ORDER
P.S. Mishra, C.J.
1. The main petition by P. Rama Rao and another is directed against a Government Order in G.O.Ms.No. 157, Industries and Commerce (Mines-II) Department, dated 2-4-1994, passed by the second respondent and for declaring Section 15 (1-A) (n) of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act (Act No. 67 of 1957) (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) in so far as it enabled the State Government to make Rules providing for the authority to which applications for revision of any order passed by any authority under these Rules may be made and Rule 35-A of the Andhra Pradesh Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules’) illegal and void.
2. The Government acquired Ac. 86-50 cents in S.No. 55/5, Rajupalem, Lakshmipuram village, Cheemakurthi Mandalam, Prakasam District, as it was surplus in the hands of one G. Subrahmanyam on 20-6-1992 under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973, which contained rocks and minor minerals. Rama Rao submitted an application in the year 1988 to the Assistant Director, Mines and Geology, Ongole, (fifth respondent herein) for grant of mining lease over an extent of 25 acres out of the said land. The Collector, Ongole, however, sent proposals to the Government to release the land for being leased out to private persons through the Department of Mines and Geology for mining purposes subject to such terms and conditions as the Collector with the approval of the Government deemed necessary. When the applications were processed, the Collector by letter, dated 7-3-1989, informed the Assistant Director, Mines and Geology, Guntur, accordingly and recommended the grant of mining lease in favour of Rama Rao. The Government by G.O.Rt.No. 876, Revenue (Land Reforms) Department, dated 3-6-1989, approved the terms of the lease. The period of lease was fixed for five years on an annual lease amount of Rs. 600/- per acre. The Collector was directed to collect the entire lease amount before handing over the possession. The Government Order also stated that the lease was approved with the concurrence of the Secretary, Industries and Commerce Department, vide U.O.No. 1772/M.IV-2/89-1, dated 30-5-1989. Rama Rao paid the entire lease amount for the period of five years and revenue for 25 acres of land. Five lease documents were executed accordingly in favour of Rama Rao, the total extent being Ac. 15-54 cents, for a period of five years for different extents of area – two from July, 1989; two from January 1990 and one from July, 1990. Since the Deputy Director did not grant lease for the balance area of Ac.9-47 cents, Rama Rao filed Writ Petition No. 9850 of 1990 in this Court in which the Court directed to consider his application and pass appropriate orders. The sixth respondent – M/s. Victorian Granites Private Limited, filed Writ Petition No. 12228 of 1990 alleging that it had applied on 2-8-1985 for mining lease over 108 acres in S.No. (old) 55/4B Part new 55/4B; 55/5 and 55/6 and sought directions for grant of lease in its application in the said lands. It was disposed of on 13-9-1990 directing the Deputy Director to pass orders in accordance with law. Sixth respondent also filed Writ Appeal No. 918 of 1992 against the judgment in the petition by Rama Rao (i.e. Writ Petition No. 9850 of 1990) of the Court directing the Deputy Director to consider the former’s application and pass appropriate orders. The Court directed the Deputy Director to dispose of the applications on merits. However, the order under appeal was not interfered with. The Deputy Director granted two more leases over Ac. 2-46 cents and four acres respectively to Rama Rao. Sixth respondent sought a consent letter to the Deputy Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur, from Rama Rao to enable it to acquire a quarry lease over an extent of three acres in S.No. 55/5 out of 25 acres granted by the Government to him and Rama Rao gave such a consent letter and the sixth respondent was granted lease over an extent of three acres by the fourth respondent i.e. Deputy Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur. Rama Rao made an application to the Deputy Director that with effect from 20-10-1990 he had joined as a partner in the second petitioner firm (i.e. M/s. Magam Inc. Exporters & Importers, Madras) seeking transfer of the lease over an extent of Ac. 11-54 cents. The second petitioner also made a similar request. The Deputy Director (fourth respondent) on 8-10-1992 ordered the transfer. One Y.A. Perilingam filed Writ Petition No. 12119 of 1990 seeking direction to the authorities to consider his claim over Ac. 86-50 cents in S.No. 55 and setting aside of the mining leases granted in favour of Rama Rao. In the said proceeding the Government Pleader represented to the Court that the Government had exercised suo motu powers under Rule 35-A of the Rules against the grant of quarry leases in S.No55/5. Rama Rao (first petitioner) or the second petitioner, however, were not aware of the same until the Government issued a notice on 10-5-1993 i.e. after the disposal of the said writ petition on 13-4-1993. The said writ petition was disposed of with the following. directions:
“The first respondent is directed to complete the suo motu examination of the issue relating to the grant of quarry lease in S.No. 55/5 of R.L. Puram Village, Cheemakurthi Mandal, Prakasam District expeditiously at any rate, not later than three months from the date of receipt of this order. At the same time, the Government is also directed to pass orders on the applications of the petitioners dated 11-9-1985, 20-12-1989 for grant of lease in respect of S.No. 55/5 of R.L. Puram in an extent of Ac. 86-55 cents excluding the extent of land for which lease was granted in favour of the eighth respondent having regard to the grievance of the petitioner mentioned supra and also having regard to the provisions of Section 11 of the Act. With the above directions, the writ petition is disposed of. No order as to costs.”
