JUDGMENT
S.S. Nijjar, J.
1. This order will dispose of Arbitration Petitions Nos. 281, 282 and 283 of 1997 as the facts and the law points raised are identical and the parties are also common.
2.
In these petitions filed under Section 5 read with Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the awards given by the arbitrator dated November 13, 1997, have been challenged and a declaration is sought to the effect that the said award is bad in law, illegal, null and void ab initio, unreasonable, not executable and the same is liable to be set aside.
3. The petitioner-company is registered under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956, having its registered office at Harshad Villa, Nehru Road, Vile Parle (East), Mumbai-400 057. The respondents are the claimants who had filed arbitration petition before this court and in the said petition Mr. Justice Jhunjhunwala (retired judge of this court) was appointed sole arbitrator by order dated June 13, 1997, passed by the Hon’ble Chief Justice of this court. By an agreement of sale entered into between the petitioner-company and the respondents on March 9, 1994, hereinafter referred to as “the main agreement”, the petitioners agreed to sell to the respondents and the respondents agreed to purchase from the petitioners two flats bearing Nos. 301 and 302 in the building known as Wembley which was then under construction on the plot of land bearing final plot No. 300 under Town Planning Scheme II, Vile Parle (First Variation) (Final), situate at Playground Road off Nehru Road, Vile Parle (East), Mumbai-400 057 along with parking space for the consideration of Rs. 76 lakhs. Likewise, an agreement was entered into between the petitioner-company and the respondents in Arbitration Petition No. 282 of 1997 on March 9, 1994. The petitioners agreed to sell to the respondents and the respondents agreed to purchase from the petitioners two flats bearing Nos. 201 and 202 in the same building for Rs. 72 lakhs. Similarly by an agreement of sale entered into between the petitioner-company and the respondents in Arbitration Petition No. 283 of 1997 on June 26, 1994. The petitioners agreed to sell to the respondents and the respondents agreed to purchase from the petitioners two flats bearing Nos. 101 and 102 for Rs. 74 lakhs. All the three agreements are identical. For convenience, the facts as narrated in Arbitration Petition No. 281 of 1997 are noticed. The agreements provided for arbitration in case of disputes. Disputes having arisen between the parties, the matter was sought to be referred to arbitration. The respondents filed Arbitration Petitions Nos. 9 and 10 of 1997 which were disposed of by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice by order dated June 13, 1997. This order has been passed after hearing the counsel for the parties and in terms of the consent minutes of the order. Paragraphs 3 to 7 of the said order are as follows :
“3. The disputes and differences having arisen the petitioners have
filed the aforesaid two arbitration petitions under the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996. In view of the aforesaid clause by consent all the
disputes and differences arising and/or connected in respect of each of the
aforesaid agreement are referred to the sole arbitration of Justice S. M.
Jhunjhunwala (retd.) in terms of the aforesaid clause contained in the said
agreement.
4. The arbitrator shall have all the powers including power to give interim directions as provided under the said Act.
5. The arbitrator shall enter upon the reference within a period of two weeks from the date of communication of the order to him by the advocate of either party.
6. The arbitrator shall make and publish his award within four months from the date of entering upon the reference.
7. The aforesaid arbitration petition stands disposed of in terms aforesaid with no order as to costs.”
4. The arbitration proceeding’s commenced, according to the respondents, on July 22, 1996. The disputes had arisen in the year 1994 itself when the petitioners abruptly stopped the construction work. Efforts were made to amicably settle the dispute in the year 1996. Since no agreement could be arrived at, the respondents requested the petitioners to refer the dispute for arbitration. The respondents suggested the names of various persons which could not be agreed upon. The respondents, therefore, filed Arbitration Petition No. 225 of 1996 under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, for ad interim reliefs. On August 13, 1996, this court granted ad interim injunction in terms of prayer Clause (a). This order was passed by consent. The respondents waived service. It was also directed that the matter be placed on board on September 18, 1996. On September 30, 1996, Justice Jhunjhunwala admitted the said petition. Notice was issued to the petitioners and made returnable for November 4, 1996. Ad interim order passed on the basis of the consent of the parties dated August 13, 1996, was directed to continue till the hearing and final disposal of the petition.
5. Since the parties were unable to agree on the arbitrator, the respondents filed Arbitration Petitions Nos. 9 and 10 of 1997. By an order dated June 13, 1997, Justice Jhunjhunwala was appointed as the sole arbitrator on the basis of the consent minutes of the order. In pursuance of these arbitration proceedings, the impugned award has been made on November 13, 1997.
