PETITIONER:
RAM PRASAD NARAYAN SAHI AND ANOTHER
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
20/02/1953
BENCH:
SASTRI, M. PATANJALI (CJ)
BENCH:
SASTRI, M. PATANJALI (CJ)
MUKHERJEA, B.K.
BOSE, VIVIAN
HASAN, GHULAM
BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H.
CITATION:
1953 AIR 215 1953 SCR 1129
CITATOR INFO :
RF 1956 SC 479 (14,26)
F 1958 SC 538 (12)
R 1961 SC1570 (14)
R 1962 SC1371 (78)
R 1963 SC 222 (51)
R 1974 SC1044 (14)
RF 1980 SC1789 (36)
RF 1983 SC 1 (167)
RF 1986 SC 872 (82)
RF 1992 SC1277 (34,85,96)
ACT:
Constitution of India, 1950, arts. 13,14-Sathi Lands (Res-
toration) Act, 1950-Law declaring settlement of land with
particular individual void-Validity-Infringement of
fundamental right to equal protection of the laws-
Discrimination-presumption of reasonableness.
HEADNOTE:
The Court of Wards granted to the appellants a large area of
land belonging to the Bettiah Raj which was then under the
management of the Court of Wards, on the recommendation of
the Board of Revenue, at half the usual rates. A few years
later, the Working Committee of the Indian National Congress
expressed the opinion that the settlement of the lands was
against public interest, and in 1950, the Bihar Legislature
passed an Act called the Sathi Lands (Restoration) Act,
1950, which declared that, notwithstanding anything
contained in any law for the time being in force the
settlement granted to the appellants shall be null and void
and that no party to the settlement or his successors in
interest shall be deemed to have acquired any right or
incurred any liability thereunder, and empowered the
Collector to eject the appellants if they refused to restore
the lands. The appellants, alleging that the Act was
unconstitutional, applied under article 226 of the
Constitution for a writ of mandamus against the State of
Bihar restraining it from taking any action under the Act.
It was found that there were several other settlements of
lands belonging to the Bettiah Raj on similar terms against
which the Government had taken no action:
Held, that the dispute between the appellants and the
State was really a private dispute and a matter to be
determined by a judicial tribunal in accordance with the law
applicable to the case, and, as the Legislature had, in
passing the impugned enactment singled out the appellants
and deprived them of their right to
1130
have this dispute adjudicated upon by a duly constituted
Court, the enactment contravened the provisions of article
14 of the Constitution which guarantees to every citizen the
equal protection of the laws, and was void.
Legislation which singles out a particular individual from
his fellow subjects and visits him with a disability which
is not imposed upon the others and against which even the
right of complaint is taken away is highly discriminatory.
Though the presumption is in favour of the
constitutionality of a legislative enactment and it has to
be presumed that a Legislature understands and correctly
appreciates the needs of its own people, yet when on the
face of a statute there is no classification at all, and no
attempt has been made to select any individual or group with
reference to any differentiating attribute peculiar to that
individual or group and not possessed by others, this
presumption is of little or no assistance to the State.
Ameerunnissa Begum v. Mahboob Begum [1953] S.C.R. 404
and Gulf of Colorado etc. Co. v. Ellis [165 U.S. 150]
referred to.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 59 of
1952.
Appeal from the Judgment and Order dated 3rd January,
1952, of the High Court of Judicature at Patna (Ramaswami
and Sarjoo Prosad JJ). in an application under article 226
of the Constitution registered as Miscellaneous Judicial
Case No. 204 of 1950.
Original Petition No. 20 of 1952 under article 32 of the
Constitution was also heard along with this appea.
P. R. Das (B. Sen, with him) for the appellants.
M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, and
Mahabir Prasad, Advocate-General of Bihar (G. N. Joshi,
with them) for the respondents.