3. By the Memo, dated 10-5-1993, the Government asked the petitioners and the sixth respondent to make representations regarding the grant of leases as the Government was of the prima facie opinion that the grants were not in conformity with the Rules and mat the Government had decided to take up suo motu revision under Rule 35-A of the Rules, (after giving opportunity of being heard to the parties). Rama Rao went to the Court of District Munsif, Ongole, in O.S.No. 180 of 1993 and sought injunction against the Government from proceeding with the enquiry as per memorandum, dated 10-5-1993, in respect of 22 acres in S.No. 55/5 (extent of area covered by the leases executed by the Government in favour of Rama Rao). The second petitioner also filed O.S.No. 1787 of 1993 in the Court of VIII Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, on 9-6-1993. Respondents 2 to 5 filed Writ Petition No. 8400 of 1993 and questioned the Ongole suit and the interim orders passed therein. The second petitioner, however, could not get any order in the suit and the plaint was returned to it for presentation to the proper Court on the ground that Hyderabad Court had no territorial jurisdiction. The Government, however, issued memo, dated 1-6-1993, referring to the two Revision Petitions filed by Y.A. Perilingam and M/s. Victoria Granites Private Limited (sixth respondent) as well as its earlier memo, dated 10-5-1993, and directing the parties to appear on 15-6-1993 to represent their cases. When copies of the documents were asked for and not supplied to the petitioners, they filed Writ Petition No. 7525 of 1993 on 14-6-1993. The Court in W.P.M.P.No. 9428 of 1993, vide order dated 14-6-1993, stayed the proceedings before the Government. Copies of some documents, however, were supplied, as demanded by the petitioners, by the Government in the evening of 14-6-1993 itself. Writ Petition No. 7525 of 1993 was dismissed on the ground that roving investigation by the petitioners was not permissible and that documents were of confidential nature and could not be claimed. Writ Petition No. 8400 of 1993 challenging the Ongole Suit and the orders passed therein by the Government, was allowed to the extent that the order in the Interlocutory Application in the Ongole suit was quashed. Petitioners filed Writ Appeal Nos. 817 and 818 of 1993 against the said orders in the writ petitions. Writ Appeal No. 818 of 1993 was dismissed and Writ Appeal No. 817 of 1993 was disposed of with the direction that the materials relied on by the revision petitioners and the Government would be furnished to the appellants. Petitioners moved the Supreme Court in S.L.P. Nos. 3526 and 3527 of 1994 against the orders in Writ Appeal Nos. 817 and 818 of 1993. The Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petitions. Petitioners by separate memos, dated 16-3-1994, were informed by the Government that suo motu enquiry would be held on 25-3-1994 at 3 p.m. and Revision Petitions would be heard on 25-3-1994 at 4-30 p.m. Petitioners moved a petition on 25-3-1994 before the Minister (the Government) to decide the jurisdictional issue and until such decision, to stay the proceedings. The Minister, however, disagreed with the contention and decided to proceed with the enquiry. Petitioners submitted written arguments and served copies of the arguments on the counsel for revision petitioners. Petitioners filed once again a writ petition i.e. Writ Petition No. 5930 of 1994 in this Court on 30-3-1994 seeking declaration that Section 15(1-A) (n) of the Act and Rule 35-A of the Rules and the consequential enquiry were illegal and void and for prohibiting the Government from proceeding with the matter. Before, however, any significant development could take place in the said writ petition, the Government issued G.O.Ms.No. 157, dated 2-4-1994. This development caused withdrawal of Writ Petition No. 5930 of 1994 and filing of the instant petition.
