ORDER
1. This writ petition is filed challenging the order of the Government dated 19-6-1997 in Memo No.7793/M.H(1)/95 by the petitioner (hereinafter noted as ‘Pradeep Minerals’). It is to be noted at this stage itself that by the impugned order dated 19-6-1997 the Government of Andhra Pradesh modified the order dated 2-6-1995 passed by the Director of Mines and Geology in proceedings No.35003/K5/94. In other words, by the impugned order, the Government held that the application filed by the fifth respondent (hereinafter noted as ‘Swetha Granites’) dated 22-12-1994 was in time, therefore, the granting of lease in favour of Swetha Granites was in order.
2. The learned Counsel for the petitioner strenuously contended that the acceptance of the surrender made by M/s K.S.R. Granites regarding 1.00 Hectare of the land in survey number in question with effect from 21-12-1994 is bad, because under Rule 16(1) of A.P. Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1966 (for short, the Rules) the surrender can be accepted only after six months of notice of intimation of the surrender. Therefore, the surrender made by M/s. K.S.R. Granites shall
necessarily take effect after six months of their application dated 21-12-1994, and in this view of the matter, the application for grant of lease filed by the petitioner-Pradeep Minerals on 3-2-1995 was in time. He further argued that proviso to Rule 16(2) of the Rules provides for the acceptance of such surrender forthwith or the date of the application only regarding a different case of land which is barren or the deposits of minerals being since exhausted or depleted to such an extent that it is not longer economical to work in such area. Therefore, under Rule 16(1) of the Rules, the acceptance of the surrender shall necessarily take effect only after 21-12-1994 regarding all other kinds of minerals, which do not fall to proviso to Rule 16(2). Therefore, the impugned order is bad. Secondly, he contended that in fact M/s. K.S.R. Granites sent the letter of surrender on 21-12-1994 but it appears that the same, has been received on 29-12-1994 and some amount (Rs.100/-) has been paid vide challan dated 31-12-1994 for surveying the lands etc. From these facts, it follows that the said application for surrender should be taken to have been filed either on 29-12-1994 or on3l-12-1994 at any rate not en 21-12-1994. Therefore, there is a factual error in the impugned order passed by the Government taking 21-12-1994 as the basis. Thirdly, he contended that the lease has been granted to Swetha Granites without advertising the availability of the land for lease and it is contrary to the judgments of this Court in Devangiila Laxminarayana v. Director of Mines and Geology, and Vadde Labour Contract Co-Operative Society Limited v. The Secretary to Government, 1995 (3) ALD 343 as well as the judgment of Supreme Court in Ajit Singh v. Union of India and others, 1995 Supp. (4) SCC 224.
3. As against the arguments of the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the learned Counsel for the fifth respondent contended that the impugned order of the Government does not call for interference. Though the impugned order of the Government states that the revision-petition filed by the Swetha Granites is accepted in fact such a revision was unnecessary since that was filed against the
order of Assistant Director of Mines and Geology directing the petitioner to stop further quarrying in view of the interim order granted by the Government in the same revision-petition. He further submitted that in substance though for other reasons the grant of lease made in favour of Swetha Granites is confirmed by the Government taking the application filed by Swetha Granites dated 21-12-1994 as against the application dated 29-12-1994 which was accepted by the Director of Mines and Geology. At any rate, the grant of lease in favour of Swetha Granites is confirmed by the Government but for different reasons, and the said order does not call for interference. He further submits that Rule 16(1) and (2) of the Rules do not apply to the facts of the case. At any rate giving of six months by the person, who intend to surrender in terms of Rule 16(1) of the Rules is only a directory but not mandatory. He further submits that in the instant case such surrender has been accepted by the Government. Therefore, this contention of the petitioner cannot be accepted. He lastly contended that the contention of the Counsel for the petitioner that the lease has been granted in favour of Swetha Granites without proper publication is not tenable because that was not one of the ground before the Government and the petitioner cannot be permitted to raise the same at this stage in this writ petition, he being an applicant in the same proceedings. Thus he contended that the writ petition has no merits and the same is liable to be dismissed.
