JUDGMENT
Byas, J.
1. The petitioner challenges the order dated October 12, 1987 (Annexure-6) by which his services were terminated. The petition was originally filed against the respondent Bank and its Secretary. Subsequently, the Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur was impleaded as party.
2. Briefly recalled, the relevant facts are that the petitioner was initially appointed as L.D.C. in the respondent Bank on 24th January, 1987 on daily wages. While he was so working on the post of L.D.C., he was appointed as Class IV employee in the regular pay scale on 15th May, 1987 by order Annexure-5. By the impugned order, Annexure-6 dated 12th October, 1987 his services were terminated. It appears from Annexure-6 that the petitioner’s appointment was found irregular and as such the Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Government of Rajasthan (respondent No. 3) issued directions to terminate his services. In compliance of those directions, the Administrator of the Bank issued the impugned order Annexure-6.
3. The grievance of the petitioner was that he had actually worked for more than 240 days within a period of 12 calendar months preceding the day of termination of the service (12th October, 1987). The termination of his service amounts to retrenchment. This retrenchment was made without the compliance of the mandates of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, ‘the Act’). It is also alleged that the respondent Bank is an ‘industry’ and is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. The relief claimed is that the order Annexure-6 be quashed and he be reinstated with back wages.
4. The petition is opposed by the respondents on the grounds that the respondent Bank is not a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and hence not amenable to the writ jurisdiction. It is stated that the respondent Bank is also not an industry and as such neither the petitioner can be treated to be a workman nor the provisions of the Act are attracted. It is further stated that since the appointment of the petitioner was irregular, his services were terminated.
5. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties at length.
6. We may state at once that the Sahakari Bhumi Vikas Banks in the State of Rajasthan have been taken to be ‘industry’ as defined in the Act in a number of decisions given in the writ petitions by this Court. Again it is not disputed that the entire control and management of Sahakari Bhumi Vikas Banks in Rajasthan vests in the State Government and the Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Government of Rajasthan is the controlling head. The Sahakari Bhumi Vikas Banks have been held to be amenable to the writ jurisdiction. These two positions stand well established. Mr. Lodha does not controvert these positions. We find no merit in the contention of the respondents that since the appointment of the petitioner was not valid, the termination of his service does not amount to retrenchment. The definition of retrenchment as given in the Act is wide and comprehensive to include all types of terminations of service unless the termination falls within any of the excepeted categories mentioned therein. The petitioner’s case is not covered by any of the exceptions contained in the definition of retrenchment. As such, the termination of the petitioner’s service amounts to retrenchment.
7. The petition is also opposed on the ground that the petitioner has not put 240 days service during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of retrenchment. The contention of Mr. Lodha is that the petitioner first worked as L.D.C. from 24th January, 1987 to 14th May, 1987 and thereafter from 15th May, 1987 to 12th October, 1987 as Class IV employee. It is argued that the petitioner worked in different capacities and as such the two periods of his service-first of L.D.C and then the Peon, cannot be clubbed together to arrive at a conclusion that he had worked for a requisite period of 240 days. We are not at all impressed by the contention of Mr. Lodha.
8. The definition of the ‘continuous service’ has been given in Section 25B of the Act. Sub-section (2) lays down that what is required is that the workman should have been in continuous service under an employer. The employer must be one and the same. It is not at all necessary that the workman should work in the same capacity during the required period in order to earn the continuous service as defined in Section 25B of the Act. If the contention of Mr. Lodha is accepted, it would result to anomalous position and create unforeseen hardship to the workman. The legislature while defining the “continuous service” never intended so. In our opinion, in order to earn the continuous service by a workman, what is required is that he should work under the same employer. It is not necessary that he should continue to do the work in the same capacity. If he is workman as defined in the Act and the employer is the same he earns the continuous service by working for 240 days within the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of retrenchment. The petitioner has worked from 24th January, 1987 to 12th October 1987, i.e. to say 240 days in total. He has thus worked for 240 days during the 12 calendar months preceding the date of his retrenchment. He had thus earned the continuous service at his credit.
9. Admittedly, the provisions of Section 25F of the Act were not complied with. Any retrenchment in violation of the provisions of Sec-tion25-F of the Act is bad and non-est. Such a retrenchment is invalid.
10. In the result, we allow the writ petition and quash the impugned order dated 12th October, 1987, Annexure-6. The respondents are directed to forthwith reinstate the petitioner on the post he was working on 12th October, 1987. As regards the back wages, the petitioner is advised to initiate the legal proceedings under Section 33C(2) of the Act because it is a disputed question whether he remained in gainful employment or not for the period from 13th October, 1987 till today.
11. No order as to costs.