4. The main return to the allegations in the writ petition is by the sixth respondent. It has furnished a chronology of events starting from 17-5-1985 and claimed that it applied to the Deputy Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur, for grant of quarry lease for quarrying black granite useful for manufacture of granite panels and tiles over an extent of 25 acres in S.No. 55 (Part), R.L. Puram village for a period of ten years, followed by another application, dated 2-8-1985, for quarry lease for a period of five years over an extent of 108 acres (five acres own land, 17 acres private land and 86 acres Government land) in S.No. 55/4B (Part) of R.L. Puram village. Its application, dated 17-5-1985, according to the chronology of events, however, was deemed to be rejected as no orders were passed thereon within ninety days, vide Rule 13(1) of the Rules as it then stood. It (6th respondent) addressed a letter to the Deputy Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur, on 2-9-1985 stating that it was not interested in obtaining the quarry lease over the said area mentioned in its quarry lease application, dated: 17-5-1985, as it had filed fresh application for grant of quarry lease over an extent of 108 acres, including 25 acres applied earlier. The earlier application was, however, not withdrawn or treated as withdrawn. Since no order was passed nor any action taken on the application, dated 2-8-1985, that also was deemed to be rejected. On 25-10-1985 the sixth respondent informed the Deputy Director that it intended to pursue the application, dated 17-5-1985, and was filing a revision against the deemed rejection. It actually filed a Revision Petition allegedly under Rule 35-A of the Rules before the Government against the deemed rejection of the application dated 17-5-1985, on 30-10-1985. Since the application dated 2-8-1985 was also deemed to be rejected, the sixth respondent filed one more application in revision. It is asserted, however, in the counter affidavit by the sixth respondent that on 4-11-1985 the Government allowed the first revision petition and set aside the deemed rejection, vide Memo No. 995, dated 4-11-1985. The second Revision Petition was also allowed, vide Memo No. 1092, dated 8-11-1985. It appears the sixth respondent addressed two letters, one after the other, for expediting the process of granting quarry lease to it. Y.A. Perilingam applied on 10-3-1988 for grant of quarry lease of black granite over an extent of 84 acres in S.No. 55 of R.L. Puram Village, according to the sixth respondent, and Rama Rao (first writ petitioner) made his application for quarry lease over an extent of 25 acres in S.No. 55 of R.L. Puram village on 3-10-1988. M/s. Yak Granite Industries, according to the sixth respondent, also filed an application for quarrying black granite over an extent of 25 acres in S.No. 55 of R.L. Puram village on 7-12-1988.Petitioners’ allegation that the Collector sought release of the land by the Government for being leased out to private individuals and eventually the first petitioner (Rama Rao) getting the lease, as claimed by him, are not denied. It is further, however, stated that on 12-12-1988 the Commissioner of Land Revenue addressed a letter to the Secretary, Revenue Department, endorsing the Collector’s proposal and the Collector issued no objection certificate to the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology for grant of quarry lease in S.No. 55 over an extent of 25 acres and recommended the quarry lease application of Rama Rao, dated 3-10-1988, on 7-3-1989. The facts that Rama Rao got the lease duly excuted and transferred to the second petitioner (i.e. M/s. Magam Inc. Exporters and Importers), there were proceedings in this Court and the dispute took a turn when allegedly the Minister took up the suo motu revision application and several writ petitions were filed by the parties in this Court, are not disputed. It is asserted, however, that the sixth respondent pursued his applications for grant of lease and moved the Government in Revision, when no action was taken on its application for grant of quarry lease by the Deputy Director within the statutory period and applications suffered the deemed rejection and orders were passed in such applications by the Government and specific directions were issued for considering its application by the Government as well as in the writ petitions.
5. One is likely to mix up facts and get confused unless care is taken to keep them limited to the controversy and ignore such contentions which are raised on the basis of certain orders passed in the writ petitions, which parties had filed for specific directions, but at no time the Court ever entered into the issues which have been raised before us. Government’s affidavit is not of much help except the fact that it has supported the case of the sixth respondent, in so far as the deemed rejection of the applications by the sixth respondent for quarry leases, revision against such deemed refusal and orders in such applications, etc., are concerned. On the grant of lease to the petitioners, however, the State Government and official respondents have accepted that the Government in G.O.Rt. No. 876, Revenue Department, dated 3-6-1989 approved the lease terms and, stated, inter alia,–
“It is a fact that these terms and conditions are approved by the Finance Department and Industries and Commerce Department in the Secretariat. The terms and conditions are not meant for to be imposed on Sri P. Rama Rao, but they are to be imposed on the lessees who are granted the leases in the 25.00 acres released by the Government. Nowhere the name of Sri P. Rama Rao figured either in G.O.Rt.No. 261 of Revenue Department, dated 1-3-1989 or in G.O.Rt.No. 876, of Revenue Department, dated 3-6-1989. Sri P. Rama Rao cannot claim that the above G.Os. have been issued in his favour alone.”
6. The Government and its officers have taken the stand that in granting lease to the petitioners, the Deputy Director of Mines and Geology, Guntur (4th respondent) violated Rule 12 (2) of the Rules. The affidavit is critical of the actions of the fourth respondent in granting transfer, as requested by Rama Rao, of a part of the quarry lease to the second petitioner and about suo motu revision, the stand taken in the counter affidavit is that Government initiated suo motu enquiry in November, 1992 and called for a report from the Director of Mines and Geology on the quarry leases granted for black granite in S.No. 55/5 of R.L. Puram village and,–
“As the Government took up the suo motu examination of the leases granted in S.No. 55/5 of R.L. Puram village under Rule 35-A of A.P. Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1966 the learned Government Pleader was requested to inform the same to the Honourable Court during the course of hearing of W.P.No. 12119 of 1990 filed by Sri Y.A. Perilingam.”