1953. February 20. The court delivered judgment as
follows :-
PATANJALI SASTRI C. J.-I concur in the judgment which my
learned brother Mukherjea is about to deliver, but I wish to
add a few words in view of the important constitutional
issue involved.
The facts are simple. The appellants obtained a
settlement of about 200 bikhas of land in a village known as
Sathi Farm in Bettiah Estate, in Bihar,
1131
then and ever since in the management of the Court of Wards
on behalf of the disqualified proprietress who is the second
respondent in this appeal. The lands were settled at the
prevailing rate of rent but the salami or premium payable
was fixed at half the usual rate as a concession to the
appellants who are said to be distant relations of the
proprietress. The appellants paid the salami and entered
into possession of the lands on the 2nd November, 1946, and’
have since been paying the rents regularly. On the 13th
June, 1950, the Bihar Legislature passed an Act called the
Sathi Lands (Restoration) Act, 1950. The genesis of this
legislation is thus explained in the counter-affidavit filed
on behalf of the State of Bihar, the first respondent
herein.
Report against the settlement of these lands with the
petitioners as well as some other lands to Sri Prajapati
Mishra and the unlawful manner in which these settlements
were brought about, was carried to the Working Committee of
the Indian National Congress, which body, after making such
enquiry as it thought fit, came to the conclusion that the
settlement of these lands with the petitioners was contrary
to the provisions of law and public policy and recommended
that steps should be to taken by the State of Bihar to have
these lands restored to the Bettiah Estate. In pursuance
thereof a request was made to the petitioners and to the
said Prajapati Mishra to return the lands to Bettiah Estate.
While Sri Prajapati Mishra returned the land settled with
him, the petitioners refused to do so.
The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Sathi Lands
(Restoration) Bill runs thus:
“As it has been held that the settlement of Sathi lands in
the District of Champaran under the Court of Wards with Sri
Ram Prasad Narayan Sahi and Shri Ram Rekha Prasad Narayan
Sahi is contrary to the provisions of the law and as Sri Ram
Prasad Narayan Sahi and Sri Ram Rekha Narayan Sahi have
refused to return the lands to the Bettiah Estate,
Government
1132
have decided to enact a law to restore these lands to the
Bettiah Estate.”
The impugned Act consists of three sections. Section
2(1) declares that “notwithstanding anything contained in
any law for the time being in force”‘, the settlement
obtained by the appellants is “null and void”, and that “no
party to the settlement or his successor in interest shall
be deemed to have acquired any right or incurred any
liability thereunder”. Sub-section (2) provides that the
appellants and their successors in interest “shall quit
possession of the said land from the date of commencement of
this Act and if they fail to do so, the Collector of
Champaran shall eject them and restore the lands to the
possession of the Bettiah Wards Estate”. Subsection (3)
provides for the refund of the amount of salami money and
the cost of improvement, if any, to the lessees by the
estate on restoration to it of the lands in question.
In the “case” lodged in this court for the State of Bihar,
the legislation is sought to be justified and its validity
maintained on the following grounds:
” It is well settled that a Legislature with plenary powers
so long as it enacts law, within the ambit of its powers, is
competent to enact a law which may be applicable generally
to society or to an individual or a class of individuals
only … It is submitted that grants of the lands belonging
to the Bettiah Estate made by the Court of Wards were of
doubtful validity; hence they have been dealt with by the
impugned Act … No evidence has been adduced by the
appellants, except a bare allegation, which has not been
substantiated, that about 2000 acres of land were settled to
show that persons in similar circumstances with whom similar
settlements were made, were treated differently. It is
submitted that in the context the impugned Act, has a
reasonable basis of classification.”
The decision of the majority of this Court in Chiran v. The
Union of India(1) is relied on in suport of these
contentions, In that case, however, the
(1) [1950] S.C.R. 869,
1133
majority felt justified in upholding the legislation, though
it adversely affected the rights and interest of the
shareholders of a particular joint stock company, because
the mismanagement of the company’s affairs prejudicially
affected the production of an essential commodity and caused
serious unemployment amongst a section of the community.