4. As regards the first contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner, I find that this contention, prima facie, not acceptable for the simple reason that the surrender made by M/s K.S.R. Granites regarding 1.00 Hectare of land in the survey number in question has already been accepted by the Government and that order has become final. The validity of the said order has not been challenged before me and it is not possible for this Court to go beyond the order passed by the Deputy Director of Mines and Geology dated 4-2-1995 accepting the surrender with effect from 21-12-1994. Therefore, whether the surrender
was validly accepted in terms of Rule 16(1) and (2) of the Rules, whether the surrender takes effect after the period of six months as contemplated in terms of Rule 16(1) of the Rules do not arise for my consideration,
5. As regards the second contention of the petitioner that the application of M/s. K.S.R. Granites on the basis of the material on record, shall be taken one file on 29-12-1994 because the said application though dated 21-12-1994 but the same has been actually received in the office on 29-12-1994 and an amount of Rs. 1007- was deposited by challan dated 31-12-1994, is also rejcctable for the same reasoning given to the first contention that it is not possible for this Court to go beyond the order passed by the Deputy Director of Mines and Geology dated 4-2-1995. Even if there is any mistake, unless that order is challenged before me by filing a Writ or appropriate proceedings, it is not possible for this Court to consider the validity of the same on one ground or the other. In fact, the fact whether the said application was filed on 21-12-1994, 29-12-1994 or on 31-12-1994 would be a matter of question of fact and it is not possible for this Court to go into that aspect. For these reasons, I reject the second contention also.
6. The third contention of the petitioner is that the land has been granted in favour of M/s Swetha Granites, without advertising the same either in the newspaper or in the gazette or in any other mode, so as to give opportunity to all the persons concerned to apply for the same, and granting of lease in favour of M/s Swetha Granites Exports (P) Limited -5th respondent is illegal and arbitrary. As against this argument, the Counsel for Respondent No.5 contended that there is no rule under which such publishing advertisement either in the newspaper or in the gazette, regarding the availability of the land for quarrying lease is required. Therefore, there is no illegality on the part of the official respondents in granting the mining lease in favour of Respondent No.5. He further submitted that as held by the revisional authority, the application filed by Swetha
Granites on 21-12-1994 was prior in point of time and accordingly, the miniming lease has been rightly granted in favour of Respondent No.5. He further submitted that at any rate, the petitioner himself was one of the applicants in the said proceedings and he did not raise this point before the authorities below, therefore, the petitioner cannot raise this point in this petition. He relied upon the two judgments of the Supreme Court reported in J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills v. Sales Tax Officer, and Bachan Singh v. Gauri Shankar, .
7. It is no doubt true that there is no express provision in the Rules for advertising the availability of the land for grant of mining lease either by way of publication in the newspaper or in the official gazette, but the principle of this type is implied in these rules. Rule 12(1) of the said Rules provides as under:
“12(1) Grant of lease:–A quarry lease for sand shall be granted by auctioning the areas and in respect of other minerals on application subject to provisions of sub-rules (2) and (2A) and each such application for grant of quarry lease except for the minerals mentioned in Items 9 and 10 of Schedule-I to sub-rule (1) of rule 10 shall be accompanied by a treasury or bank challan (for rupees one thousand) in token of the remittances towards fees.’;
From the above rule, it is clear that a quarry lease for sand shall be granted by auctioning the areas and in respect of other minerals on application subject to provisions of sub-rules (2) and (2A). Under sub rule (2) it is provided that whenever more than one application is received for the grant of quarry lease, the Deputy Director shall dispose of the applications in order of preference viz., (i) applications of Government Departments and Government Corporations and Companies, (ii) applications of Labour Contract Co-operative Societies; (iii) applications of unemployed persons who possess any recognised qualified in Geology, Geophysics, or Mining Engineering
or any other allied subjects and (iv) other applications. In the instant case, the matter relates to category No (iv). other applications, since there are no applications “pertaining to category’ Nos. (i) to (iii). Regarding the applications received under category No.(iv), the fourth proviso to Rule 12(2-A) provides as under:
“Provided also that whenever more than one application falling under category (iv) above are received for grant of a quarry lease and have to be considered in the order of preference specified above, such preference shall be given to the applications according to the date of their receipt, unless the government, for special reasons, otherwise direct and in case of applications received on the same day, the (Deputy Director) after taking into consideration the particulars furnished in the applications, may grant the lease to any deserving applicant; or he may, with the previous approval of the Director, grant a quarry lease to an applicant whose application was received later in preference to an earlier application for any special reason to be recorded in writing,”
From the above proviso, it is clear that the applications received under category (iv) shall be considered by giving preference to the applications according to the date of their receipt, unless the Government, for special reasons, otherwise directs. In other words, applications received earlier in point of time requires to be considered as against applications received later in point of time. From reading of all these provisions, the logical conclusion would be that persons who intend to apply, should be made known regarding the availability of quarrying lease in respect of a particular land or lands as on a particular date. For instance, 12(1) of the Rules itself provides that a quarry lease for sand shall be granted by auctioning the areas and in respect of other minerals, on an application. Such an act of auction has got to be held after due notice or publication to the persons interested. Likewise the other applicants regarding other minerals should be made known that they could