7. Parties have filed written arguments which contained almost every detail of the events leading to the filing of the present writ petition. Petitioners, however, made an issue against the claim of the sixth respondent that it had filed applications against the deemed rejection of their applications for grant of quarry lease and asserted, in course of the hearing before us, that there were no applications in revision ever filed, as claimed by the sixth respondent, against the deemed rejection due to non-passing of the order by the Deputy Director (fourth respondent). They wanted thus the respondents to produce in proof of the statements in this behalf in the counter affidavit of the sixth respondent as well as the State Government and its officers. They have particularly referred to the order, dated 31-10-1992, passed by the Deputy Director (fourth respondent) wherein it is mentioned as follows:
“As per the information available in this office records, it is not known whether the applicant has filed revision under Section 35-A of the Andhra Pradesh Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1966 and whether the Government have allowed the same or not and hence the reference first cited is hereby rejected under Rule 13(1) of the Andhra Pradesh Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1966.”
Petitioners have made a grievance that the Government has not produced the records, even the record which could support the order of the Deputy Director, dated 31-10-1992. When asked to respond to the allegation that the Government was withholding the records only to avoid their assertion from being discredited that the sixth respondent had filed any application for grant of quarry lease before the first petitioner had filed his application and that, after alleged deemed rejection of such applications, it (sixth respondent) had filed any Revision Application; which revision applications were ordered by the Government in its favour, learned Government Pleader has stated before us that no records were available as they were lost.
8. Since learned counsel for the parties have addressed us at length and a question of Constitutional validity of an Act of Parliament and the legislation by the State Government under such a provision in the said Act, has been urged before us, we propose to note the legislative background of the law which provides for the regulation of mines and development of minerals. Government of India Act, 1935 divided the legislative field of regulation of mines and development of minerals between the central legislature and the provincial legislature, but the first enactment of it, however, was made by the legislature of the dominion of India on 8-9-1948 i.e. after independence but before the Constitution. The Act was called “The Mines and Minerals Regulation and Development Act, 1948″. The Central Government made the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949 for regulating the grant of prospecting licences and mining leases for minerals other than petroleum and natural gas, which Rules came into force on 25-10-1949. After the commencement of the Constitution, the said law continued to occupy the field until in 1957 the Parliament enacted on December, 28 the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957. Entry 54 in List I of the Union list to the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India gives to the Parliament the authority to provide for regulation of mines and minerals development to the extent to which such regulation and development under the control of the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest. Entry 23 in List-II called ‘State List’ to the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India gives to the State Legislature power to provide for regulation of mines and mineral development subject to the provisions of List-I with respect to regulation and development under the control of the Union.
9. In State of Orissa v. M.A. Tulloch, the Supreme Court has considered a law on the subject which existed from before the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 came into force, for the State of Orissa called ‘Orissa Mining Areas Development Fund Act (Act. No. 27 of 1952). The Court has held subject to the provisions of List-I the power of the State to enact legislation on the topic of mines and mineral development is plenary to the extent, however, to which the Union Government had taken under its control the regulation and development of minerals under Entry-54 of List-I so much was withdrawn from the ambit of the power of the State Legislature under Entry-23 of List-II and legislation of the State which had rested on the existence of power under that entry would, to the extent of that control, be superseded or by rendered ineffective.
10. In the instant case, however, the controversy is generated by the attack upon the validity of Section 15 of the 1957 Act, which gives power to the State Governments to make Rules in respect of minor minerals to which Sections 5 to 13 of the Act do not apply, the provisions of which deal with the powers of the Central Government and speak of the exclusion of the State Government in matters such as prospecting licences or mining leases, royalties in respect of mining leases and dead rent pertaining to mining leases. This Section empowers the State Government to make Rules for regulating the grant of quarry leases, mining leases, or other mineral concessions in respect of minor minerals and for purposes connected therewith. Validity of this provision has been upheld by the Supreme Court in the case of D.K. Trivedi & Sons v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1986 S.C. 1323. The Supreme Court has in this judgment held that Rule making power of States under Section 15(1) of the Act does not amount to excessive delegation of legislative power and does not infringe either Article 14 or Article 245 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court in particular has in this judgment pointed out that the provision, which appears to provide no guidelines, in fact had inherent in it the guidelines which are available in Section 13(1) of the Act and is subject to the restrictions under Sections 4 to 12 of the Act. Restrictions which take care of the power of the Central Government to make Rules in respect of minerals generally also take care of the power of the State Government in respect of minor minerals. Thus the power which the State Government can exercise to make Rules in respect of minor minerals is similar to the power of the Central Government to make Rules in respect of minerals and whether it is grant of prospecting licences or grant of mining leases, fixation of royalty or dead rent, restrictions as provided under Sections 4 to 12 of the Act have to be applied and guidelines generally imported and extrinsic in the exercise of power by the State Government to make Rules save the Constitutional validity of Section 15 of the Act.
