ORDER
1. The petitioner while serving as Branch Manager at Hyderabad was charged with misconduct under the service regulations. The charge memo issued to the petitioner on 3-7-1985 mentions three charges (i), (ii) and (iii). The Inquiring Authority appointed by the Managing Director conducted the departmental enquiry and submitted his report recording the finding that the charges (i) and (ii) are not proved and that only charge No.(iii) is proved. The Chief General Manager, after consideration of the findings recorded by the Inquiring authority and taking into account all the attending facts and circumstances of the case and the evidence placed before him concluded that the petitioner is guilty of the (iii) charge and the petitioner deserves deterrent action. However, taking lenient view of the matter and with a view to afford the delinquent-petitioner an opportunity for improving, the Chief General Manager imposed the penalty of reduction to lower stage in the time scale applicable to the petitioner i.e., Middle Management Grade Scale III by two stages fixing his basic pay at Rs.3,050/-. The petitioner’s appeal and the review filed before the appellate authority and the reviewing authority under the regulations are also dismissed. When the review filed by the petitioner was pending before the reviewing authority, the instant writ petition was presented in this Court. After the rejection of the review by the reviewing authority on 5-12-1990, the petitioner filed WPMP to amend the writ petition so as to assail the validity of that order also.
2. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner would contend (i) that the punishment is imposed on the petitioner by an authority lower than the authority which appointed the petitioner to the M.M. Grade III scale and therefore the proceedings of the Chief General Manager dated 11th July, 1988 should be held to be one without competence and authority; (ii) that the finding recorded by the Inquiring authority on charge No. (iii) is perverse and not based on ‘acceptable evidence’; (iii) that non-furnishing of report of the Chief Vigilance Commissioner despite the request of the petitioner resulted in violation of principles of natural justice and caused prejudice to the petitioner; and (iv) that the management was represented by the Inspector of Police of C.B.I., well-versed in prosecution and on that count itself the disciplinary proceedings are vitiated. No other contention was urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. Sri K. Srinivasa Murthy, the learned Standing Counsel for the Bank supported the disciplinary action.
3. Adverting to the first contention, the learned Counsel would elaborate and contend that the term ‘appointing authority’ is not defined under the regulations and in the absence of the definition of the term ‘appointing authority’ it should be held that the authority which appointed the petitioner to MM. Grade III should be treated as appointing authority as per the decision of the Division Bench of this Court handed down in W.PNo.7398/88 dated 20-12-1988, and if it is so held, the Managing Director of the Bank who promoted the petitioner to M.M. Grade II Scale should be treated as the ‘appointing authority’ for the purpose of imposing the major penalty on the petitioner, and if it is so held, the Chief General Manager who is admittedly an officer lower in rank to the Managing Director, is incompetent to impose the major penalty of reduction in rank. I do not find any substance in this contention. I say it, because, admittedly after the petitioner was promoted to M.M. Grade Scale III by the order of the Managing Director, there was amendment of the Regulations by virtue of which the Chief General Manager is designated as the appointing authority as well as the disciplinary authority as regards M.M. Grade Scale III officers. It is trite to state that by virtue of this amendment of the service regulations, the power of the Managing Director as the appointing authority is divested and that power is invested in the Chief General Manager. There is no controversy between the parties that as on 11-7-1998, the date on which the Chief General Manager passed the order imposing the penalty of reduction in rank against the petitioner, the Chief General Manager was the appointing authority as regards M.M. Grade Scale III officers. These facts are not in dispute. If that is so, the decisions of the Supreme Court in State Bank of India v. S. Vijaya Kumar, ,; and Pyare Lal Sharma v. Managing Director, J & K Industries Ltd., , squarely cover the situation. The judgment of the Supreme Court in State Bank of India v. S. Vijaya Kumar (supra) is an authority to state that though an official of the batik was appointed by a different authority than the authority which passed the order imposing the penalty and if the authority which has passed the order imposing the penally is the competent authority under the Regulations applicable on the date of the order, disciplinary action taken against the delinquent would not vitiate. The opinion handed down by the Supreme Court in Pyare La! Sharma v. Managing Director, J&K Industries Ltd., (supra) also supports this view.
4. Alternatively, it may be pointed out that as a matter of fact, the petitioner being aggrieved by the order passed by the Chief General Manager preferred appeal to the Managing Director and the Managing Director too after due application of mind found that the finding recorded by the Inquiring authority and accepted by the disciplinary authority is unexceptionable. In oilier words, the case of the petitioner on merits was also dealt with by the Managing Director after due application of Mind. Looking from that angle also, there is no ground for the Court to interfere with the disciplinary proceedings on the basis of the first contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner.