6. Parekh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, has submitted that the impugned award is liable to be set aside on three grounds. It is submitted that the award is liable to be set aside firstly on the ground that the petitioner was under incapacity as they had not been given proper notice of the discharge of the advocates of the petitioner. Since no notice was given to the petitioner of the discharge of the advocates they were unable to present their case. Thus the award is contrary to Section 34, Sub-section (2)(i) and (iii). Secondly, it is submitted that the award is in conflict with the public policy of India as given in Section 34, Sub-section 2(b)(ii) of the Act of 1996. Thirdly the award is said to be without jurisdiction as it has been made after the appointment of the provisional liquidator and thus the arbitrator could not have proceeded with the arbitration proceeding by virtue of Section 446 of the Companies Act. The first point argued by Parekh is to the effect that the arbitrator ought not to have continued with the arbitration proceedings as he had occasion to deal with the merits of the claim whilst he was a sitting judge of this court. To make good this submission it is pointed out by Parekh that Justice Jhunjhunwala had admitted the petition filed by the respondents and had ordered that the ad interim order dated August 13, 1996, shall continue till the hearing and final disposal of the petition. A perusal of the order passed by Justice Jhunjhunwala on September 30, 1996, shows that he had merely continued the ad interim order passed by Justice Baam on August 13, 1996, which had been passed by consent of the parties. In order to satisfy itself the court has examined the findings returned by the arbitrator. A perusal of the award amply demonstrates that the plea has been raised by the petitioner merely for creating some ground for challenging the award. The other two grounds put forward by Parekh are also not well founded.
7. A perusal of the award shows that the arbitrator held a preliminary meeting on July 14, 1997. On that day detailed instructions were given by the arbitrator. It is to be noticed that Parekh and Bhaskar appeared for the petitioners. The respondents were directed to file the statement of claim by July 30, 1997, and to furnish copies of the same to Bhaskar by July 29, 1997. The petitioners were to file written statements in each matter with counter claims, if any, on or before August 18, 1997. They were also to supply copies to the respondents by August 18, 1997. Rejoinder, if any, was to be filed by September 1, 1997. Compilation of copies of the agreed documents was also to be filed by September 1, 1997. Date for hearing was fixed on September 9, 1997, at 3 p.m. Notice of the hearing was waived by counsel for the parties. On September 23, 1997, Bhaskar, advocate, again appeared for the petitioners. The statement of claim has duly been filed. No written statement had been filed by the petitioners. Bhaskar appearing for the petitioner applied for adjournment of the hearing on the ground that the director of the petitioner was feeling unwell. By consent and by way of last chance to enable the petitioners to file the written statement, the hearing was adjourned to October 3, 1997. On October 3, 1997, the respondents filed three compilations of documents along with synopsis and date of events which were taken on record. Copies of the same were furnished to the advocates for the petitioner. The director of the petitioner again applied for further time to enable them to file the written statement. This application was opposed by the respondents on the ground that sufficient indulgence had already been granted to the petitioners. The arbitrator observed that though the application for extension of time to enable the petitioners to file the written statement is devoid of any merit, yet with a view to give one more opportunity time was granted till October 8, 1997. This request was granted with a specific direction that under no circumstances any further time would be granted to the petitioner to file the written statement. It was also pointed out that in the event of the petitioners failing to file the necessary written statement, the consolidated hearing shall be proceeded with ex parte against the petitioners without any further notice to the petitioners. The next hearing was fixed on October 9, 1997. Service of notice for the hearing fixed on October 9, 1997, was waived by all concerned. It may be noticed that the same advocate appeared throughout the proceedings. It may be also noticed that the same advocate had been on the record in all the previous proceedings before Justice Baam, the Hon’ble the Chief justice. Justice Jhunjhunwala and before the arbitrator also. On October 9, 1997, the arbitrator observed that three applications had been received by the arbitrator before the date of hearing filed by the petitioners. These applications took an objection to the continuance of the proceedings by the arbitrator on the ground that he had heard the matter at the interim stage. Thus it was stated that he would not be an impartial arbitrator. These applications were also rejected. The arbitrator noticed that his appointment had been made by the Chief Jus-tice with the consent of the parties. No reference was made to the order dated September 30, 1996, before the Chief