JUDGMENT
P.A. Mohammed, j.
1. The subject matter of these appeals is the interim awards passed by the Additional M. A. C. Tribunal, Mavelikara, under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short “the Act”). These appeals were filed by the Oriental Insurance Company Limited, the insurer of the motor vehicle, involved in a rail-motor collision which took place on May 14, 1996, at the railway level crossing on public road near Mampra-Alum-mood junction. In the collision 33 persons died and their legal heirs filed applications under Section 166 of the Act claiming compensation. In these appeals we are concerned with three of such applications. After filing the main applications the claimants filed separate petitions under Section 140 of the Act praying for interim awards. The Tribunal awarded Rs. 50,000 each in those applications by three separate interim awards after hearing the parties. Those awards are under challenge in these appeals filed by the insurer.
2. Heard learned counsel for the appellants and respondents. Standing counsel for the Southern Railway was also heard.
3. In order to consider the contentions of the parties more effectively, it would be worthwhile to examine the distinctive features of the provisions contained in Chapter X of the Act which deals with “liability without fault” in certain cases. It contains five sections, sections 140 to 144, and corresponding sections in the old Act are sections 92A to 92E in Chapter VII-A. The principle of “no-fault liability” is recognized in Section 140. While fixing the liability to pay compensation in the case of death or disablement, the claimant shall not be required to plead and establish that the death or permanent disablement was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner or owners of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or any other person. This is what is provided in Sub-section (3) of Section 140. Sub-section (4) provides that a claim for compensation under Sub-section (1) shall not be defeated by reason of any wrongful act, neglect or default of the person in respect of whose death or permanent disablement the claim has been made nor shall the quantum of compensation recoverable in respect of such death or permanent disablement be reduced on the basis of the share of such person in the responsibility for such death or permanent disablement. However, the liability of the owners of the vehicles to pay the compensation is joint and several. It is significant to note that the provisions contained in Chapter X shall have overriding effect in view of the provisions contained in Section 144. It provides that the provisions in the said Chapter shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of the Act or of any other law for the time being in force.
4. The provisions contained in Chapter VII-A containing sections 92A to 92E were incorporated in the repealed Act by Act 47 of 1982, with effect from October 1, 1982. While interpreting the provisions contained in Chapter VII-A, Venkataramiah J. (as the learned judge then was) observed in Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai [1987] 62 Comp Cas 609, 620 ; [1987] 3 SCC 234 :
“This part of the Act is clearly a departure from the usual common law principle that a claimant should establish negligence on the part of the owner or driver of the motor vehicle before claiming any compensation for the death or permanent disablement caused on account of a motor vehicle accident.”
5. The history behind this legislation can be discerned from the following observation of the learned judge in the decision (page 619) :
“Where a pedestrian without negligence on his part is injured or killed by a motorist whether negligently or not, he or his legal representatives as the case may be should be entitled to recover damages if the principle of social justice should have any weaning at all. In order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents there has been a continuous agitation throughout the world to make the liability for damages arising out of motor vehicles accidents as a liability without fault. In order to meet the above social demand on the recommendation of the Indian Law Commission, Chapter VII-A was introduced in the Act.”
6. What is required to be stated by a claimant for obtaining an order for compensation under Section 140(1) of the Act is that the death or permanent disablement of a victim has resulted from an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle or motor vehicles. When the Tribunal is satisfied with this requirement it can by order direct the owner or owners of the motor vehicles to pay compensation in respect of such death or disablement under Sub-section (1). While doing so, the Tribunal is not concerned as to whether the accident was due to any wrongful act neglect or default of the owner or driver of the vehicle ; nor was it due to such act of the victim. It need not identify at this stage all the vehicles liable for compensation because the liability under the Act is joint and several. When the owner of one of the vehicles involved in the accident is identified the Tribunal gets power to order compensation under Section 140 making such owner liable to pay the compensation.
