ORDER
N.S. Singh, J.
1. Upon hearing Mr. Banikumar Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner and also Mr. N. Ibotlmbi Singh, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 and Mr. Jagatchandra Singh, learned Additional Govt. Advocate for the State respondents, I am of the view that this matter can be disposed of at the motion stage considering the facts and circumstances of the case and, accordingly, I hereby dispose of this writ petition with the following judgment and order.
2. In this writ petition, the petitioner made a prayer for quashing the entire proceedings of the Co-operative Tribunal Revision Case No. 1 of 1999 now pending before the learned Manipur State Co-operative Tribunal, Manipur and also for setting aside the impugned order dated 29-4-1999 passed in the said revision case as in Annexure-A/2 to the writ petition. Mr. Banikumar Singh, learned counsel at the very outset submitted that the learned Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain the revision petition namely, the Co-operative Revision Case No. 1 of 1999 by contending inter alia, that no revision lies from any order passed by the State Government in a connected appeal as it is barred by provisions of law laid down under Section 149(3) read with Section 152(4) of the Manipur Co-operative Societies Act, 1976. According to the learned counsel, the respondent No. 1 herein, preferred an appeal under Section 152 of the Act of 1976 against the order relating to the issuance of the Registration certificate bearing No. 1 of 1997-98. dated 21st August, 1997 to and in favour of the Manipur State Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes Development Co-operative Bank Ltd. issued by the Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Imphal West, Manipur and that appeal was dismissed by the State Government however, the appellate authority dismissed the said appeal being Appeal Case No. 3 of 1997 with a direction to the Registrar concerned to take up corrective action keeping in view of the office letter issued by the Deputy General Manager, RBI Central Office, 1st Floor, Garment House, Worli, Bombay under No. 924/08.01.08/98. dated 9th March. 1999 and to report the progress of the case and other similar case to the Government so as to avoid complicacies in future. Being aggrieved by the order of 12th April. 1999, the present respondent No. 1 filed a revision petition being Cooperative Revision Case No. 1 of 1999 before the learned Tribunal, Manipur. The learned Tribunal admitted the revision petition on 29th April. 1999. In the said revision case, the present writ petitioner was the respondent No. 3 who raised preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability of the said revision petition. At this stage, Mr. N. Ibotombi Singh, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1 contended that the preliminary objection was partly heard by the learned Tribunal and the case was fixed for further argument and the learned Tribunal is going to dispose of the said preliminary objection raised by the present writ petitioner and, as such, it may not be justified to interfere with the proceedings of the case now pending before the Tribunal. It is also argued by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 that a revision petition lies from the order passed by the appellate authority and the revision petition is maintainable. Supporting the case of the respondent No. 1, Mr. N. Ibotombi Singh had drawn my attention to the related provisions of Section 149(3). Section 152(4) and Section 154 of the Act of 1976 and submitted that the Tribunal may call for and examine the record of any proceedings in which an appeal lies to the State Government. The learned counsel interpreted the word it appearing in Section 149(3) of the Act, 1976 as the subordinate authority like the State Government and other subordinate authorities. A reliance has been made by Mr. N. Ibotombi Singh, learned counsel to a decision of the Apex Court rendered in Kihoto Hollahon v. Zachillhu, reported in 1992 Supp (2j SCC 651 : (AIR 1993 SC 412) and also another decision of this Court rendered in Union of India v. Mullick Harbans Lal & Co., reported in AIR 1992 Gau 103. After proper application of my mind in this matter and also upon hearing the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that the decisions so far relied upon by Mr. N. Ibotombi Singh, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 are not applicable in the instant case and, apart from it, the learned Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain a revision petition against the order passed by the State Govt. in an appeal for the following reasons :
(1) The case in Kihoto Hollahan (supra) the Supreme Court Interpreted the language of para 7 of Schedule 10 of the Constitution and held that the provision excluding jurisdiction of Courts should be strictly construed and said rule of construction would apply only where more than one reasonable possible views open and the Apex Court further observed that the purpose of enactment of para 7 of Schedule 10 was to bar the jurisdiction of the Courts under Articles 136. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and the said provision which seeks to exclude the jurisdiction of Courts is to be strictly construed is inapplicable as the rule of construction is attracted where two or more reasonable possible constructions are open on the language of the statute. The Apex Court also relied upon the words of Professor H. W. R. Wade, in his book the Administrative Law (6th Edn.) Prof, said :
“If a statute says that some decision or order ‘shall be final’ or ‘shall be final and conclusive to all intents and purposes’ this is held to mean merely that there is no appeal; judicial control of legality is unimpaired. ‘Parliament only gives the impress of finality to the decisions of the Tribunal on condition that they are reached in accordance with the law. This has been the consistent doctrine for three hundred years’.”
