ORDER
1. This matter, which purported to be a revision petition, filed Under Section 131 of the Customs Act, 1962 (as then applicable), has been taken up today, as an appeal, and heard accordingly.
2. The petitioner Company, namely, M/s. R.K. Optical Services will be hereinafter referred to as an appellant, and it appears from the grounds of appeal that the appellant Company had imported goods described as “Opthal-mic Rough Blanks” and the same were assessed to, inter alia, countervailing duty by invoking tariff item 23-A(4) of the Central Excise Tariff (hereinafter referred to as CET). It is not made specifically clear in the grounds of revision as to on what date the impugned duty was paid, but it appears from the original order of the Asstt. Collector of Customs, Refund Department, Bombay which is dated 17-4-80, that the duty had been paid on 18/19-4-79, whereas the claim for refund was received in the concerned office on 15-4-80, i.e. approximately after a year of the payment. This application was rejected straightaway by virtue of the time bar created by Section 27, Sub-sec. (1) of the Customs Act, 1962, which governs the provisions for refund.
3. On an appeal being taken up before the Appellate Collector of Customs, Bombay, the view held by the Assistant Collector, was upheld and the appeal was accordingly dismissed, expressing the view that the time bar had been rightly invoked and there was no discretion to waive the same.
4. Feeling aggrieved by this rejection, the appellant came up with this appeal, contending that the ground of time bar, invoked by the Asstt. Collector as well as Appellate Collector of Customs, was not justified as this time limit, as contemplated by Section 27 of the Customs Act, was not applicable to the present case. The plea is, that the correct item applicable to the goods was tariff item No. 68 of the CET and not 23-A(4) as applied by the assessing authority, and as such the excess amount recovered, was to be treated as having been realised without any authority of law, and as such refundable to the party and the authorities in rejecting the claim of the Company by reference to limitation, as laid down in Section 27 of the Customs Act, and that the period of limitation, which would apply in this case would be that of three years under the general law of limitation because of the fact that the excess payment of duty was made under mistake and as soon as the same was discovered, the claim for refund was laid before the concerned authorities.
5. We heard learned counsel for the appellant with reference to the contentions set forth in the appeal and have applied our careful thought to the matter, and we are of our considered view that the grounds set up by the appellant, seeking reversal of the orders of the customs authorities, are not tenable.’
6. It is to be noted that the Customs Act is a complete statute by itself and an application for refund having been made Under Section 27 of the said Act, the provisions of that Act would govern such matters in their entirety, unless the legislation intended otherwise.
7. The only exception recognised by law is, that the application for refund could be entertained even after the expiry of period of six months, in case the amount had been paid under “protest” or “provisionally”. The only other contingency contemplated in Section 27, contained in Sub-section (3) which provides that in case the order whereunder a particular amount was paid, refund, whereof, is sought has been upset “as a result of any order passed in appeal or revision under this Act”, and refund of duty becomes due to any person as a consequence of the said order in appeal or revision, then the amount may be refunded irrespective of the time-limit provided by Section 27(1) of the Act.
8. Reverting to the facts of the case, the appellant neither pleads to have paid the amount under protest nor provisionally, nor seems to have gone in appeal or revision against the assessment and seems to have accepted the same and paid the amount. It is not even indicated as to what occasioned the application for refund because there is only vague reference to some decisions coming to the notice of the appellant without detailing further particulars. It has been held by long line of authorities of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, that where provisions of Special Act govern a particular case, then so far as Authorities acting under that particular Act are concerned, they are bound by the provisions thereof. This distinction is streamlined even in the authority cited by the appellant in the ground of revision; namely, 1980 Cencus (Part II) at page 56-D, wherein it has been held that –
“In view of the provisions providing for a limit of time for making claims of refund, the authorities functioning under the Act may not be entitled to direct refund…”
9. This makes it abundantly clear that even in this case on which the appellant places reliance, the view was expressed that so far as authorities by Special Act are concerned, they are bound by the time-limit provided therein and the general law of limitation of three years could be invoked if a suit was filed by reference to Section 72 of the Contract Act, before the Civil Court or High Court while exercising writ jurisdiction may apply principles thereof, and direct refund on the basis that State could not be allowed undue enrichment at the cost of a party.
10. There is an authority of the Supreme Court, reported as AIR 1976 SC page 638 with direct reference to Section 27(1) of the Customs Act, holding that application for refund having been made after the expiry of the period provided by said Section, had been rightly rejected.
11. The claim for refund was, therefore, rightly rejected as being filed beyond the time prescribed by Section 27(1) of the Customs Act and we do not find any infirmity in the view held by the Collector of Customs (Appeals) Bombay. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.