. The plaintiffs further alleged that they required the room in question for their personal use as the portion of the holding occupied by them was proving insufficient for the growing family. On the above grounds, after a notice terminating the lease under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was served, the plaintiffs instituted the suit on the 29th August, 1967, for eviction of the defendant.
3. The defendant contested the suit and pleaded that the reconstruction was to be completed within six months from the date of the execution of the lease, and, therefore, the tenancy commenced from the 21st August, 1957, and the determination of the tenancy by notice dated the 3rd July. 1967, was invalid. The defence case further was that the defendant exercised his option for the renewal of the lease by sending a letter dated the 16th February. 1967, addressed to the plaintiffs, through plaintiff No. 1, who was managing the affairs and realising rent on behalf of all the plaintiffs under registered cover, asking them to intimate as to when and on what date they would be available for executing the new lease deed for a further period of five years. The defendant has averred that the plaintiff evaded service of the notice, which was returned unserved. The defendant further sent another notice addressed to plaintiff No. 1 by his Dalmianagar address, but that also was returned to him as refused. There is also an averment that whenever the defendant met plaintiff No. 1, when the latter came to Daltonganj, he requested him for renewal of the lease, but the plaintiff continued to evade the same on some pretext or the other.
Thus, there was no laches on the part of the defendant and in the circumstances he must be deemed to have exercised the option for renewal of the lease and to have continued to be a lessee of the suit premises, and, therefore, the lease could not be determined. The defendant also denied that there was any default in payment of the rent and it is averred that when plaintiff No. 1, who used to realise rent on behalf of all the plaintiffs, did not turn up to receive the rent for the month of February, 1967, the defendant sent the rent by money order, which the plaintiff refused to accept with ulterior motive to make out a case of default for his eviction- The plaintiffs’ case of personal necessity was also denied and it is stated that the residential portion of the house of the plaintiffs is very spacious and alleged that the shop-portion of the house being in the middle of the Bazar is suitable only for holding a shop and not for residential purpose. According to the defendant, the action for his eviction was motivated one to coerce the defendant to agree to enhance the rent.
4. The trial court decreed the suit and an appeal by the defendant before the lower appellate court also failed. The lower appellate court concurring with the findings of the trial court, came to the following conclusions :–
(i) The reconstruction of the premises in suit was completed by the 30th April, 1957, and the tenancy in question began from the 1st of May, 1957, from when adjustment of the cost of reconstruction towards rent started and the entire sum of Rs. 2,400/- was adjusted by April, 1967, and the tenancy did not commence from the 21st August, 1957, as alleged by the defendant.
(ii) There was a valid notice dated the 3rd July. 1967, terminating the tenancy by the mid-night of the 31st July, 1967.
(iii) The option for renewal was not legally exercised by the defendant and the period of the lease cannot be deemed to have been automatically extended.
(iv) The defendant did not pay the rent for the months of February, 1967, onwards, for a period of more than two months, as found by the learned Munsif, and was a defaulter in the eye of law,
(v) The plaintiffs required the house for their personal necessity and affirmed the finding of the trial court on this point also.
Thereafter, the present appeal has been filed by the defendant.
5. Mr. Lalnarayan Sinha, appearing on behalf of the appeallant, has urged that there is no legal and valid notice terminating the tenancy. He referred to the lawyer’s notice (Ext. H) dated the 3rd of July, 1967. This notice, the learned Counsel pointed out, was signed by the Advocate, Shree Ganauri Lal, and counter-signed by Plaintiff No. 1, and urged that the notice being on behalf of Plaintiff No. 1 alone, there was no valid termination of the tenancy on behalf of all the plaintiffs. Learned Counsel submitted that although there is a recital in paragraph 1 of the notice by the lawyer that his client (plaintiff No. 1} is one of the heirs of the late Syed Ajmal Hussain, Bar-at-Law, and “he is sending this notice to you through me on behalf of all other heirs of late Syed Ajmal Hussain”, this would not make the notice on behalf of all the heirs, unless all the heirs had countersigned the notice or it is shown that the lawyer had authority on behalf of all the plaintiffs. There does not seem to be any substance in this contention of the learned Counsel. Section 2 (d) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease. Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947, defines “landlord” as follows:–
” ‘landlord’ includes the person who for the time being is receiving, or is entitled to receive, the rent of a building whether on his own account or on behalf of another, or on account or on behalf or for the benefit of himself and others or as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver or guardian or who would so receive the rent or be entitled to receive the rent, if the building were let to a tenant”;
It is not disputed that after the death of late Syed Ajmal Hussain, plaintiff No. 1 was alone realising rent on behalf of all the plaintiffs and granted receipts to the defendant and thus plaintiff No. 1 was the “landlord” within the meaning of the Act of the premises in question. The definition of the word “landlord” is wide enough to include even an agent or a manager of the owner of the house. Under Section 11 of the Act, suit for eviction could be maintained by such a landlord. Even an agent realising rent could maintain an action for eviction, except on the ground of personal necessity. In the notice (Ext. D), by which the defendant claims to have exercised the option of renewal of the lease, under his own signature, has made the following relevant statements in this connection :–
“You are realising rent from me for yourself and also on behalf of other heirs as Manager. I am in good faith paying you rent and obtaining receipts from you in that capacity”.