7. What is embodied in Section 140 is a modern measure of social justice in order to protect and preserve the socio-economic life of the persons who approach the Tribunal for compensation in respect of death or disablement without pleading and proof. This interim award serves two causes ; firstly it is a measure of eo instanti security to the victims or their family members and, secondly, it is a measure of economic aid to them to approach the courts to obtain the full compensation. The access to justice is thus guaranteed to the claimants who seek compensation in respect of death or disablement, as the case may be. In this context it would be worthwhile to recall what Cappallatti said :
“The right of effective access to justice has emerged with the new social rights. Indeed, it is of paramount importance among these new rights since, clearly, the enjoyment of traditional as well as new social rights presupposes mechanisms for their effective protection. Such protection, moreover, is best assured by a workable remedy within the framework of the judicial system. Effective access to justice can thus be seen as the most basic requirement–the most basic ‘human right’–of a system which purports to guarantee legal right.”
8. Michael Zander says :
“The concept of justice has been central to civilisation from time immemorial. But it is only in this century that the concept of universal access to justice has been taken seriously. It was not until well into the twentieth century that western democracies began to make genuine provision through legal aid schemes for citizens who lacked the means to secure the services of lawyers as legal advisers and advocates in legal proceedings. Britain was foremost amongst them.
Today the problem of access to justice is seen to consist of a variety of issues–the extent of the use and non-use of lawyers, the scope of the legal aid scheme, the availability of other systems for financial assistance to those who need the services of lawyers, and alternative systems for providing legal services through non-lawyers and for avoiding the need for legal services through use of alternative techniques.”
9. (A matter of justice) Joshua ‘Rozenberg, observed in his “The search for justice” :
“The key issue facing the legal system today is access to justice. Few of us give it a second thought. We assume justice will somehow be available, on tap, whenever we need it ; but when the time comes to enforce our rights many of us will find it very difficult–if not downright impossible–to obtain true justice from the courts.”
10. Krishna Iyer J. (as the learned judge then was) while dealing with a question relating to payment of court fee made a clarion call in State of Haryana v. Smt. Darshana Devi, AIR 1979 SC 855.
“We should expand the jurisprudence of access to justice as an integral part of social justice. . .”
11. While deciding a petition under Section 140 of the Act the Tribunal as well as the courts shall not forget the enshrining principle of access to justice theory behind the legislative measure. What is contained in Chapter X is a clear legislative mandate in favour of access to justice theory.
12. Learned counsel for the appellants has brought to our notice the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. [1997] 8 SCC 683. This decision is cited in support of his argument that the general manager of the Southern Railway was also a joint tort-feasor and, therefore, the Tribunal should have fastened the liability to pay compensation under Section 140 on him also. His case is that the accident occurred as a result of the collision between the motor vehicle insured with the appellant and train owned by the Southern Railway. Whether the Southern Railway is also liable for the compensation is a question to be decided by the Tribunal in the main application. The Supreme Court in the decision in Union of India v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (1997] 8 SCC 683 was dealing with an award passed under Section 110B and not an award under Section 92A. There one of the questions was whether under the law of torts claimants in a rail-motor collision can
claim that the obligation of the Railways under the statute as well as under the common law will run concurrently. The court, inter alia, observed that in the case of a motor vehicle accident on being hit by a train at an unmanned level crossing the Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain claims against the Railways in addition to claims against the insurer, owner or driver. We have no dispute on this question. The only thing is all such questions need not arise for determination while passing an interim award. At this stage before the Tribunal, there is an identified owner of the vehicle involved in the accident which is insured with the appellant. The insurer cannot now contend that the liability to be fixed finally would also be on the Southern Railway and, therefore, that liability should be apportioned at this stage. Since the liability under Section 140 is joint and several, there is no reason to entertain apprehension by the insurer.
13. The next contention advanced by learned counsel is based on Section 124 of the Railways Act, 1890. Section 124 under Chapter XIII of the Railways Act which deals with the liability of the Railway administration for death and injury to passengers due to accidents, prescribes the extent of liability. It provides that when in the course of working a railway, an accident occurs, being either a collision between trains of which one is a train carrying passengers or the derailment of or other accident to a train or any part of a train carrying passengers, then whether or not there has been any wrongful act, neglect or default on the part of the railway administration, it shall notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, be liable to pay compensation to such extent as may be prescribed. This section would apply to a collision between trains and not to a collision between the train and a motor vehicle. Even assuming that this provision would apply, the liability of the Railway administration has to be determined and then only the extent of liability can be found out. This question, in such cases, will have to be decided in the main application for compensation and not in a petition for interim award.
14. In view of the discussion hereinabove, we do not find any merit in these appeals. They are accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.