file one application for grant of quarrying lease. It is only with reference to particular point of time given to such prospective entrepreneurs, one can say earlier in point of time or later in point of time. There is no express rule requiring the authorities to advertise the date of auction, but the authorities should advertise inviting bidders, so as to get the maximum rates. Hence, it logically follows that the auctioning of an area for quarrying lease for sand, would necessarily be after due advertisement, though the rules does not provide for an advertisement cither in the newspaper or in the gazette notification. So also the phrase “all applications” indicates that applications which are invited for the purpose of granting quarrying lease regarding other minerals. It is only with reference to the date on which prospective entrepreneurs are made known by a known method, one can say that an application filed by A is earlier in point of time than the application filed by B and so on. Therefore, I am constrained to conclude that such public notice either by paper publication or by gazette notification is a necessary corollary for effective implementation of these rules. In the absence of such an advertisement or public notice, what possibly could be expected by an applicant or a prospective entrepreneur is that they should keep in ‘touch’ with the officials of the Department to find out when a particular land or lands would become available for grant of quarrying lease. In other words, every such prospective entrepreneur should keep on visiting the office and the case workers or the officers concerned, to elicit the information as to when a particular land or lands would be available for quarrying lease. This would lead definitely to undesirable consequences and a citizen should not unnecessarily be made to knock the doors of the Department every day to find out the latest position regarding the availability and that has not been the intention of these Rules. Rule 12(1) presupposes the act on the part of the officials that they had already advertised the availability of the land for public auction, in case of sand or in case of other minerals, applications were already invited, and it is thereafter only, the rights of quarrying lease
could be disposed of by public auction regarding sand and other minerals on the basis of the priority in the applications, subject to the other preferences available to the categories of persons. This is the scheme of Rule 12 of the Rules. Therefore, without advertisement in a specific mode known to law, if any, quarrying lease is granted in favour of one person or the oilier, would be contrary to the scheme of these rules. In case of person who is already holding mining lease, knows that he is required to apply for renewal of lease within a particular period. In case of a person who has abandoned his lease, the authorities would be knowing it when the land becomes available for third party’ after determining such lease. The prospective entrepreneur or an applicant would not be known when such lease was determined and when a particular land becomes available for quarrying lease. The case on hand is itself an illustration how an administrative difficulty was caused if the things are left on the official records only, without proper publication. In this case, it is not in dispute that M/s K.S .R. Granites sent a letter on 21-12-1994 proposing to surrender one hectare of land in the Sy.No. in question. The Deputy Director of Mines and Geology vide his order dated 4-2-1995 accepted the surrender of that one hectare with effect from retrospective date as on 21-12-1994, the date on which M/s K.S.R, Granites filed application for surrender. The question would be, when the said land surrendered would be available for fresh grant. As per the order of the Deputy Director dated 4-2-1995, it becomes available only after 4-2-1995. But as per the order of the said Deputy Director of Mines and Geology, the surrender is accepted with a retrospective date, with effect from 21-12-1994, and if viewed that way, the land becomes available for fresh grant with effect from 21-12-1994. M/s Swetha Granites, has filed two applications, one on 22-12-1994 and the other on 4-2-1995 and M/s Pradeep Minerals filed one application on 3-2-1995, Taking the second application of M/s Swctlia Granites, filed on 4-2-1995, on which date the Deputy Director of Mines and Geology accepted the surrender, held that the second
application dated 4-2-1995 was earlier in point of time. Whereas, the Government in its revisional order, taking retrospective date of surrender with effect from 21-12-1994 took the earlier application of M/s Swetha Granites dated 22-12-1994 and granted lease in favour of M/s Swetha Granites, on the basis of the date 21-12-1994. These kinds of two approaches arose, because the availability of the and was not advertised on a particular date and if the things are to be left for the movement of the files, and orders to be passed from time to time in the files such administrative difficulties arc bound to arise. These administrative difficulties arc made to arise, because neither the Director of Mines and Geology, nor the Deputy Director of Mines and Geology is notifying the availability of the land as per the scheme of the Rules that I have noticed above. How, M/s Swetha Granites came to know that an order was passed on 4-2-1995 by the Deputy Director of Mines and Geology, could be anybody’s guess, since the outsiders arc not supposed to know when a particular order is passed by an officer, surprisingly, it filed one application on the same day (i.e., 4-2-1995). It is only having regard to these circumstances, the petitioner raised a ground in the revision-petition as under:
“4. The Director of Mines and Geology ought to have seen that M/s Swetha Granite Exports (P) Ltd., has played fraud and submitted its application 4-2-1995 having collided with lower officials.”
