JUDGMENT
G.C. Garg, J.
1. This revision is directed against the order dated January 18, 1992 passed by the executing Court.
2. Kahan Singh, respondent filed a suit for declaration seeking a decree to the effect that his date of birth was December 21, 1931 and not July 1, 1926 as recorded in the record of the defendants, now petitioners. Suit was contested but was decreed by judgment and decree dated February 13, 1990 in favour of the plaintiff-respondent. It was held that (he date of birth of the plaintiff was December 21, 1931. The petitioners filed appeal against the said judgment and decree but the same was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge and the judgment debtors were restrained from terminating the services of the decree holder, Kahan Singh before December 21, 1991. The case of the decree holder is that in spite of his suit having been decreed, the defendant petitioners have failed to pay to him the arrears of salary for the period he remained out of service on account of his illegal retirement by treating his date of birth as July 1, 1926. In the circumstances, he filed execution application out of which this revision has arisen.
3. Execution application was resisted by the judgment debtors by filing objections. The main objection being that the decree for declaration was not executable and the only remedy available to the decree holder was to file a suit for recovery of the amount. The executing Court relying upon State of Punjab v. Krishan Mohan Sarvia, 1980 Current Law Journal 9 directed the judgment debtors to make payment of pay, allowances and other benefits to the decree holders. While doing so, the executing Court further ordered the payment of interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of decree i.e. February 13, 1990 till the actual payment of arrears that the decree holder may be found entitled to. Aggrieved by the said order, the judgment debtors have filed the present revision.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the decree holder is not entitled to interest on the amounts of arrears of salary etc. as the decree which is sought to be executed never granted interest to the decree, holder. In other words, the submission of the learned counsel is that the executing Court cannot go beyond the decree and grant relief which was not granted by the Court granting the decree, which is under execution. Learned counsel in support of his submission relied upon State of Punjab and Ors. v. Krishan Dayal Sharma, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 2177. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners could not be met by the counsel for the respondent-decree holder. He also could not refer to any rule or law entitling the decree holder to the grant of interest as has been granted by the executing Court. Ultimately, learned counsel for the respondent very fairly and in my view, rightly conceded that the decree holder is not entitled to interest and the order of the executing Court to that extent deserves to be set aside. It is therefore, so ordered. It is thus held that the decree holder is not entitled to any interest as ordered by the executing court.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that the decree holder is also not entitled to salary and other pecuniary benefits on the principle (hat the employee did not work during that period. I find no merit in the contention. The decree holder had been granted ad-interim injunction but the same was vacated by the appellate Court in appeal taken against the grant of temporary injunction, by observing that no question of hardship would arise to the plaintiff as he will get salary in consequence of declaration prayed for in the event of his succeeding in the suit. Even while disposing of his application under Order 41 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, learned Additional District Judge observed that the plaintiff would he entitled to get his pay etc. as a book binder in the event of the appeal filed by the judgment debtors failing before the appellate Court. In the circumstances the decree holder was always under the impression that he was entitled to salary for the period he was impelled to remain out of service because of illegal action of the defendants. The principle of “no work, no pay” is not at all applicable to the facts of the present case. The instant is not a case where the employee had refused to work or refrained from attending to his duties but is a case where he was not permitted to work. In the circumstances. I am clearly of the view that the respondent-decree holder is entitled to salary, allowances and other pecuniary benefits for the period he remained out of service, as he would have otherwise received had he not been retired on the basis of his wrongly entered date of birth i.e. July 1, 1926. Thus, there is no merit in the second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners and the same is rejected.
6. For the view taken above, the order of the executing Court is modified and it is held that the decree holder, respondent is not entitled to any interest as has been granted by the said Court. There will be no order as to costs.