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1. This was a suit to eject the defendant, after notice to quit, from a small piece of homestead land in respeot of which it has been found that no right of occupancy could be acquired,
2. The estate was at one time the property of Government, and as a khas mehal it was settled ryotwari for a period of 30 years from 1247 B. Section In that Settlement the defendant was recorded as tenant of the land in suit at a rent of nine annas seven pies per annum. Subsequently the plaintiff became proprietor of the estate. The first Court held that by virtue of the Settlement made by Government the defendant acquired a title to hold the land at the same rent until a new Settlement should be made; and that this action to eject him would not lie.
3. The lower Appellate Court was of opinion that the fact that defendant had been permitted to hold the land for a lengthened period at a small rent was not per se sufficient to protect him from ejectment by the owner; and could see nothing in the Government proceedings at the Settlement to justify the Munsiff s inference in the matter. The Court accordingly made a decree in favour of the plaintiff.
4. Before us the pleader for the appellant has contended:
1st.–That the Munsiff s view of the effect of the Settlement was right, and that the plaintiff was bound to respect that Settlement.
2nd.–That the Court below ought to have presumed from the circumstances of the case that the origin of defendant’s title was a grant to continue in permanent possession.
5. We think that neither of these contentions can prevail.
6. As to the first it seems to us that the mere record of the name of a tenant who is found in occupation of a particular piece of land in Settlement proceedings, and of the rent payable by him, does not invest him with any permanent title to hold it, and admitting that the purchaser from Government was bound to respect the Settlement made with the ryots during its currency, that consideration would not bar the present suit which was brought after the termination of the period of that Settlement. Any further Settlement must be made not with the tenants, but with the proprietor of the estate.
7. As to the second contention the authority cited is Govinda Chundra Sikdar v. Ayinuddin Sha Biswas 11 C.L.R. 281. But that case lays down no more than that the Court is at liberty to presume if it thinks fit from the particular circumstances of a case that the land was granted for building purposes, and that the grant was of a permanent character.
8. We cannot hold that in the present case the Appellate Court committed an error of law in not making such presumption.
9. On the other hand, the plaintiff’s right seems to be established by the authority of the cases Addaito Charan Dey v. Peter Doss 13 B.L.R. 417 : 17 W.R. 383 and Prosuno Goomar Debea v. Rutton Bepary I.L.R. 3 Cal. 696. We must dismiss this appeal with costs.