1. Who, after stating the facts as above, continued. The respondent’s pleader objects in limine to the hearing of the appeal, on the ground that the original suit was one of the nature cognizable by a Court of Small Causes, and supported his objection by reference to Soorjo Coomar Surma Roy v. Kristo Coomar Chowdry (2 B.L R., 224; S.C., 14 W. R., P. B., 30).
2. It is in our opinion unnecessary to express any opinion on this point as the case is a very clear one on the merits.
3. We think that the contention of the appellant’s pleader, that Section 293 only applies to cases of resale under Section 309, cannot stand examination. We do not pretend to explain why the Legislature adopted the expression “resold” and “resale” in Section 293 and Sections 308 and 309, while the expression in Section 297 and Section 306 is “put up again and sold;” but it is quite clear that the second sale, whether held under Section 297, Section 306, or Section 308, is a resale, and that Section 293 applies to all of them. It is only necessary to notice the position of Section 293 amongst the general rules, and the 2nd schedule under the heading chap, xix, to understand that the provision for making a defaulting purchaser at a sale liable for deficiency on resale, now extends to all sales, whether of moveable or immoveable property, and also to re sales held under Sections 297, 306 or 308. It had been held under the old Code that this liability did not extend to purchasers defaulting to make the deposit under Section 353, Act VIII of 1859—Ajoodhya Persad v. Gopal Dutt Misser (17 W. R., 271)—and we have no doubt the law has been advisedly made wider in its scope.
4. Whether the case comes under Section 244, Act X of 1877, or not, is a point which is perhaps open to doubt. We leave it open for the present.
5. We dismiss the appeal with costs.