11. Learned counsel for the petitioners has not been able to show to us any material or authority upon which the judgment of the Supreme Court in D.K. Trivedi & Sons v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1986 SC 1323 has not made pronouncement. No ground to challenge the validity of Section 15(1) of the Act is urged before us which can make us examine – whether the State Government is competent to make Rules and whether the Parliament has gone beyond its power in providing in Section 15 of the Act for the State Government to make Rules in respect of minor minerals. He has not been able to bring to our notice anything from which we could be induced to examine whether Section 15 is hit by any provision of the Constitution.
12. The Rules framed by the State Government called ‘Andhra Pradesh Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1966’ has in Rule 5 laid down that no person shall undertake quarrying of any minor mineral in any area except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of a quarry lease or a permit granted under the Rules. It contains, however, a proviso which gives to the Government power to grant exemption from obtaining a lease or a permit for quarrying any minor mineral in any area in the case of any category of persons, subject to such conditions as may be specified in the order granting such exemption. Since we are concerned in the instant case with the land which has vested in the State and in which land sub-soil rights belonged to the State, we are not required to deal with many provisions of the Rules. One relevant provision, however, which is of some importance is found in Rule 9-A which in Sub-rule (1) provides for reservation of areas for exploitation in the public sector, etc., and in Sub-rule (2) provides that no area, which has been reserved by the Government under Rule 9-A(1), shall be available for grant of quarry lease unless the availability of the area for grant is notified in the official Gazette specifying a date (being a date not earlier than thirty days from the date of the publication of such notification in the official Gazette) from which such area shall be available for grant. Sub-rule (3)1 of this Rule provides that applications for the grant of a quarry lease in respect of areas whose availability for grant is required to be notified under Rule 9-A (2) shall, if (a) no notification has been issued under that Rule, or (b) where any such notification has been issued, the period specified in notification has not expired, shall be deemed to be premature and shall not be entertained; and the application fee thereon, if any paid, shall be refunded. Rule 12 provides for grant of a quarry lease for sand by auctioning the areas and in respect of other minerals on application subject to Sub-rules (2) and (2A), which Rules, inter alia, provide the mode of disposal of the applications in order of preference– (1) applications of Government Department and Government Corporations and Companies; (2) application of Labour Contract Co-operative Societies; (3) applications of unemployed persons who posses any recognised qualification in Geology, Geophysics, or Mining Engineering or any other allied subjects; and (4) other applications and other, “whenever more than one application falling under any of the categories (1) to (3) are received for grant of a quarry lease, they have to be considered under the order of preference and whenever more man one application falling under category (4) are received, in order of preference according to the date of the receipt of the applications unless the Government for special reasons otherwise direct and in case of applications received on the same day preference has to be given to any deserving applicant or with the previous approval of the Director, to an applicant whose application was received later in preference to an earlier application for special reasons to be recorded in writing. Rule 13 has fixed a time limit for grant of quarry leases of 180 days from the date of the receipt of the application and provided that if the application is not disposed of within the said period, the application shall be deemed to have been refused in the case of Government lands. The standard period of lease is envisaged under Rule 15 for five years in respect of minerals which can be extracted without much equipment or instrument, and in respect minerals which require investment and equipment to develop the quarry, of ten years and in respect of minor minerals useful for road metal, etc., for a period of 15 years. The lessee is statutorily put to a condition to notice in writing under Rule 16 of not less than six calendar months, if he intended to abandon the lease. Rule 20 confers rights under a lease in these words:
“Subject to a contract to the contrary, a quarry lease granted under the Rules shall confer on the lessee, the right to quarry, carry away, sell or dispose of the minor mineral or minerals specified in the lease deed and found upon under the lands specified therein.”
13. Preceding, however, any step for grant of a quarry lease, Rule 22 provides no area which was previously held or which is being held under a quarry lease, or in respect of which an order has been made for the grant of a quarry lease but the applicant has died before the execution of the quarry lease deed, or in respect of which an order granting the lease has been revoked under Sub-rule (1) of Rule 13 and in respect of which a notification has been issued under Sub-rule (1) of Rule 9-A shall be available for grant unless the availability of the area for grant is notified in the official Gazette by the Director specifying a date (being a date not earlier than 30 days from the date of publication of such notification in the official Gazette) from which such area shall be available for grant, provided that it shall not apply to the renewal of a lease in favour of the original lessee or his legal heirs notwithstanding the fact that the lease has already expired, provided further that where an area is reserved under Rule 9-A and is proposed to be granted to a Government Company no notification shall be required before issue. Rule 31 spells out conditions of permit or lease, including the conditions applicable to first renewal and second renewal. Rule 35 provides for appeal against any order passed by the Assistant Director (matters which falls under his care), or Deputy Director (matters which fall under his care) to the Director within a period of two months from the date of communication of such order to the party aggrieved. Since the Director is authorised to impose penalty for unauthorised quarrying as per Rule 26, Rule 35 provides for appeal against the order of the Director under Rule 26, to the Government. Rule 35-A which has been particularly attacked by the learned counsel for the petitioners, reads as follows:
“35-A Revision:-The Government may either suo motu at any time or an application made within ninety days, call for and examine the record relating to any order passed or proceeding taken by the Director, Deputy Director or Assistant Director under these Rules for the purpose of satisfying themselves as to the legality or propriety of such order or as to the regularity of such proceedings and pass such order in reference thereto as they think fit.
