ORDER
1. These civil revision petitions filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India can be disposed of by this common order as all of them are directed against the order passed by the learned III Additional District Judge, Kakinada in A.T.A. No.23 of 1995 and cross objections, on 6-10-1998. For the sake of convenience, the parties shall be referred to as they are arrayed in A.T.C. No.7 of 1988.
2. Petitioner No.1 in A.T.C. No.7 of 1988 is the father of petitioner Nos.2 and 3. Second petitioner died during the pendency of the proceedings and as such petitioner Nos.4 to 7 were brought on record as his legal representatives as per orders in 1A No.1039 of 1991 dated 22-11-1993. The schedule land consists of Ac.28.83 cents situated in Golaprolu village. Admittedly, it belongs to the first petitioner and his two sons viz., the deceased second petitioner and the third petitioner. First petitioner got another son by name Gopikrishna. It is the case of the petitioners that there was an agreement of sale between themselves and the first and second respondents, which,
however, could not fructify into final transaction. According to them, there was a partition among the family members. It is their further case that the first and second respondents remained in possession of the schedule land as tenants on payment of Maktha of (105) Kata bags of paddy, which was subsequently enhanced to (125) bags and ultimately to (140) bags of paddy. It is the case of the petitioners that during the year 1985-86 and 1986-87, respondent Nos. 1 and 2 paid only part of Maktha of Rs. 16,100-00 and Rs.18,200-00 respectively. The payments were accepted by the petitioners under protest by issuing notices Exs.A7 and A9 dated 10-3-1986 and 1-3-1987 respectively. For the year 1986-87, the third respondent is stated to have sent a draft for a sum of Rs.16,100-00 on 17-3-1988, which was returned by the landlord. It is the case of the petitioners that respondent Nos. 1 and 2 alone are the tenants but not the third respondcnl. It is their further case that the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have sublet the schedule land in favour of the third respondent. Under those circumstances, the petitioners filed eviction petition – A.T.C. No.7 of 1988 on the ground that there was delayed payment of Maktha for three years, as the Maktha was not paid by the stipulated date of 15th January of every year and also on the ground of sub-lease in favour of the third respondent by the first and second respondents.
3. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 took the plea that the third respondent, who is in possession of the land is a tenant and the agreement of sale was not cancelled. There is no relationship between the petitioners and the first and second respondents as tenant and landlords. It is also their case that the third respondent has been in possession and enjoyment of the schedule land since 1980 as cultivating tenant. It is the case of the third respondent that he is a tenant holding over the property and the rent is being paid by him from time to time as agreed by the first petitioner. There are no arrears of rent whatsoever payable by the third respondent. In view of the amendment of (he provisions of A.P. (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act (for short ‘the Act) he has acquired permanent rights. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have never paid any Maktha nor they were in possession of the schedule land at any point of time. The petitioners having received Maktha from him failed to issue any receipts for the year 1988. It is the case of the third respondent that the petitioners maliciously took the plea ‘as if the first and second respondents are the tenants. Maktha of (105) bags was not enhanced to (125) bags as alleged by the petilioners.
4. On the basis of the above pleadings the Special Officer had framed the following points for consideration:
(1) WhctherRl and R2 are the cultivating tenants under the petitioners in respect of the petition schedule property?
(2) Whether the third respondent is the cultivating tenant under the pelitioners as contended by the third respondent?
(3) Whether the third respondent is the sub-tenant inducted by R1 and R2 as contended by the petitioners?
(4) Whether the respondent committed default in payment of Maktha for the years 1985-86 and 1987-88?
(5) Whether the petitioners are entitled for the eviction of the respondents from the plaint schedule property?
5. The petitioners have examined the third petitioner as PW1 and filed Exs.Al to A7. The first respondent, himself, was examined as RWI and the third respondent as RW2 and filed Exs.B 1 to B11.
6. The original authority after elaborate consideration of the matter and after appreciation of the entire material available on record came to (he conclusion and held that the petitioners have established their case that they have leased out the schedule land to respondent Nos.l and 2 after cancellation of the agreement of sale earlier entered into between themselves and accordingly declared that respondent Nos.l and 2 are the cultivating tenants of the petitioners. The original
authority also held that the third respondent was inducted into possession of the schedule land by respondent Nos. I and 2 and the third respondent is the tenant of first and second respondents. It is also held that the induction of the third respondent is without consent and knowledge of the petitioners. The original authority, however, held that there is no default in payment of Maktha on the part of the respondents. However, the eviction petition filed by the petitioners-land lords was allowed on the ground that the third respondent was inducted into possession by the first and second respondents without the knowledge and consent of the petitioners. It was accordingly declared that the respondents are entitled to be evicted from the schedule land under Section 13(c) of the Act.
7. Aggrieved by the same the third respondent preferred an appeal – A.T.A. No.23 of 1995 and the petitioners/landlords filed cross objections so far as the finding relating lo default, which went against them. The learned appellate authority having gone through the material available on record and upon re-appreciation of the evidence came to the conclusion that the first and second respondents are the original tenants of the petitioners in respect of the schedule land and they were alone paying Maktha as claimed by the petitioners-landlords. The learned appellate authority also took note of the fact that the third respondent is a close relation of respondent Nos. 1 and 2. The learned appellate authority also held that though the third respondent claimed to be the cultivating tenant of the schedule land, he could not substantiate the said plea. The learned appellate authority confirmed all the findings recorded by the original authority and upheld the order of eviction.
