1. Three questions have been raised in this appeal.
2. It was first contended that under Section 110 of Act IV of 1884 the power of distraint could only be exercised in respect of an arrear which had accrued due within one year. We are of opinion, however, that that section should not be read limiting the powers given by Section 103 but as giving a further power to distrain property on the premises after notice given to the occupier. Under Section 103 it is the property of the defaulter only, that is, the person on whom notice has been served under Section 102, that can be distrained and sold.
3. The next contention had reference to the notice which an owner of property may give in order to entitle himself to remission of the house-tax. The tax is an annual one and the language of Section 51 of Act III of 1871 appears to us to show that an annual notice was intended.
4. The case stood over for the decision of a Division Bench (Chief Justice and weir, J.) on the question whether the Municipal authorities can legally distrain the doors of a house of a defaulter under the first portion of Clause (1) of Section 103 of the Madras District Municipalities Act IV of 1884. The Division Bench have found this question in the negative [vide Queen-Empress v. Shaik Ibrahim I.L.R., 13 Mad., 518]. We concur in the conclusion and in the reasons for the conclusion in that case, and we must accordingly allow this appearand reversing the decree of the District Court, we restore the decree of the District Munsif’s Court.
5. Appellant will receive his costs in this Court and in the lower Appellate Court.