If the authorities below were to advertise the availability of the land after surrender of land made by M/s. K.S.R. Granites, which was accepted on 4-2-1995, this kind of allegation that there is collision between the officials, of the office of the Mines and Geology and M/s Swetha Granites, could not have been raised, nor there could have been such an apprehension, as extracted above, in the mind of the petitioner (made by the petitioner before the Government in revision). This allegation was made only because the mining lease was granted to M/s Swetha Granites, without advertising the availability of the land, in any
appropriate mode. Though the petitioner has not raised the point that the granting of lease in favour of M/s Swetha Granites is illegal for want of proper advertisement, but the ground No.4 extracted above, precisely stands for the point, now raised before this Court, Assuming for the sake of argument, this point is not raised by the petitioner before the revisional authorities, but in my humble opinion, granting of lease without advertisement goes to the very root of the matter, since it results in arbitral action violating Article 14 of the Constitution. If Ihe availability of the land were to be advertised, definitely not only the petitioner, but other persons other than Respondent No.5 would have applied for the same. In almost similar circumstances, the Hon’blc Supreme Court in Ajit Singh v. Union of India, 1995 Supp. (4) Supreme Court Cases 224 noticed this kind of consequences winch involves third parties rights who wish to apply for grant of mining lease. In paragraph No.17, the Supreme Court ruled as under:
” 17. So far as the applicant in whose favour the grant of mining lease was made which grant stands revoked under Rule 19(1), the revocation takes effect from the date when the period of three months prescribed under Rule 19(1) or the extended period under the proviso to Rule 19(1) expires and the right that had accrued to the said applicant on the basis of the grant comes to an end. But in respect of third parties, the matter regarding availability of the area in question for regrant cannot be allowed to rest on the internal communication between the officials concerned of the State Government and the applicant for the mining lease the relevant facts regarding which would not be known to public and are only contained in the office files. Since grant of mining lease involves grant of a privilege by the State, every applicant for such mining lease must have an equal opportunity to apply for the same. This can be achieved only if a public notice is issued about the availability of the area for regrant so that an intending applicant knows about the availability of the area for grant and can submit his application for that purpose.”
This is the law declared by the Supreme Court in the year 1995 and it is Jaw in terms of Article 141 of the Constitution of India and all the authorities in India are bound to comply with this law declared by the Supreme Court. But this law has not been taken note of by the A.P. Government when it passed the order on 19-6-1997, inspite of the fact that a specific ground of collusion and fraud between the Respondent No.5 and officials was raised in the revision-petition. From these circumstances it follows that even though there is no specific provision under the A.P. Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1966, but in view of Rule 12(1) and other provisions of Rule 12 of the said Rules, which requires consideration of applications on the basis of priority in point of time, an advertisement in the newspaper or in gazette making known the public regarding the availability of the land for granting mining lease would be mandatory. Such mandatory nature of principle of law is declared by the Supreme Court in the decision cited 6 supra, even assuming for the sake of argument that there is no rule providing for advertisement by public notice. Therefore, the impugned order of the authorities below granting quarrying lease in favour of Respondent No.5 without advertisement, is illegal and contrary to Article 14 of the Constitution and also contrary to the principles of natural justice. However, the learned Counsel for the Respondent No.5 relied upon two judgments of the Supreme Court reported in Bachan Singh vs. Gauri Shankar (supra) and J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills v. Sales Tax Officer, (supra) in support of his contention that such a point regarding the non-advertisement of the availability of the land for grant of lease cannot be permitted to raise in the writ petition. From reading of the judgment of the Supreme Court cited 5 supra, I find that the Letters Patent Bench did not permit the raising of the question of ratification. It is common knowledge that whether there has been ratification of a particular act or not would be a matter of evidence. Normally, a point involving the finding of fact, cannot be permitted to be raised in a writ jurisdiction. Thus, the said judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court is distinguishable from the facts of this case, Even the other judgment cited 4 supra also relied on certain findings recorded by the Sales Tax Officer and issues of fact not raised before the Sales Tax Officer, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the same cannot be permitted to be raised in the writ jurisdiction. But this case is also distinguishable from the facts on hand.
