ORDER
1. This is an appln. by three persons who have been ordered to execute bonds for Rs. 1000 each with two sureties in the like amount for keeping the peace.
2. The Mag. on the basis of a petn. filed on 1-2-1949, by one Lakhan Gope & a police report thereon, started a proceeding under Section 107, Cr. P. C., & ultimately passed the order referred to above. The order was upheld in appeal by the 3rd. Addl. Ses. J., Patna. The matter then came to this Ct. in revision, and the Chief Justice by his order dated 4-4-1950, rejected the appln. summarily.
3. We are asked to grant a certificate under Article 134 (1) (c), Const. Ind., which provides that an appeal shall lie to the S. C. from any final order in a criminal proceeding of H. C. in the territory of India if the H. C. certifies that the case is a fit one for appeal to the S. C. There is a proviso to Article 134 (1) which lays down that an appeal under Sub-clause (c) shall be subject to such provision as may be made in that behalf under Clause (1) of Article 145 & to such conditions as the H. C. may establish or require ; we are not concerned in the present case with any such provision or condition.
4. The only ground on which we can grant a certificate is that it is a fit case for appeal to the S. C. It is conceded that the Mag. took cognizance on a police report of a likelihood of a breach of the peace. The Mag. had territorial jurisdiction & he being responsible for the peace in the Sub-division, considered the case one in which the petnrs. should be called upon to show cause against the execution of bonds for keeping the peace. Therefore, he did exercise his jurisdiction bearing in mind the peace of the Sub-division. That being so, there is no want of jurisdiction in the Mag. There may or may not have been an error of law or an error of fact. Even if there was an error of law or an error in the procedure adopted by the Mag., we do not think that that is a sufficient ground to grant leave to appeal to the S. C.
5. The provision for a certificate of fitness for appeal in original cases was unknown before the commencement of the Constitution. An appeal to the Privy Council could lie only by special leave, & the settled practice of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee was not to act as a Ct. of appeal, review or revision. They interfered only if it was shown that by a disregard of the forms of legal process or by some violation of the principles of natural justice or otherwise substantial or grave injustice had been done. Unless there was something so irregular or so outrageous as to shock the very basis of justice their Lordships refused to interfere. It was pointed out by Lord Dunedin in Mohindar Singh v. Emperor, 59 I. A. 233 : (A.I.R. (19) 1932 P.C. 234: 34 Cr. L. J. 18) that “their Lordships have repeated ad nauseam the statement that they do not sit as a Ct. of criminal appeal. For them to interfere with a criminal sentence there must be something so irregular or so outrageous as to shook the very basis of justice.” This observation was repeated in Otto George Gfeller v. The King, A.I.R. (30) 1943 P. C. 211 at p. 216 : (45 Cr. L J. 241). The same view has been reiterated by their Lordships of the F. C. in the case of Kapildeo Singh v. The King, (A.I. R. (37) 1950 F. C. 80 : 51 Or. L. J. 1057) (Cr. App. No. 1 of 1949 of the Federal Court–an appeal arising by special leave against an order of the Patna H. C). Their Lordships have held that the F.C. does not act in the exercise of its power to review the course of justice in criminal cases in the free fashion of a fully constituted Ct. of criminal appeal. A. mere mistake on the part of the Ct. below, for example, in the admission of improper evidence, will not suffice if it has not led to injustice of a grave character.
6. It is not pointed out that any injustice of a grave character has been done to the petnr. by reason of a mistake in the procedure. The observations of their Lordships apply with all the greater force in a case like the present, where a certificate is sought for an appeal against an order of the H. C. passed in exercise of discretionary revisional powers.
7. Under Article 134 (1) (c) of the new Constitution, the H. C. has to certify that the case is “a fit one for appeal to the S. C.” Some guidance as to the meaning of this expression may be furnished by the decisions relating to the similar provision for civil appeals contained in Section 109 (c), Civil P. C., regarding which it has been held that a certificate should not be granted in a case which does not involve question of wide public or private importance : see Banarsi Parshad v. Kashi Krishna Narain, 28 I. A. 11 at p. 13; (23 ALL. 227 P. C.), Radhakrisna Ayyar v. Swaminatha Ayyar, 48 I.A. 31 at P. 34 : (A.I.R. (8) 1921 P. C. 25), Mritunjoy v. Balmakund, 6 Pat. L. J. 125 : (A.I.R. (8) 1921 Pat. 33), Maung Ba Than v. District Council, Pegu, 6 Rang. 43: (A. I. R. (15) 1928 Rang. 187), Ruchcha Saithwar v. Hansrani, 50 ALL. 64.0 ; (A.I.R. (15) 1928 ALL 220).
8. Further guidance is afforded by the decision of their Lordships, of the Judicial Committee in the case of Delhi Gloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Income-tax Commr., Delhi, 54 I. A. 421 : (A.I.R. (14) 1927 P. C. 242). This was a case under the Income-tax Act. There was no provision for appeal to the P. C. under the Income-tax Act, 1922, till Section 66A was added by Section 8, Income-tax (Amendment) Act (XXIV [24] of 1926). The relevant provision with which we are concerned is Section 66A, Clause (2), which runs as follows:
“An appeal shall lie to His Majesty in Council from any judgment of the H. C. delivered on a reference made under Section 66 in any case which the H. C. certifies to be fit one for appeal to His Majesty in Council.”
9. While interpreting the words “to be a fit one for appeal to His Majesty in Council” Lord Blaneshurg observed:
“These words are textually the same as the concluding words of Section 109 (c), Civil P. C., & coupled with the carefully limited referential words to the Civil P. C., in Sub-section (3), suffice, in their Lordships’ judgment, to exclude from any right of appeal eases which fall within the requirements of Section 110 of the Code, & are operative to confine that right to cases which are certified to be otherwise fit for appeal to His Majesty in Council. It was conceded in argument that if Sub-section (2) of the section had stood alone, it would be difficult to escape from the construction of it which has just been indicated.” (The underlinings (here italicised) are ours).
10. Therefore, their Lordships have in interpreting Section 66A, Sub-section(2), adopted the same rule of interpretation as they have laid down for interpretation of the provision of Section 109, Clause (6), Civil P. C.
11. In view of these decisions, we think we shall not be justified in granting a certificate under Article 134, Clause (c) of the Constitution.
13. A similar matter came up before us in Mahanth Ramkishun Das v. The State, (or. Revn. No. 91 of 1950) where we refused to grant a certificate. At that time the recent judgment in Kapildeo Singh v. The King, (A.I.R. (37) 1950 F. C. 80: 51 Cr. L. J. 1057) was not brought to our notice. We feel satisfied that the view we took in the case of Mahanth Ramkishun Das (Cri. Revn. No. 91 of 1950) is fortified by the recent order of the F. C. The appln. is rejected.