Justice. At that time the petitioner was aware of the order having been passed by Justice Jhunjhunwala. Thus the applications were rejected and the matter was adjourned to October 16, 1997. On the adjourned date, i.e., October 16, 1997, one Saraogi appeared for the petitioners. Saraogi also sought an adjournment on the ground that he had just been retained by the petitioners. These applications for adjournment filed by Saraogi were not signed by the petitioners. Yet they were taken on record by the arbitrator. It was submitted by Saraogi that it being a transferred brief he needs time to prepare himself. It was also stated that the petitioners have decided to challenge the order dated October 9, 1997, passed on the application of the petitioners. The arbitrator, however, rejected the application by giving cogent reasons. A perusal of the proceedings of October 16, 1997, shows that the order dated October 9, 1997, had been duly communicated and received by the petitioners on October 10, 1997. It is observed that the petitioner had sufficient time to take appropriate proceedings to challenge the same if so intended, which the petitioners did not do. It is also noticed that earlier Bhaskar and Company were appearing for the petitioners and have been appearing since July 14, 1997. It is noticed that the petitioners had failed to file the written statement by August 18, 1997. It is also noticed that the said written statement had not been filed till that date. Thus the application for adjournment was rejected. Examination-in-chief of the witnesses of the respondent was conducted. Saraogi partly cross-examined the witness on behalf of the petitioners. After part cross-examination of the witness Saraogi again applied for adjournment of the hearing till October 21, 1997, to enable him to prepare for further cross-examination. Again the arbitrator showing indulgence adjourned the consolidated hearing of the reference to October 21, 1997. On October 21, 1997, Dinesh Shah, counsel appeared for the petitioners instructed by Saraogi. On this occasion, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner handed over three applications for stay of proceedings. This time the applications are made on the ground that since the provisional liquidator stands appointed, further proceedings in the reference ought to be stayed in view of Section 446 of the Companies Act, 1956. In view of the aforesaid application the matter was adjourned to October 22, 1997. On that day certain important facts were brought to the notice of the arbitrator. It was stated on behalf of the respondents that on making enquiries from the office of the official liquidator it has been learnt that neither the official liquidator has been appointed as provisional liquidator nor the official liquidator has taken possession of any of the assets of the petitioner-company. It was further pointed out that the order passed by Justice Variava on April 30, 1997, is a conditional order. It was also submitted that even if provisional liquidator has been appointed, the arbitration proceedings can continue as there is no bar under Section 446 of the Companies Act, 1956. The respondents relied upon Rules 109 and 110 of the Companies (Court) Rules as also on the judgment in Star Trading Corporation v. Rajratna Naranbhai Mills Company Ltd. [1971] 41 Comp Cas 1023 (Guj). Shah, appearing for the petitioners stated that no stay had been granted by any court in respect of the order dated April 30, 1997, passed by Justice Variava. It was, however, conceded that the appeal filed against the order of Justice Variava was dismissed on October 7, 1997. The appeal having been dismissed it was submitted that the order passed by Justice Variava became fully operative and the official liquidator stands appointed as provisional liquidator of the petitioner-company. Thus it would be necessary to seek leave of the court under Section 446 of the Companies Act for proceeding further with the arbitration. These arguments of both the sides have again been considered at length by the arbitrator. It has been held that Section 446 of the Companies Act, 1956, appears in Chapter II Part VII of the Companies Act, 1956, which deals with “winding up” of the companies. Interpreting Section 446 it has been held as follows :
“Section 446 of the Companies Act, 1956, appears in Chapter II in Part VII of the Companies Act, 1956, which deals with ‘winding up’ of the companies. As per Section 446, when a winding up order is made or the official liquidator has been appointed as provisional liquidator, no suit or other legal proceedings shall be commenced, or if pending at the date of the winding up order shall be proceeded with against the company, except by leave of the court and subject to such terms as the court may impose. Hence, Section 446, visualizes a situation where the winding up order has been made or the official liquidator has been appointed as provisional liquidator, before it is applicable. In the arbitration reference pending before me, it is an admitted position that no winding up order of the respondents-company has so far been made though the said company petition for winding up of the respondents-company is still pending. There is no jurisdiction, under this section to order stay in respect of suits or other legal proceedings pending against the company unless a winding up order is made.