Mr. Justice Das and I took the ‘view that legislation
directed against a particular named person or corporation
was obviously discriminatory and could not constitutionally
be justified even if such legislation resulted in some
benefit to the public. In a system of government by
political parties, I was apprehensive of the danger inherent
in special enactments which deprive particular named persons
of their liberty or property because the Legislature thinks
them guilty of misconduct, and I said in my dissenting
opinion:
“Legislation based upon mismanagement or other misconduct
as the differentia and made applicable to a specified
individual or corporate body is not far removed from the
notorious parliamentary procedure formerly employed in
Britain of punishing individual delinquents by passing bills
of attainder, and should not, I think receive judicial
encouragement.”
My apprehensions have come true. Recently we had before
us a case from Hyderabad (Civil Appeal ,No. 63 of
1952Ameerunnissa Begum v. Mahboob Begum)’ where the duly
constituted legislative authority of that State intervened
in a succession dispute between two sets of rival claimants
to the estate of a deceased person and ” dismissed ” the
claim of the one and adjudged the Property to the other by
making a special ” law ” to that effect. And now comes this
case from Bihar of an essentially similar type. The
appellants assert title to certain lands in Bettiah Estate
under a settlement which they claim to have lawfully
obtained from the Court of Wards, while it is now alleged on
behalf of the Estate that the settlement was not for the
benefit of the Estate and was contrary to law, as the Court
of Wards did not then ” apply its
(1) Since reported as [1953] S.C.R 404
147
1134
mind ” to that question. This is purely a dispute between
private parties and a matter for determination by duly
constituted courts to which is entrusted, in every free and
civilised society, the important function of adjudicating on
disputed legal rights, after observing the well established
procedural safeguards which include the right to be heard,
the right to produce witnesses and so forth. This is the
protection which the law guarantees equally to all persons,
and our Constitution prohibits by article 14 every State
from denying such protection to anyone. The appellants
before us have been denied this protection. A political
Organization of the party in power decides after making such
enquiry as it thought fit, that the settlement in question
was ” contrary to the provisions of law and public policy ”
and the State Legislature, basing itself on such decision,
purports to declare the settlement ” null and void ” and
directs the eviction of the appellants and the restoration
of the lands to the Estate. The reasons given for this
extraordinary procedure are indeed remarkable for their
disturbing implications. It is said that “there was
agitation amongst the tenants of the locality and opposition
on the part of persons living in the locality against the
appellants’ possession of the lands which led to breach of
the peace and institution of criminal cases “. Whenever,
then, a section of the people in a locality, in ‘assertion
of an adverse claim, disturb a person in the quiet enjoyment
of his property, the Bihar Government would seem to think
that it is not necessary for the police to step in to
protect him in his enjoyment until he is evicted in due
course of law, but the Legislature could intervene by making
a ” law ” to oust the person from his possession.
Legislation such as we have now before us is calculated to
drain the vitality from the rule of law which our
Constitution so unmistakably proclaims, and it is to be
hoped that the democratic process in this country will not
function along these lines.
MUKHERJEA J.-This appeal, which has come before us on a
certificate granted by the High Court of
1135
Patna under article 132 (1) of the Constitution, is directed
against a judgment of a Division Bench of that court, dated
3rd January, 1952, by which the learned Judges dismissed a
petition of the appellants under article 226 of the
Constitution. The prayer in the petition was for a writ in
the nature of mandamus, directing the opposite party, not to
take any action, under an Act passed by the Bihar
Legislative Assembly in 1950 and known as The Sathi Lands
(Restoration) Act which was challenged as void and
unconstitutional.
To appreciate the points in controversy between the
parties to the proceeding, it may be necessary to narrate
the material facts briefly. Maharani Janki Koer, the
respondent No. 2 in the appeal, is the present proprietress
of an extensive Estate in Bihar known by the name of Bettiah
Raj, which is held and managed on her behalf by the Court of
Wards, Bihar, constituted under Bengal Act IX of 1879. On
19th July, 1946, the appellants, who are two brothers and
are distantly related to the Maharani, made a representation
to the Government of Bihar through the Manager of the
Estate, praying for settlement in raiyati right, of 200
bighas of land preferably in Sathi farm or Materia farm
along with a certain quantity of waste lands. On 20th July,
1946, the then Manager of the Wards Estate wrote a letter to
the Collector of Champaran recommending that the applicants
might be given settlement of the lands as prayed for,
without payment of any selami. The Collector, however, did
not. agree to this proposal, nor did the Commissioner of the
Tirhut Division, and the matter then came up for
consideration before the Board of Revenue which recommended
that settlement might be made with the applicants provided
they were agreeable to pay selami at half the usual rates.
On 14th October, 1946, the recommendation of the Revenue
Board was accepted by the Provincial Government and six days
later the Court of Wards accepted a cheque for Rs. 5,000
from one of the lessees, towards payment of the selami money
and rent for the year 1354 F.S. On the 2nd November, 1946,
possession
1136
of the lands was given to the appellants and on the 18th of
November following, the Manager of the Court of Wards
recorded a formal order fixing the selami of the land at Rs.
3,988 annas odd and rent at Rs. 797 annas odd per year. On
the same day, a Hisab Bandobasti form, which is the usual
form employed in the Estate for raiyati settlements, was
signed by the Circle Officer on behalf of the Court of Wards
and by one of the lessees for himself as well as the
constituted attorney of the other lessees. It is not
disputed that the lessees continued to possess the lands
since then on payment of the stipulated rent.
On the 3rd June, 1950, the Bihar Legislative Assembly
passed an Act known as The Sathi Lands (Restoration) Act
which received the assent of the Governor on the 13th June,
1950. The object of the Act, as stated in the preamble, is
to provide for restoration of certain lands belonging to the
Bettiah Wards Estate which were settled contrary to the
provisions of law in favour of certain individuals. Section
2, which is the only material section in the Act, enacts in
the first sub-section that the settlement of Sathi lands
(described in the schedule to the Act) on behalf of the
Bettiah Court of Wards Estate with the appellants, as per
order of the Manager of the Estate dated the 18th November,
1946, is declared null and void and no party to the
settlement ,or his successor-in-interest shall be deemed to
have acquired any right or incur any liability under the
same. The second sub-section embodies a direction to the
effect that the said lessees and their successor-in-interest
shall quit possession of the lands from the date of the
commencement of the Act and if they fail to do so, the
Collector of Champaran shall eject them and restore the
lands to the possession of the Bettiah Estate. The third
and the last sub -section provides that the Bettiah Wards
Estate shall on restoration to it of the lands pay to the
lessees the selami money paid by them and also such amount
as might have been spent by them in making improvements on
the lands prior to the commencement of the Act.
1137
In substance, therefore, the Act declared the lease granted
by the Bettiah Wards Estate to the appellants on the 18th
November, 1946, to be illegal and inoperative and prescribed
the mode in which this declaration was to be given effect to
and the lessees evicted from the lands.
On the 28th August, 1950, the appellants filed the petition,
out of which this appeal arises, under article 226 of the
Constitution in the High Court of Patna, challenging the
validity of The Sathi Lands Act and praying for a writ upon
the respondents restraining them from taking any steps under
the said Act, or from interfering with the possession of the
appellants in respect of the lands comprised in the lease.
It was asserted by the petitioners that in passing the
impugned legislation the Bihar Legislature actually usurped
the power of the judiciary and the enactment was not a law
at all in the proper sense of the expression. The other
material contentions raised were that the legislation was
void as it conflicted with the fundamental rights of the
petitioners guaranteed under articles 14, 19(1) (f) and 31
of the Constitution.
The respondents opposite parties in resisting the
petitioners’ prayer stated inter alia in their counter-
affidavit that the settlement of the lands in question with
the appellants by the Court of Wards, was not for the
benefit of the estate or advantage of the ward and that the
transaction was entered into by the Wards Estate without
properly applying their mind to it. It was stated further
that after the settlement was made, there was a good deal of
agitation among the tenants in the locality which led to the
institution of certain criminal proceedings. In these
circumstances, the matter was brought to the notice of the
Working Committee of the Indian National Congress and the
Working Committee was of opinion that the settlement of
these lands was against public interest. The lessees,
therefore, were asked to vacate the lands and on their
refusal the legislation in question was passed.
The petition was heard by a Division Bench consisting of
Ramaswami and Sarjoo Pershad JJ. Ramaswami J.
1138
decided all the points raised by the petitioners against
them and held that the Act was neither ultra vires the Bihar
Legislature nor was void under article 13(1) of the
Constitution. The learned Judge was further of opinion that
it was not a fit case for interference by the High Court
under article 226 of the Constitution. The other learned
Judge expressed considerable doubts as to whether a
legislation of this type, which in form and substance was a
decree of a court of law, was within the competence of the
legislature and warranted by the Constitution. He agreed,
however, with his learned colleague that the case was not
such as to justify an interference of the High Court in
exercise of its discretionary powers under article 226 of
the Constitution. The remedy of the petitioners might lie,
according to him, in a regularly constituted suit. The
result, therefore, was that the appellants’ petition was
dismissed and it is the propriety of this judgment that has
been assailed before us in this appeal.
Mr. P. R. Das, who appeared in support of the appeal, put
forward at the forefront of his arguments, the contention
raised on behalf of his client in the court below that the
impugned legislation was void by reason of its violating the
fundamental rights of the appellants under article 14 of the
Constitution. The point appeared to us to be of substance
and after hearing the learned Attorney-General on this point
we were satisfied that the contention of Mr. Das was well-
founded and entitled to prevail, irrespective of any other
ground that might be raised in this appeal.
There have been a number of decisions by this court where
the question regarding the nature and scope of the guarantee
implied in the equal protection clause of the Constitution
came up for consideration and the general principles can be
taken to be fairly well settled. What this clause aims at is
to strike down hostile discrimination or oppression or
inequality. As the guarantee applies to all persons
similarly situated, it is certainly open to the legislature
to classify persons and things to achieve particular
legislative objects;
1139
but such selection or differentiation must not be arbitrary
and should rest upon a rational basis, having regard to the
object which the legislature has in view. It cannot be
disputed that the legislation in the present case has
singled out two individuals and one solitary transaction
entered into between them and another private party, namely,
the Bettiah Wards Estate and has declared the transaction to
be a nullity on the ground that it is contrary to the
provisions of law, although there has been no adjudication
on this point by any judicial tribunal. It is not necessary
for our present purpose to embark upon a discussion as to
how far the doctrine of ‘separation of powers has been
recognised in our Constitution and whether the legislature
can arrogate to itself the powers of the judiciary and
proceed to decide disputes between private parties by making
a declaration of the rights of one against the other. It is
also unnecessary to attempt to specify the limits within
which any legislation, dealing with private-rights, is
possible within the purview of our Constitution. On one
point our Constitution is clear and explicit, namely, that
no law is valid which takes away or abridges the fundamental
rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution. There
can be no question, therefore, that if the legislation in
the present case comes within the mischief of article 14 of
the Constitution, it has got to be declared invalid. This
leads us to the question as to whether the impugned
enactment is, in fact, discriminatory and if So, whether the
discrimination made by it can be justified on any principle
of reasonable classification ?
The appellants, it is not disputed, are only two amongst
numerous leaseholders who hold lands in raiyati right under
the Bettiah Wards Estate. It cannot also be disputed that
the lands were settled with them on the recommendation of
the Board of Revenue after due consideration of the
respective views put forward by the Manager of the Estate on
the one hand and the Collector and the Divisional
Commissioner on the other. The appellants are admittedly
paying rents which are normally assessed on lands of similar
1140
description in the locality. The learned AttorneyGeneral
referred in this connection to the provisions of section 18
of the Court of Wards Act and argued that the lease in
dispute was granted in contravention of that section.
Section 18 of the Court of Wards Act provides as follows:
“The Court may sanction the giving of leases or farms of any
property under its charge … and may direct the doing of
all such other acts as it may judge to be most for the
benefit of the property and the advantage of the Ward”.
Apparently it makes the Court of Wards the sole judge
of the benefit to the estate or advantage of the ward. But
it is said that the Court of Wards did not apply its mind
properly to this matter when it granted lease to the
appellants at half the usual rate of selami. The Wards
Estate thus suffered loss to the extent of nearly Rs. 4,000
which could legitimately have been recovered from any other
lessee. This contention does not impress us much; the
utmost that can be said is that this could have been put
forward, for what it is worth and with what result, nobody
can say, as a ground for setting aside the lease in a court
of law. But that is not the question which is relevant for
our present purpose at all; we were not called upon to
decide whether or not the lease was a proper one or
beneficial to the estate. The question for our decision is,
whether the statute contains discriminatory provisions so
far as the appellants are concerned and if so, whether these
discriminations could be reasonably justified ? It is
clearly stated in paragraph 9 of the affidavit made by the
appellants in support of their petition that there are
numerous other persons to whom leases on similar terms were
granted by the Bettiah Wards Estate. Clauses (b), (c) and
(d) of paragraph 9 of the affidavit stand thus:
“(b) In this long course of management by tile Court of
Wards, leases or settlement of lands used to be made without
any selami on proper rent. This state of affairs continued
down to recent times during
1141
which period thousands of bighas were so settled with
numerous persons;
(c) in 1945 the authorities decided to make settlements on
large scale with war returned soldiers on a selami equal to
5 times the average rent prevailing in the locality for
similar lands;
(d) in 1946, 1947, 1948 and 1949 a good number of
settlements covering about 2000 acres of lands were settled
on the basis of IO years’ rental obtaining in the locality
and in some cases for good reasons, at five years’ rental.”
In paragraph 12 of the counter-affidavit put in on behalf of
the respondents, these statements are not denied. In fact,
they are admitted and the only thing said is, that these
leases were granted in due course of management. Ramaswami
J. has dismissed this part of the case by simply remarking
that no details of these settlements were furnished by the
appellants; but no details were at all necessary when the
correctness of the statements was not challenged by the
respondents. It will be interesting to note that the
respondents themselves in paragraph 10 of their counter-
affidavit mentioned the name of Shri Prajapati Mishra as one
of the persons with whom similar settlement of lands was
made by the Bettiah Estate. It is stated in that paragraph
that the cases of the appellants as well as of Prajapati
Mishra were brought to the notice of the Working Committee
of the Indian National Congress and the Committee came to
the conclusion that both the settlements were contrary to
the provisions of law. Thereupon a request was made to both
these sets of lessees to restore their lands to the Estate,
but whereas Prajapati Mishra returned his lands to the
Bettiah Estate, the appellants refused to do so. In reply
to this statement, the appellants stated in their rejoinder
that the said Prajapati Mishra did not vacate the land,% but
created a trust in respect of the same, he being the
chairman of the board Of trustees and the lands were still
in possession of the board of trustees. Strangely, as it
seems, the State of Bihar raked up this matter again in a
148
1142
further affidavit where it was admitted that the said
Prajapati Mishra did execute a trust and that the trustees
took possession of the property. It was stated, however,
that Prajapati Mishra, who was one of the trustees, did
actually surrender the lands in two installments but the
other trustees did not, and hence legal advice was being
taken to find out ways and means of recovering the property
from them. The whole thing smacks of disingenuousness and
the State of Bihar, it seems, was not well advised in rely-
ing upon facts like these in their attempt to repel the
appellants’ attack on the legislation on the ground of
discrimination.
Be that as it may, there is no doubt that the appellants
were not the only lessees under the Bettiah Estate who got
settlement of lands at a selami of five years’ rental. On
the sworn statements of the appellants, which are not
challenged by the other side, it appears that there are
numerous persons occupying the same position as the
appellants, who however were not subjected to
this expropriatory legislation. But the vice in
this legislation goes much deeper than this. It is not
merely a question of treating the appellants differently
from the other lessees under the Wards Estate, with whom
settlements of land have been made on similar or identical
terms. If a lease has been given by a Court of Wards, which
is not for the benefit of the estate or advantage of the
ward, it is for a court of ,law to decide whether it is
warranted by the terms of the Court of Wards Act. If the
lessor proceeds to cancel the lease, the lessee has a legal
right to defend his claim and satisfy the court that the
lease is not in contravention of law. If, on the other
hand, the lessee is actually dispossessed, he has a right to
sue in court for recovery of possession of the property on
establishing that he has been illegally turned out. The
dispute here, is a legal dispute pure and simple between two
private parties. What the Legislature has done is to single
out these two individuals and deny them the right which
every Indian citizen possesses to have his rights adju-
dicated upon by a judicial tribunal in accordance with
1143
the law which applies to his case. The meanest of citizens
has a right of access to a court of law for the redress of
his just grievances and it is of this right that the
appellants have been deprived by this Act. It is impossible
to conceive of a worse form of discrimination than the one
which differentiates a particular individual from all his
fellow subjects and visits him with a disability which is
not imposed upon anybody else and against which even the
right of complaint is taken away. The learned Attorney-
General, who placed his case with his usual fairness and
ability, could not put forward any convincing or
satisfactory reason upon which this legislation could be
justified. It is true that the presumption is in favour of
the constitutionality of a legislative enactment and it has
to be presumed that a Legislature understands and correctly
appreciates the needs of its own people. But when on the
face of a statute there is no classification at all, and no
attempt has been made to select any individual or group with
reference to any differentiating attribute peculiar to that
individual or group and not possessed by others, this
presumption is of little or no assistance. to the State. We
may repeat with profit what was said by Mr. Justice Brewer
in Gulf Colorado etc. Co. v. Ellis(1) that “to carry the
presumption to the extent of holding that there must be some
undisclosed and unknown reason for subjecting certain”
individuals or corporations to hostile and discriminatory
legislation is to make the protection clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment a mere rope of sand”. In our opinion,
the present case comes directly within the principle
enunciated by this court in Ameerunnissa, Begum v. Mahboob
Begum(2 ).
The result is that we allow the appeal and set aside the
judgment of the High Court. A writ in the nature of
mandamus shall issue directing the respondents not to take
any steps in pursuance of The Sathi Lands (Restoration) Act
of 1950 or to interfere with the possession of the
appellants in respect to the lands
(1) 165 U-S. 150. (2) [1953] S.C.R- 404.
1144
comprised in the lease referred to in that Act. The
appellants will have their costs in both courts.
VIVIAN BOSE J.-I am in entire agreement with my Lord
the Chief Justice and with my learned brother Mukherjea.
GHULAM HASAN J.-I agree with my Lord the Chief Justice
and with my brother Mukherjea.
BHAGWATI J.-I entirely agree with the judgment just
delivered by my Lord the Chief Justice and my brother
Mukherjea and there is nothing which I can usefully add.
Appeal allowed.
Agent for the appellants: I. N. Shroff.
Agent for the respondents: G. H. Rajadhyaksha.
