JUDGMENT
Dawson Miller, C.J.
1. These appeals arise cut of suits instituted by the landlord the proprietor of mouza Dhanaut against a number of his tenants claiming enhancement of rent under Section 30 of the Bengal Tenancy Act.
2. The learned Munsif after hearing the evidence arrived at the conclusion that the landlord was entitled to enhancement at the rate of 2 annas in the rupee.
3. The tenants appealed from this decision and the landlord filed a cross-appeal claiming that the rate of enhancement ought to be more than the 2 annas found by the Munsif. The learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the appeal of the tenants and allowed the appeal of the landlord. He found by calculation under Section 32 of the Bengal Tenancy Act that the rate at which the enhancement should be allowed worked out at 3 annas 8 pies in the rupee and that the Munsif had taken too lenient a view of the case in favour of the defendants by reducing it to 2 annas. He considered that the Court had no option; that it could not reduce the enhancement which was found by calculation under Section 32 to be the proper rate ofenhancement. He considered, therefore, that the plaintiff was entitled to the full enhancement worked out in accordance with that section but as he had only claimed 3 annas 6 pies he decreed enhancement at that rate.
4. From this decision the tenants have appealed. It would appear that they called evidence to shew that they had been in occupation of their holdings for a period of 20 years before the suit paying rent at the same rate. They further contended that they were not liable to enhancement at all as they were tenants at fixed rates. In support of this contention they prayed in aid the provisions of Section 50 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. The learned Subordinate Judge, however, considered that that section in the circumstances of the case had no application, because the Record-of-Rights had been finally published and recorded within the meaning of Section 115 of the Bengal Tenancy Act and that the presumption arising under Section 50 no longer existed after final publication of the Record-of-Rights, It has been argued on behalf of the appellants before us that Section 115 of the Bengal Tenancy Act applies only in bar of the tenants’ right to rely upon the presumption under Section 50 in so far as they rely upon occupancy for 20 years after the publication of the Record-of-Rights and that if they can show that they have been in occupation paying the same rent for 20 years before the publication of the Record-of-Rights then Section 115 has no operation. According to what I should consider to be the ordinary and natural interpretation of Section 115 the presumption under Section 50 ceases to apply in all cases except in so far as the Act may otherwise determine once the particulars mentioned in Section 102, Clause (b) have been recorded under Chapter X. In support of their contention the appellants rely upon a case decided in the year 1908 in the Calcutta High Court by Mr. Justice Doss, Maharaja Radha Kishore Manikya Bahadur v. Umed Ali. 12 C.W.N. 904 In that case the landlord brought a suit for enhancement of rent. It was held that notwithstanding the provisions of Section 115 of the Act the tenant was entitled upon proof of uniform payment of rent for 20 years before the Record of-Rights was framed to the benefit of the presumption arising under Sub-section (2) of Clause 50. The learned Judge considered that the word “thereafter” in Section 115 referred to a period subsequent to the publication of the Record-of-Rights. There can be no doubt, in my mind, that the word “thereafter” does refer to a period subsequent to the publication of the Record of-Rights, but what is provided is that the presumption under Section 50 shall not thereafter, that is to say after the particulars mentioned in Section 102 have been recorded, apply. This decision so far as I am aware has not received any support in other cases. It was referred to in a latter case of the Calcutta High Court in Pirthichand Lal Chowdhry v. Basarat Lal 8 Ind. Cas. 449 : 37 C. 30 : 18 C.W.N. 1149 : 10 C.L.J. 343 and on that occasion a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court expressed the view that the wording of Section 115 was plain enough and might without anything else lead to the conclusion that as soon as a final record is framed under Section 103-A Clause (2) the particulars mentioned in Section 102 Clause (b) should be taken to have been recorded and the presumption under Section 50 should cease to apply thereafter to that tenancy. The question, however, in that case was whether the presumption arising under Section 50 was still available to the tenant in proceedings under Section 105 although the Record-of-Rights had been finally published. Their Lordships considered the history of the matter and pointed out that from 1885 up to the year 1898 the tenant always had the benefit of the presumption under Section 50 in all proceedings under Sections 105 and 106 and they did not think that Section 115 was intended to take away that benefit. They regarded proceedings under Section 105 as proceedings which would have to be recorded eventually and when a decision was given under that section the Record-of-Rights might be amended and was always liable to amendment until proceedings under that section had come to an end. That case, however, is no authority in support of the plaintiff’s contention in the present case. Indeed in so far as this Court is concerned the matter has been considered on more than one occasion. At least four cases have been drawn to our attention which are to the same effect. 1 need only refer to two of them. In Maharaja Bahadur Kesho Prasad Singh v. Ramjas Pande 79 Ind. Cas. 199 : 2 Pat. 92 : (1923) A.I.R. (Pat.) 324 it was decided by a Division Bench of this Court that after the the publication of the Record-of-Rights the tenants are not in view of Section 115 of the Bengal Tenancy Act entitled to the benefit of the presumption which arises under Section 50, Clause (2) and, therefore, in order to establish that they are entitled to their holdings on payment of a fixed rent in perpetuity they must prove by evidence that they have held the land at a rate of rent which has not been changed since the time of the Permanent Settlement. Incidentally they found that production of rent receipts shewing payment at a uniform rate for 33 years was not sufficient to prove that the rate of rent had not changed since the date of the Permanent Settlement. Again in the case of Gobind Lal Sijuar v. Ram Sahu 68 Ind. Cas. 433 : 2 P.L.T. 642 it was decided that under Section 115 of the Act a tenant cannot rely upon the presumption under Section 50, Clause (2) after the final publication of the Record-of-Rights except in a suit instituted under Section 106 challenging the entry itself within three months from the date of final publication. These cases and others which it is unnecessary to refer to seem to shew that there has been a uniform course of decisions in this Court which lay down the view that once the Record-of-Rights has been finally recorded as provided in Section 115 then the presumption under Section 50 is no longer open to the tenants whether they are relying upon a payment of rent at a uniform rate either before or after the publication of the Record-of-Rights. In my opinion this point must be decided against the appellants.
5. The only other question which was raised was that the learned Judge in arriving at the rate of enhancement had not stated any particulars or figures shewing how he arrived at it. What he does say is that by calculation under Section 32 of the Act the rate at which the enhancement should be allowed is found to be 3 annas 8 pies. It is contended that this is not sufficient and that not having given his figures or his methods of calculation the appellants are not in a position to criticise the manner in which he arrived at his figure of 3 annas 8 pies. The appellants, however, had at their disposal full information as to the rates which were taken into consideration in arriving at that figure and if they were prepared to shew that the result of the learned Judge’s calculation was wrong in any particular we certainly should have heard their argument about it. The learned Vakil for the appellants, however, is unable to shew us in what particular he could satisfy the Court, if we remanded this case, that the learned Judge had arrived at a wrong result. In the circumstances it seems to me that we should not be justified in sending back this case for further hearing merely because the learned Judge has not set out in detail the figures by which he arrived at his result. In second appeal we will never send back a case for further consideration merely because it is suggested that if the matter went back some different result might possibly be arrived at. It has not been pointed out to us at all in what particulars these figures are wrong. In my opinion these appeals must be dismissed with costs.
Foster, J.
6. I agree.