Though there is a controversy as to whether the official liquidator has or has not stood appointed as provisional liquidator of the respondents-company. The language used of Section 446 clearly indicates that no suit or legal proceedings if pending at the date of the winding up order shall be proceeded with against the company ordered to be wound up except by leave of the court. Since admittedly no winding up order against the respondents-company, has yet been passed. The present arbitration references pending before me at this stage cannot be considered as pending at the date of winding up order of the respondents-company and hence the question of claimants in the reference at this stage obtaining leave of the court under Section 446 of the Companies Act, 1956, to proceed with the references does not arise. In the result, the applications made on behalf of the respondents for stay of further proceedings in the arbitration reference are rejected.
Shah, learned counsel for the respondents applies for adjournment on that ground that he needs some time to consider the order just passed rejecting the applications of the respondents-company.”
8. Again an effort was made to get the proceedings adjourned. The request, however, was turned down in view of the fact that the petitioners had already commenced the cross-examination of the respondents. At this stage counsel for the petitioners tendered three applications for condonation of delay in filing written statements. These applications were also opposed by the respondents. It was also pointed out that although the written statement had been signed by the advocate, the same were however not signed by the petitioners. The arbitrator again very reasonably observes “though no ground is made out for condoning delay in filing the written statement of the petitioners and the petitioners are now seeking leave to file the written statements after all technical objections so far raised, yet to give fair opportunity to the petitioners to defend the claims of the respondents made in the reference on the merits and in the interests of justice, the written statement of the petitioners in each arbitration –reference is ordered to be taken on record subject to the petitioners paying costs to the respondents quantified at Rs. 2,000 in each reference”. Having failed, Shah, learned counsel for the petitioners then applied for an adjournment on the ground that he wants to consider as to whether he can represent the petitioner-company in view of the appointment of the provisional liquidator. This application has again been refused after taking into consideration all the necessary facts and circumstances as narrated above. Thereafter, the counsel for the petitioner applied to withdraw his appearance as also the appearance of Saraogi. It was Stated that they have no instructions to proceed with further cross-examination of the respondents. It was also pointed out to the counsel and the advocate that further proceedings shall continue even if they are permitted to withdraw their appearance. At that stage Shah and Saraogi left the venue of arbitration. It was in these circumstances that the arbitrator was left with absolutely no option but to proceed in the absence of the petitioners. The evidence of the respondents was closed. There were no cross-examinations as none was present on behalf of the petitioner. Thereafter the hearing of the remaining part of the reference was kept on October 27, 1997. On that date none was again present on behalf of the petitioners. Due notice had been given to the petitioners. Thus the reference came to be closed. Thereafter the award has been given on November 13, 1997.
9. A perusal of the facts narrated above would clearly show that all the grounds pleaded in the petition are wholly without merit. With reference to the first ground that Justice Jhunjhunwala had passed the order dated September 30, 1996, it is observed that the reasons are recorded in the order passed on October 9, 1997. Reference to that order has already been made. However, the findings of the arbitrator may be reiterated. This ground has been rejected in view of the fact that the arbitrator had been appointed by the Chief Justice of this court on the basis of the consent of the parties. It is also noticed that the petitioners were aware of the order dated September 30, 1996, when the arbitrator was appointed. It is also noticed that after his appointment as an arbitrator the petitioners appeared before him in all the proceedings. This court finds no reason whatsoever to hold that the aforesaid reasons are erroneous or that they go to show that the arbitrator was in any manner incapacitated. Apart from this, a perusal of Section 12 would show that the appointment of the arbitrator can be challenged by a party after having participated in the appointment of the arbitrator only for the reasons of which he becomes aware after the appointment has been made. On the date Jhunjhunwala was appointed as the arbitrator, the petitioners were well aware that he had passed the order dated September 30, 1996, wherein he had confirmed the order dated August 13, 1996, which had been passed by Justice Baam. Even otherwise, admission of a petition can hardly be said to be pre-judging the merits of the petition. Furthermore, the ad interim order which had been confirmed had been passed by the consent of the parties. It could hardly, therefore, be said that Jhunjhunwala having confirmed the order had disqualified himself from acting as the arbitrator. Parekh has, however, laid considerable stress on the other