JUDGMENT
1. These 7 writ petitions can be disposed of by a common judgment and order, as they raise the same question of law and the facts are also similar, if not identical.
2. The petitioner is each of these writ petitions is a Cantonment Board constituted under the Cantonments Act, 1924. The first respondent is the Appellate Authority set up by the Central Government to hear appeals under Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act 1972 (hereinafter, for short, called “the Act”), who has passed the impugned order. The other respondents are the workmen of the petitioners, who are hereinafter referred to as “the workmen”.
3. The workmen filed applications under Section 4 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, claiming different amounts of gratuity due to them under the provisions of the Act. These applications came to be allowed by the Controlling Authority under the provisions of the Act. The petitioner-Board appealed against the said orders of the Controlling Authority to the Appellate Authority, which dismissed the appeals. The petitioners are in this Court to impugn the orders of the Appellate Authority.
4. At the outset, it may be mentioned that the facts alleged in each of the applications are not disputed by the petitioner/Board. The petitioners opposed the applications only on the ground of non- applicability of the Act, which is the legal objection canvassed throughout. Mr. Presswala, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner-Board, fairly conceded that, if the Board’s legal objection is not upheld, then the workmen would be entitled to the amounts of gratuity claimed by them in their respective applications as awarded by the Controlling Authority.
5. This takes us to the legal objection that has been raised by the petitioner-Board as to the tenability of the applications under the provisions of the Act. The contention, shortly put, is that the Act does not apply to the petitioner-Board, as the offices/establishments where the concerned workmen were employed do not fall within the ambit of Section 1(3)(b) so as to make the Act applicable. It is common ground that, at the relevant time, no notification within the contemplation of Section 1(3)(c) had been issued and that such a notification came to be issued only in January, 1982. It is also common ground that the petitioners’ offices/establishments would not fall within Clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Act. The Appellate Authority has negatived the contention by taking the view that the offices/establishments of the petitioner-Board were covered under the provisions of Section 1(3)(b) of the Act, as they satisfy the definition of the term “establishment” both under the provisions of the Contract Labour Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 and the Bombay Shops & Establishments Act, 1948.
6. The applicability of the Act is determined by Section 1 of the said Act. Clause (b) of sub-section (3) of Section 1, which is the only relevant provision which needs to be considered reads as under :
“1 Short title, extent, application and commencement –
(3) It shall apply to –
(a)……
(b) every shop or establishment within the meaning of any law for the time being in force in relation to shops and establishments in a State, in which ten or more persons are employed, or were employed, on any day of the preceding twelve months;
(c)…..”
7. The contention of the petitioner is that the offices/establishments where the concerned workmen were employed are not covered by the provisions of the Contract Labour Regulations and Abolition) Act, 1971, and the provisions of the Bombay Shops & Establishments Act, 1948. Consequently, those establishments would not amount to “establishments” within the meaning of the said laws, contemplated by Clause (b) of sub-section (3) of Section 1. Hence, the petitioner contends that he Payment of Gratuity Act would not apply.
8. It is difficult to accept the contention urged on behalf of the petitioner for more than one reason. In State of Punjab v. The Labour Court, Jullundur, and others 1981-I-LLJ-354, the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider a some what similar contention. The question arose therein as to whether the Hydel Department of the Government of Punjab, which had under taken a construction project, in which the concerned workmen were employed as work charged employees, answered the test in Section 1(3)(b) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, so as to enable the employees to claim gratuity. The State of Punjab contended that Section 1(3)(b) required that the establishment within its contemplation must be one “within the meaning of any law for the time being in force in relation to establishments in a state”, which meant that it should be an establishment within the meaning of a law applicable to shops and establishments enacted by the State Legislature. This contention was emphatically rejected by the Supreme Court by pointing out (p. 355) :
“It is difficult to accept that contention because there is no warrant for so limiting the meaning of the expression ‘law’ in Section 1(3)(b). The expression is comprehensive in its scope, and can mean a law in relation to shops as well as, separately, a law in relation to establishments or a law in relation to shops and commercial establishments and a law in relation to non-commercial establishments. Had Section 1(3)(b) intended to refer to a single enactment, surely the appellant would have been able to point to such a statute, that is to say, a statue relating to shops and establishments, both commercial and non-commercial. The Punjab Shops and Commercial Establishments Act does not relate to all kinds of establishments. Besides shops, it relates to commercial establishments alone. Had the intention of Parliament been, when enacting Section 1(3)(b), to refer to a law relating to commercial establishments, it would not have left the expression ‘establishments’ unqualified. We have carefully examined the various provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act, we are unable to discern any reason for giving the limited meaning to Section 1(3)(b) urged before us on behalf of the appellant. Section 1(3)(b) applies to every establishment within the meaning of any law for the time being in force in relation to establishments in a State. Such an establishment would include an industrial establishment within the meaning of Section 2(ii)(g) of the Payment of Wages Act.”