5. The second contention was meekly putforth before the Court by the learned Counsel without demonstrating how the finding recording by the Inquiring authority on charge No.(iii) and accepted by the disciplinary authority is perverse. Dealing with charge No.(iii), the Inquiring authority in paragraphs Hand 15 observed thus:
“Defence of the charged officer on this charge is that it was the responsibility of the Field Officer to inspect the machinery and has in support of his contention referred to deposition of Shri P. Ganapathirama Iyer (SW4), who was working as Acting Manager of this branch after the transfer of the charged officer and SW6. Charged Officer has also
referred to page 6 of the sanction from H.O. at F,x.S13, Reference has also been made to the Bank’s circular dated 27-11-79 at Ex.D2.
6. But I find that the C.O’s defence on this charge is weak and hallow. Page 5 (and not as” stated by C.O.) of Ex.S13 referred to by the charged officer is the branch’s proposal which states that the inspection will be carried out fortnightly by Field Officer/Manager at irregular intervals. Thus, even as per the proposal of the Branch, inspection was not the sole responsibility of the field officer. But the H.O. sanction at last para of Ex.S13 in para (ii) makes it abundantly clear that the machinery should be inspected by the Manager (i.e. C.O.) monthly at irregular intervals. Even according to SW4, Field Officer is the person responsible other than the Manager for inspecting the units which have laken loan from the bank. Inference is clear that both Field Officer and Manager are responsible for undertaking the inspection. SW6 has also deposed that inspection of the units by the Manager, in addition to the inspection by the Field Officer, has to be done by the Manager once in 3 months. Ex.D2 referred to by the charged officer is on duties and responsibilities of Field Officer. It does not in any way preclude inspection by the Manager. It is thus proved . that C.O. was required to undertake inspection of the unit to see whether the machinery has been installed or not. He was also required to undertake inspections subsequent at irregular intervals. Charged Officer failed in this duty. Article (iii)against the charged officer is thus proved.”
7. It cannot be said that the opinion formed and finding recorded by the Inquiring authority are perverse or based on ‘no evidence’. The disciplinary authority also referred to the finding recorded by the Inquiring authority and recorded its satisfaction. In fact the disciplinary authority was of the initial opinion that the petitioner-delinquent deserved graver form of punishment, but he thought it appropriate to give an opportunity to the petitioner to reform himself, and so observing, the disciplinary authority awarded relatively lesser punishment” of reduction in rank. It is quite often stated by the Constitutional Courts that the Courts while reviewing the disciplinary action and the findings recorded by the Inquiring authorities and the disciplinary authorities cannot go into the question of adequacy or inadequacy of the evidence on the basis of which findings are recorded. The only thing the Courts should see is whether the findings recorded by the Courts (sic disciplinary authorities) are on ‘acceptable evidence’. In the instant case the findings are based oft acceptable substantial and legal evidence. No interference is therefore called for.
8. While puttingforth the third contention, the learned Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in State Bank of India v. D.C. Aggarwal, . I should state at the threshhold that this decision was cited before the Court in support of the contention out of context and without any relevance. It goes without saying that if the disciplinary authority makes use of any undisclosed material against the delinquent, on that count itself, the disciplinary proceedings will be vitiated. In that judgment, the report of the Central Vigilance Commissioner was made use of against the delinquent without furnishing the report to the delinquent. In the instant case, the disciplinary authority has not based any reliance on the report of the Vigilance Commissioner. Charge No. (iii) reads:
“He failed to visit the factory premises of M/s. Varalakshnii Industries, Tondiarpet, Madras-81 to check whether the machinery was actually installed and failed to make surprise monthly inspections at irregular intervals of the said industry which resulted in the diverting of the loan amount sanctioned to the said Industry to other purposes.”
This charge is quite simple. The allegation is that the petitioner-delinquent failed to visit the factory premises of M/s. Varalakshmi Industries, Tondiarpet, Madras-81 to check whether the machinery was actually installed and failed to make surprise monthly inspection at regular intervals.
This charge is held to be proved. I have already referred to the finding recorded by the Inquiring authority and accepted by the disciplinary authority. The disciplinary action taken by the Chief General Manager on 11-7-1998 is essentially based on the finding recorded by the Inquiring authority on charge No.(iii). I would have appreciated the argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner if the disciplinary authority were to place reliance on the opinion or report of the Chief Vigilance Officer. Be that as it may, even Regulation 71 provides that the bank shall consult the Central Vigilance Commission for its opinion, wherever necessary, in respect of only those disciplinary cases having vigilance angle (emphasis is supplied by the Court). It is not a case where vigilance angle is involved.
9. The last contention is required to be noted only to be rejected. The contention is that the management was represented by the Inspector of Police of C.B.I, as presenting officer. If the petitioner thought that since the management was represented by a well versed official like the Inspector of Police of C.B.I, as presenting officer and if he wished to be represented by an equally competent person as his representative, he ought to have made a request before the disciplinary authority or the Inquiring authority. For the reasons best known to him, he did not pursue such course of action. Therefore, this plea at this belated stage cannot be taken while assailing the disciplinary action.
10. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs.