JUDGMENT
Uday Sinha, J.
1. By this application under Article 226 of the Constitution the petitioner has prayed for issuance of a writ of certiorari or mandamus for quashing the order contained in Annexure ‘2’ to this application.
2. On the 16th of March, 1964, an agreement was arrived at between the President of India and the petitioner under the National Savings Scheme whereby the petitioner was appointed an Agent for transacting business of National Savings Certificates and Postal Time Deposits, The agreement has been annexed to this application as Annexure ‘3’. It appears that the petitioner acted as Agent and received commendations as well but his agency was terminated by the National Savings Executive Officer, Bhojpur and Sasaram by letter dated the 8th of December, 1974. This letter has been annexed and marked as Annexure ‘2’ to this application. This annexure forms the central point of the grievance of the petitioner. This letter contains recital that the agency of the petitioner was being terminated in terms of Clause 9-A of the Agreement arrived at between the parties which is Annexure ‘3’ to this application. The contract of Agency executed on the 16th of March, 1964 was for three years and had been renewed from time to time. It was renewed for the last time on the 15th of March. 1973, and would have been in force till the 14 of March, 1976 had its life not been cut short by Annexure ‘2’ which is D/- the 8th of December, 1974 and which is alleged to have been served on the petitioner on the 12th of December, 1974. The grievance of the petitioner is that the National Savings Executive Officer has acted arbitrarily in determining the agreement contained in Annexure ‘3’.
3. In elucidation of his grievance learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that Clause 9-A in terms of which the agreement has been terminated postulated that the order terminating the Agency should have contained reasons for the termination of the contract. That not having been done, learned counsel for the petitioner contended, that the act of the Authorities was arbitrary and liable to be quashed by this Court. In all fairness to learned counsel for the petitioner, it must be stated that he did not contend that he was entitled to any notice to show cause why the Agency be not terminated but he contended that the order of termination should have contained the reasons for termination of the contract.
4. In order to appreciate the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner, it is essential to notice the relevant clauses of the Agreement between the parties quoted below–
“9-A. The Agency would be liable to be terminated by the Government without notice if the work or conduct of the Agent is adversely commented upon by the supervising authorities or if he/it is, in the opinion of the Government which shall be final and binding guilty of breach of any provision of the Agreement, or if he becomes insolvent, or it runs into liquidation or if it is discovered that a part or the whole of the business was secured by him/it with the help or connivance of an official of the Posts and Telegraph Department or National Savings Organisation. The commission earned on such business would also be liable to forfeiture and if the commission on such business has already been paid the Agent must refund it to the Government.
10. This Agreement may be terminated by either party by giving three months’ notice to the other provided, however, the Government shall be at liberty to terminate the Agency at any time without notice and without assigning any reasons for the same.”
It will be noticed that Clause 9-A states that the Agency of the petitioner was liable to be terminated without any notice. Clause 9-A mentions that Government could terminate the agency without notice if the work or conduct of the Agent had been adversely commented upon by the supervising authorities, or if there was breach of any provision of the Agreement, or leaving out the irrelevant clauses — if it was discovered that a Dart or whole of the business was secured by him/it with the help or connivance of an official of the Posts and Telegraph Department or National Savings Organisation. Thus it is manifest that in case of breach of any of the provisions of the Agreement it could entail termination of the contract without any notice. There is no doubt that the reason for terminating the contract has not been mentioned, but Annexure ‘A’ to the counter-affidavit filed by respondent No. 1 shows that various acts and omissions had been found by the supervising officer of the petitioner. The delinquencies found in the conduct of the petitioner were that the Receipt Books issued to the petitioner had been lying in various Post Offices for doing illegal transactions through connivance of the Postmasters concerned. Some of the Receipt Books had already been signed and left in Post Offices. It was, therefore, found that the petitioner had contravened the provisions of Sub-clause (k) of Clause 8 of the Agreement which prohibits any Agent from assigning or otherwise transferring the benefit of this Agreement or any part thereof to a third party. The fact that the petitioner was found to have left the Receipt Books at various Post Offices and the fact that some of those Receipt Books had been signed by him and left in Post Offices clearly shows that a part or whole of the business of the Agent had been secured by him with the help or connivance of the officials of the Posts and Telegraphs Department. Leaving aside other considerations, there can be no doubt that the petitioner had violated two of the injunctions imposed upon him by the Agreement arrived at between the parties. In that view of the matter, the termination of the contract between the parties cannot toe said to be without any reason nor can it be said to be arbitrary.
5. The next question that arises upon the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is as to whether he was entitled to be informed of the ground for the termination of the contract. The submission of learned counsel is untenable firstly for the reason that merely because Annexure ‘2’ does not contain the acts of omissions of the petitioner which called for determination of the contract, the power of the authority contained in Clause 9-A cannot become limited. The full effect of the provisions contained in Clause 9-A that Government could terminate the contract without notice clearly implies that the Agent was not entitled to be given any opportunity to show cause against any laches or delinquencies attributed to him. If that position is accepted that he is not entitled to show cause that he is not guilty of the acts attributed to him. I fail to see what purpose would be served by informing him at the tune of terminating the contract, the reasons which impelled the authorities for terminating the contract. For the reasons mentioned, the fact that Annexure ‘2’ does not contain the recital or the reasons for terminating the contract cannot show that Annexure ‘2’ was either arbitrary or in excess of the powers contained in Clause 9-A.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner attempted to show that the main reason for determining the contract was that information of loss of Receipt Books had not been communicated to the proper authorities which was incumbent upon him to do. It was contended by him that as early as 1972 the petitioner had informed the Post Master, Sasaram Head Office that some Receipt Books had been lost. The total number of Receipt Books reported to have been lost was five. The letter by which the petitioner claimed to have informed the Post Master has been annexed and marked as Annexure 2 to the reply to the counter-affidavit filed by the petitioner; the posture adopted by the petitioner has been controverted by respondent No. 1. In relation to this document the supplementary counter-affidavit of respondent No. 1 states that that letter had not been received in the Office of the National Savings Executive Officer, Arrah and that Annexures ‘2’ and ‘3’ to reply to the counter-affidavit were fabricated documents which had been managed subsequently after second thought to help himself. The said Annexure ‘2’ filed by the petitioner in reply to counter-affidavit was filed after the counter-affidavit of the State wherein it had been stated in para. 4 of the counter-affidavit that some Receipt Books were missing since the year 1972, but the Petitioner never cared to inform the authority concerned and that it was only on the 6th of December, 1974, that he reported the matter after the Assistant Regional Director had made adverse report against him. We have looked into the original letter alleged to have been sent by the petitioner to the Post Master, Sasaram dated the 30th of December. 1972. A look at that letter does not convince me that the stand taken by the respondent regarding it is untenable. The letter does not bear the seal of the Post Office nor is it clear who had received that letter and, therefore, it is not possible to hold that the petitioner had informed the Post Master, Sasaram Head Office in 1972.
7. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that timely information had been given to the concerned authority is not tenable for another reason. Clause 8 (e) of the Agreement contains the stipulation that the Agent was to keep the Certificate (s) of Authority and Receipt Books issued to him/it with care and in case of loss, immediately report the same to the Appointing/Issuing Authority and the Post Office(s) or other Offices (s) to which he/it is attached. Learned counsel for the petitioner in answer to Court’s question replied that he had informed the Issuing Authority. That would satisfy the first part of Clause 8 (e), but the petitioner was also required to inform the Post Office or other Office to which he was attached. There is no averment either in the petition or the affidavit of the petitioner that he was attached to Sasaram Post Office. In the absence of such an averment it is not possible to hold that the petitioner had informed the Post Office or other office to which he was attached. The second part of Clause 8 (e), therefore, had certainly not been complied with. If the story of timely information having been given was correct the Supervising Authority must have informed the Post Office to which the Petitioner was attached. That shows that timely information had not been given to the concerned authority and the stand of the respondents in that behalf is correct. The loss of Receipt Books may occasion severe loss to Government and, therefore, specific instructions have been given in that behalf. Instruction No. 24 of the Executive Instructions of Standardised Agency System, with which we are concerned, deals with Loss of Certificate of Authority or Receipt Books. It provides that on receipt of information of the loss of Certificate of Authority or Receipt Books the Appointing Authority or the Issuing Authority should forthwith intimate the loss to the office with which the Agent is registered. Further the loss must be notified in the Slate Gazette at the cost of the Agent. If the petitioner had informed the authority in time as he claims, there is no reason why the authority would not have taken the actions required of it in Clause 24 since it would entail loss of Government money. For that reason as well, the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner in that behalf is untenable. In case of loss of Certificate of Authority or Receipt Books an Agent is required to execute an Indemnity Bond indemnifying the Government of any loss. That execution of the Indemnity Bond had to be done at the cost of the Agent, If information of the loss of Certificate of Authority or Receipt Books had been given in tune and if the supervising authorities were hostile to the petitioner as contended by learned counsel for the petitioner, I am unable to see why the authorities would not have called upon him immediately to execute indemnity Bond. This course of action the supervising authorities would have taken in their own interest to safeguard themselves. For the reasons stated above, I am not inclined to accept the position that the petitioner had given timely information of the loss of the Receipt Books and other papers to the authorities.
8. In the view that I have taken above, there can be no doubt that Clause 9-A gives ample powers to the authorities to terminate the contract without any notice to the Agent concerned Apart from Clause 9-A. Clause 10 as well of the Agreement gives unfettered power to Government to terminate the Agency at any time without notice and without assigning any reasons for it. In that view of the matter, the contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioner has no substance.
9. Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his contention that the act of the authorities was arbitrary relied upon the case of Erusian Equipment and Chemicals Ltd v. State of West Bengal. (AIR 1975 SC 266). Learned counsel for the petitioner placed emphasis on paragraphs 17 to 20 of that case. In my view the authority cited by learned counsel for the petitioner has no application to the present case. That that authority has no bearing on the present case will be clear if it is borne in mind that the present case is not one of blacklisting, but of determination of contract in terms of the stipulations thereof. In that situation, the Supreme Court observed that blacklisting had the effect of preventing a person from the privilege of dealing with individuals in transactions of sales and purchase of goods and of entering into lawful relationship with the Government for the purpose of gains. The disability caused by blacklisting without any opportunity having been given to the party would be certainly contrary to the principles of natural justice. In that view of the matter, the blacklisting of the petitioner in the case relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner was struck down. But unfortunately that situation does not prevail in the present case. The present case is one of determination of a contract in terms of a contract which gave full powers to Government to terminate the contract without notice. It does not entail any temporary much less permanent disability in the petitioner. Annexure ‘2’ is absolutely silent why the contract was being terminated. It cannot, therefore, be said that the order terminating the contract cast any stigma on the petitioner. In that view of the matter, Annexure ‘2’ does not run counter to the principles of natural justice. It should be remembered that the rules of natural justice as laid down in the case of A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India. (AIR 1970 SC 150) only supplement the law of the land and do not supplant it. If Clauses 9 and 10 of the Agreement clearly ruled out issuance of notice to the Agent and thus ruled out the principles of natural justice Annexure ‘2’ cannot be said to suffer from the delinquency of arbitrariness or being unjust.
10. For the reasons, stated above, I do not find any merit in this application and it is accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order for costs.
K.B.N. Singh, J.
I agree.