In my considered view, this decision goes against the case of the respondent No. 1 inasmuch as, the State Legislature enacted this Special Act of 1976 giving and impressing the finality of the decision of the State Government in a related appeal under Section 149 of the Act of 1976. The provision of Section 149(3) is quite clear in the matter and the said clause is important for deciding the present case and, accordingly, the same is quoted below :
“149(1) The State Government shall constitute a Tribunal called the Manipur State Co-operative Tribunal, to exercise the functions conferred on the Tribunal by or under this Act. .
(2) The Presiding Officer, Revenue Tribunal appointed by the State Government as such shall be deemed to be the Manipur State Co-operative Tribunal for the purposes of this Act.
(3) The Tribunal may call for and examine the record of any proceedings in which an appeal lies to it, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any decision or order passed. If in any case, it appears to the Tribunal that any such decision or order should be modified, annulled or reversed, the Tribunal may pass such order thereon as it may deem just.”
Giving to Section 152(4) of the Act of 1976 which envisages :
“152(4) Save as provided in this Act, no appeal shall lie against any order, decision or award passed in accordance with this Act, and every such order, decision or award shall be final, and where any appeal has been provided for any order passed on appeal shall be final and no further appeal shall lie against it.”
A bare perusal of these 2 provisions of law laid down under Sections 149 and 152 of the Act established rather, enshrined that the Tribunal may call for and examine the record of any proceeding in which an appeal lies to it (emphasis laid). The legislature made a plain and clear language in the provision of Sections 149(3) and 152(4) which excludes the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal to entertain an appeal arising from an order passed by the State Government in a related appeal preferred by a person or persons under Section 149 of the Act of 1976. In the decision rendered in Union of India (AIR 1992 Gau 103) (supra), this Court held that the provisions of the C.P.C. applies about all the proceedings of the Court to all appeals under the Act namely, the Arbitration Act and there is no express bar to exercise the revisional Jurisdiction under Section 115 of the C.P.C. by the High Court. This is the plain and clear language and decision of this Court which does not enable the State Co-operative Tribunal to exercise its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the C.P.C. or under any provision of law laid down under the Act of 1976.
3. According to me, Section 149(3) of the Act of 1976 is a finality clause and the normal effect of it is therefore to prevent any further appeal or revision to the Tribunal.
4. In view of the above position, the submission of Mr. N. Ibotombi Stngh that his case is supported by the said decision of the Apex Court and this Court as mentioned above has no substance and the same holds a little water, This Court need not go more into depth in this regard. As discussed above, there is no provision under the Act of 1976, for enabling the first respondent to file revision petition before the learned Tribunal against the order passed by the appellate authority namely, the State Government in a related appeal.
5. For the reasons, observations and discussions made above, I am of the view that the learned Tribunal exercised a jurisdiction which is not vested upon it by any law of the land and, as such, the entire proceedings of the Co-operative Revision Case No. 1 of 1999 deserves to be quashed and, accordingly, it is quashed.
6. In the result, this writ petition is allowed but no order as to costs.