two grounds. It is submitted that the arbitrator wrongly permitted the counsel and the advocate for the petitioners to be discharged on September 22, 1997. It is submitted that this could not have been done without giving due notice to the petitioners. A perusal of the award, however, shows that the conduct of the petitioner was such that they can hardly complain. The consent order granting ad interim injunction in terms of prayer Clause (a) was passed by Justice Baam on August 13, 1996. On September 30, 1996, Justice Jhunjhunwala had continued the order. No appeal was filed against the order of confirmation of the ad interim order. It has also been brought to my notice by Thakkar, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, that in fact on that day the petitioners had already created third party rights by way of mortgage. This fact was not brought to the notice of Justice Jhun-jhunwala. Consequently they were constrained to take out proceedings for criminal contempt of court. After hearing the counsel for the parties, the Division Bench of this court on January 31, 1997, restrained the petitioners from creating any third party rights of any nature whatsoever in respect of the disputed flat. On objection being taken by the petitioners that the contempt petitions ought to be heard on the original side, the matter was reheard on March 10, 1997. Again the injunction as earlier granted was given. The order in fact shows that the ad interim injunction in terms of paragraphs 3 and 4 of the order dated January 3, 1997, was granted. The appointment of Justice Jhunjhunwala as arbitrator was made by the consent of parties in a petition filed by the respondents. A perusal of this order would show that although there is no time limit prescribed under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, for deciding a reference yet the parties had restricted themselves to a time bound schedule. It was provided in the said consent terms that the arbitrator shall make and publish his award within four months from the date of entering upon the reference. Having agreed to that order, thereafter the petitioners seem to have developed cold feet and, therefore, commenced delaying the proceedings. It has already been noticed that various technical grounds had been taken and various frivolous applications have also been filed for adjournment of the case. Reference has already been made to the various proceedings taken before the arbitrator. A perusal of the award also shows that the withdrawal of the advocates from the proceedings was merely a last ditch effort to delay the proceedings. I therefore, find no substance in the second ground also that the arbitrator ought to have given further notice before permitting the advocates to withdraw from the proceedings. It may be noticed that at every stage, service of notice was waived by the parties or their counsel. Thus Parekh can hardly claim that another notice ought to have been given by the arbitrator. The parties themselves were present until October 21, 1997. It was only when it became apparent to them that the proceedings are not going to be further adjourned that they first disappeared themselves and thereafter instructed that counsel and advocate to withdraw from the proceedings. Thakkar is right in his submissions that it is inconceivable that counsel as well as the advocate would plead that they are not fully prepared for further cross-examination of the witnesses. This seems to be just a made up excuse to create some sort of a ground for challenging the award in case the same is made against them.
10. Parekh has also laid considerable stress on the ground that the provisional liquidator having been appointed the arbitrator ought not to have continued with the proceedings. For this ground it is necessary to see the sequence of events. This ground was raised for the first time on October 21, 1997. Three applications were made before the arbitrator for stay of the proceedings. The provisional arbitrator was appointed by Justice Variava on April 30, 1997. The conditional order of appointment of the provisional liquidator passed by Justice Variava reads as follows :
“Accordingly, I direct that if the respondent-company pays to the petitioners the amount of Rs. 1,20,00,000 with interest at 15 per cent. per annum from September 11, 1995, till payment in 12 equal monthly instalments, then there will be no ad interim order. The first of such instalments to be paid on or before June 15, 1997. Each and every subsequent instalment to be paid on or before 15th day of each subsequent month. In the event of any two defaults the official liquidator will stand appointed as provisional liquidator of all the assets of the respondent-company. The provisional liquidator to take possession of all assets including the mortgaged premises.”
11. Against this order, an appeal was filed before the Division Bench being Appeal No. 501 of 1997. This appeal was dismissed on October 7, 1997, by a speaking order. Against the aforesaid order, SLP was filed in the Supreme Court which was disposed of on December 15, 1997. In” paragraph 6 of the said order it is observed as follows :
“6. The orders of the High Court dated April 50, 1997, directing the provisional liquidator to take possession of the property as well as the injunction granted on June 15, 1997, shall cease to operate. But in the event of the failure on the part of the appellants to deposit two consecutive monthly instalments of Rs. 10,00,000 both these orders of the High Court shall come into operation without reference to this court.”