Provided that no order adversely affecting any person shall be passed under this Rule unless such person has been given an opportunity of making his representation.
Explanation: for purposes of this Rule where a Deputy Director has failed to dispose of an application for the grant or renewal of a quarry lease within the period specified in respect thereof under these Rules, the Deputy Director shall be deemed to have made an order refusing the grant or renewal of such lease on the date on which such period expires.”
14. Contention in this behalf is based upon an amendment to Section 30 of the Act, which speaks of the power of revision of Central Government. Before amendment, which has taken effect on and from 25-1-1994, Section 30 provided that the Central Government may, of its own motion or on an application made within the prescribed time by an aggrieved party, revise any order made by a State Government or other authority in exercise of the powers conferred on it by or under this Act. The amendment has introduced the words – “with respect to any mineral other than a minor mineral”. Thus, the amendment has restricted the revisional power of the Central Government to matters with respect to any mineral other than a minor mineral. Rule 35-A of the Rules framed by the State Government, however, has been in force from before the amendment. It is urged, since the Act gave to the Central Government power of revision in respect of all minerals, it intended exclusion of any revisional power of the State Government. This argument is expanded before us by suggesting that even though delegated under the Rules, when Assistant Director, Deputy Director, or Director passed orders, such orders were directly revisable by the Central Government, as the Rules vested them with authority, which authority is one conferred in exercise of the powers by or under the Act. The position, however, is different, after the amendment in the sense that the revisional power of the Central Government is confined to minerals other than a minor mineral. The power of revision given to the State Government by the Rules against orders of the Assistant Director, Deputy Director or Director, as the case may be, under Rule 35-A conflicted with the Central Governments revisional power under Section 30 of the Act until amendment, restricted the Central Government’s power and excluded minor minerals from its revisional purview. This Rule (Rule 35-A), according to the learned counsel for the petitioners, was as if nonexistent in the eye of law on all such dates the Government purportedly exercised its revisional powers to set aside the orders of allegedly deemed refusal of the application of the sixth respondent and the Government had no power to take up the suo motu revision on 1-5-1993/10-5-1993, when it resolved to initiate suo motu revision vide Memo No. 213/1A-II(1)/92-14.
15. Two things, however, clearly emerge – (1) that Rule 35-A has existed from before the amendment in Section 30 of the Act, and (2) besides the suo motu revisional power or otherwise on an application as contemplated therein, the Rules have determined a hierarchy by prescribing power of the Assistant Director, Deputy Director and Director, and appeals against their orders to prescribed authorities. It is difficult to see any conflict with the revisional power of the Central Government when, in the hierarchy of authorities, the State Government is the appellate authority in respect of some matters and is revisional authority in respect of some other matters. Concurrent jurisdictions to a higher and lower authority in the hierarchy are not unknown to the system of law. There can be a revision under a special law provided before a higher authority and at the same time before a lower authority. In such cases, however, the exercise of authority by a subordinate, either in appeal or revision, does not in any manner affect the power of the superior authority and notwithstanding such exercise of power by the inferior authority, the superior authority can exercise its power. A person aggrieved by the order of the inferior authority can always bring to the notice of the superior authority, if the law gives such power to the superior authority, and it can always exercise its power notwithstanding the exercise of a similar or other power granted under a law to the inferior authority. Before the amendment, the Central Government exercised a superior authority. The petitioners have acted under misapprehension that Rule 35-A had any conflict with Section 30 of the Act. Rule 35-A had given to the State Government a power which it could exercise in appropriate cases without in any manner denying to the Central Government the revisional power under Section 30 of the Act. Before the amendment in Section 30, the Central Government could exercise the power of revision notwithstanding the power exercised by the State Government under Rule 35-A. After the amendment, the exercise of revisional power by the State Government is final, the Central Government has ceased to be the revisional authority in respect of minor minerals.