It is, therefore, apparent that the notice terminating the tenancy is not an invalid one, as urged by the learned Counsel. It may be stated that although the validity of the notice was challenged in the court of appeal below, it was challenged, as appears from the judgment, on the ground that the tenancy commenced from the 21st of every month and, therefore, its termination on the 31st of July, 1967, was not a valid termination. It may also be stated that in the written statement also the notice has been challenged on the above ground. The finding that the tennancy started from the 1st of every month has not been challenged before me, therefore, the notice could not be assailed also on the ground on which it was assailed in the court of appeal below.
6. Mr. Lalnarayan Sinha has urged that the finding of the Court below that the appellant has not exercised the option of renewal properly is illegal. Learned Counsel urged that the option having been exercised within time, the suit must be held to be premature, as the appellant must be deemed to be continuing as a tenant under the extended lease. He has further urged that the court below acted illegally in mixing up the question of renewal of the lease with Section 12 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947. In this connection, the relevant portion of the renewal clause in the lease deed may be usefully quoted :–
“Whereas the lessee has agreed to meet all the costs of the proposed reconstruction which is estimated at Rs. 2,400/- (Rupee Two thousand and Four hundred) for which the lessor has agreed to give him a lease for ten years with an option of renewal at every five years after the expiry of this lease, ………”
There cannot be any doubt that the option for renewal is for the benefit of the tenant. The question is whether the finding of the court below that the option was not exercised in time is vitiated, as urged by the learned Counsel for the appellant.
7. It appears that the defendant-appellant sent a letter dated the 16th February, 1967, under registered cover, addressed to the plaintiff-respondent No. 1, describing him as the son of late Shree Syed Ajmal Hussain near Chhoti Masjid, at and P. O. Daltonganj, Palamau. This letter has been marked as Exhibit D, and the registered envelope, in which the letter was contained as Exhibit ‘G’. In this notice the defendant has expressed his intention to hold over after the expiry of the term of the original lease and he wanted the plaintiff to let him know as to on what date plaintiff No. 1 and the other heirs of his father would be available for execution and registration of a fresh lease. It is an undisputed position that the letter was returned undelivered. According to the defendant-appellant, plaintiff-respondent No. 1 refused to accept the letter. This letter subsequently seems to have been re-directed to Respondent No. 1, giving his address as Booking Clerk, Dehri-on-Sone. The lower appellate court has held that there is, however, no evidence that the envelope containing the notice was ever tendered to the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 and he had refused to accept the same. The lower appellate court has adversely commented against this notice being addressed to the Daltonganj address of Plaintiff No. 1, when it was well-known to the appellant that respondent No. 1 was not living at Daltonganj.
It has referred to the statement made in paragraph 5 of the written statement about plaintiff-Respondent No. 1 living out of Daltonganj and the defendant-appellant himself being aware of it. In these circumstances, in absence of any evidence about the letter being actually tendered to Respondent No. 1, either at Daltonganj or at Dehri-on-Sone, the Court below came to the conclusion that the option of renewal was not legally exercised by the appellant and that the lease in question cannot be deemed to have been automatically extended. In the absence of any evidence of the notice having been tendered to the plaintiff-respondent No. 1, it is difficult to impute any knowledge with regard to the contents of the letter exercising option for the renewal of the lease to him, even if such an inference be possible. In that view of the matter, the lower appellate court cannot be said to have committed any illegality in coming to the finding that the option for renewal was not legally exercised by the defendant-appellant.
It is true that the lower appellate court has mixed up the fact of statutory extension under Section 12 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947, which does not apply to a case where extension of the lease is claimed under option for renewal of the lease. Mr. Lalnarayan Sinha has submitted that the moment the defendant-appellant expressed his intention and posted the registered letter. It was sufficient to indicate that he had exercised the option of renewal. I do not think that mere desire on the part of the defendant-appellant is sufficient to constitute the exercise of option for renewal, without properly addressing the communication to the landlord (Plaintiff-respondents), In the instant case, on the finding recorded by the final court of fact, as mentioned above, it cannot be said that the defendant-appellant had taken effective steps to get the renewal before the expiry of the lease by correctly addressing the letter to the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 and also by leading evidence to show that the communication in question was refused by plaintiff-respondent No. 1, even if notice to plaintiff-respondent No. I is considered to be sufficient. Therefore, there is no substance in this contention of the learned Counsel. Apart from that, the other findings recorded by the court below that the defendant-appellant was a defaulter and that the landlord required the house bona fide for their personal use are pure findings of fact and could not successfully be assailed on behalf of the appellant. It is not disputed that Clause 11 (c) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, does not apply to a case like this, and this finding also is quite sufficient to dispose of the present appeal.
8. Thus, there is no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly dismissed, but, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.