The Supreme Court, therefore, held that the Hydel Project run by the State of Punjab was an establishment falling within Section 1(3)(b) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, and, therefore, the workmen were entitled to claim gratuity.
9. In may view, the reasoning adopted by the Supreme Court in the judgment in Stated of Punjab (supra) would equally apply to the case of the petitioner. The Appellate Authority has taken the view that the petitioner’s offices/establishments would be ‘establishments’ within the meaning of the Contract Labour Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, as defined in Section 2(1)(e). Interestingly, Section 2(1)(e) of the said Act defines the expression ‘establishment’ as under :
“2(i) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, –
…….
(e) “Establishment” means –
(i) any office or department of the Government or a local authority, or
(ii) any place where any industry, trade, business, manufacture or occupation is carried on;”
Even a cursory look at Section 2(1)(e)(ii) is sufficient to lead to the conclusion that the establishment contemplated thereunder could be an establishment of a local authority. It is not disputed that the Pune Cantonment Board is a local authority, and, therefore, I would have though that there would be no difficulty in holding that the establishment of the Pune Cantonment Board would be establishment within the meaning of Section 2(1)(e) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970.
10. Mr. Presswala, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, contended that the petitioner-Board does not employ any contract labour, and, therefore, the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, would not apply to any of the concerned establishments of the Board as it does not qualify under Section 1(4)(a). In other words, the contention seems to be that, in order to make Section 1(3)(b) of the Payment of Gratuity Act apply, not only must the establishment be an ‘establishment’ within the meaning of any law for the time being in force in relation to shops and establishments in the State, but that such law must also apply to the establishment in question. I am afraid, it is not possible to accept this contention. The only test of applicability prescribed in Section 1(3)(b) is that the establishment must be an ‘establishment’ within the meaning of a specified type of law in the State. The section does not prescribe the further qualification canvassed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. It is irrelevant, therefore, in my view, whether the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, applies to any of the petitioner Board’s concerned establishment or not. What may not apply today may apply tomorrow, if the Board decides to engage 2 or more contract labour. While it is true that the application of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, may be determined by a voluntary act of the Board in engaging the requisite number of contract labour, Section 1(3)(b) of the Payment of Gratuity Act does not contemplate applicability depending upon the volition of the employer. All that is necessary under Section 1(3)(b) is that the establishment in question must answer the description of an “establishment” within the meaning of any law relating to shops and establishments which is in force in the State”, nothing more and nothing less. Although the Appellate Authority has also relied upon the definition of the expression ‘establishment’ as contained in the Bombay Shops & Establishments Act, 1948, I am not taking the said Act into consideration, since, as rightly contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner-Board the question whether the petitioner’s establishments would answer the description of the said expression defined in that Act, is not free from doubt. For the purpose of disposing of the resent petitions, it is sufficient that we concentrate our attention on the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, which is capable of applying to all establishments of local authorities like the petitioner-Board.
11. Thus, in my view the establishments of the petitioner-Board are ‘establishments’ within the meaning of Section 2(1)(e)(i) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, which is a law in force in the State of Maharashtra in relation to shops and establishments in this State. Thus, the qualifying test in Section 1(3)(b) being satisfied, the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, was applicable, even at the relevant time, to the establishments of the petitioner Board, wherein the concerned workmen were working.
12. In the result, I find that here is no substance in the petitions, which are hereby dismissed. Rule issued in each of the petitions is discharged. The workmen concerned shall be entitled to claim their respective amounts of gratuity found due, which have been deposited in this Court. The petitioner is directed to give notice to the concerned workmen, by way of a public advertisement in a Marathi newspaper circulated in the Pune area, intimating to them the fact that these writ petitions have been dismissed and that they could collect the amounts due to them from this Court. There shall be no order as to costs, as none of the respondents has put in appearance.
13. Certified copy expedited.