16. The Court’s exercise should have been limited, had learned counsel for the parties not persisted with the questions as to the vires of Section 15 of the Act and the vires of Rule 35-A of the Rules. The controversy between the parties is based upon the claim of the 6th respondent that it had made applications for grant of quarry lease before the first petitioner had applied. Except the assertion that we find repeated, by and on behalf of the sixth respondent, there is no record to show that it had made any application for grant of quarry lease other than what is found repeated by the parties before us, i.e. the first disclosure of any application for mining lease by the sixth respondent to the Court is found in W.P.No. 12228 of 1990, in which it asserted that it had applied on 2-8-1985 for mining lease for 108 acres in S.No. (old) 55/4B (part)-(new) 55/4B, 55/5 and 55/6. This petition was disposed of on 13-9-1990 directing the Deputy Director to pass orders in accordance with law. Sixth respondent also made disclosures about its case, as presented before us, in Writ Appeal No. 918 of 1992 against the judgment in the petition by Rama Rao i.e. Writ Petition No. 9850 of 1990. Sixth respondent has conceded that in the letter bearing the date 2-8-1985 (it is asserted that it was actually signed on 2-9-1985 and received by the Deputy Director on 5-9-1985) it indicated as follows:
“In continuation of our application referred to above, we submit that we are not interested in obtaining quarry lease over the said area as we have filed a fresh application for an extent of 108 acres, including 25 acres applied for earlier”.
17. According to the sixth respondent, it had made the application for mining lease on 17-5-1985. The words – “we are not interested in obtaining quarry lease over the said area” -are referable to the application for lease of the area of an extent of 25 acres with which we are concerned. 17-5-1985 application, if any, thus was substituted by the sixth respondent, according to his version, by the application dated 5-9-1985. It is not in dispute that the Government passed orders making available the said extent of 25 acres for leasing to private individuals on 1-3-1989, vide G.O.Rt.No. 261, Revenue (G) Department. It is also not in dispute that Rama Rao applied in the year 1988 for lease over 25 acres for which extent of land, according to the sixth respondent, it had applied on 2-8-1985 but substituted it by another application for lease of an extent of 108 acres on 2-9-1985. According to the sixth respondent, no orders were passed on the letter bearing date 2-8-1985, signed on 2-9-1985, actually submitted on 5-9-1985, within the statutory period of 180 days. The only application thus, according to the sixth respondent, which was required to be processed was one bearing the date 2-8-1985 for a lease of 108 acres, which stood rejected since no order was passed on it within the statutory time limit. The whole case of the sixth respondent thus depends upon the alleged challenge by him to the deemed order and the order passed by the revisional authority in exercise of power under Rule 35-A of the Rules. As we have noticed earlier, there is no record to support that there was any challenge to the deemed refusal of the application for the lease of 108 acres of land. There is no record also of any order passed by the State Government in these applications. There is no record of any communication of the Government Order to the Deputy Director or the Assistant Director. In fact, there is no material to link the application for the lease of 108 acres of land with the grant of lease of 25 acres to the first petitioner, except a mention about it in the letter by the sixth respondent to the Deputy Director bearing the date 2-8-1985, allegedly although signed on the same day when the application for an extent of 108 acres was filed by it. The case of the sixth respondent loses its consistency when notice is taken of the fact that it sought Rama Rao’s consent, which he gave to it on 8-10-1992 and gave a letter on 9-10-1992 to the Deputy Director that quarry lease may be granted to it over an extent of three acres in S.No. 55/5, instead of 108 acres in S.No. 55/4B including New 55 /4B, 55 /5 and 55 /6. It accordingly got the lease over an extent of three acres and the first petitioner got the leases as above, which it (sixth respondent), however, has chosen to challenge.
18. Learned counsel for the sixth respondent, however, has submitted that, whether records are available or not, the Government has acknowledged in the proceedings under Rule 35-A deemed refusal of the sixth respondent’s two applications for grant of lease – one for 25 acres and the other for 108 acres -having been set aside in revision and has thus acknowledged that the sixth respondent’s two applications were earlier in time than the application of the petitioner. We have difficulty, however, in accepting this assertion. We have no difficulty in accepting the case of the sixth respondent that it had made applications – one for 25 acres and another for 108 acres – before the petitioner made his application. We, however, do not find any credible material to accept its case that when orders were not passed in the said two applications within the statutory time, it filed revision applications and Government passed orders setting aside the deemed rejection of its applications. When confronted, however, with the application by it, evidently after the application by the petitioner, for grant of lease it had sought first petitioner’s consent and applied for a lease over an area of three acres in only S.No. 55/5, learned counsel for the sixth respondent has contended that it cannot stand against the sixth respondent’s case for grant of lease, as his earlier applications stood revived by the order of the revisional authority and the Assistant Director and Deputy Director failed to take any action in spite of the order of the Government in revision. The only way the sixth respondent could get its claim considered was by moving this Court and seeking directions to the Deputy Director and when nothing came out, the suo motu revision and applications therein by it alone forced all concerned to consider its claim. The entire argument, however, in this behalf is far fetched. Obviously the two applications which the sixth respondent has claimed to have been made for grant of lease before Rama Rao’s application could not for obvious reasons revive. According to its own case, the sixth respondent had substituted the application for lease over 25 acres by another application for lease of 108 acres. There is some mention on its behalf that realising that it was not proper to give up the first application for grant of lease of 25 acres, the sixth respondent made some representations and claimed that it was not withdrawing its earlier application for the lease of 25 acres. The mix up, confusion, and change in the stand of the sixth respondent is such that only thing which is shown clearly established i s its application for lease of three acres of land and the order of the competent authority for it. In all other respects, unless one is ready to accept every word stated on behalf of the sixth respondent, it is difficult to believe its case.