8. As I have noticed above. Rule 12 of the said Rules, impliedly provides that the availability of the land has got to be advertised, so as to give an opportunity to the third parties to compete for their rightful claim, since grant of lease involves grant of privileges by the State and all the other applicants for such mining lease must have an equal opportunity to apply for the same, as ruled by the Supreme Court in the decision cited 6 supra. In this view of the matter, I have no option, but to hold that the objection raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in this behalf is unsustainable.
9. The learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon two judgments of this Court reported in Devangula Laxminarayana v. Director of Mines and Geology, and Vadde Labour Contract Co-op. Society Ltd v. The Secretary to Government, 1995 (3) ALD 343. In the decision cited 7 supra. His Lordship Justice M.N. Rao (now the Chief Justice of Himachal Pradesh), dealing with the similar situation held as under:
“5. There is no specific provision under the Rules imposing an obligation on the concerned authority to notify availability of land for fresh grant in the event of failure on the part of the existing lessee to make an application for renewal within ninety days before the expiry of the lease as enjoined by sub-rule (3) of Rule 12. No difficulty will arise if the existing lessee makes an application within ninety days before the expiry of the lease. If such application is made, sub-rule, (xiv) of Rule 31 days down that renewal shall be granted for not more than two times to the period of quarry except in respect of areas notified
under Rule 9-A(1). If no such application is received, sub-rule (3), of Rule 12 says-
“….fresh application for grant of quarry lease, in respect of those areas, will be entertained thirty days before the expirty of the lease.”
How is it possible for any one to ascertain whether there has been a failure on the part of the existing lessee to seek renewal within ninety day’s – the period prescribed by sub-rule (3) of Rule 12?
6. Prospective applicants arc not supposed to make secret enquiries in the offices in order to submit applications for grant of fresh leases. The latter limb of sub-rule (3) of Rule 12 regarding making of fresh application. I think, is intended only to enable the existing lessee, who failed to apply for renewal within ninety days before the expiry of the lease, to submit an application seeking fresh grant within thirty days before the expiry of the lease and, in such an event, his application will be considered along with the applications of others. I am inclined to think that the Rules do not intend exclusion form consideration of the claims of existing lessee, who either due to in advertence or negligence, failed to make an application seeking renewal within ninety days before the expiry of the lease but diligent enough to submit fresh application within thirty days before the expirty of the lease. But, entirely a different situation emerges if the existing lessee did not make even a fresh application within thirty days before the expiry of the lease.
7. Availability of the land for grant of lease must be made known to the public either by publication in newspapers or in official gazette. Unless such a step is taken, it is utterly unreasonable to insist upon any limitation of time for consideration of the applications received. In the interest of good government, it is obligatory to notify availability of the land for grant of lease. Any act which results in encouraging secrecy in the running of administration is
contrary to public policy. It is, therefore, incumbent on the part of the concerned authority to notify, cither in official gazette or in the newspapers, about availability of the land for grant of lease and then prescribe the period within which applications should be submitted. In the absence of such a notification, any application received cannot be termed ‘premature’ or defective. The impugned order, therefore, must be held to be bad.”