8. In these civil revision petitions, Sri N. Subba Reddy, learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submits that the judgment of the appellate authority suffers from jurisdictional errors and is vitiated for the reasons of non-consideration of the evidence available on record. Learned senior Counsel would urge that the order of the appellate authority suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record requiring correction by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Learned senior Counsel would proceed further and urge that the appeal is the valuable right conferred upon an aggrieved person and the appellate authority is required to consider the entire evidence on record and only then record its own findings either confirming or reversing the verdict of the original authority.
9. Sri V. Venkata Ramanaiah, learned Advocate-General appearing on behalf of the respondents submits that both the tribunals below concurrently found that the first and second respondents are the cultivating tenants and they have inducted the third respondent into possession as sub-leassee without the prior consent and knowledge of the petitioners-landlords. This Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constilution of India cannot re-appreciate the evidence on record and substitute its own findings for that of the authorities. Re-appreciation of the evidence and material available on record is not permissible in a proceeding under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
10. It is true that this Court in a proceeding under Article 227 of the Constilution of India does not exercise any appellate jurisdiction. This Court does not sit in appeal over the decisions rendered by the authorities/quasi judicial bodies, as the case may be. It is not permissible for this Court to disturb the findings recorded by the authorities, provided such findings are based upon appreciation and consideration of the entire evidence and material available on record. This Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the authorities concerned.
11. The Constitutional Courts have a long-standing dislike of investigating questions of fact in exercise of its judicial review or supervisory jurisdiction is too
well known. Findings of fact are traditionally the domain where a deciding authority or tribunal is master in its own house. (See: Administrative Law by H.W.R. Wade & Forsyth).
12. At the same time, this Court may interfere where findings recorded by the inferior tribunal is perverse or not based on any material whatever, or the conclusion arrived at is such that no reasonable Tribunal could possibly have come to it. This Court also would interfere where the order of a Tribunal has resulted in manifest injustice. It is also settled law that this Court’s intervention may be required, if an order passed by an inferior Tribunal is vitiated by an error apparent on the face of the record. But the High Court under the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot convert itself into a Court of appeal and use the power as the cloak of an appeal is disguise. (See: R. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, Ex Parte Shaw, (1952) 1 All ER 122.
When a finding could be said to be perverse one.
The Supreme Court in Achutananda Baidya v. Prafullya Kumar Gayen, , observed:
“If the evidence on record in respect of a question of fact is not at all taken into consideration and without reference to such evidence, the finding of fact is arrived at by inferior Court or Tribunal, such finding must be held to be perverse and lacking in factual basis. In such circumstances, in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court will be competent to quash such perverse finding of fact.”
13. In such circumstances, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court will be competent to quash such perverse findings of fact. The conclusions reached either way after weighing the conflicting evidence by the Tribunal cannot be disturbed by this Court, even if any error or mistake has been committed by the Tribunal in reaching such conclusions. The power of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is required to be exercised sparingly and only in the aforementioned circumstances; but not for correcting any and every error of law or fact.
14. Let me now apply the test to decide the point as to whether the order passed by the appellate authority is sustainable.
15. The third respondent (examined as RW 1) in his version before primary Tribunal stated that he has been cultivating the land of the petitioners as a cultivating tenant and in this regard relied upon Exs,B2 to B8, adangal extracts for the years 1392 Fasli to 1398 Fasli. The primary Tribunal referred to these documents and observed “the adangal extracts cannot alone be taken into consideration to come to a conclusion that he is cultivating tenant of the petitioners…” But the learned appellate authority while dealing with the aspect as to whether the third respondent could be held to be a cultivating tenant observed that “the only document to support his plea of tenancy is Ex.A12 letter dated 11-3-1988 sent by him along with the demand draft for Rs. 16,100.00, evidently representing the rent for 1987-88. Apart from his failure to place any material to substantiate his plea of individual tenancy rights since long time, this Ex.A12 letter written by him, on a reading of it would indicate that he was informing the land lord, that he was cultivating their land.” According to the appellate authority, the third respondent has produced only one document i.e. Ex.A12, letter dated 11-3-1988, in support of his case. Thus, it is absolutely clear that the appellate authority completely ignored Exs.B2 to B8 adangal extracts for the years 1392 Fasli to 1398 Fasli. Those documents are not at all taken into consideration by the appellate authority. It is not possible for this Court to visualise as to what view the appellate authority would have
taken had it taken into consideration the
documents Ex.B2 to B8, adangals. Any
further investigation by this Court would
amount to substituting this Court’s opinion
for that of the appellate authority. Such a
course is not permissible for the reasons
already indicated. At the same time, the
finding of the appellate authority rejecting
the claim of the third respondent that he is
the cultivating tenant is totally vitiated for
the reason of non consideration of the material
and evidence available on record. The
question as to whether the third respondent
is a cultivating tenant requires re-
determination by the appellate authority by
taking into consideration the entire material
available on record, including Exs.B2 to B8
adangals. The matter is required to be
remitted to the appellate authority for fresh
consideration in the light of the observations
made in this order.
16. In the result the order of the appellate authority made in A.T.A. No.23 of 1995 dated 6-10-1998 is set aside and the civil revision petitions are accordingly allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.
CRP (SR) No.81264 of 1998:
I do not find any merit whatsoever in this civil revision petition, as both the primary, as well as the appellate authority concurrently found that the respondents have not committed any default in payment of Maktha and the delayed payments cannot be considered as default in payment of rents. The said findings are based on appreciation of evidence and material available on record. The findings are not at all vitiated and the order does not suffer from any infirmity warranting this Court’s interference in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
The civil revision petition fails and it is accordingly dismissed. No costs.