12. Thus it appears that till December 15, 1997, possession had not been taken by the provisional liquidator. The only modification was that the petitioners were required to make monthly instalments of Rs. 10 lakhs failing which the earlier orders of Justice Variava and the Division Bench would come into operation. In these circumstances it cannot be said that the provisional liquidator stood appointed from the date of the passing of the order by Justice Variava on April 30, 1997. This objection has been considered by the arbitrator and he has passed a speaking order. Reference in this connection may be made to the order passed on October 22, 1997, wherein the learned arbitrator has interpreted the import and the scope of Section 446 of the Companies Act. The relevant portion of the award has already been reproduced above. This court is unable to hold that the view taken by the arbitrator is either erroneous in law or that such a view goes to the root of the award on the face of it. Thakkar has in fact relied upon a judgment of the Kerala High Court in A. M. Padmakshi v, Sudarsan Chits (India) Ltd. [1987] 62 Comp Cas 637. After analysing the scope of Section 446 it has been held as follows (page 641) :
“It is true that an order of winding up was passed and a provisional liquidator was appointed by a learned single judge by order dated June 16, 1981. But it is seen that in the appeal, MFA Nos. 578, 579 and 520 of 1981-Sudarsan Chits (India) ltd. v. Sukumaran Pillai [1983] ILR 1, Ker 700, 737, 738 ; [1985] 57 Comp Cas 85, the official liquidator was directed to function as the provisional liquidator and the winding up order was held in abeyance. It is common ground that the judgment of the Division Bench, whereby the winding up order was ordered to be kept in abeyance, is still in force. If that is the position, the only question is, even assuming that the provisional liquidator was appointed for certain purposes as envisaged by Section 450(1) and (3) of the Act, whether Section 446(1) will be attracted. In B. V. John v. Coir Yarn and Textiles Ltd. [1960] 30 Comp Cas 162, 166, Raman Nayar J. held :
‘On the wording of Section 446(1) of the Companies Act, 1956, which, in this respect, makes a significant departure from the language of Section 171 of the Act of 1913, the appointment of the provisional liquidator does not affect the continuance of a pending proceeding and leave of the winding up court is required only for commencing a new proceeding. But, once a winding up order is made, even the continuance of a pending proceeding can only be by leave of the court and subject to such terms as the court may impose.’
In this case, the winding up order is kept in abeyance. No doubt there is a ‘provisional liquidator’. Even so, I am of the view that the fourth respondent was not obliged to obtain the leave of this court to continue the execution proceedings in O. S. No. 1 of 1982 when he brought the property to sale. Section 446(1) of the Act is not attracted to the instant case. This follows from the decision in B. V. John v. Coir Yarn and Textiles Ltd. [1960] 30 Comp Cas 162, 166. In this view of the matter, there is no infirmity in the execution proceedings taken in O. S. No. 1 of 1972 and O. S. No. 349 of 1979 of the sub-court, Tellicherry, and the applicant cannot have any grievance in this matter.”
13. This judgment relies on an earlier judgment of the same High Court in B. V. John v. Coir Yarn and Textiles Ltd. [1960] 30 Comp Cas 162, 166. Apart from the aforesaid precedent a perusal of Section 446 clearly shows that the first part of the section puts a bar on initiation of any fresh proceedings in the event when a winding up order has been made or a provisional liquidator has been appointed. The second part of the section makes a clear distinction that the bar applies only against the continuance of the proceedings which have been filed on the date when the winding up order is made. These proceedings can then only be continued with the leave of the court. The section makes a clear distinction between proceedings which are taken out on the date when the order of winding up is passed and the order appointing the official liquidator is passed and pending
proceedings which continued, to be pending at the time when the winding up order has been passed. In the present case, admittedly no winding up order has been passed of the companies. Thus the question of applicability of Section 446 of the Companies Act does not arise. I find no infirmity at all in the findings given by the arbitrator.
14. Apart from this, it may also be noticed that the grounds as pleaded in the petition do not come within the purview of any of the grounds stated in Section 34 of the Act of 1996. After the coming into operation of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the interference in arbitration proceedings and arbitration awards by the courts has been greatly restricted. Section 5 of the said Act provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in this part. Section 34 sets out the grounds on which an arbitral award can be challenged. As noticed above all the grounds pleaded do not come within the ambit of any of the matters mentioned in Section 34 of the Act. Even otherwise, it is a settled proposition of law that this court while examining an arbitration award does not sit as a court of appeal. It can only correct errors which amount to error apparent on the face of the award. This court cannot interfere if erroneous findings of fact or of law are given by the arbitrator. In fact, the “courts can also not interfere on the ground of reasonableness of the reasons given by the arbitrator. In the present case the arbitrator has shown every indulgence to the petitioners. The arbitrator has been appointed by consent. The time was limited for the pronouncement of the award in the consent terms itself before the Chief Justice. Having agreed to the consent terms all manner of technical grounds have been taken. Having considered the facts and circumstances of the case I find no merit in the arbitration petitions. The same are hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.