From the reading of the above judgment, it is clear that His Lordship while considering the effect of Rule 12(3) of the said Rules, and availability of the land, has specifically pointed mat availability of the land for grant of mining lease must be known to the public by notifying either in the official gazette or in the newspapers. His Lordship further pointed out that prospective applicants are not supposed to make secret enquiries, in order to submit for grant of fresh lease. But unfortunately, the said judgment of the learned single Judge (Sri M.N. Rao, J) has been set aside by the Division Bench of this Court vide judgment and order dated 25-2-1991 in W.A.No.62/1991, as pointed out by the learned Counsel for the Respondent No.5, But I find from the reading of the Division Bench Judgment that the said order of the learned single Judge was set aside on the ground that the appellant before the Division Bench was not served with the notice of the writ petition and the matter was remanded back. It appears that after remand, the petitioner got the writ petition dismissed stating that he was not interested in prosecuting the same, vide judgment and order dated 9-3-1991. The learned Counsel for petitioner also brought to my notice that the said judgment of learned single Judge cited 7 supra was followed by another learned single Judge in the decision 8 supra. The latter judgment not only followed the decision 7 supra, but also followed the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Labour Contract Co-Op. Society v. Director, Mines & Geology, Hyderabad, AIR 1993 SC 147 regarding the scheme of Rule 12, as to the preference and priorities, and ultimately ruled that granting of fresh lease without notifying the availability
of the area for mining operation for the benefit of public was illegal and accordingly set aside the order of the lease granted in favour of respondent therein, with a direction to the official respondents to notify the availability of the land, either in the official gazette or in one or more daily newspapers having circulation in the area in question for grant of lease prescribing the period within which applications should be received and then dispose of the same in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules. But as pointed by the learned Counsel for Respondent No.5, this judgment has also been set aside by the Division Bench of this Court in W.A, No.480/1995 vide judgment and order dated 11-3-1997 on the ground of petitioner had an alternative remedy of appeal. From this fact it follows that the two judgments referred to 7 and 8 supra are no doubt set aside by the Division Bench on technical grounds, but no law is laid down by the Division Bench as against the principle of law enunciated by the two learned single Judges of this Court. It has to be noted at this state itself that presumably by accepting the law declared by the teamed single Judge in the decision cited 7 supra, the rule making authority amended A.P. Minor Mineral Concession Rules 1966 by inserting Rule 22 into the Rules vide G.O. Ms. No.238 I & C, dated 9-7-1992 (with effect from 15-7-1992), which reads as under:
“22. Availability of the areas for grant to be notified:-
(1) No area-
(a) Which was previously held or which is being held under a quarry lease; or
(b) In respect of which an order has been made for grant of a quarry tease, but the applicant has died before the execution of the quarry lease deed; or
(c) In respect of which an order granting the lease has been revoked under sub-rule (1) of rule 13; or
(d) In respect of which a notification has been issued under sub-rule (1) of
Rule 9-A shall be available for grant unless:–
the availability of the area for grant is notified in the Official Gazette by the director specifying a date (being a date not earlier than 30 days from the date of publication of such notification in the Official Gazettes) from which such area shall be available for grant:
Provided that nothing in this rule shall apply to the renewal of a lease in favour of the original lessee or his legal heirs notwithstanding the fact that the lease has already expired.
Provided further that where an area is reserved under rule 9-A is proposed to be granted to a Government Company no notification shall be required before issue.
(2) The State Government may, for reasons to be recorded in writing relax the provisions of sub-rule (1) in any special case.”
From the reading of the above rule it is clear that the Government provided a rule of issuing a notification regarding the availability of the area for grant in the official gazette by the Director, specifying the date for submitting the applications by the interested persons. But after the said judgment referred to 7 supra was set aside by the Division Bench of this Court, on certain technical grounds, vide G.O.Ms. No.315 Industries and Commerce (Mines.1) Department dated 2-8-1994. Legislative history, it is clear that even the authorities do not want that there should be a rule for advertisement either in the official gazette or m the newspaper in terms of Rule 12 as stated above or in terms of law declared by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in Ajit Singh v. Union of India (supra). But unfortunately, those two judgments of learned single Judges of this Court are set aside by the Division Bench, as I have stated above, on technical grounds, I am placing these material on record in order to keep in mind the history of Rule 12 and its interpretation. However, I do not hesitate to make it clear that the
reasonings that I have adopted in this judgment arc similar to the one expressed by the two learned single Judges of this Court in the decisions cited 7 and 8 supra, but with a slightly different approach. At any rate, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the decision cited 6 supra, laid down the same principle, which is binding on me. In view of this law. as I have noticed above, the grant of law in favour of Respondent No.5 is liable to be set aside by setting aside the orders of both the authorities below.
10. For the above reasons, I pass the order as under:-
Writ petition is allowed. The impugned orders are set aside. Respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 are hereby directed to notify the availability of the land in question either in the official gazette or in one or more daily newspapers having circulation in the area in question for grant of lease, prescribing the period within which the applications should be received and then dispose of the same in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules. No Costs.