JUDGMENT
G.H. Guttal, J.
1. The petitioner, a dismissed employee of the Thalanadu Service Co-operative Bank Limited, the respondent No. 1 herein, impugns the validity of the order of the Appellate Authority under the Kerala Shops and Commercial Establishment Act, Kottayam, dated July 3, 1993 in S.A. No. 5 of 1989 whereby his appeal against the dismissal by the Society was rejected.
2. An enquiry was held by the respondent No. 1 against the petitioner. The charge was that he had fabricated documents with a view to having loans sanctioned in the names of certain members. The respondent No. 1 and its officers made a report which preceded the enquiry. The petitioner, by an endorsement below this report, admitted that he did commit the misconduct. This admission was reiterated by the petitioner during the course of the enquiry. In view of the admission of the petitioner no evidence was recorded. Eventually the enquiry officer made the order of dismissal which was confirmed by the order of the Appellate Authority.
3. The first submission of counsel for the petitioner is that even where an employee admits that he has committed misconduct, the enquiry officer is bound to invite evidence in regard to the charges and cannot make a report merely on the basis of the admission. In my opinion, this generalised submission is untenable. Evidence is required to prove disputed facts and not admit- 3 ted facts. Where an admission is made after knowing the charges, no evidence need be led. It would be a different matter if the admission of guilt is by an employee who could not understand what the charges were or if he was induced or coerced into admitting his guilt. There was no dispute before the enquiry officer about the fact that the petitioner was indeed guilty of the charge of fabricating documents. The admission was made twice – firstly by the writing endorsed by him before the report of the respondent No. 1 and secondly during the course of the enquiry. Therefore there is no substance in the petitioner’s contention that notwithstanding his admission of guilt the enquiry officer was under an obligation to record evidence.
Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Cock Brand Sinnar Bidis Ltd. v. Shakuntalabai Dashrath Khandare (1992-II-LLJ-420). The employee who was alleged to have confessed that she was guilty of the charges of (a) selling ‘Bhel’ within the premises and (b) absence for a long period, was an illiterate woman. Secondly the admission that she was guilty was written not by her but by another employee, who was in a position of being influenced by the employer.
Thirdly at the enquiry, the employee “categorically denied the charge”. These three distinguishing facts went into the judgment of the Bombay High Court. In the present case the petitioner was a Secretary and is an educated person. Secondly unlike the case of Shakuntalabai (supra) the petitioner not only admitted the guilt before the enquiry by a writing but reiterated it during the course of the enquiry. These facts make the judgment of the Bombay High Court inapplicable to the facts of this case.
4. The second point urged by learned counsel is that the petitioner admitted the guilt because the President and the enquiry officer promised to him that he would not be harmed if he admitted the guilt and that he would be reinstated. Thus according to the petitioner the admission of guilt was procured by the promise made by the enquiry officer and the President. Before the Appellate Authority evidence was led. The petitioner, the President of the Society and the enquiry officer were examined. The Appellate Authority considered the evidence which was translated and read out before me too. It was the petitioner’s word against the words of the President and the enquiry officer. The Appellate Authority had before him all the circumstances. He accepted the word of the President and the Enquiry Officer as trustworthy. He held: “He could not prove that he was assured to take him back after the enquiry by the President or the enquiry officer.” This is a finding of the Appellate Authority based on the evidence led before him. There is a concluded finding of fact. It is not permissible to interfere with this finding in this jurisdiction.
5. For all these reasons the O.P. is dismissed.