19. It may not be altogether heyarre, but it is curious no doubt how the Minister in-charge of the Department got the scent of any injury to the interests of the sixth respondent. There is nothing, except the statement in the order, supporting the suo motu revision on the footing that – (1) there was any irregularity in the grant of lease to Rama Rao and the second petitioner; (2) there was something unjust in denying to the sixth respondent a consideration of its application for grant of lease and that the two applications – one for the lease of 25 acres covered by area overlapping the area for which lease was granted to Rama Rao, and the other for 108 acres. It is difficult to understand why the first application, which the sixth respondent has itself said, was superseded by the second application for 108 acres lease, was accepted by the Minister as one surviving for consideration as its deemed refusal had been set aside. At least the Government could see the obvious either the application for 25 acres was surviving or the application for 108 acres was surviving. There is nothing on the record, as we have noticed earlier, from which it can be inferred that deemed refusal was set aside and no one could know better about it than the Government because the Government was always in the know of the grant of the lease of 25 acres to the first petitioner. The Government obviously could not grant to the sixth respondent lease to the extent of 108 acres. It could also not grant to the sixth respondent lease to the extent of 25 acres, as it (sixth respondent) had taken three acres in S.No. 55/5 which it had included, according to its own case, in its two applications filed by it earlier.
20. Although we have not found any invalidity in Rule 35-A, we cannot desist examining whether the Government should understand its suo motu revisional power exercisable at any time on any ground whatsoever and for any purpose. The words in this Rule, “either suo motu at any time or on an application made within ninety days”, have to be understood to limit the revisional power to a period of ninety days on an application not by any person but a person aggrieved and suo motu within a reasonable time on such informations which disclose grave illegality or impropriety, or even irregularity in the proceedings, which has caused unjust results to the interests of the applicant in case there is an application for revision or has caused damage to the public interest, if it is a suo motu revision. One can hardly find any reason to think that in the instant case the Government exercised its revisional power in public interest. The only interest involved is that of the sixth respondent and as shown in the directions issued by the Government, a reconsideration in this situation would mean grant of lease to the sixth respondent because the only guideline, we have already noticed, in the Rules is to give preference to one who has applied earlier than the other. It is hard to think that the Government could not differentiate between the public interest and the interest of the sixth respondent.
21. There is nothing on the record for us to see that there were any extraneous or irrelevant considerations in entertaining the application of Rama Rao and later accepting the transfer by him to the second petitioner and finally ordering and executing documents of lease in his favour. It will not be, however, reasonable for a Government to interfere at will with leases executed by it or on its behalf by the competent authority. The Government is always expected to honour its commitments, particularly when its representations and order create certain legal rights. Any lease deed, like any other contract, is a document of consensus ad idem. A democratic Government is not expected to breach a contract unless there are exceptional reasons. We do not propose, however, to spell out in this proceeding such exceptions in which suo motu revisional powers can be exercised under Rule 35-A by the Government. The Rules of executive business have chosen the Constitutional functionary i.e., the Minister in-charge of the Department as the person who shall exercise the power of the Government. While exercising the power under Rule 35-A, the Minister shall not exercise any executive power but a statutory power only under the Rules framed by the State Government under Section 15 of the Act and since it involves adjudication, the function is quasi judicial. A functionary at the highest level of the executive, we have no reason to think, shall not be fully responsible and respond to his duties with necessary constraints. We hope and trust that all legal refrains shall be exercised when suo motu revisional power is exercised. In the instant case, however, we have reasons to hold that the suo motu revisional power under Rule 35-A has been exercised almost as a fiat forgetting the legal restraints and refrains which quasi judicial authorities are expected to exercise.
22. In sum, the order passed by the Government in exercise of the revisional power under Rule 35-A, vide G.O.Ms.No. 157, Industries and Commerce (M.II) Department, dated 2-4-1994, is illegal and without jurisdiction. The impugned proceeding is quashed. Respondents are restrained from interfering with the lease of the petitioners save in accordance with law.
23. The Writ Petition is accordingly allowed with costs. Hearing fee Rs. 5,000/-.