1. I am not prepared to say that the Joint Magistrate has improperly acquitted the accused, who was charged with criminal trespass. This offence is defined in Section 441 of the Indian Penal Code as follows: “Whoever enters into or upon property in the possession of another, with intent to commit an offence (offence denotes a thing made punishable by the Penal Code), or to intimidate, insult, or annoy any person in possession of such property; or having lawfully entered into or upon such property, unlawfully remains there with intent thereby to intimidate, insult, or annoy any such person, or with intent to commit an offence, is said to commit criminal trespass.” From the statement of the Officiating Magistrate of the District, it would appear that the criminal trespass charged consisted in accused plying a boat for hire on the Jumna, three miles to the north-west of the public ferry at Barah, which had been leased to the complainant. Mr. Carter, the Joint Magistrate, considers that no offence as defined in Section 441 of the Penal Code was committed, and looking at the terms of the section, and the admitted fact that the accused had plied the boat at a distance of three, miles from complainant’s ferry, I concur with Mr. Carter’s view of the case.
2. Section 6, Regulation VI of 1819, prohibits all persons from employing a ferry-boat plying for hire at or in the immediate vicinity of public ferries without the previous sanction of the Magistrate. If, in the case of a prohibition distinctly made known to a person, lie continued to ply a boat for hire at or in the immediate vicinity of a public ferry, the Magistrate doubtless is empowered by the Penal Code to punish him for his disobedience of such order.
3. Act VIII of 1851 enables the Government to levy tolls on public roads and bridges, and Section 6 relates to a distinct offence, defined in the section, committed against the person appointed to collect the toll at a public ferry or bridge, and also to the offence of unlawfully and extortionately demanding a higher rate of toll than that fixed by the schedule to the Act. It would hardly apply to the particular case before the Court…. The Court, as at present advised, sees no ground for interference under Section 297 of the Criminal Procedure Code.